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A violent and complex phenomenon referred to by many observers as Islamic 
radicalisation has affected certain individuals linked to Muslim societies. Research 
studying Islamic radicalisation has been trying, through different frameworks, to 
construct a standard profile of a typical Islamic radical, but without success. This thesis 
argues that the violent Islamic radical is an abstract, political person comprising of the 
Arendtian ideological mindset and, hence, may be identified as an Islamic ideologue. 
The study develops and applies a novel theoretical framework to conceptualise the 
mindset of the central character of Islamic radicalisation. In Part One, I glean five 
essential elements of an ideological mindset from Hannah Arendt as my theoretical 
framework, namely: the superhuman source as origin of thought; the claim to global 
domination; violence and the call for action; the objective enemy; and rejection of 
factual reality. I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart who developed the method 
“characterology” from Arendt to conceptualise a character from the discursive 
practices of six online magazines (4 English and 2 Urdu) published by Al-Qaida (AQ), 
Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT).  In Part Two, I apply the Arendtian 
framework to this unique set of empirical material. I conduct a thematic analysis 
technique to detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts from the magazines that 
resonate with the Arendtian theoretical articulations of the five elements of an 
ideological mindset. The research affirms that all five Arendtian elements are part of 
the character’s mindset that has been discursively constructed by these three Islamist 
organisations. The study also summarises the ideas/themes detected through the 
Arendtian framework and used by the organisations to create a conceptual tool entitled 
‘The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals’ (MILIR). MILIR can act as the standard 
profile of the abstract person known as Islamic radical. It can also inform de-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis Introduction 
This thesis develops a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of Islamic1 
radicalisation and its central character, namely the Islamic ideologue that is 
radicalised for violence and linked to Muslims in the contemporary radicalisation (and 
terrorism) studies. The thesis conceptualises Islamic radicalisation as a “process” of 
acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset namely, the 
superhuman source as the origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence 
and the call for action; the objective enemy and rejection of factual reality. This study 
argues that the central character of the phenomenon is an abstract political person with 
an ideological mindset which is radicalised by ideology and may, therefore, be 
categorised as an ideologue. I glean five essential elements of the ideological mindset 
from Arendt’s writings, especially “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958). The thesis 
applies Arendt’s criteria of ideology to categorise the mindset2 of the character 
constructed by three Islamist organisations; Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and 
Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT), in their discursive practices, i.e. textual expressions in online 
magazines. It uses “characterology” as a method developed by Hans-Joerg Sigwart 
from Arendt. The Islamic ideologue of this research is an abstract character 
constructed by three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices in online 
magazines.   
The study problematises and argues that together the five Arendtian elements of 
ideological mindset weave a toxic intellectual fabric in the mind of a radicalised 
character, which informs their (mostly violent) behaviour and actions. Why is it 
important to reconceptualise the notion of Islamic radicalisation; also, detect and 
 
1 The suffix “Islamic” is used to clearly recognise the identity assigned to the 
contemporary violent radicalisation.   




categorise the mindset of the discursively constructed character by the Islamist 
organisations and the purpose it will serve?  
To address this question, I follow a sequence in this chapter that firstly, lays down the 
contribution of this research to the pre-existing debates on Islamic radicalisation. 
Secondly, I identify gaps in existing studies and their implications. Thirdly, I situate 
the research and form the research question to address the gap. Fourthly, I conduct a 
literature review of the five areas or the frameworks that concern the ‘research 
question’ specifically, the conceptualisations of the phenomenon of radicalisation; to 
‘what’ does the “process” (of radicalisation) lead to?; de-radicalisation; the existing 
tools/scales for measuring radicalisation, and theories of radicalisation. Finally, I lay 
out the structure of the thesis. 
This thesis contributes to the research studying Islamic radicalisation in two ways. 
Firstly, it adds a novel theoretical framework, namely, the five Arendtian elements of 
an ideological mindset to categorise a character as an Islamic ideologue. This 
theoretical framework has a wider application and can categorise the mindset of a 
character in other situations as well, e.g. far-right ideologues. The five Arendtian 
elements of ideological mindset are sufficiently abstract to apply to a variety of 
characters to assess whether the character’s mindset is ideological or otherwise. 
Secondly, it constructs the standard profile of the Islamic radical as an abstract person 
comprising the Arendtian ideological mindset.  In the conclusion of the Thesis, I 
summarise all the ideas detected through the Arendtian framework in a chart entitled 
by me as the “Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic radicals” (MILIR). I think it is an 
interesting way to summarise and present my findings. Through MILIR, I present 38 
ideas from the three Islamist organisations, which they use to construct the mindset of 
the central character in their textual constructs. MILIR can inform de-radicalisation 
policy as well. I also record, in the chart, the level of emphasis with which an 
organisation engages with an idea/theme.   
I, detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts from five online magazines namely, Dabiq, 
Inspire, Azan, Rumiyah (all English), Shariat and Hitteen (Urdu) published by the three 
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Islamist organisations. The analysis also notes the distinctions and similarities of the 
textual constructions across the organisations.   
The research studying Islamic radicalisation theorises the phenomenon as a “process”, 
without clearly enumerating the essential elements of the product the “process” 
produces or leads to. Categorising the “product” like violence, Islamist, extremist or 
terrorist, as identified by Islamic radicalisation literature, is too vague and does not 
help in identifying stable criteria to theorise essential elements of a typical profile of a 
radical character.  Due to this gap in the literature, the debate on Islamic radicalisation 
mostly conceptualises the phenomenon as religious violence. This thesis argues that 
the “process” of radicalisation results in a web of ideas in the mind of the radicalised 
character, and these ideas are ideological in nature. These ideas inspire the character 
to commit ideological violence. Ideological violence is unique in its role and functions 
it performs in an ideology (See Chapter 5 ‘Violence and the Call for Action’). 
These ideas are not novel in their essence as the mindset of past ideologues, namely the 
Communist and Nazi ideologues, according to Arendt, exhibited all the elements of an 
ideological mindset. The character is pulled or pushed through the “process” of 
radicalisation by a set of contextual reasoning, which the Islamist organisations 
construct as they lay out their arguments.  
A second contribution of this thesis is to cover a gap in the research also identified by 
a 2010 “Research and Development” (RAND) study. The study notes that “one of the 
most glaring gaps in the literature is the failure to examine the similarities and 
differences between Islamist militants and other types of extremists and then to 
determine the implications of these findings for the processes of disengagement and 
de-radicalisation” (Rabasa et al., 2010: 26). This research detects and summarises the 
distinguishing ideas/themes that represent an ideal type of an Islamic ideologue 
(militant), which distinguishes Islamic radical from other types of radicals.    
The prevailing conceptual vagueness, identified by the above mentioned two gaps, has 
its effects on the research studying Islamic radicalisation. Firstly, the previous research 
failed to construct a standard profile of an Islamic radical as a person. The conclusions 
of two major UK Government-sponsored studies are worth quoting to highlight the 
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conundrum. The House of Commons report (2006) presented after the 7 July 2005 
London bombings concludes.  
What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not 
a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second-generation 
British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose 
parents were of Jamaican origin; Kamel Bourgass, convicted of the 
Ricin plot, was an Algerian failed asylum seeker; Richard Reid, the 
failed shoe bomber, had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others 
of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-educated, 
some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well 
integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with 
children. Some previously law-abiding, others with a history of petty 
crime. In a few cases, there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early 
life, but in others, their upbringing has been stable and loving (Home 
Office, 2006: 31).  
A few years later, a second study conducted by MI5’s3 “Behavioural Science Unit” 
concurred with the findings of the House of Commons report mentioned above. The 
study analysed several hundred individual case studies of Muslim individuals and their 
associates linked to violence and concluded that “it was not possible to draw up a 
profile of a typical ‘British Terrorist’” (Travis, 2008). The findings of academic 
research (Bux, 2007; Horgan, 2003; Merari, 1990; Bakker, 2006; Kelly et al., 1992) 
were no different from the government-sponsored studies mentioned above. For 
example, Edwin Bakker analysed personnel, social and situational characteristics of 
200 radicals, who had been involved in 31 incidents of terrorism in Europe and 
concluded that “there is no standard Jihad terrorist” (2006: 53). 
 
3 The document is classified and for internal use only, however, The Guardian 
newspaper reported the key findings in August 2008: Travis, A. (2008). MI5 Report 
Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain. London: Guardian.   
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This study asserts that the conceptual confusion that exists in the conceptualisation of 
the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation is also linked to the methodological 
approaches. The phenomenon is too complex for the methods adopted to study it. Most 
of the studies that tried to find a standard profile of an Islamic radical adopted 
interview-based methods without anchoring the search in a substantial theory (as 
explained in the next section). The interview-based methods of gathering the standard 
characteristics of a radicalised person proved inadequate, as a randomly selected 
sample of radicalised persons may not exhibit all the elements of a mindset that the 
Islamist organisations present and aspire to. Such efforts may locate partial elements 
of the radicalised mindset but embedded in the subjective contexts of the interviewees.   
Further, locating a radicalised human in Muslim communities without the conceptual 
understanding of the radical person is erroneous. We need to know what comprises this 
radicalised person. I argue that the Islamic radical is an abstract construction, which 
can translate into a politically active person. The analysis of the discursive construction 
of an ideal type character with a radicalised mindset by Islamist organisations in their 
magazines is a good starting point. A discursively constructed character, detected 
through the lens of a substantial theory such as Arendt’s, is likely to exhibit all the 
elements of a mindset that is idealised equally by radicalised minds and potential 
recruits. The clear identification of the elements of the ideological mindset is also 
necessary to inform UK De-radicalization Policy because “[i]f the very concept of 
radicalisation itself is problematic, the same must – by extension – also be true for ‘de-
radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ – terms that are ‘poorly defined and mean 
different things to different people” (International Crises group, 2007: I).  
The existing category of the radicalised character is not only unclear (as explained 
above) but problematic as well. The existing research on Islamic radicalisation links 
the radicalised person to Muslim communities through the category of Islamist, 
extremist or terrorist. All these categories are rejected by Muslim communities, whose 
cooperation is crucial in tackling the radicals.  The thesis proposes that the category of 
Islamic ideologue is suitable for the identification of the radicalised character. It is 
likely to bring into focus the particular understandings of the religion that are politically 
6 
 
exploitable. By suggesting a separate analytical category of ideology, this research 
affords an opportunity to the common religious people to distance themselves from the 
violent Islamic ideologue. Some other writers such as Jeffrey M. Bale have also linked 
the present wave of Islamic radicalisation to the ideological understanding of religion. 
Such studies, however, neither move beyond an assertion of their claim nor engage 
with the Arendtian conception of ideology. Bale argues,  
[d]espite their seemingly absolute rejection of Western values and their 
claims to be purely Islamic in inspiration, several Islamist leaders and 
thinkers were strongly influenced by and indeed borrowed considerably 
from modern Western political ideologies and movements such as 
nationalism, communism and fascism, in particular, their techniques of 
organisation (the establishment of front groups and parallel hierarchies), 
propaganda, ideological indoctrination and mass mobilisation. Sayyid 
Abu al-A‘la Maududi went so far as to openly claim that Islam – read 
Islamism – was a ‘revolutionary party’ comparable to communism and 
fascism, Hasan al-Banna was clearly influenced by fascist ideas and 
organisational techniques, and even the ostensible anti-Western puritan 
Sayyid Qutb devoted considerable space to emphasising the vitally 
important role of the Islamist ‘vanguard’ (tali‘a) in organising, 
mobilising and properly ‘educating’ Muslims (Bale, 2009: 85). 
Bale’s abovementioned assertion does not identify those specific ideas that comprise 
the particular or ideological understanding of Islam. Such a general distinction has also 
been noted by “The Washington Institute for Near East Policy”. It notes: “The extremist 
ideology at issue is a distortion of Islam, and in fact, many who have been radicalised 
remain surprisingly ignorant about the religion, particularly as the radicalisation 
process has accelerated in recent years” (Carpenter, 2009: 303). Mark Juergensmeyer, 
in his work entitled “Religion as a Cause of Terrorism” rightly concludes.  
The grievances – the sense of alienation, marginalisation, and social 
frustration – are often articulated in religious terms and seen through 
religious images, and the protest against them is organised by religious 
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leaders through the medium of religious institutions. Thus, religion is 
not the initial problem, but the fact that religion is the medium through 
which these issues are expressed is problematic. [...] Religion brings 
more to conflict than a repository of symbols and the aura of divine 
support, it problematizes a conflict through its abiding absolutism, its 
justification for violence, and its ultimate images of warfare that 
demonize opponents and cast the conflict in trans historic terms’ 
(Juergensmeyer, 2006:141-143).  
The above quoted texts point to the fact that certain scholars did try to conceptualise 
conflict and violence as a conflated yet a separate analytical category from the religion 
Islam. However, such efforts did not move beyond their initial assessment of the nature 
of Islamist violence, and did not develop the ideological violence as a separate category 
of analysis. The Islamist organisations extensively quote from Islamic sources to 
support their ideological claims and to identify the constructed character with Islam. 
My research, however, terms their understanding the ideological understanding of the 
Islamic sources. The research accepts the right of scholars, who view ideology as not a 
pejorative term, to have reservations for such a categorisation. Nevertheless, the 
research asserts that a normative phenomenon such as Islamic radicalisation needs a 
normative criterion such as the Arendtian criteria of ideology to conceptualise it. The 
normative nature of Arendtian articulations on ideology alerts the reader to the inherent 
dangers of violence in an ideological mindset. It is, however, surprising that despite 
Arendt’s detailed work on ideology and ideological thinking, and especially her efforts 
to theorise the thinking of known ideologues i.e. the Communist and Nazi ideologues; 
her work is missing from the theories that link ideology with Islamic radicalisation.  
While this thesis acknowledges the contributions of theories of radicalisation, these 
theories (for a detailed discussion see the ‘Literature Review’ below) fall short of 
answering the question raised by the government studies mentioned above: that is, what 
is considered to be a standard profile of an Islamic radical? To my knowledge, being 
the first of its type, this research shall present a substantial theory-guided map of ideas 
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that can constitute a standard profile of an ideal type of an Islamic radical, whom I call 
the Islamic ideologue.   
Theories of radicalisation are relevant to explain the factors that pull or push4 a 
character towards the “process” of radicalisation but do not answer the question ‘what’ 
elements the radicalised character’s mindset exhibit after the “process” is complete. 
The thesis assumes that the mindset of the discursively constructed character is the 
cumulative product of the (radicalisation) “process” and an understanding that it is this 
typical mindset that the government-sponsored studies mentioned above are seeking. 
The thesis, therefore, formulates the question for the inquiry as: whether the character 
constructed by the three Islamist organisations in the textual literature in their online 
magazines carries all the elements of Arendtian ideological mindset? if it does, what is 
the nature and extent of these ideas?  
The thesis divides the research into two parts. In part one, I lay out the theoretical 
foundations of the research. I discuss Arendt’s notions of totalitarianism, ideology and 
“thinking” to glean five essential elements of the ideological mindset.  I explain the 
reasons why I selected Arendt to understand the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation 
conceptually. I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart in developing an Arendtian method of 
inquiry, namely “characterology” to anchor the method theoretically. I employ a 
thematic analysis technique to identify the themes that characterise the mindset of the 
character.  In part two, the study conducts a theory-guided thematic analysis of the 
literature produced by the three Islamist organisations mentioned above. I assume that 
their discursive practices construct an ideal type character whose mindset carries all 
the radicalising ideas the Islamist organisations exemplify and propagate in their 
recruitment strategies. I allocate five chapters to analyse five elements of the 
ideological mindset. The aim is to detect the ideas associated with the subthemes 
clustered around the chapter theme. I argue that viewed with an Arendtian theoretical 
lens, the discursively constructed character is the radical person who carries all the 
 
4 The contributions of pull and push factors towards a “character’s” involvement in the 




Arendtian elements of the ideological mindset. However, before I lay out a detailed 
outline of the chapters, I conduct a literature review of how experts have pursued to 
understand the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation.  
1.2 Literature Review – (Re)conceptualisation of the Phenomenon of Islamic 
Radicalisation 
Due to the very nature of the phenomenon, governments are one of the major 
stakeholders in its understanding. Therefore, apart from academic research, a 
significant part of the Islamic radicalisation literature is contributed by government-
sponsored studies. Basically, I note five frameworks used to conceptualise Islamic 
radicalisation.  The first framework conceptualises radicalisation as a “process”. This 
framework has a consensus. The second framework, which is least researched, engages 
with the questions such as: to ‘what’ the radicalisation process leads to? The third views 
the phenomenon through the de-radicalisation framework. The fourth tries to measure 
the phenomenon through radicalisation measuring scales and tools. The fifth 
framework consists of theories of radicalisation, which theorises reasons for 
radicalisation. As this thesis (re)conceptualises the complex phenomenon of Islamic 
radicalisation and its central character through a novel framework, namely the 
Arendtian criteria of ideology, and concerns with all the five areas, therefore, in the 
succeeding paragraphs I group the radicalisation literature under the corresponding five 
headings.    
1.2.1 Radicalisation as a “Process”. On its own, “Radicalisation” is a term which is 
“ill-defined, complex and controversial” (Coolsaet, 2011: 240). Tinka Veldhuis et al. 
note that “a universally accepted definition of the concept [of radicalisation] is still to 
be developed” (Veldhuis et al.,2009:6). Some authors conclude that “the only thing that 
radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a ‘process’. Beyond that, there 
is considerable variation, as to make existing research incomparable” (Nasser et al., 
2011, 13). Derek M. D. Silva in his work entitled “Radicalisation: the journey of a 
concept revisited” observes that “over the past decade, radicalisation has emerged as 
perhaps the most pervasive framework for understanding micro-level transitions 
towards violence” (Silva, 2018:1). Further, “what is perceived, for instance, as ‘radical’ 
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in one situation, can be considered as ‘normal’ in another situation” (De Koning, 2015: 
420). Islamic radicalisation is the term in vogue to link popularly terrorist violence to 
Muslim communities.5   
Radicalisation is associated with transformation from one condition to another. Some 
researchers argue that radicalisation is a gradual process with distinguishable features 
and that the process is neither sudden nor easy (Horgan, 2005; Sibler and Bhatt, 2007). 
Therefore, a person may not become radicalised suddenly although an event (such as a 
personal loss, an experience of discrimination) can act as a “catalyst”, and one can start 
perceiving reality differently. Some studies note that “it has often been assumed that 
radicalisation precedes recruitment, but there have also been cases where recruitment 
comes first and is followed by radicalisation” (Sageman, 2008: 72). Such statements 
indicate that the researchers studying radicalisation miss a stable criterion which can 
categorise a character as a radical. It is precisely due to a lack of theory-guided stable 
criteria that researchers such as Sageman do not realise that certain strands of radical 
thinking are already present in a society which may not be noted by an uncritical 
observer. This thesis argues that a radical character acquires the fundamental elements 
of the ideological mindset from the ideas prevalent in wider society. The terrorist (or 
ideological) organisations provide a platform to crystallise and synthesis the 
ideological mindset. It is, however, possible that the character (and the wider society) 
might be unaware of the ideological nature of the acquired ideas. 
The radical character has not always been understood in pejorative terms. Historically, 
the term “radical” had periods of positive as well as negative usages. During the 18 th 
century, the term meant a character who is more enlightened than others. During the 
19th century, however, the term “radical” became linked with some extreme positions; 
it meant “supporting an extreme section of a party for social and political reforms” 
(Awan et al., 2011: 3). The term “radical” was as respectable, if not more, as “liberal” 
in England in the second half of the 19th century (Williams 1983; reprinted in Awan et 
 
5 Other forms of radicalisations include ethno-nationalist anarchist, right-wing and left-
wing radicalisation, but this study is only focusing on the Islamic radicalisation. This 




al., 2011: 131). Daniel Pisoiu states “it appears that for a significant period of time, 
radicalism was very much part of ‘regular’ political life (…) more often than not, 
radical movements militated for democracy and democratic principles rather than 
against them. Radical ideas referred, among others, to the progress and liberation of 
humankind, based on the principles of human rights and democracy” (Pisoiu 2011: 13-
24). The usage of the term changed substantively within 100 years: in the time of a 
century; from a term reserved primarily for progressive, anti-religious, liberal and pro-
democratic to “Islamic radical” thereby pointing to the opposite direction, e.g. An 
Islamic radical is considered to be someone who is anti-democratic, anti-liberal, 
fundamentalist, and with a regressive agenda.   
Likewise, the phenomenon of radicalisation is also contextual in nature. 
“Radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, sociological 
and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones” (European 
Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008: 7). Mark Sedgwick 
quotes Peter Neumann, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation (ICSR) in London, for an interesting explanation as to how the notion 
of radicalisation was introduced to the current debate on Islamic radicalisation. 
Neumann states:    
Following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (…) 
it suddenly became very difficult to talk about ‘the roots of terrorism’ 
which some commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify 
the killing of innocent civilians (…) It was through the notion of 
radicalisation that a discussion (…) became possible again. (Neumann 
quoted by Sedgwick, 2010: 480). 
The expert group working under Peter Neumann devised their own conceptualisation 
of the term. It defines radicalisation as “socialisation to extremism which manifests 
itself in terrorism” (Coolsaet, 2011:  269). It is an example of further complicating an 
already complicated term by using the terms extremism and terrorism. The definition 
replaces the term “process” with the term “socialisation”. The academics, however, 
agree that “radicalisation” is a process (Porta et al., 2012:4). The following definitional 
12 
 
chart is an example to demonstrate that although academics struggle with the 
conceptualisation of the term “radicalisation”, yet they agree that it is a “process”.   
• Taarnby (2005): “the progressive personal development from law-
abiding Muslim to Militant Islamist”.  
• Jensen (2006): “a process during which people gradually adopt views 
and ideas which might lead to the legitimisation of political violence”. 
• Ongering (2007): “process of personal development whereby an 
individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas 
and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals 
justifies extreme methods”.  
• Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie (2008): “a process of de-
legitimation, which decreases the confidence in the system and the 
individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because 
he or she no longer feels part of society”. 
• Ashour (2009): “ a process of relative change in which a group 
undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to 
the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation 
of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and 
possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of 
violence, to achieve political goals”. 
• Olesen (2009): “the process through which individuals and 
organisations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to 
achieve political goals”. 
• Githens-Mazer (2009): “a collectively defined, individually felt moral 




• Horgan & Bradock (2010): “the social and psychological process of 
incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or 
religious ideology”. 
• Kortweg, et al. (2010): “the quest to drastically alter society, possibly 
through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to the 
democratic structures and institutions”. 
• Mandel (2012): “an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the 
thinking, sentiments, and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of 
individuals”. 
Awan, et al. (2011): “a phenomenon that has emerged in the early 
twenty-first century because the new media ecology enables patterns of 
connectivity that can be harnessed by individuals and groups for 
practices of persuasion, organisation and the enactment of violence. The 
very possibility of this happening but uncertainty about how it happens 
created a conceptual vacuum which ‘radicalisation’ filled”. 
• Sinai (2012): “Radicalisation is the process by which individuals – on 
their own or as part of a group – begin to be exposed to, and then accept 
extremist ideologies”. 
• Baehr (2013): “The concept radicalisation defines an individual 
process, which, influenced by external actors, causes a socialisation 
during which an internalisation and adoption of ideas and views take 
place which is supported and advanced in every form. [Armed] with 
these ideas and views, the persons [affected] strive to bring about a 
radical change of the social order. If the ideas and views represent an 
extremist ideology, they even seek to achieve their goals by means of 
terrorist violence. [What is] decisive is, that radicalisation presuppose a 
process of socialization, during which individuals adopt, over a shorter 
or longer period of time, political ideas and views which in their 
extremist form can lead to the legitimization of political violence”. 
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(Adopted from International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—the Hague, 
2013:17,18) 
Most of the definitions mentioned above acknowledge that radicalisation is a 
“process”, which leads to violence. It is a phenomenon that is linked to political ideas 
in the mind of a person. The term is still evolving in its conceptualisation. Even some 
of the studies specifically commissioned to clarify the conceptualisation of the term 
came up with yet more complex definitions. For example, Alex P. Schmid’s detailed 
study defines a “radical” person the one who is  
[a]dvocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the 
status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally 
different alternative appears to be available to the radical. The means 
advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for 
government and society can be non-violent and democratic (through 
persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through 
coercion and revolution) (Schmid, 2011: 679-80). 
Schmid’s conceptualisation mentioned above presents the radical character as a 
political person who is involved in a struggle to change the status quo. It constructs the 
character as a political activist. This conception is not very helpful to understand the 
central and complex character of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation because 
Schmid borrows from scholars who conceptualise radicalisation as violent and non-
violent (Midlarsky, 2011: 7; Schmid, 2011: 630). Such scholars categorise a violent 
character as an “extremist” and a nonviolent character as a “radical”. Radicalism, to 
them, is more redeemable than extremism. In contrast, this study argues that in the 
context of Islamic radicalisation, violence is an essential element of the mindset of a 
radicalised character. Therefore, an apparently non-violent ideologue is biding his/her 
time and using other means (which appear non-violent) only as a strategy. At its core, 
ideological violence is parallel to any ideological aim(s).  Ideological violence is still 
supposed to continue, albeit in a different form, even after attaining the stated aim(s) 
(see Chapter 7, ‘Violence and the Call for Action’). 
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A character conceived under the rubric of violent radicalisation, i.e. “extremism”, is 
the character this study is investigating to conceptualise the elements of their thinking. 
The thesis hypothesises that the discursively constructed central character is an 
ideologue as the character exhibits all the five essential elements of the ideological 
mindset. Therefore, an ideologue, for this study, is a constructed character variously 
called Islamist, terrorist, extremist or radical in the wider discourse of Islamic 
radicalisation.  
Another important study employs the term “master narratives” to understand the role 
of certain Islamic narratives and stories.6 Jeffry R. Halverson et al. explain some of the 
themes and metaphors widely used in the Islamic discursive practices in their book 
entitled “Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism” (2011). In a similar language 
Mahood et al. have examined the ISIS propaganda literature. The article examines “the 
core narratives that characterise ISIS propaganda disseminated through its media 
productions” (Mahood, 2017:15).  Halverson’s work follows the same format as this 
thesis and allocates one chapter for a narrative. Accordingly, the book dedicates one 
chapter to each narrative, and these are: the Pharaoh; the Jahiliyyah; the battle of Badar; 
 
6 Several other studies have also analysed Islamist propaganda literature to understand 
the thinking and behaviour of terrorists like Jorda, J., Torres, M.R., and Horsburgh, N., 
2005. The intelligence services’ struggle against Al-Qaeda propaganda. International 
journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, 18 (1), 31–49; Torres Soriano, M.R., 
2010. The road to media Jihad: the propaganda actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb. Terrorism and political violence, 23 (1), 72–88; Smith, M. and Walsh, J.I., 
2013. Do drone strikes degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence from propaganda output. 
Terrorism and political violence, 25 (2), 311–327; Baines, P.R. and O’Shaughnessy, 
N.J., 2014. Al-Qaeda messaging evolution and positioning, 1998–2008: propaganda 
analysis revisited. Public See See also Public relations inquiry, 3 (2), 163–191; Baines, 
P.R. and O’Shaughnessy, N.J., 2014. Al-Qaeda messaging evolution and positioning, 
1998–2008: propaganda analysis revisited. Public relations inquiry, 3 (2), 163–191. 
“These studies analyse Islamist organisations’ political and propaganda literature to 
understand the construction of militant worldview. The studies conclude that the 
militant worldview is centred on death with a suggestion for a struggle to attain pious 
life that shall be rewarded in the hereafter.” What’s the reference for this quote? This 
is only one aspect of the constructed mindset of the Islamic radical. The mindset is 
more complex than simply having a death wish for a pious life of the hereafter. It has 





The Hypocrites; the battle of Khyber; The battle of Karbala; the Mahdi; the infidel 
invader crusaders; Shaytan’s Handiwork; the year 1924 (when the Ottoman Caliphate 
was abolished); Nakba (the catastrophe for Palestinians), and seventy-two virgins. This 
thesis, in its analysis, engages with some of the above mentioned “master narratives” 
such as infidel and invaders, as the Islamist organisations routinely use these narratives 
in their discursive practices. The overall understanding of the master narratives is in 
line with this study.  
There are, however, two major differences between this thesis and Halverson’s book. 
First, I analyse textual literature produced by the three Islamist organisations only and 
do not supplement it with the wider Islamic perspective, while the book does. This 
thesis is an endeavour to present the character constructed by the Islamist organisations 
in their discursive practice. I aim to present a map of ideas which are present in the 
thinking of the constructed character without any normative judgement. The inclusion 
of wider Islamic literature in the analysis shall call for a comparative analysis of the 
interpretations.  Second, this study follows a theory-guided thematic analysis approach 
to isolate the ideas that resonate with the Arendtian articulations on ideology. 
Therefore, this thesis differs in epistemological positionality from Halverson et al. The 
analytical framework of this thesis, also, captures a much wider set of Islamic ideas 
and metaphors than Halverson. The book explains the meaning of Islamic terms and 
metaphors from a wider Islamic historical perspective, which may or may not be 
adopted by Islamist organisations. Nevertheless, both studies are complementary to 
each other and when read together help in enhancing our conceptual understanding of 
the complex phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation.  
Acknowledging the complexity attached with the term radicalisation, Sedgwick 
cautions researchers and advises that “the best solution for researchers is probably to 
abandon the idea that ‘radical’ or ‘radicalisation’ are absolute concepts, to recognise 
the essentially relative nature of the term ‘radical’. And to be careful always to specify 
both the continuum being referred to and the location of what is seen as ‘moderate’ on 
that continuum” (Sedgwick 2010: 491). This advice is accounted for in this study by 
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explicitly explaining the application of Arendtian theoretical framework and the five 
elements the ideological mind consists of.  
1.2.2  To ‘What’ the Islamic Radicalisation “Process” Leads  
If we agree, as the above mentioned broader consensus suggests, that radicalisation is 
a “process”, the conceptualisation of the term remains incomplete until we clearly 
understand to ‘what’ this process leads to? It is the question that concerns this research 
the most; it is the area that is not well researched. My research argues that the “process” 
leads to a political character that has a distinct mode of thinking, which I call 
ideological mindset.  
A limited number of researchers have studied the patterns of thinking of radicalised 
minds under different approaches (Pearlstein, 1991). What this study calls ideological 
mindset or radicalised minds in the context of Islamic radicalisation, others use 
alternative terms such as “militant-extremist mindset” (Saucier, 2009), “dogmatism” 
(Altemeyer, 1996) or “authoritative ideologue” (Rokeach, 1956). Another study that 
profiled suicide bombers in the Middle East argues that suicide bombers share 
personality traits with “authoritative personality” (Lester et al., 2003). Gerald Saucier 
headed a team of researchers to study the “Patterns of Thinking in Militant Extremism” 
(2009). The authors selected 13 militant groups from seven regions of the world and 
relied “as much as possible on explicit statements made by group members” (Saucier 
et al., 2009: 259). The study detected 16 themes that characterised extremist-militant 
thinking and concluded that “key themes in this thinking pattern might fit together to 
construct a potentially compelling narrative, which may be a key part of the ideological 
appeal of salient militant-extremist groups” (Saucier 2009:256). The study constructs 
a narrative informed by the 16 elements of the extremist mindset as follows:   
We have a glorious past, but modernity has been disastrous, bringing on 
a great catastrophe in which we are tragically obstructed from reaching 
our rightful place, obstructed by an illegitimate civil government and/or 
by an enemy so evil that it does not even deserve to be called human. 
This intolerable situation calls for vengeance. Extreme measures are 
required; indeed, any means will be justified for realizing our sacred 
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end. We must think in military terms to annihilate this evil and purify 
the world of it. It is a duty to kill the perpetrators of evil, and we cannot 
be blamed for carrying out this violence. Those who sacrifice 
themselves in our cause will attain glory, and supernatural powers 
should come to our aid in this struggle. In the end, we will bring our 
people to a new world that is a paradise (Saucier et al., 2009:265).  
The above mentioned narrative is the type of narrative the Islamist organisations 
construct in their magazines. My analysis, in Part 2 of the thesis, detects the themes 
Islamists use to construct such a narrative. Saucier et al., however, constructed the 
narrative from the 16 themes their study detects in the extremist mindset. I detect 38 
themes in the texts of the magazines, which construct an ideological mindset. I 
summarise the detected themes/ideas as “The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals” 
(MILIR). The MILIR includes the 16 themes used in the construction of the study’s 
extremist mindset. The 16 themes detected by Saucier at el. are explained as follows.  
1. The necessity of unconventional and extreme measures. The theme 
here is that one cannot work through the system; instead, one must resort 
to tactics that might seem unconventional and extreme.  
2. Use of tactics that function to absolve one of responsibility for the 
bad consequences of the violence one is advocating or carrying out. Can 
be seen as a cognitive distortion.  
3. Prominent mixtures of military terminology into areas of discourse 
where it is otherwise rarely found.  
4. Perception that the ability of the group to reach its rightful position is 
being tragically obstructed.  
5. Glorifying the past, in reference to one’s group. If one's group is 
currently frustrated from reaching its potential (as in Theme 4), the 
present might provide too little evidence for the special importance of 
the group. The best claim for special importance might then be found in 
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a glorious past, and a theme that a "former golden age” of our people 
should be restored.   
6. Utopianizing. There is frequently reference to concepts of a future 
paradise or at least ‘the promise of a long and glorious future’.   
7. Catastrophizing. There is a perception that great calamities either 
have occurred, are occurring, or will occur.  
8. Anticipation of supernatural intervention: Miraculous powers 
attributed to one’s side, miraculous events coming to help one’s side, or 
commands coming from supernatural entities.  
9. A felt imperative to annihilate (exterminate, crush, destroy) evil 
and/or purify the world entirely from evil.  
10. The glorification of dying for the cause.  
11. Duty and obligation to kill, or to make offensive war.  
12. Machiavellianism in service of the "sacred." This theme involves 
the belief that those with the right (i.e., true) beliefs and values are 
entitled to use immoral ends if necessary, to assure the success of their 
cause.  
13. An elevation of intolerance, vengeance, and war likeness into virtues 
(or nearly so), including, in some cases, the ascribing of such militant 
dispositions to supernatural entities.  
14. Dehumanising or demonising of opponents.  
15. The modern world as a disaster.  
16. Civil government as illegitimate.  
(Saucier et al., 2009: 259) 
In many instances, however, Saucier et al. had to contend with secondary sources as 
they could not access primary material produced by some of the organisations due to 
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content restrictions placed on such material by the agencies as well as by the 
organisations themselves for different reasons. The study claims itself as exploratory 
research that aims at locating common themes in the thinking of 13 militant 
organisations spread across the world by employing the inductive method. This thesis, 
however, adopts a theory-guided thematic analysis approach to locate the themes and 
subthemes that characterise the mindset of a radicalised character and is focused only 
on the Islamic radicalisation. I analyse the Islamist organisations’ textual constructs 
directly from their magazines, i.e. primary sources. Further, Saucier at el. do not anchor 
their findings in a substantial theory as my study links the map of ideas to the Arendtian 
theorisations on ideology. Nevertheless, both the studies are complementary to each 
other in an area which is less researched, namely the mindset of a radicalised character.  
Saucier et al. are among the very few scholars that tried to conceptualise the mindset 
of a radical through the ideas/themes exhibited by such a mindset. Some studies, 
however, engage this important question but lack precision in identifying and 
presenting the map of ideas that is the distinct domain of the radicalised character; and 
which can satisfactorily answer the ‘what’ question. For example, the European 
Commission conceptualises Islamic radicalisation as “[t]he phenomenon of people 
embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (Veldhuis 
2009: 6). The report, however, is silent as to ‘what’ are those opinions, views and ideas 
that the phenomenon helped the people to embrace. Certain other studies that prefer to 
discuss radicalisation under the rubric of political extremism and note some elements, 
which can be categorised as the elements of an extremist mindset. Manus I. Midlarsky, 
for example, identifies certain elements of political extremism. He conceptualises 
extremism as   
the will to power by a social movement in the service of a political 
program typically at variance with that supported by existing state 
authorities, and for which individual liberties are to be curtailed in 
the name of collective goals, including the mass murder of those who 
would actually or potentially disagree with that program. 
Restrictions on individual freedom in the interests of the collectivity 
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and the willingness to kill massively are central to this definition: these 
elements characterize all of the extremist groups considered here. This 
definition is consistent with others put forward by scholars of fascism 
[bold mine-used to highlight central themes of the extremist thinking] 
(Midlarsky, 2011: 7). 
 Midlarsky’s conceptualisation overlaps with the Arendtian articulations of the 
ideological mindset, especially in the themes of the objective enemy, call for action and 
violence, and curtailment of freedom (See Chapter 2). Midlarsky’s approach, however, 
does not grasp the full extent of elements of the ideological mindset as theorised by 
Arendt. Schmid, working for “The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 
– The Hague” (2011), extracted five elements of an extremist mindset. Schmid prefers 
to use the term “extremist” for the radical character. Schmid extracted the five 
elements from three studies, namely, “Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and 
Concepts relating to Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism” (2011), “Origins of Political 
extremism” (2011) and “Extremismus. Theorien – Konzepte – Formen (2012). Schmid 
argues that the “process” (of radicalisation) leads to an extremist mindset that exhibits 
the following five elements.  
• Use of force/violence over persuasion.  
• Uniformity over diversity. 
• Collective goals over individual freedom.   
• Giving orders over dialogue. 
• Strong emphasis on ideology. 
Schmid separates the first four elements from ideology, whereas in the Arendtian 
theorisation, the first four elements are part of the ideological mindset. As such the 
ideological mindset (see Chapter 2) as argued by Arendt, includes all the themes 
mentioned in Schmid’s listing.  
As governments are one of the interest groups in the Islamic radicalisation debate, I 
analyse salient governmental conceptualisations of the phenomenon. As this thesis 
focuses on the elements of a radical mindset, to understand ‘what’ the radicalisation 
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“process” produces, I highlight some parts of the text which can be assumed as 
referring to an element.       
1. Danish: a process, by which a person to an increasing extent 
accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including 
terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological 
objective (Danish Intelligence Service [PET], 2009). 
2. Netherland: ‘The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-
reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the 
continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may 
involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm 
the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)’ (Dutch 
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, 2004). 
3. US: ‘The process of adopting an extremist belief system, including 
the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method 
to effect social change’ (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2007).  
4. Sweden: Radicalisation can be both: a process that leads to 
ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to 
society’ and a ‘process that leads to an individual or group using, 
promoting or advocating violence for political aims (Swedish 
Security Service, 2009).  
    (Adopted from ICCT Report 2013:12) 
Collectively, there are four elements of a radicalised mindset in these governmental 
conceptualisations. These are violence; support for far-reaching changes; an extremist 
belief system and ideological or religious activism. It should be kept in mind that these 
four elements are gleaned from separate conceptualisations of different governments 
and as such do not represent the understanding of any one government. All four of 
these conceptualisations emphasise the centrality of violence in the radicalised 
character’s mindset. Violence is indeed central to the Arendtian ideological mindset as 
well, but the Arendtian ideological mindset does not start and end with violence only 
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as the governmental conceptualisations suggest, but ideological violence has a 
particular context. This context can be understood once all the five Arendtian elements 
of an ideological mind are studied together.    
Another significant study conducted at Consortium for Strategic Communication, 
Arizona State University, focuses on the functions of ideology. The research 
(Tretheway et al., 2011) identifies four elements of an ideologically inspired mindset, 
namely naturalising, obscuring, universalising and structuring. The research articulates 
the following four influences of ideology on the mindset of a character.  
• Naturalising: [The ideological mindset turns] socially constructed, 
politically motivated, and fluid ideas into taken-for-granted 
assumptions, beliefs, and meanings. Doing so makes them seem fixed, 
objective, and ‘naturally occurring’.  
• Obscuring:  is denying or hiding contradictions in ongoing systems 
of meaning, making them seem to be seamless, coherent, and unified 
worldviews.  
• Universalising:  means presenting the interests or concerns of those 
in power as the interests of all group members.  
• Structuring: involves creating rules and resources in a social system 
that preserves an ideology. (Tretheway et al., 2011)   
The study, however, refrains from delving deeper into the phenomenon of Islamic 
radicalisation. It consults limited textual material that is produced by only one 
organisation, namely IS. While some of the identified elements resonate with the 
Arendtian elements of ideological mindset, the study omits certain elements and 
themes such as the nature of violence and enemy, which are the distinguishing features 
of an ideology inspired radicalisation. The five Arendtian elements of ideological 
mindset are more precise and engage much wider aspects of an ideology inspired 
character’s mindset. All the five Arendtian elements are integrated into each other and 
collectively weave the intellectual fabric in the mind of the character that perpetrates 
a particular type of violence within a particular context. The thesis, therefore, adopts 
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the following conceptualisation of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation, that I 
will explain in more detail in the following chapters.  
Radicalisation is the “process” of acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements 
of ideological mindset, i.e., the superhuman source as the origin of thinking; 
the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; objective 
enemy and rejection of factual reality.   
This conceptualisation fills in the gaps identified in the reviewed literature in this 
section, and is a contribution to the literature on Islamic radicalisation, as the literature 
misses the answer to the question, namely, ‘what’ the radicalised character consists 
of? A lack of clarity as to ‘what’ the radicalised character consists of has significant 
policy implications. For example, a study analysing PVE (Preventing Violent 
Extremism—a UK Government counter-radicalisation strategy) noted that,    
[T]he central theoretical flaw in PVE is that it accepts the premise that 
non-violent extremists can be made to act as bulwarks against violent 
extremists. Non-violent extremists have consequently become well dug 
in as partners of national and local government and the police. Some of 
the government’s chosen collaborators in ‘addressing grievances’ 
of angry young Muslims are themselves at the forefront of stoking 
those grievances against British foreign policy; western social 
values; and alleged state-sanctioned ‘Islamophobia’. PVE is thus 
underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, 
intolerant and anti-western world view. Political and theological 
extremists, acting with authority conferred by official recognition, and 
indoctrinating young people with an ideology of hostility to western 
values [bold mine] (Vidino et al., 2010).  
A reconceptualisation of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation shall help provide 
important ideas for the development of de-radicalisation policies. The 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation is not independent of the conceptualisation 
radicalisation. Therefore, in the next section, I engage with the literature that 
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conceptualises de-radicalisation. The UK De-radicalisation Policy may positively 
benefit from the outcome of this research.   
 
1.2.3 De-Radicalisation  
A confused conception of the radicalisation “process” is likely to affect the de-
radicalisation policies as well. In other words, successful de-radicalisation is linked to 
a clear understanding of ‘what’ the Islamic radicalisation consists of, e.g. a clear map 
of ideas that constitute the mindset of the radicalised character. Therefore, a debate of 
de-radicalisation shall inevitably involve an identification of the elements of the 
mindset which has radicalised the character. Therefore, studies discussing de-
radicalisation are generally conscious of this fact and try to identify the aspects of the 
radicalised mindset before conceptualising de-radicalisation. A RAND study follows 
this pattern.    
Islamist radicalisation involves adopting the belief that, to recreate an 
Islamic state, Muslims must not only adhere to a strict Salafist or 
ultraconservative interpretation of Islam but also wage Jihad, defined as 
armed struggle against the enemies of Islam, including non-Muslim 
nations (especially the United States) and the current rulers of Muslim 
states who have supplanted God’s authority with their own’. Islamist 
de-radicalisation is therefore defined as the process of rejecting this 
creed, especially its beliefs in the permissibility of using violence 
against civilians, the ex-communication of Muslims who do not adhere 
to the radicals’ views (takfir), and opposition to democracy and 
concepts of civil liberties as currently understood in democratic 
societies (Vidino, 2011: 9)  
Lorenzo Vidino’s conception does engage with some of the themes discussed under 
the Arendtian elements of ideological mindset (see Chapter 2). His conceptualisation 
of the elements of a radicalised mindset is, however, very sketchy and limited in its 
scope. The study, however, suitably defines de-radicalisation as the reversal of the 
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ideas acquired during the radicalisation process. John Horgan et al. acknowledge that 
“de-radicalisation includes any effort to change or re-direct views that are supportive 
of – and thereby, the assumption goes, conducive to – violent action” (Horgan et al., 
2012: 86). Omar Ashour, in his work, links the “process” of radicalisation with de-
radicalisation in the following manner.  
Radicalisation is a process of relative change in which a group 
undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations(…)De-
radicalisation is another process of relative change within Islamist 
movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-
legitimises the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while 
also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and 
economic changes within a pluralist context (Ashour, 2009: 56).  
The researchers, therefore, generally agree that de-radicalisation is a “process” of 
(again) engaging with the elements of the radicalised mindset (ideological mindset) and 
intending to reverse the process. Importantly, the clear map consisting of the elements 
of the radical mindset is central to both “processes”: “process” of radicalisation and 
“process” of de-radicalisation. This thesis, therefore, adopts the following 
conceptualisation to conceptualise the phenomenon of (de)radicalisation.  
Islamic radicalisation is a “process” of the acquisition of the Arendtian 
elements of ideological mindset. De-radicalisation is a “process” of distancing 
from the elements of the ideological mindset.   
In the understanding of Islamic radicalisation, the five elements of Arendtian 
ideological mindset are central to the approach of this thesis. The study argues that the 
five elements and the attendant sub-themes collectively present a stable criterion to 
categorise a mindset as radical or ideological mindset. A character with all the elements 
of the ideological mindset in his/her intellectual fabric is the political person that the 
“process” of Islamic radicalisation leads to. Some researchers, as discussed below, 
name the criteria that can categorise a radical person as radicalisation measuring tools 
or scales. In the following paragraphs, I shall review the literature that name the 





1.2.4 Scales Measuring Islamic radicalisation 
The scales that measure Islamic radicalisation list the elements of radical mindset. Two 
such widely used instruments, namely, Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale and 
the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
1.2.4.1 The Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale  
The scale is designed to measure religious fundamentalism. It measures attitudes 
towards one’s religious beliefs through 12 elements of a religiously-motivated 
fundamentalist thinking. The revised scale cuts down the elements to 12 from the 
original 22 elements. The scale is not exclusive to Islamic radicalisation but can 
capture elements of fundamentalism of any faith (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004). 
Both the scales, i.e. original and revised, are attached in Annexes A & B. 
The original scale tested the presence of fundamentalism in Roman Catholics in the 
USA as well as Muslims living in Canada and Ghana with promising results. Both 
scales rely on statistical tools for the assessment. There was, however, a 
methodological weakness in the revised scale as it was developed from a very narrow 
range of participants, comprising undergraduates of two USA Universities and their 
parents; hence, it did not represent the broader population. Additionally, the scales only 
measure religious fundamentalism, which means it cannot assess the ideological 
mindsets adequately. Although in many instances, the Islamic radicals identify 
themselves as religious persons, the ideological mindset moves beyond the religious 
fundamentalism. Particularly, my analysis reveals that the elements of compassion, 
forgiveness and individual accountability, which are propagated by religions, are 
completely missing from the ideological mindset. Additionally, such a mindset does 
not draw a line between politics and religion but thinks that politics is the 
operationalisation of the religion. Therefore, religious fundamentalism scales do not 
capture the ideas related to violence, which is the distinguishing feature of 
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contemporary Islamic radicalisation. Further improvement is required to apply the 
scales to read the mindset of the radicalised character.  
1.2.4.2 The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA)  
D. Elaine Pressman developed a specialised risk assessment tool, VERA, to measure 
the risk of “violent political extremism” (Pressman, 20019: 21-26). VERA captures the 
disposition of a radicalised mind concerning violence. It specifically focuses on the 
targets, group affiliations and origins of violent action. It estimates the ideological, 
political or religious origins of violence. In this sense, it describes the elements of a 
mindset that has been radicalised by the (radicalisation) “process”. Pressman, 
furthermore, claims that VERA can also assess a set of the population that is nearing 
the completion of the radicalisation “process”. He, however, advises that the scale is 
still in the process of development and should be considered as a “conceptual tool for 
research purposes” (Pressman, 2009: 21-26). A practitioner needs some level of 
training before applying VERA as it involves judgements. An understanding of the 
radicalisation process is a prerequisite as the tool does not give a score but acts as a 
“structured professional judgment tool” (Pressman, 2009: 25). 
The scale consists of 28 elements drawn from five risk factors. Each factor is assessed 
as high, medium or low risk, and the scale produces a “judgement score”. Pressman 
presents a detailed explanation of each risk factor along with its justification and a 
narrative for the twenty-eight risk factor themes (Pressman, 2009: 35-39 in Christmann, 
2012: 36). Pressman draws from previous professional judgement tools that assess the 
risk of violence in adults and adolescence such as SAVRY (Borum et al., 2006, 
Pressman, 2009: 31) and HCR-20 version 2 (Webster et al., 1997 in Pressman, 2009: 
31). Pressman’s 28 elements of the violent extremist risk assessment scale are as 
follows:   
Attitude items: 1. Attachment to ideology justifying violence; 2. 
Perception of injustice and grievances; 3. Identification of target of 
injustice; 4. Dehumanisation of identified target; 5. Internalised 
martyrdom to die for cause; 6. Rejection of society and 
values/alienation;    7. Hate, frustration, persecution; 8. Need for group 
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bonding and belonging; 9. Identity problems;10. Empathy for those 
outside own group.              
Contextual items: 1. User of extremist websites; 2. Community support 
for violent action; 3. Direct contact with violent extremists; 4. Anger at 
political decisions, actions of a country.            
Historical items: 1. Early exposure to violence in home; 2. 
Family/friends involvement in violent action; 3. Prior criminal violence; 
4. State-sponsored military, paramilitary training; 5. Travel for non-
state sponsored training/fighting; 6. Glorification of violent action.  
Protective items: 1. Shift in ideology; 2. Rejection of violence to obtain 
goals; 3. Change of vision of enemy; 4. Constructive political 
involvement; 5. Significant other/community support.               
Demographic items:  1. Sex; 2. Married; 3. Age.   
Fundamentally, Pressman’s 10 items described under the heading of attitude items are 
the elements of radicalised mindset; the rest of the 18 elements explain the personal 
circumstances of the radicalised character (4 for context, 6 for the previous history, 5 
for mitigating circumstances and 3 for gender, age and marriage [either mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances]). The Arendtian theorisation on ideology covers all the ten 
items of Pressman’s extremist mindset. Pressman acknowledges that his scale is a 
generalised scale with inputs from previous scales based on psychological constructs. 
As such it is not designed specifically for Islamic radicalisation; it further misses, 
therefore, misses some very pertinent elements of the mindset of the character of 
Islamic radicalisation, namely; the claimed source of thinking, the understanding of 
the nature of enemy, the nature of violence, the nature of the claim to global domination 
and the understanding of factual reality. The research investigating Islamic 
radicalisation needs a map of ideas that help in assessing the radicalised character’s 
mindset in political constructs. This thesis constructs such a conceptual scale, which is 
constructed from Islamist organisations’ political literature as the primary source.  
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Milton Rokeach constructs another conceptual scale to measure dogmatism. Rokeach 
defines dogmatism as a characterisation of one’s belief systems. He claims that the 
scale is independent of ideological bias towards left or right. The elements of the scale 
are supposed to capture a dogmatic or closed mindset. Rokeach identifies 5 elements 
of the dogmatic mindset. This mindset tends “to accentuate the differences between his 
beliefs and the belief systems that he rejects; to regard man as isolated and helpless and 
the future uncertain; to be concerned with power and status; to be, as a "true believer," 
intolerant of renegades and disbelievers; to discount the present for a utopian view of 
the past or future” (Rokeach, 1960: 203). The explanations of Arendtian elements of 
ideological mindset include Rokeach’s elements of a dogmatic mindset.    
The purpose of reviewing the literature on the scales that are used to measure a 
radicalised mindset is to familiarise the reader with the fact that other scholars have 
also engaged with the elements of radicalised mindsets. Their constructed scales 
capture the elements of the ideal types of a religious fundamentalist, extremist or 
dogmatic mindset of a character.  As I shall also present “the Map of Ideas linked to 
Islamic radicalisation” (MILIR) as a summary of my analysis of the textual literature 
produced by the Islamist organisations, it was necessary to situate this aspect of my 
research in the available literature. My MILIR shall be constructed on the lines of 
VERA. MILIR has the advantage of being informed by a substantial theoretical 
framework, which is missing in all the above mentioned instruments used to categorise 
a radicalised mindset. More specifically, MILIR incorporates most of the ideas/themes 
that are included in the above mentioned instruments. MILIR, therefore, is not novel in 
its form but novel in its theoretical foundations and the empirical material it is 
constructed from.  
As this thesis shall also add the Arendtian theoretical framework to theories of 
radicalisation. It is, therefore, pertinent to review the existing literature on theories of 
radicalisation. The literature reviewed under the topic of (re)conceptualisation of 
radicalisation flows from theories of radicalisation. Fundamentally, it is the theories of 
radicalisation that inform all debate on the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation.   
1.2.5 Theories of Radicalisation  
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Drawing on political, social and psychological research, scholars have tried to 
understand and theorise the Islamic radicalisation (Christmann, 2012; Abbas, 2007b; 
Fraihi, 2008; Coolset, 2009; Al-Lami, 2009; Mosaddeq, 2009; Pratchett et al., 2010, 
McCauley et al., 2011). Recent research tends to agree that Islamic radicalisation is a 
complex phenomenon and involves multiple factors (Pressman, 2012; Kundnani, 
2015). The researchers articulate the following ten theories to explain Islamic 
radicalisation. These include: biological theories (Bakker, 2006; Wadgy, 2007; Silk, 
2008); psychological theories (Ardila, 2002; Arena, et al., 2005); Muslim identity 
(Thomas, 2008); societal theories (Andrews, 2008); relative deprivation and poor 
Integration (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Home Office, 2004; New York City Police 
Department (NYPD), 2007; Jenkins, 2007); the role of segregation and enclavisation 
(Mahmood, 2004; The Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo), 2007; Vardy, 2008; 
Macey, 2008); political explanations (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2007; NYPD, 
2007; Sanghera et al., 2007; Gill, 2007, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2008); the role of social bonds and networks (Sageman, 2004, 2008; Hamid, 2007; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Bartlett et al., 2010; Bjørgo, 2005) and  the role of religion 
and ideology in the radicalisation process (Altmeyer et al., 2003, 2004; Bell, 2005a; 
Habeck, 2006; Ansari et al., 2006; Bukay, 2006;  Awan, 2007a; Sageman, 2005 in 
Wadgy, 2007). In the following paragraphs, I shall review each theory.  
1.2.5.1 Biological Theories 
Biological theories suggest that human biology plays a major part in the radicalisation 
of minds. Such theories argue that people involved in violence in the west are male, 
young, and generally aged between 16 to 27 years of age (Bakker, 2006; Wadgy, 2007). 
These findings have “strong parallels with much mainstream criminological research, 
which suggest that higher levels of impulsivity, confidence, risk-taking and status need 
play a partial role in the attraction that violent extremism holds for a few” (Christmann, 
2012: 23). Further, personal inclinations towards vengeful retaliation and approval of 
vengeance are also important (Silk, 2008).  
More research is needed to assess the role of females in Islamic radicalisation. 
Presently, their role appears to have confined to mainly supportive roles. Their role, 
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what the western media labels as “Jihadi Brides”, has also surfaced.  Lately, the 
research has noticed a qualitative intensity in their role in the Muslim linked violence 
(General Intelligence and Security Service of Holland [AIVD], 2006). Biological 
theories fail to explain that almost all the top leaders of Islamist organisations are well 
into their forties and fifties. Additionally, many Islamic radicals do not have any history 
of youth crimes. 
1.2.5.2 Psychological Theories  
The research in this field has mostly focused on the individual level explanations for 
terrorism but is silent on the nonviolent radicalisation. Psychological theories capture 
distinguishing psychological features of radicals that differentiate them from others.  
The main focus is on discovering a “terrorist personality”. The central explanations of 
psychological theories link pathology (psychological illness, suppressed sexuality or 
other psychological traits) with radicalisation for violence. However, such explanations 
have largely been rejected as the radicalised character is notable for their ordinariness. 
Arendt also notes the ordinariness of such a character in her “Banality of Evil” (Arendt, 
1963). This thesis is also an attempt to offer an alternative to the argument about the 
psychological theories of Islamic radicalisation. I argue that the character is 
radicalised not because of his/her mental illness but because of exposure to an ideology. 
An ideology mediating mind develops a particular type of mindset which Arendt calls 
ideological.  
1.2.5.3 Muslim Identity 
Young Muslim people, in search of their own personnel identity, engage in an exercise 
to define their relationship with the world, their peer group and heritage. Such 
radicalisation may or may not lead to violent radicalisation. The theory argues that 
some young Muslims, however, fail to resolve the contradictions between the outside 
world and their assumed “Muslim identity”, leading to “identity crises” or “identity 
confusion”. The character in this situation feels that they do not belong to a wider 
society. Such feelings are aggravated by adverse experiences or perceptions of 
discrimination, segregations, blocked mobility and a lack of trust in the political 
system. The moments of crises can guide the character to search for ontological 
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security, accentuating one’s propensity to radicalising influences such as violence or 
structured religious rituals. Some empirical research exploring conflicts in Britishness 
and Muslim identity such as Paul Thomas’ (2008) reject this assertion and show that 
most of the young Muslims in Yorkshire do not think that there is an inherent 
contradiction in the construct of Muslimness and Britishness. I agree that such a 
construct is too simplistic.    
1.2.5.4  Societal Theories 
Societal theories are the most cited explanations of Islamic radicalisation. These 
theories typically identify failed integration, influences of discrimination, and 
perceptions and experiences of segregation as the causes of Islamic radicalisation.     
1.2.5.4.1 The role of poor integration and deprivation 
It is possible to experience relative deprivation at an individual as well as at the 
community level. It is an awareness of one’s relative position concerning other 
individuals or groups. A perception that the difference is meaningful and unjust can 
lead to a feeling of relative deprivation. People acquire it in several ways, such as when 
fortunes of an in-group have declined relative to an out-group (Gurr, 1970, in Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2008b). Perception of relative deprivation may act as a cause to radicalise (The 
Institute of Community Cohesion (iCOCO), 2007). The reason for linking relative 
deprivation as a cause to Islamic radicalisation is the data which repeatedly show that 
Muslim communities suffer from relative deprivation in the UK. The Muslim 
awareness of this inequality is the basis of resentment and resistance. However, the 
data does not support this claim once closely analysed. Daniela Pisoiu (2007) argues 
that the relative deprivation hypothesis draws its credibility from a comparison of data 
at the national level, where Muslims are compared with non-Muslims. The results, 
however, change radically once the data is compared at local levels. It reveals that 
generally, Muslims are more likely to concentrate in the areas that have high 
unemployment rates for all populations. Pisoiu asserts that the argument of relative 
deprivation is further diluted as “studies on the education levels and overall 
performance of British born Muslims have actually shown better results than the 
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national average.” (Pisoiu, 2007:8).  Additionally, the available integration data in 
Europe is not very reliable (Pisoiu, 2007: 8).   
Another common explanation cited as a cause for Islamic radicalisation is the failure 
of the second and third generation of Muslims in integration into wider European 
societies (Jenkins, 2007; NYPD, 2007; Home Office, 2004; Netherlands Ministry of 
Justice, 2004). Some biographical data of the violent radicals, however, does support 
the “failed integration hypothesis” (Dornhof, 2009; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Alonso and 
Reinares, 2006;). Some Jihadist biographies do sight identity crises and failed 
integration as the reasons for radicalisation, but many biographies do not sight such a 
reason. Insufficiently supported correlation may not be considered as proof of a valid 
reason (Pisiou, 2007:13).   
Some ethnographic studies (Wiktorowicz, 2004), however, do avail some data which 
suggests that the experiences of discrimination, relative deprivation and hostility can 
play some facilitative role in radicalisation. There is evidence which suggests that 
intense feelings about the experiences of discrimination, blocked mobility and hostility 
can trigger a “cognitive opening” for a change in identity formation. One can change 
previous belief systems and adopt new ones which may be radical. The new identity 
formation may lead the character to a new group which may be extreme or violent in 
its thinking. These findings, however, cannot be generalised as methodologically, 
Quintan Wiktorowicz’s research is at a very small level and uses a sample which is 
non-random (Christmann, 2012: 26). The societal theories citing the role of failed 
integration and relative deprivation in radicalisation are quite frequent and hard to 
settle, yet, these can be considered, at best, as “the cause of the causes” in the “process” 
of radicalisation, which is not an essential one. I argue that the societal conditions 
linked to Muslim communities in the West are shared by other (non-Muslim) migrant 
communities as well, yet none of their members is involved in this particular type of 
radicalisation. Even this type of radicalisation is comparatively less frequent in the 
members of Muslim communities that migrated from India. India, with 201 
million Muslims (2018 estimate), houses the world’s largest minority Muslim 
population in the world. Societal theories, as testified by the governmental studies cited 
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in the introduction, may contribute towards enabling environments for Islamic 
radicalisation to some extent.   
 
1.2.5.4.2 The role of enclavisation and Segregation  
Enclavisation is the result of different groupings living separately from each other; 
clustered and segregated, they lead “parallel lives” (Cantle, 2001). Some suggest that 
enclavisation “only play a limited role” (Vardy, 2008: 6) in the radicalisation of the 
character, others suggest that more than enclavisation, self-segregation in residential 
spaces play greater role in the “process” of Islamic radicalisation (Macey, 2008; 
iCoCo, 2007; Mahood, 2006). Many other communities also suffer equally from 
enclavisation and segregation in the UK, but they do not radicalise for violence.  
1.2.5.4.3 Political explanations 
Several explanations of Islamic radicalisation link socio-psychological conditions to 
the “process” of radicalisation. These conditions emphasise a relationship between the 
radicalised character and discontent, which may be generated by certain emotions such 
as grievances, frustration or humiliation.  In one sense, grievances and discontentment 
can push a character to violent radicalisation.  The grievances can have a powerful 
effect on one’s thinking and maybe a by-product of political, cultural and socio-
economic conditions.   
A range of data and surveys support the assertion that Muslim populations in Europe 
feel aggrieved by western policy towards certain Islamic countries. A perception of 
humiliation is prevalent in Muslim minds (Christmann, 2012: 26). Therefore, there are 
political reasons which may be linked to radicalisation.  
Nevertheless, despite their importance, political explanations alone are insufficient to 
answer one of the most defining questions of Islamic radicalisation debate, namely as 
to why some individuals from the same communities become violent while others do 
not? (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008: 5; Sageman, 2008: 21; Moghaddam, 2007; NYPD, 
2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004: 4). Dalgaard-Nielsen and other scholars argue that a 
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progression from non-violent to violent radicalisation requires something more than 
psychological anxieties and grievances.  Others suggest that some form of crisis acts 
as a catalyst for joining the violent social networks (Gill, 2007: 144, 2008: 416; 
Sageman, 2004, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Such arguments suggest a closer look at 
the role of social networks and bonds.  
1.2.5.4.4 The role of social networks and bonds 
Within societal theories of radicalisation, the role of social networks and bonds is one 
of the most cited reasons of Islamic radicalisation. Such theorists consider 
participation in the radicalisation “process” as a group phenomenon. “Several 
mechanisms such as group socialisation, group bonding, group polarisation and 
isolation, and peer pressure can transmit and intensify indoctrination and moral 
disengagement, possibly leading to entry into violent extremism” (Christmann, 2012: 
27).  Researchers argue that social movement and network theory, framing theory and 
resource mobilisation theory explain how potential recruits are recruited through the 
exploitation of political opportunities (Hamid, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 
2004, 2008).  These theories explain how normal activists move into violent extremism 
through the motivation created by inter-subjective and social processes (Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2008/2: 7).  The process involves mobilising agents, who reach out to a 
grievance sharing “sentimental pool” and “re-frame” issues as blatant injustices with, 
thus, constructing a moral justification for violence against the framed enemy 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004).  
However, these studies do not answer this counter-question: can social groups and 
bonds turn anyone into a violent radical? Some studies argue that would be radicals are 
“pushed” into a group because of “their pre-existing cognitive or affective attributes” 
(Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008: 22). The role of social bonds are important in the 
recruitment processes but “questions remain about the developmental process leading 
to the acquisition of these ‘pre-existing’ attributes, or to the selection process, by which 
some individuals come into contact with environments (settings) conducive to moral 
change and the acquisition of new moral habits”(Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008: 22).  
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I assert that the “pre-existing cognitive or affective attributes” are the elements of 
ideological mindset, which are prevalent in Muslim communities but in scattered and 
mostly unarticulated form; the Islamist organisations use social networks and bonds to 
synthesise the elements of pre-existing attributes into a cohesive set of mutually 
supporting ideas that resonate with the subjective emotions of young Muslims. 
Inducements or motivations such as a sense of belonging, vengeance, self-esteem, 
sense of risk, danger, excitement and being part of Ummah are the consequences of 
group dynamics (Demos 2008a, 2008b; Crenshaw, 2003; Silke, 2008: 117).  Group 
pressures play an important role in the acceptance of radicalising ideas. “Radicalisation 
depends on how far one’s peers accept such ideas and the extent to which they are seen 
as worthy of imitation” (Demos, 2010b: 31). This thesis focuses on the nature of 
“radicalising ideas” and argues that these ideas are ideological in nature and are present 
in scattered social pockets in a Muslim society. The Islamist organisations provide a 
platform to organise these scattered ideas into a logical thinking Arendt calls 
ideological mindset. In the case of Islamic radicalisation, Islamist organisations use 
Islamic historical terms and metaphors to construct the thinking of the character in 
their discursive practice. That is one of the reasons that, instead of calling it ideological 
radicalisation, some theories call it religious radicalisation.  
1.2.5.5 The Role of Religious Ideology in Islamic Radicalisation 
Even though most of the studies point out that Islamic ideology is at play in the 
radicalisation of Muslim people, yet oddly enough, “it is the area, which is 
comparatively less researched” (Pressman, 2012, 29; Blaydes et al., 2008).  Some 
researchers theorise that the central character of Islamic radicalisation “draws 
authority from a particular interpretation of Islam” (Christmann, 2012: 28).  Awan 
noted increased religiosity in character before violent radicalisation (Awan, 2007a). 
Others, also, cite religious beliefs as “the principal motivating factor” for involvement 
in the violence (Sageman, 2005 in Wadgy, 2007; Bell, 2005a; Ibrahim, 1988). These 
facts place religious Islam at the centre of Islamic radicalisation. This thesis, however, 
differentiates between the religion of Islam and (Islamist) ideology. The discursive 
practices present the character as a Muslim, but the explanations that feed into the 
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character are ideological. The studies linking Islamic radicalisation to ideology have 
not focused fully on the mindset developed by ideology. Without contesting the claims 
that equate religion with ideology, I assert that it is the patterns of thinking of the 
radicalised character, which when studied retrospectively, can point to the fact whether 
the structural concept is religion or ideology. The elements of mindset developed by 
ideology are different from the elements developed by a religion.   
The existing research linking religion or ideology with Islamic radicalisation suffers 
from two aspects. One, empirical studies in this area are significantly rare. Two, the 
research is struggling to agree to a stable set of criteria that can help to differentiate 
between mainstream Muslims and the character that is radicalised for violence.  
Ansari’s study is one such exception that has made an attempt to empirically show that 
“respondents who felt their primary identity was Muslim held more positive views 
towards Jihad and martyrdom, terrorism, violence, suicide, Jihad and the 9/11 attacks, 
whereas respondents with a dominant British identity did not” (Ansari et al., 2006, in 
Silke, 2008). The study is important because of empirical evidence yet, 
methodologically, it suffers from a smaller sample size. Others also found a link 
between religiosity and prejudice (Allport and Ross, 1967, in Altmeyer, 2003). 
Altmeyer concluded that “religious fundamentalists tended to have a very small ‘us’ 
and quite a large ‘them’” (Altmeyer, 2003:17). There are, however, studies that put up 
the counterarguments. For example, Ghulam Abbas and Githens et al. argue that 
majority of Muslims are not radicals and think that radicals misuse religious terms for 
politically motivated violence (Abbas, 2007; Abbas, 2007a; Gothens et al., 2008).  
The purpose of reviewing the literature in the five sections mentioned above is to bring 
home the point that the conception of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation suffers 
from a kind of compartmentalisation in the research. The research in one area is not 
sufficiently communicating with the research in other areas. For example, the scales of 
measuring radicalisation do not link the instruments with the theories of radicalisation; 
and theories of radicalisation do not present stable criteria to categorise a character as 
a radical. One of the reasons for such a flaw can be linked to the methodology adopted 
by the research. Generally, the studies researching Islamic radicalisation, whether in 
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the areas of radicalisation measuring instruments or theorisations, rely on the individual 
stories of the violent radicals. The individual stories narrate individualised and 
subjective conditions of a radical. I appreciate the efforts of the researchers to find 
patterns of behaviours in the selected samples. However, such efforts are likely to miss 
some areas which are part of an ideal type character’s mindset. Additionally, there is 
an element of subjective judgment involved in the understanding of a condition by a 
narrator.   
Islamic radicalisation research lacks a study that links all the areas mentioned above, 
namely, conceptualisation (to ‘what’ the process leads to); de-radicalisation and the 
radicalisation measuring scales with a substantial theory. The Arendtian theorisations 
of the ideological mindset are not only linked to the past ideologues but also connects 
all the reviewed areas of Islamic radicalisation.  It also has the potential to link theory 
with policy, as I construct MILIR by applying the theory to the empirical material.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I forms the theoretical framework and part 
two applies the theory to the source material. Chapter 2 of Part I discusses the 
theoretical foundations of the thesis. I explain my rationale for selecting Hannah Arendt 
for understanding Islamic radicalisation in section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 explains Arendt’s articulations on the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism. I assume that the three Islamist organisations, namely Al-Qaida (AQ), 
Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT) are totalitarian movements as per the 
criteria of Hannah Arendt. For Arendt, totalitarianism has three central concepts: 
firstly, it is a radically original and unprecedented development; secondly, it is formless 
and thirdly; it combines ideology and terror. Arendt argues that totalitarianism replaces 
all previous political understandings of the “principals of action” of regimes such as 
virtue, honour and fear. In totalitarianism, ideology becomes the “principle of action” 
as well as the “essence” of a regime. Totalitarian movements do not differentiate 
between the “principle of action” and the “essence” of a government; it is ideology-
inspired terror in both cases. The unprecedented “principle” that totalitarian 
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movements introduce is less of a principle and more a “substitute of a principle; it is 
the ‘ideology’” (Arendt, 1958: 468).   
In section 2.4, I explain Arendt’s understanding of Ideology. Arendt explains ideology 
as a restraint of the mind, an intellectual constraint that impedes the process of thinking. 
It is a kind of “super sense” or a “superstition” which claims to have resolved “the 
riddles of the universe” (Arendt, 1958: 468-469). All ideologies have totalitarian 
elements in them, but “the real nature of all ideologies was revealed only in the role the 
ideology plays in the apparatus of totalitarian dominations” (Arendt, 1958: 470). I argue 
that the three terrorist movements, namely AQ, IS and TT operationalises “the real 
nature of the ideology” and construct a character in their discursive practices that 
exhibits all the elements of the ideological mindset.    
Section 2.5 engages with the Arendtian notion of thinking. Thinking, argues Arendt, is 
a dialogue with self; which can be imaginary or real. The faculty of thinking helps 
humans to have an internal dialogue. Ideology replaces me from myself and stifles the 
internal dialogue. An ideology dominated mindset stops thinking and draws ideology 
compliant conclusions from the factual reality. Arendt also differentiates between, 
solitude, isolation and loneliness. In loneliness, a mindset draws the worst conclusions.  
In the rest of the chapter, I deduce the five essential elements of the ideological mindset 
from Arendt. These elements are: the superhuman source as the origin of thought; the 
claim to global domination; Violence and the call for action; the objective enemy and 
rejection of factual reality. I allocate one part to each element and follow Arendt in 
linking ideological mindset with the past ideologues, namely the Communist and Nazi 
ideologue.  
In Chapter 3, I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart to conceptualise the method of inquiry 
“characterology”. Sigwart develops the method from Arendt. The “characterological” 
approach signifies three aspects of a phenomenon. Firstly, it supports the idea that a 
dynamic, mutually constitutive and reciprocal relationship exists between the action of 
a character type and the abstract concept. Secondly, it interprets incidents and 
narratives to construct a representative type. Thirdly, it allows detection of the elements 
which are employed to construct the character type. I select the online magazines 
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produced by three organisations (AQ, IS and TT) as empirical evidence to understand 
the characteristics of the mindset of the central character constructed by these 
organisations. I employ a thematic analysis technique to analyse the exemplary texts. 
In the analysis, I note the differences and similarities between the textual constructs of 
the three Islamist organisations.      
Part II of the thesis conducts a theory-guided analysis of my source material and 
consists of five chapters. I compare the texts across the three organisations to note 
similarities and differences in the constructs. Chapter 4 analyses the exemplary texts to 
detect the first element of the ideological mindset, namely ‘The Superhuman Source as 
the Origin of thought’. I quote original passages from the magazines as evidence of the 
presence of this element in the mindset of the constructed character. I argue that the 
character describes a superhuman source, specifically God, as the origin of all thought. 
The eternal superhuman source operates through an eternal Divine Law. Humans are 
not supposed to think but only to implement the divine law. I quote exemplary texts to 
explain the characteristics of the superhuman source. The Islamist organisations 
construct a character in the texts, which is supposed to believe in the sovereignty of 
God. I use additional literature to explain how the idea of the sovereignty of God is 
constructed. This is the only chapter where I use wider Islamic literature to clarify the 
origins of the idea. It is necessary because this is the idea which is common in both; 
the ideological version of Islam and the mainstream religion of Islam. I, however, argue 
that adoption of one element of ideological mindset does not mean that a character is 
an ideologue, but rather it is the adoption of all the elements of the ideological mindset 
that signify the character as an ideologue. Through this idea, the terrorist organisations 
appropriate legitimacy for themselves against the democratic principle of the “will of 
people”.  
Section 4.5 cites examples from the texts to note that the proposed Superhuman source 
is independent of “consensus iuris”, i.e. wider consent of the people for the law. Arendt 
asserts that “both moral judgment and legal punishment presupposes this basic 
consent” (Arendt, 1958: 462). The mindset constructed by the Islamist organisations 
does not believe in the “consensus iuris”; rather, it shows contempt for any notion that 
42 
 
links “will of the people” with governance. The constructed character abhors all types 
of freedoms. As Islamist organisations cannot ignore the modern idea of freedom, they 
change their meaning. “Freedom”, for them, means a surrender of worldly desires, 
emotions and thinking to the Divine Law. Such surrender is supposed to liberate man 
from manmade shackles. In addition to thematic analysis, this chapter also employs 
two linguistic terms, namely dixies and metaphors. With regards to this element of an 
ideological mindset, these two linguistic terms capture the themes more effectively in 
the analysis to better comprehend the ‘pointing’ in the texts. In a unique perversion, 
the organisations assign the title of a freedom fighter to the constructed character.  
Section 4.8 analyses the themes where the character is constructed as a freedom 
fighter. The Islamist organisations extensively use time, person and place deixis and 
metaphors to construct the themes of a freedom fighter in their rhetoric. I decipher the 
deixis and metaphors to understand the themes. In such rhetoric, the organisations 
extensively construct the identities of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The character as a freedom 
fighter is fighting against historical injustices committed by the West against Muslims. 
The ideal type is the one who follows the Divine Law in letter and spirit and following 
true freedom.     
In Chapter 5, I analyse the texts from the magazines that thematically carry a ‘Claim to 
Global Domination’. By rereading the material using the Arendtian theoretical 
framework (see Chapter 2), I generated six subthemes. After sifting the available 
material under the subthemes, I further segregated the material affiliated with an 
organisation.  
It appears from the analysis that cross-fertilisation of ideas across the organisations 
took a particular concretisation as the textual construction shifts to IS and TT from AQ. 
One of the reasons for such a shift in expressions can be attributed to the actual 
operationalisation of the ideology in the real world. AQ is still free from the actual 
execution of the professed ideology, while IS and TT had to execute the ideology in the 
real world.  
The constructed character, however, appeared stuck in regional politics in the TT 
constructs as the themes in their texts carry a strong flavour of Afghan nationalism. 
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With such a nationalistic leaning, it is, therefore, not surprising that TT as an 
organisation is less idealised and attracting fewer recruits than the other two 
organisations. Arendt asserts that “a development towards nationalism would frustrate 
its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive” (Arendt, 
1958:389). Nonetheless, at the fundamental level of conceptual understanding, TT 
nationalism is ideological; there is an ideological brotherhood across the three Islamist 
organisations. It can also explain the presence of AQ safe heavens in TT dominated 
Afghanistan before the 9/11 incident. Even with these differences in the circumstances 
of the organisations and the resultant compulsions vis a vis the operationalisation of 
ideology, ‘The Claim to Global Domination’ and its attendant themes are shared across 
the organisations.          
Essentially, the discursive practices construct a character who thinks that they are 
entitled to dominate the world for ideological reasons. The claim to global domination 
draws its legitimacy from the Islamist organisations’ understanding of history. They 
interpret history through the lens of ideology. History, in the textual constructions, 
appears non-contradictory and a proof of the correctness of the ideology. The discursive 
practices’ reference to history illuminates those areas brightly where Muslims 
dominated the world.  
Ideology, as it springs from a universal superhuman source, is not for one nation but 
the whole world. The ideologues “are not satisfied with the revolution in one country 
but aim at the conquest and rule of the world” (Arendt, 1958: 359). Therefore, with the 
ideological mindset acting as the philosophical foundations, the ideologues try to 
engage with important ideological questions spread over centauries. Being a true 
embodiment of the Divine Law, the character is supposed to think that they are in 
knowledge of the historical operation of the Divine Law. This knowledge (of historical 
operation of Divine Law) entitles them to answer ideological questions of import 
spread over centuries.  Such a mode of thinking is useful to the discursive construction 
as it obliterates and confuses the existing political arrangements to the ideologues’ 
advantage. History is (re)interpreted and portrayed as moving in sync with the ideology. 
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The discursive practices draw on selected Islamic political and theological literature to 
articulate the answers to support their claim to global domination.  
The character is presented as a representative figure of historical discourses clustered 
around religion. In this sense, the organisations do not consider the constructed 
character as a new character, but such character was always present in the discursive 
practices of religious beliefs. The contemporary character, however, is presented as 
the refined model that does not suffer from the imperfections of the past characters 
and, therefore, is ideally placed to dominate the world for the benefit of everyone. 
One of the main hurdles that the claim to global domination is the manmade political 
division of the world. International and intranational political boundaries are manmade 
and superfluous. The character is supposed to obliterate or at least ignore these 
superfluous divisions. The textual constructs suggest that the ideologue should believe 
that the world comprises of two exclusive political categories; the people of truth 
namely, ideologues, and the people of falsehood, namely “Kuffar”. These two political 
categories are well integrated, homogeneous and plan their actions collectively. As the 
ideological mindset believes that all action flows from some ideology; therefore, it is 
assumed that ‘they’ are also following an ideology.  
The idea of the nation-state is another hurdle to the claim to global domination that the 
discursive practices construct; the idea is an innovation orchestrated by ‘them’. People 
are not supposed to innovate, but rather discover the true meaning of eternal law and 
follow it. Instead of many nation-states, the character is supposed to imagine a global 
state led by a global leader. The global state namely, Khilafah, should unite all Muslims 
under a global state ruled by the ideology. The textual constructs suggest that 
ideological rule shall benefit all including “Kuffar”. Khalifah, being the supreme leader 
of the global state, is tasked to understand the will of the eternal law and personally 
guard against all innovative interpretations of the law. The organisations imagine 
Muslim ummah in terms of a global race.   
The discursive constructions articulate that Muslims were the original race known as 
humanity. All humanity was following one eternal law, but then the “Kuffar” deviated 
from the laws of humanity and started perceiving themselves as different races. All 
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racial thinking except the thinking of “nation of Islam” are false. The “nation of Islam” 
is following the laws of truth. Therefore, for the sake of truth to prevail, this nation 
must dominate the world. For effective domination of the world, the “nation of Islam” 
should establish its own global institutions parallel to the United Nations and acquire 
military muscles. The true potential of this race, however, lies in true allegiance to the 
ideology. True allegiance to the ideology is also the fundamental precondition of 
becoming a full member of the “nation of Islam”. The imagined “nation of Islam” shall 
comprise of fully disciplined subjects reformed to shun all notions of human diversity 
and spontaneity.  
Chapter 6 analyses the exemplary texts to detect the third element of the ideological 
mindset, namely ‘Violence and the Call for Action’. The constructed character across 
all three organisations is supposed to believe that ‘Violence and the Call for Action’ 
are essential to dominate the world for the sake of superhuman sourced law. However, 
in places, there are subtle differences in the articulations of the themes linked to 
violence and action among the organisations. The analysis of the texts in this chapter 
supports the assertion of the previous chapters that mostly AQ articulates the reasons 
for the ideological claims.  
The character that emerges from the discursive constructions is restless and ready for 
violence and action all the time and in all circumstances. They prefer violent over non-
violent action. Non-violent action is a position of compromise; the character is 
supposed to aim at culminating the activity in violence. They believe in the ideological 
division of the world; the world comprises of two parts, Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harb. 
Dar-al-harb are the areas not under the control of the organisations. Violence is central 
in all action in Dar-al-harb. The character is supposed to be a law unto themselves in 
Dar-al-harab. The organisations employ metaphors to point, dehumanise and violently 
eliminate the ‘other’ as part of their call for violence and action.  
“Dajjal”, drawn from Islamic history, is one such metaphor that the organisations 
employ to this effect. The metaphor represents falsehood, concealment and “decadent 
races”, fit to be eliminated. All the three organisations suggest the character to call 
their opponents “Dajjal”. Such a ‘pointing’ helps the character to imagine the ‘other’ 
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in ideological language. AQ is more philosophical and abstract in its application of the 
metaphor and calls the Western civilisation as “Dajjal”. IS and TT, being involved in 
the actual contest for territory, are more concrete in naming their immediate opponents, 
e.g. Assad/Iraqi government sympathisers and Americans as “Dajjal”. The Arendtian 
ideological mindset capitalises on the prevalent inconspicuous phrases to dehumanise 
the ‘other’. The Islamist organisations frequently employ the metaphors used by 
Islamic theological/political history for ‘pointing’ dehumanising and eliminating the 
‘other’.  
“Kuffar” is another metaphor that frequently linked the violence with the action in the 
magazines. The discursive practices construct a character that calls all the opponents 
“Kuffar”. The construction sufficiently dehumanises “Kuffar” before suggesting their 
ruthless elimination. “Taghut” is the third metaphor that inherently calls for violence 
and action against the ‘other’. The constructed character calls violent action as Jihad.  
The discursive construction does not believe in a nonviolent Jihad and rejects all 
explanations that try to explain the nonviolent nature of Jihad. Jihad for the ideological 
mindset is part of the ideology and shares equal status with the worship. It is endless 
and shall never cease. Therefore, there shall always be a need to create new categories 
of the ‘other’ if, and when, the existing categories are eliminated. 
In line with the Arendtian ideological mindset, the Islamist organisations suggest to the 
character that they employ violence as a tool to unmask the hypocrisy of the world 
(Western) states. In the Arendtian articulations, the ideologues may perform an act to 
provoke a power to use violence. The aim is to expose the hypocrisy of power. The 
ideological mindset feeds on contradictions and hypocrisies of the real world, which 
must be exposed. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers can be categorised as 
one such action.     
The ideal form of action for the constructed ideal type of an Islamic ideologue is 
violence. However, the character is not supposed to remain passive but actively seek 
other forms of action such as disavowal. The character is required to disown virtually 
everything that is not owned by the ideology. The character should not only keep the 
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hatred towards the non-ideological world in their heart but actively express that hatred 
through all available means.  
‘The Object Enemy’ is the fourth element of the ideological mindset that I analyse in 
Chapter 7. I argue that the enemy of the ideological mindset is objective and eternal. It 
is designated by the ideology, and any subjective behaviour cannot change the status 
of an enemy. I quote exemplary texts to explain the themes of the objective enemy 
constructed by Islamist organisations. All efforts to eliminate the objective enemy 
should be considered as Jihad. The fundamental principle of relationship with ‘them’ 
is hate. Hate, towards the enemy, should not be allowed to recede even in those cases 
where Islamists are under some compulsion to take lenient action against the objective 
enemy. “Wala” and “Bara” are concepts used in the texts to decide the nature of the 
relationship with ‘them’. Elimination is the best option to apply to the objective enemy; 
however, when such an option is not available, the ideal type is supposed to adopt the 
action of disavowal. Jews, Christians, Kuffar and Munafiqeen are among the categories 
of the objective enemy. Jew and Christian are the worst enemies as they are supposed 
to hate Muslims the most. Virtually everyone is declared as an enemy who does not 
follow the ideological mindset. The constructed character is supposed to perform the 
ideological role of an executioner and a victim. The organisations visualise an eternal 
fight with an eternal enemy.   
Chapter 8 analyses the texts to detect the themes of the fifth element, the ‘Rejection of 
Factual Reality’. I argue that for an ideological mindset, facts are only admissible if 
these are consistent with the ideological explanations. The super sense developed by 
ideology in an ideologue is the final arbitrator between a fact and a non-fact. For 
Islamists, life itself is temporary, unreal and superfluous, hence, should be rejected. 
“Dunya” and “Akhira” are the terms used for the temporariness of ‘this’ world and 
‘eternity’ of ‘that’ world. The imagined nature of ‘this’ world helps in eliminating the 
emotion of fear in the ideal type. Such conceptualisation strengthens the emotion of 
sacrifice. Islamists radically alter the meaning of commonly understood terms. For 
example, I quote texts to show that how the term “peace “is transformed for the 
ideological consistency. For the ideological consistency the facts can be twisted. They 
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shall take every action to transform factual reality to the reality that is consistent with 
the ideological world.  Logical reasoning as a tool is employed to twist facts and 
achieve imagined consistency. For the ideological mindset it is legitimate to twist facts 
to uncover the objective enemy.  
Finally, in Chapter 9, I conclude the study with the thesis conclusion. I review the 
findings. I summaries all the ideas the Islamists organisations used in their texts to 
construct an ideal type of an Islamic ideologue in a tool, I call ‘The Map of Ideas Linked 
to Islamic radicalisation’ (MILIR). I also clarify how to use the tool and point out the 
areas it can be usefully employed. I explain about the limitations of the research and 



















Chapter 2: Hannah Arendt’s Theorisations on Totalitarianism, 
Ideology, Thinking and Ideological Mindset 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In the writings of Arendt, all the four conceptions of totalitarianism, ideology, thinking 
and ideological mindset are inseparable and make sense only with each other. In this 
chapter, I shall explain first the reasons for my selection of Arendt’s theory as the 
theoretical framework for my research. Second, I shall engage with Arendt’s 
theorisation on totalitarianism, ideology and thinking. Third, I shall explain the five 
essential Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset, which Arendt calls ideological 
thinking. Arendt studies the mindset of the past ideologues, namely the Nazi and 
Communist ideologue in her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958).  
Arendt’s philosophical articulations have a peculiar style. She specialises in 
discovering basic experiences in action. She would analyse individuals and groups in 
their contexts, looking for unprecedented experiences in historical moments. Her 
philosophising would start from concrete and particular experience, which astonished 
her, instigating her to explore. She starts her journey with the analysis of philosophies 
of Saint Augustin in her PhD dissertation with Martin Heidegger. Heidegger and, also, 
Karl Jasper had a profound influence on Arendt’s philosophy. Arendt also draws 
significantly on Montague, Aristotle, Kant and many others while crystallising her 
concepts on totalitarianism.  
It is Arendt’s standard method to single out a concept, explore how the humans had 
used that expression with relation to their experiences in recorded history. She 
identifies shifts in their experiences and uses her strong philosophical instincts to 
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subject the key concept to scrutiny. She devises a new expression if the historical 
expression has failed to express all the facets of new experience(s).  
For Arendt, humanity was subjected to an unprecedented experience during the first 
half of the twentieth century, necessitating a fresh look, as all previous expressions 
linked to the past political dispensations had failed to express the new phenomenon in 
its entirety. The new experience, which she calls totalitarianism was different from all 
previous political organisation known to man, namely, tyranny, despotism, republics 
and dictatorship. She mainly explores the concept in her book “The Origins of 
Totalitarianism” (1958).   
2.2 Arendt’s Relevance for this Research  
It is somewhat surprising that, despite her well-known work on the notion of ideology, 
Arendt is neglected even in the theories that link Islamic radicalisation to ideology. 
This is especially so as such research has been useable to substantially link the 
ideological radicalisation with empirical evidence. The research, while debating 
ideological radicalisation, either mixes up or simplistically equates religion with 
ideology. It mainly focuses on theological belief systems of the Islamic radicals 
(Christmann, 2012: 29), and does not delve deeper into the nature of the ideas that 
develop a radical mindset. Arendt’s theorisations on ideology give us a lens to 
understand the true nature of the mindset of the Islamic radical as the constructed 
character. Seen through this lens, the ideas of the radical mindset appear ideological.   
The scarcity of empirical research into ideological radicalisation is attributable to the 
difficulty in finding the theoretical framework that can connect the abstract concept of 
ideology with the agency, i.e. a radicalised character. The paucity of such frameworks 
(Christmann, 2012: 4, 73) is one of the reasons for the lack of empirical research on 
the topic. A suitable framework should allow certain empirically oriented questions 
such as how do we study the thought of a character before we categorise their mindset 
as ideological? Alternatively, are there certain characteristics which can be identified 
as elements of an ideological mindset?  
Additionally, as the previous chapter has outlined the current wave of violence is 
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closely identified with Muslim communities, the attention of researchers is diverted to 
the nature of religiousness and the sociology of the Muslim communities. 
Consequently, the debate on Islamic radicalisation spares less attention for ideological 
radicalisation than the debates of religiousness and societal aspects of the radicals. The 
expression ‘Muslim communities’ is a religious expression; therefore, the problems of 
religion get greater primacy in the radicalisation debate than the problems of the 
thinking framework, i.e. the mindset. Moreover, it is the very nature of the phenomenon 
at hand that can account for such a lack of empirical research in this field. Some 
research, however, has tried to fill this gap by devising certain measuring scales, such 
as “The Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004) 
and “The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA)” (Pressman, 2009); but have 
mixed up ideology religion as analytical categories.  
Mostly, studies researching ideological radicalisation try to locate violent behaviour in 
the religiosity of the character. While some research does suggest a correlation 
between levels of religiosity and Islamist violence, (Ibrahim, 1988; Bell, 2005a; 
Sageman, 2005; Awan, 2007a; Wadgy, 2007), there is also compelling evidence to the 
contrary: namely,  most of religious Muslims are not violent (Demos, 2006; Abbas, 
2007; Githens-Mazar, 2008). So how to resolve this puzzle? Some theories try to 
answer this question through the rubric of enabling environments linked to several 
possible factors (Christmann, 2012: 42). Arendt’s theorisations help answer this 
question as she separates religion from ideology as an analytical category. Although, 
religious beliefs can become part of ideology (and in the case of Islamic radical it is 
true, as they perceive the ideology in religious phraseology), an ideological mindset, in 
principle, is independent of any forms of religion. In this sense, this mindset, once 
operationalised is more similar in its intellectual structure with a Nazi ideologue than 
a fellow religious Muslim.   
Arendt, however, argues that “ideologies are a recent phenomenon” (Arendt, 1958: 
468) and a result of modernity. On the contrary, the religious phraseology employed 
by the Islamist organisations in their discursive constructions are linked to centuries 
old Muslim political history and practice of religion i.e. Islamic theology. I argue that 
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the Islamic ideology in twentieth century is shaped by the current trends of modernity 
albeit as a reaction. I follow Hansen at el. who identify the similarities between the 
three ideologies namely, Islamic, Bolshevik and Nazi ideologies7 and argue that the 
Islamic ideology “does not attack the lack of modernity in Arab countries, but the very 
ideas of modernity: the concept of freedom and democracy” (Hansen et al., 2007: 56).  
I assert that in their endeavour to react to modernity, Islamists in their discursive 
constructions transform religious thinking into ideological thinking. At least in three of 
the five proposed elements of the Arendtian ideological thinking in this research 
namely, ‘essential violence’, ‘objective enemy’ and ‘rejection of factual reality’, the 
departure from religious thinking to ideological thinking is quite evident. I propose that 
religious thinking does not subscribe to all of the above mentioned three elements as 
constructed by the Islamists in their magazines (see chapter 5,6 and 8). The remaining 
two elements of ideological thinking namely, ‘the superhuman source as the origin of 
thought’ and ‘the claim to global domination’ appear common to the religious as well 
as ideological thinking, yet this commonality is only in principle and differ in 
operationalisation of the ideas.   
Arendt, in Origins as well as in her other writings, does not engage much with the idea 
of religious thinking. She calls the thinking that perceives itself as originating from the 
idea of God as deism. She explains,     
Deism, for example, would then be the ideology which treats the idea of God, with 
which philosophy is concerned, in the scientific manner of theology for which God is 
revealed reality. Yet we know that this is only part of the truth. Deism, though it denies 
 
7 Hansen et al. produce a very interesting table at page 65 of their article which 
compares the salient claims of the three ideologies.  Even before the 9/11 event, some 
scholars pointed to the similarities between the ideological version of Islam and the 
two totalitarian ideologies of the past. See Frederic Volpi, “Understanding the 
Rationale of the Islamic Fundamentalists’ Political Strategies: A Pragmatic Reading of 
their Conceptual Schemes during the Modern Era”, in Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 1/3 (2000), pp.73–96; Whine, “Islamism and Totalitarianism”, or 





divine revelation, does not simply make “scientific” statements on a God which is only 
an “idea” but uses the idea of God in order to explain the course of the world. (Arendt, 
1958: 469).  
However, in this thesis, I extend the above mentioned Arendtian articulation of deism 
in this thesis and argue that a theology which claims to originate in divine revelation 
can also be transformed into ideology — a distinct mode of thinking which is different 
from religious thinking. This transition is most evident in the constructed character of 
the Islamic ideologue of this research. It takes place as the Islamist organisations resist 
and articulate their response to the modern ideas such as freedom, democracy or 
nationalism. These organisations re-interpret Islamic theology in their contest against 
the modern ideas. This political contest is one of the main drivers which is facilitating 
the transformation of Islamic religious thinking into ideological thinking. It is through 
Arendt’s articulations of ideological thinking that one can distinguish between the said 
two types of thinking which otherwise appear to be indistinguishably blurry and 
confusing and co-exist in the overall spectrum of contemporary Muslim thought.  
Arendt’s assertion that an ideologue is the embodiment of eternal law (Arendt, 1958: 
462-465) is very helpful in distinguishing between “ideology” and “religion”. The 
Islamists in their belief that they comprehend the ‘true essence’ of the will of God, 
obliterate all distinction and space between God, Divine Law and man. They perceive 
themselves as the true embodiment of the Divine law. The religious idea of separation 
of these categories presupposes a space between them. This space allows humans 
freedom—freedom to even reject the religious message itself. The Quran explicitly 
states that “there is no compulsion in religion” (Quran, 2: 256). The faculty of thinking 
in humans need this space for its operation, and freedom to think is contingent upon a 
space for the activity of thinking. This freedom to think, or its absence could be 
considered as a distinguishing indicator between religion and ideology. 
Religion assigns a mission to humans. It is “to lead a life that will get him closer to 
God – in Islam this can be achieved by following God’s commandments. Yet, a person 
living a devout life does not become God, but rather remains an imperfect and flawed 
human being. This fundamental difference between man and God cannot be overcome” 
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(Hansen et al., 2007:63). Even when a religious character thinks they are following 
absolute truth, they “do not become identical with God in the fight against what 
he[/she] regards as evil” (ibid). The perception of fighting evil is common in religious 
as well as ideological thinking. It is the prioritisation of external over internal struggle 
which separates ideology from religion. The religious thinking turns into ideological 
thinking as and when an internal struggle against one’s evil inclinations is either 
prioritised or replaced by essential violence to rout external evil. Hansen et al. endorse 
this distinction in the following argument.   
It is this operationalisation of the notion where Arendt is distinguished from other main 
approaches to ideology8. She has delved much deeper into the notion and has managed 
 
8 One other main approach is from Karl Mannheim who argues that ideology operates 
at two levels -- particular conception and total conception of ideology. The particular 
ideology is concerned with the individual and psychological explanations while total 
conception explains sociological and cultural views of the notion. He argues that 
“whereas the particular conception of ideology designates only a part of opponent's 
assertions as ideologies--the total conception calls into question the opponent’s total 
Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus) and of which he partakes” 
(Mannheim, 1976:50). Mannheim’s conception, however, is in line with one aspect of 
the Arendtian ideological thinking as Mannheim thinks that ideological thinking 
“comes from the outside and shapes the personality of the individual as well as the 
group”, and that ideology operates “through individuals and groups, rather than 
individuals and groups creating them in response to their circumstances” (Williams, 
1988; 26). A further very prominent, however, politically highly controversial notion 
comes from Karl Marx who conceptualises ideology as “false consciousness”. 
According to Marx, when our thinking fails to properly reflect the circumstances, it 
gets confused. Such mindset does not appreciate the material basis of man’s thinking 
and his existence in its entirety. For Marx, “consciousness can never be anything else 
except conscious existence, and existence of men is their actual life-process” (Easton 
et al., 1967: 414). The “false consciousness” thesis is problematic as it implies the 
existence of a true consciousness. Even Marxists such as Alex Callinicos suggests that 
“epistemological elements in Marx’s own theory of ideology” should be scraped 
(Callinicos, 1985: 134). Martin Seliger thinks that “such pejorative and negative 
conception of ideology should be discarded all together” (Seliger, 1976:11). Goran 
Therborn argues that the ideas of true and false consciousness should be rejected 
“explicitly and decisively, once and for all” (Therborn, 1980: 5). An important, and 
next to Mannheim, second sociological approach is explained by Emile Durkheim, who 
argues that “ideological methods are concerned with the use of notions to govern the 
collation of facts rather than deriving notions from them” (Durkheim, 1982: 86). The 




to grasp an operationalisation which is empirically applicable in the case of this study. 
In Arendt’s thinking, it is possible to identify certain characteristics of an ideological 
mindset which separates it from a non-ideological mindset. While, of course, this 
identification cannot be strictly binary, the distinguishing features of an ideological 
mindset are traceable. In this sense, the mindset of the character constructed by the 
three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices shares features with a Nazi or 
a Communist ideologue according to and following the characteristics developed by 
Arendt.  
As the radicalised character is geographically pattern-less, too much focus on their 
physical location has frustrated research. The House of Commons report (2006) 
presented after the 7 July 2005 London bombings confirms this assertion (see literature 
review in the previous chapter). Although this character belongs to Muslim 
communities, he/ she is obscure, ordinary, normal, and indistinguishable. Apart from 
Arendt, this normalness is also noted by an English writer, who describes Heinrich 
Himmler in “The House that Hitler Built”, as “a man of exquisite courtesy and still 
interested in the simple things of the life……..No man looks less like his job than this 
police dictator of Nazi Germany, and I am convinced that nobody I met in Germany is 
more normal” (Roberts, 1938: 89-90). It should be remembered that Heinrich Himmler 
was not an ordinary ideologue in the Nazi hierarchy. He was tasked by Hitler to raise 
and command deadly SS troops. Later he was promoted to head the United Police Force 
of Germany. He played a major role in the Holocaust. Arendt appears surprised to find 
ordinariness of such a character in “Eichmann in Jerusalem; Banality of the Evil” 
(1963). With the Islamic radicalisation, this amazement is expressed by friends and 
 
“empirical”. More recently, Terry Eagleton (2007) summarizes different definitions of 
ideology as: “a process of production of meaning, signs and values in social life; a body 
of ideas (which may be false) characteristics of a particular social group or class which 
help to legitimize a dominant political power; systematically distorted communication; 
a position for a subject; [a] form of thought motivated by social interest; identity 
thinking; socially necessary illusion; the conjecture of discourse and power; the 
medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; action oriented set 
of beliefs; the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; semiotic closure; the 
indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to social structures; 
the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality” (Eagleton, 2007: 1-2).  
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neighbours of the Islamic radicals, who express this sentiment as they realise that “the 
terrorist” was their well-mannered neighbourhood boy/girl.  Arendt intensely focuses 
on Eichmann’s mindset, where he was distinguishable from his fellow beings. The 
Eichmann trial helped Arendt to theorise a link between thoughtlessness and radical 
evil. So, either this mindset thinks everything to the worst or stops thinking. This is, 
likewise, the mindset of the character that is constructed by the Islamist organisations 
in their discursive practices I call Islamic ideologue and shall be dealing with in this 
study. I apply Arendt’s theory in this exercise due to certain advantages she had over 
her contemporaries who have written on ideology.  
Firstly, Arendt was born and belonged to a group on which ideologues executed their 
ideology. Her group was the objective enemy of the ideological mindset. This belonging 
to the victim group was, according to Arendt (1994:12), an advantage in the sense that 
she could grasp the concept in its totality. A member of the victim group is an outsider 
from the oppressor group, and sometimes the factual reality is better understood from 
a marginal position.  
Additionally, ideological persecution is a multidimensional phenomenon; while parts 
of oppressor groups might be contributing towards some part of the whole exercise, the 
hapless victim experiences all the facets of the occurrence. Arendt and her community 
had practically endured the abstract concept of the notion in action, especially the race 
ideology. The Jewish community was the immediate target of ideological mindset at 
the social and political level. This personal experience is missing for other social 
theorists who dealt with ideology. The experience helps the philosophical mind of 
Arendt to grasp the elements of the mindset of the persecuting ideologues and articulate 
these as elements of an ideological mindset. 
Secondly, Arendt’s book, “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (first edition 1951, revised 
edition 1958)9, where she substantially engages with the notion of ideology and 
ideological mindset, was written and published after the Second World War. This was 
 
9 Two chapters were added to the revised edition in 1958, i.e., “Ideology and Terror: 
A Novel Form of Government” and “Reflections on Hungarian Revolution”.  The 
main arguments and the focus of the book stayed the same.  
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the time when an ideological mindset had run its full course. It was, therefore, possible 
for her, in retrospect, to interpret the ideology as well as the ideological mindset to 
reconstruct a character type that thinks ideologically. 
In my research, I assume that Islamist organisations in their discursive practices 
construct this character type. This research is not about why and how a normal human 
being develops this mindset. This is an area for further or separate research. Arendt, 
however, has given certain hints to throw some light on these questions. In “The 
Origins of Totalitarianism” (1951, 1958) and “Eichmann in Jerusalem: Banality of the 
Evil” (1963), she hints that mass atomization, propaganda, dominant ideology, 
logicality, loneliness, superfluousness, and thoughtlessness are some of the areas which 
might help explain why and how someone is entrapped into an ideological mindset.  
Arendt’s efforts to interpret the phenomenon of ideology and totalitarianism are, 
however, not without criticism. The critics argue that her work in “The Origins of 
Totalitarianism” lacks an epistemological basis, a theoretical framework and an 
explicit methodology (Crick, 1977: 111; Canovan, 1992: 18; Bernstein, 2002: 382; 
Shapiro and Wendt, 2005: 39– 41).  
It is true that in the first instance, it is difficult to locate Arendt’s work on totalitarianism 
and ideology in some methodological understanding. It seems that the effort suffers 
from the absence of an explicitly explained conceptual framework. Arendt argues that 
her work “does not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially 
recognised or officially controversial instruments” (Arendt, 1953: 77).  This seemingly 
unconventional character of Arendt’s thoughts on totalitarianism is also a reflection of 
her critical perspective on methodology.  
Arendt is quite sceptical about too much emphasis on methodology and believes that 
as a result of social scientists’ over-emphasis on methodology during their “academic 
quarrels (…) methodological problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental 
issues” (Arendt, 1953: 77). For her, “experience in how to think can be won, like all 
experience in doing something, only through practice, through exercises” (Arendt 
(1968/2006: 13).   Arendt also resists the abstraction of structural theories and asserts 
that “theory must be relentlessly and ruthlessly concrete” and should be able to deal 
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with “events and action which have taken place in fact” (Wolin, 1977: 93).   
Arendt concedes that her approach to ideology lacks an explicit explanation of her 
method of inquiry. She argues that it is, rather, an “unusual approach …. to the whole 
field of political and historical sciences as such” (Arendt, 1953: 77). Arendt called her 
method “unusual” as it did not fit nicely into the Anglo-American tradition of her time.  
Sigwart (2016: 1) argues that Arendt did use a methodology which was “unusual” for 
her time, but now is described as the “characterological” method of political theorising. 
I adopt “characterology” as the method of inquiry in the next chapter. Through this 
method, Arendt manages to interpret empirical material, including biographical 
narratives within a specific framework. Her frame of reference connects the interpretive 
method of structural elements with an ideographic and individualistic perspective on a 
political phenomenon. Arendt’s deliberate effort to keep articulation of methodology 
obscure helps her to devise a method where she successfully manages to connect the 
structure (totalitarianism/ideology) and the person (the ideologue).  
In order to understand the political movements of her time, Arendt studies history and 
concludes that the phenomenon of totalitarianism movements was unprecedented in its 
manifestation. For her, totalitarianism was the result of crystallisation of certain 
concrete historical elements. This study, however, starts with the assumption that the 
three-understudy Islamist organisations resemble the totalitarian organisations of the 
twentieth century, namely the Nazi and Communist organisations. If they succeed, the 
Islamist organisations will establish a totalitarian form of government. The basic unit 
of present-day totalitarian organisations is the violent Islamic radical, like the basic unit 
of racism was a Nazi, or for Communism, it was a Bolshevik.  Eric Voegelin in a review 
of “The Origins of Totalitarianism” concludes:  
The investigation inevitably will start from the phenomena, but the 
question of theoretically justifiable units in political science cannot be 
solved by accepting the units thrown up in the stream of history at their 
face value. What a unit is will emerge when the principles furnished by 
philosophical anthropology are applied to historical materials. It then 
may happen that political movements, which on the scene of history are 
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bitterly opposed to one another, will prove to be closely related on the 
level of essence (Voegelin, 1953: 85). 
In line with the above statement, this research will apply Arendtian philosophical 
principles of an ideological mindset to the discursive practices to unearth the ideas that 
the Islamist organisations use to construct the mindset of the character. In other words, 
the research design is an interpretive and empirical analysis of an agency (the 
constructed character) with reference to an intellectual structure, i.e. the ideology.   
In this research, I am concerned with the ontological inquiry of the “characterology” 
of an ideological mindset. I assert that the constructed ideal type of the character has 
adequate signatures of a distinct mindset woven in an ideology which is empirically 
traceable. In this endeavour, I shall try to narrate the story of the ideal type of an Islamic 
ideologue through Arendt. Before I layout the Arendtian essential elements of the 
ideological mindset, I shall explain Arendtian notions of totalitarianism, ideology and 
“thinking”.   
2.3 The Arendtian Conceptualisation of Totalitarianism  
According to Arendt, totalitarianism had a great role in Europe’s political, moral and 
economic devastation during the first half of the twentieth century. The phenomenon 
originated during the First World War, amplified in National Socialism and 
Bolshevism and receded in the late 1950s. Totalitarianism is the ultimate destiny of the 
ideological mindset. In other words, totalitarianism is the operationalisation of 
ideology, which the Islamist organisations are also trying to establish.   
Arendtian theory of totalitarianism has three central concepts. First, totalitarianism is a 
radically original and unprecedented development. Arendt disagrees with social 
scientists who attempted to locate a long-established lineage of the phenomenon and 
do not see the novel uniqueness of totalitarian government. She argues:  
The trouble with totalitarian regimes is not that they play power politics 
in an especially ruthless way, but behind their politics is hidden an 
entirely new and unprecedented concept of power, just as behind their 
Realpolitik lies an entirely new and unprecedented concept of reality. 
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Supreme disregard for immediate consequences rather than 
ruthlessness; rootlessness and neglect of national interests rather than 
nationalism; contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered 
pursuit of self-interest; “idealism,” – i.e., their unwavering faith in an 
ideological fictitious world, rather than lust for power – these have all 
introduced into international politics a new and more disturbing factor 
than mere aggressiveness would have been able to do (Arendt, 1958: 
417-418). 
The second essential feature of totalitarianism is its formlessness. Formlessness in 
totalitarianism is maintained consciously and deliberately. Formlessness, besides 
helping in masking the true objectives of the movement, also helps to adapt to the 
situation. Interestingly, Nazis never used any slogan which described their future form 
of the government. Hitler’s statement in Ausgewahlte Reden des Fuehrers was one of 
the very few instances when he explained the form of future government, he said, 
“Incidentally, I am not the head of a state in the sense of a dictator or monarch, but I 
am the leader of the German people” (Hitler, 1938: 114).  
Formlessness does not mean totalitarianism is unorganised. By contrast, such 
movements are well organised and have very strict selection criteria for their 
membership. Hitler understood the masses in two categories, that is, “members”, who 
are fanatically “devoted” to the cause and “sympathisers”, who are too “lazy” for the 
organisation or “cowards” (Hitler, 1943: chapter iv). The sympathisers would form part 
of the front organisations. These front organisations act as a bridge between the 
fictitious ideological world and the normal world. This bridge is necessary; otherwise, 
the gap between the fictitious reality and the real world created by ideology is too 
obvious to be ignored by the fanatical members. Arendt explains, 
The world at large, on the other side, usually gets its first glimpse of a 
totalitarian movement through its front organisations. The 
sympathizers, who are to all appearances still innocuous fellow-citizens 
in a nontotalitarian society, can hardly be called single-minded fanatics; 
through them, the movements make their fantastic lies more generally 
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acceptable, can spread their propaganda in milder, more respectable 
forms, until the whole atmosphere is poisoned with totalitarian elements 
which are hardly recognizable as such but appear to be normal political 
reactions or opinions (Arendt, 1958: 367). 
The front organisations play a very important role in the evolution of the ideological 
mindset. The sympathisers who belong to a front organisation are ideologues but in a 
more normal and confused manner. Although these sympathisers believe in the 
ideology, they have yet not fully surrendered to the logical consequences of the 
ideology. They are still confused about their role in the ideological world; they are yet 
not fully radicalised. The sympathisers help the ideologue to reassure their self-identity. 
The Islamic ideologue probably gets these sympathisers at the places they like to visit 
the most, namely the places frequented by religious people. Unknowingly, the places 
of worship such as mosques and madrassas are serving as front organisations for 
Islamic radicalisation. The members of Islamist organisations easily blend in the 
places of religious gatherings because Islamist organisations, like the past totalitarian 
organisations, are also flexible and formless.   
Formlessness keeps the focus on the realisation of the ideological “essence”. It allows 
switching orders without any notice as per the dictates of the situation. In totalitarian 
organisations, which are at the core of totalitarian movements, the problem of 
succession is left unresolved so that it may not cloud the primacy of the ideology. The 
prime objective being the realisation of the ideological objectives. 
 Totalitarian regimes such as the IS regime in Syria or the TT regime in Afghanistan 
were in a feverish mode all the time. Domestic populations are continuously mobilised 
through struggles, campaigns, wars or eliminations of the objective enemies.  The will 
of the leader and the led must be continuously harnessed to accelerate the world 
movement towards its culmination. Certain other contemporaries of Arendt also note 
this centrality of activism and feverish activity in the totalitarian form of government. 
For example, Sigmund Neumann titles his comparative analysis of the Nazi, Fascist 
and Bolshevist uproar as “Permanent Revolution: The Total State in Total War” (1942). 
Franz Neumann calls the Third Reich a “movement state” in his Behemoth (1944), and 
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Ernst Fraenkel terms national socialism a “prerogative state” in his book “The Dual 
State”(1941) to explain the feverish arbitrariness of Nazi intrusions in legal and 
administrative affairs of the state (Baehr, 2010: 59).  
Third, ideology and terror are combined in totalitarianism. In Arendt’s writings, 
totalitarianism has roughly two phases. The first phase is a pre-power phase where the 
phenomenon appears in the shape of totalitarian movements. At this stage, selective 
violence is used to supplement the ideological propaganda appeal of the movement. 
Propaganda is used for the outside world, whereas internally totalitarian movements 
indoctrinate its members through the ideology.  
In the second phase—when the movements are in power—ideological propaganda may 
even be prohibited. The terror gets primacy at this stage. It dehumanises the victim 
through relentless repression. Ideology may not be relevant to this dehumanised man 
anymore. Himmler, for instance, emphasised that “[the] education [in concentration 
camps] consists of discipline [and] never of any kind of instruction on an ideological 
basis, for the prisoners have for the most part slave-like souls” (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol 
v: 616).  
After eliminating real opponents, totalitarianism categorises its victims as “objective 
enemies” or “enemies of the people” – “decadent races” or “dying classes” – 
supposedly condemned by nature or history for elimination” (Arendt, 1958: 465).  The 
totality of the terror lies in the fact that one’s compliance and behaviour is not taken 
into account while deciding the status of an enemy. The total terror should, among other 
things, fashion the kind of man that accepts his own disposability. This new man is 
dehumanised and bereft of reflection and spontaneity.  
Total terror creates ideal conditions for the transition of this new man. Terror becomes 
total when it is bereft of any opposition. Total terror is the “essence of totalitarian 
governments” (Arendt, 1951: 466). According to Baehr, “the essence or nature of a 
regime, according to Montesquieu, refers to its basic institutions, particularly those that 
establish who is sovereign” (Baehr, 2010: 60). All institutions established through laws 
guide human behaviour to the extent as to what is prohibited or unacceptable. However, 
it is “the principle of a regime [that] animates it, the guiding sentiment, or ethos that 
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survive so long as people actively uphold the conduct it requires” (Baehr, 2010: 60). In 
this distinction, i.e., between essence and the “principle of action”, Arendt identifies a 
unique aspect of totalitarian regimes.  
As “just lawfulness in constitutional government is insufficient to Inspire and guide 
man’s actions, so terror in totalitarian government is not sufficient to Inspire [emphasis 
added] and guide human behaviour” (Arendt, 1958: 467). Unlike its perceived 
(perceived by those who consider totalitarianism to share some aspects with other 
typology of governments; a perception which Arendt rejects, viewing totalitarianism 
as “unprecedented”) predecessors like tyrannies, monarchies, despotism and republics, 
totalitarianism, Arendt says, appears to have no corresponding “principle”.  Finding 
what Montesquieu calls a “principle of action” in a body politics is an attempt to resolve 
a very old problem of political thought. The argument is that, if positive laws are meant 
only to tell man what not to do, what inspires them to act? It is the “principle of action”. 
Arendt asserts that “such guiding principles and criteria of action are, according to 
Montesquieu, honour in a monarchy, virtue in a republic and fear in a tyranny” (Arendt, 
1958:466-467). 
In principle, says Arendt, under perfect totalitarian conditions ( i.e., where all men have 
been pressed to act like one man; where all action is to keep the superhuman laws in 
motion by executing death verdicts on objective enemies), we need not differentiate 
between the “essence” of what? and the “principle of action”. It is terror in both cases. 
These perfect conditions, however, can only be met if somehow the complete world is 
dominated by a totalitarian government (Arendt, 1958:459).  
Nevertheless, until totalitarianism controls the complete world, it must share with other 
regimes; there is a need for its subjects to have a guiding “principle of action”. Arendt, 
however, is reluctant to call any human stimulus in totalitarian regimes a “principle of 
action”, as terror destroys any capacity of man to act at all.  Arendt also excludes  
another likely candidate, namely fear, as a “principle of action” in totalitarianism. Fear, 
explains Arendt, cannot guide human behaviour in total terror. Although, fear would 
be much more widespread in totalitarianism than any other regime; however, fear as a 
stimulus to guide the human behaviour would lose its usefulness as any action guided 
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by it will not reduce the risk man fears.  
No human behaviour originating from sentiments like fear, virtue or honour, which 
may be useful for the above mentioned forms of governments, is useful for totalitarian 
affairs. In this sense, totalitarianism “has introduced an entirely new principle into 
public affairs that dispenses with human will altogether” (Arendt, 1958:468). The 
populations of totalitarian regimes are caught up in the process of accelerating the 
movement of superhuman laws and make themselves available for the dual role of the 
executioner and the victim.  
Here, one is tempted to ask two questions: one, why the nontotalitarian world fails to 
realise the true potential of totalitarian organisations in real-time? Two, why the 
totalitarian populations form part of the fictitious world of totalitarianism? Answering 
the first question, Arendt calls it a “judgmental dilemma” of the nontotalitarian world. 
She argues:  
Those who rightly understand the terrible efficiency of totalitarian 
organisations are likely to overestimate the material force of totalitarian 
countries, while those who understand the wasteful incompetence of 
totalitarian economies are likely to underestimate the power potential  
which can be created in disregard of all material factors (Arendt, 
1958:419).    
The nontotalitarian world fails to anticipate the power potential generated by an “in 
concert” working of ideological minds.  
The second question is further rephrased for clarity: If totalitarianism is based on a 
distorted or fictitious reality, then, what provides mental alignment or at least a mode 
of positioning for populations under totalitarianism? Alternatively, what primes the 
man to do away with common sense and certain subjective innate human instincts, and 
follow a “principle of action” which requires a man to be an executioner or a victim? 
In Arendt’s articulations, this unprecedented “principle” that totalitarianism introduces 
is “less a principle and more a substitute for a ‘principle of action’; it is the ‘ideology’” 
(Arendt, 1958: 468). 
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2.4 Hannah Arendt’s Theorisations on Ideology 
Ideology, in Arendt’s conception, is a restraint of the mind and intellectual constraint 
that impedes the process of thinking.  It is a kind of “super sense”, or a “superstition” 
which claims to have resolved “the riddles of the universe” (Arendt, 1958: 457-458). 
The ideological mindset is very rigid, rejects alternate conceptions and is unresponsive 
to the “miracle of being” (Arendt, 1958: 469). For Arendt, being is plural and 
communicative. Ideology disputes plurality and spontaneity and prepares the mind for 
two alternative roles – the roles of an executioner and a victim. Only under totalitarian 
regimes, the entire texture of life can be fashioned according to an ideology. Politically, 
ideologies may be harmless until and unless taken seriously and literally by totalitarian 
organisations. For totalitarian movements, ideology is not a mere set of opinions but 
becomes “as real and untouchable an element in their lives as the rules of arithmetic” 
(Arendt, 1958: 363). These explanations adequately apply to the Islamist organisations, 
namely AQ, IS and TT. 
Historically, argues Arendt, the rise of ideologies is a very recent phenomenon. It was 
only with the benefit of hindsight that it became possible to analyse certain elements 
of ideologies which were so disturbingly useful for totalitarian dominations. In the 
absence of profound influence of ideologies, totalitarian dominations of the 20th 
century may rather resemble more with tyrannies. It is the ideological mindset which 
was revealed by Arendt after the totalitarian storm had passed that can help us frame 
the actions of contemporary totalitarian organisations mentioned above. We are in a 
position now to deconstruct the mindset of an ideal type of an ideologue constructed 
by the organisations in their discursive practices and to find the elements of the 
ideological mindset —a distinct mode of thinking, which primes the ideologue to 
perform certain despicable acts for the sake of an ideology.  
Arendt calls ideologies pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophy because they 
transgress the limits of science and philosophy. Ideologies have a scientific character 
to the extent they consider that an “idea” can become a subject matter of science. 
However, this is only partially true. It transgresses science when it does not use this 
idea to make scientific statements but instead to explain the course of the world. Deism 
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in this sense would be an ideology which scientifically treats the idea of God – God as 
revealed truth.  The idea of God will not be used by ideology to make scientific 
statements on this idea, but the “idea of God” will be used to explain the course of 
history. Likewise, ideas of racism would not be used to make scientific statements on 
race laws but would be used as an instrument to assert that past, present and future 
events can be calculated by this pseudo-scientific idea (Arendt, 1958:468-469).  
In principle, all ideologies have certain elements of experience which form the basis of 
their ideological claim. Humankind was not unaware of the struggle of races for world 
domination and the struggle of classes for political power before the Nazi and 
Communist parties.  It was the political importance of theses ideologies in Germany 
and Russia which made racism and communism respectively the dominant ideologies 
of the time. These ideologies had already influenced the populations of respective 
countries before the totalitarian movements used them for their purposes.   
In an Arendtian sense, it is the political usefulness of the ideological version of Islam 
in contemporary national as well as international politics that leads this version to be 
used for political power by the Islamist organisations. An ideology becomes politically 
useful if large populations subscribe to it. The ideological version of Islam is supposed 
to work stealthily preparing Muslim populations long before the Islamist organisations 
so firmly saddled the ideology. Before the totalitarian movement's surface, certain 
sections of the populations already think in an ideological mode.  
The source of the ideological mode of thinking, argues Arendt, lies in “our fear of 
contradicting ourselves” (Arendt, 1958: 473).  This fear of self-contradiction is the 
force that drives the logical process in the minds. Stalin also confirmed that it was “the 
irresistible force of logic [which] thoroughly overpowered [Lenin’s] audience like a 
mighty tentacle seizes you on all sides as in a vice and from whose grip you are 
powerless to tear yourself away; you must either surrender or make up your mind for 
utter defeat” (Stalin, 1924)10. The postulate is forced on the mind with the help of 
logical reasoning. The ideological mindset draws conclusions through mere logical 
 
10 Quoted from “Lenin, Selected Works” (1947), Vol 1. Moscow. p.33.   
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reasoning; and no new idea or new experience can interfere with this process (Arendt, 
1958:469-471). Terry Eagleton has also noted an irreversible change in the mindset of 
an ideologue. He concludes his work on ideology with these words: “When men and 
women engaged in quite modest, local forms of political resistance find themselves 
brought by the inner momentum of such conflicts into direct confrontation with the 
power of the state, it is possible that their political consciousness may be definitely, 
irreversibly altered” (Eagleton, 2007:224). Terry Eagleton’s conceptualisation of 
political consciousness is closely aligned with the thinking patterns of ideological 
mindset.  
2.5 The Arendtian Notion of Thinking 
Thinking and its processes have been a well-reflected area in Arendt’s writings. She 
traces the thinking frameworks of an ideologue. Apart from “The Origins of 
Totalitarianism” (1958), she substantially engages with the thinking patterns of the 
ideological mindset in “Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil” 
(1963), “Thinking and Moral Considerations” (1971) and “Life of the Mind” (1978).  
Thinking, so argues Arendt, is a dialogue with another self; this can be imaginary or 
real. All thinking, Arendt says, is done in solitude.  Solitude is being with oneself, i.e., 
two in one. It is an unequivocal “dialogue of thought” with oneself. In solitude, I do 
not leave the contact with the real world, as this “world of fellow men” is represented 
by myself with whom I enter into the “dialogue of the thought”. Solitary men, however, 
need others for reconfirmation of their unmistakable single identity, which was in doubt 
while in solitude. Solitude is different from isolation and loneliness (Arendt, 1958: 474 
– 475). 
Isolation and loneliness, argues Arendt, differ only in their function. Isolation functions 
in the political sphere, while loneliness belongs to the social sphere. Isolation takes 
place once no one is ready to act with me. Isolation is the beginning of the terror and 
is a fertile ground for totalitarianism. Although isolation is anathema to power, yet it is 
“required for all so-called productive activities of men” (Arendt: 1958; 474). Isolation 
is anathema to power because power is generated when people shun their isolation and 
“act in concert” (Burke quoted by Arendt, 1958: 474). Men sometimes contribute 
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something of their own to the common world as a result of isolation from the political 
world. Isolation, however, becomes loneliness once the isolated men “are deserted by 
the world of the things as well” (Arendt, 1958: 474). Totalitarian dominations (unlike 
tyrannies that keep the private life and its innovations intact) destroys the private life 
as well. Totalitarianism is unprecedented in transferring isolation into loneliness.  
Loneliness, Arendt argues, is the common ground for terror and ideology. Loneliness 
is closely linked with uprootedness and superfluousness. “To be uprooted means to 
have no place in the world recognised and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous 
means not to belong to the world at all” (Arendt, 1958: 475). Just as the isolation can 
be a primary condition for loneliness, uprootedness can be a primary condition for 
superfluousness. Arendt thinks that 
what makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which 
can be realised in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the 
trusting and trustworthy company of my equals. In this situation, man 
loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that elementary 
confidence in the world which is necessary to make experiences at all. 
Self and world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same 
time (Arendt. 1958: 477).  
So, in absolute loneliness when man’s experience and even his thinking becomes so 
unreliable, and he/she is dependent on others for self-realisation, is there something in 
man which can determine the truth? Arendt answers that: 
The only capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor 
the other nor the world in order to function safely and which is as 
independent of experience as it is of thinking is the ability of logical 
reasoning whose premise is the self-evident (Arendt, 1958: 477). 
Even under the conditions of absolute loneliness, the truth that two and two equal four 
cannot be corrupted. Logical reasoning is the only reliable truth, argues Arendt, which 
is available to human beings to fall back, once they are no more tied to common sense. 
It is their mutual guarantee to make sense of the common world around them. However, 
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this truth is of no use in itself because it does not divulge anything. Under the conditions 
of loneliness, even this process of logical deduction can think the worst possible 
conclusions. A lonely man, Arendt quotes Luther, “always deduces one thing from the 
other and thinks everything to the worst” (Arendt, 1958: 477). Arendt further argues 
that “the famous extremism of totalitarian movements, far from having anything to do 
with true radicalism, consists indeed in this ‘thinking everything to the worst’” (Arendt, 
1958: 477).   
While “thinking everything to the worst” may point towards the thinking pattern of the 
ideological mindset, Arendt points to another aspect of worst thinking. This is the 
opposite of thinking, i.e., not thinking at all. Radical evil is not only identified with 
worst thinking but also, thoughtlessness—not thinking at all. The stage of 
thoughtlessness comes when one stops dialogue with oneself. Internal dialogue guides 
us through the riddles of conventional truths and conventional norms. If murder has 
become the norm of the time in a community, the thinking man will not live with me, 
the murderer. To live with me, the murderer, I will have to silence the thinking man in 
myself and find another partner of thought. So, who can be that comforting partner of 
my thought that can live with me, the murderer?  
It is the ideology that is the substitute for thinking. The ideological mindset can coerce 
independent thinking in man. This internal coercion is akin to the iron band of terror. 
Totalitarian domination eliminates space between men through the iron band of terror; 
thus, all avenues of their freedom are destroyed. At the same time, ideological logic 
tames the mind to only deduce from the self-evident premise of ideology and to stop 
thinking. Ideology can conspire against internal dialogue. It can restrain and straitjacket 
the thought. Ideology has the capacity to align the mind with a thought which is 
totalizing, insulating, violent, rejecting everything inconsistent with ideology and 
pretending to think objectively. This is the framework in which Arendt analyses the 
mindsets of the past ideologues, i.e., the Nazi and Communist ideologues, and 
articulates the essential elements of the ideological mindset. In the succeeding 
paragraphs, I substantially engage with the five essential elements of a mindset that 
thinks ideologically.  
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2.6 The Five Essential Elements of the Ideological Mindset  
In the succeeding paragraphs, I glean five essential elements or characteristics of an 
ideological mindset, which Arendt calls ideological thinking.  These five elements act 
as the core of my theoretical framework. After explaining elements of an ideological 
mindset with respect to the violent Nazi/Bolshevik ideologue, subsequently, in the 
analysis part, I apply these elements to the textual literature produced by three Islamist 
organisations, i.e., AQ, IS and TT, to ascertain whether the discursively constructed 
character carry these elements in its mindset.  
2.6.1 The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought 
The ideological mindset believes that their ideology originates from a superhuman or 
supernatural source. This anchorage of the ideology in a superhuman source is very 
important.  It not only places the ideology above the human philosophies but also 
provides desired consistency to the otherwise confused understanding of the factual 
reality. As the idea of the ideology is not sourced to human thinking, it is clear from 
human inconsistencies. The ideological mindset, however, is not content with the idea 
of the ideology alone but goes a step further and claims that it has captured the essence 
of the superhuman or natural law. With the help of this essence of the divine law, the 
ideologue can now resolve the riddles of the earth. This mindset thinks that it is 
equipped with a code which can unmask “the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the 
present, [and] the uncertainties of the future” (Arendt, 1958: 469). This code, which is 
unavailable to others, enables the ideologue to reach to the reality and expose the 
conspirator. This pseudoscientific code reduces everything to one simple postulate or 
an idea (Arendt, 1958:470-471).  
The ideological mindset does not treat the idea of “race” in racism for some genuine 
effort to understand human races but uses this idea to explain the movement of history. 
This mindset thinks that one idea is sufficient to calculate all the events of history. 
Arendt argues that ideological mindset draws conclusions through mere argumentation; 
and no new idea or new experience can interfere with this process (Arendt, 1958:469-
471).   
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The ideologues think that they have understood the hidden laws of divinity. This 
discovery interests the masses, who in the words of Tocqueville, want to know the 
“absolutist systems which represent all the events of history as depending on the great 
first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, suppress men from 
the history of the human race” (Tocqueville quoted by Arendt, 1958: 345). In this sense, 
the first cause of all natural and historical laws is the Divine Almighty, and man can 
only prosper if they submit to the divine will. Martin Bormann’s memorandum entitled 
“Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity” hints at the source of thought of 
the Nazi ideologue. He writes, 
[t]he more accurately we recognise and observe the laws of nature and 
life (…) so much the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. 
The more insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will 
be our success (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol IV: 1036).  
Arendt notes striking similarities in the mindset of Nazi and Communist ideologue as 
they articulate the origins of their thought. She only replaces the word “Almighty” with 
“dialectical materialism” in the case of communists. Arendt borrows from Stalin’s 
notion of “correct leadership” as mentioned in Leninism (1933, Vol. II: chapter iii) and 
rephrases it to highlight the striking similarities between both the articulations. She 
writes,  
[t]he more accurately we recognise and observe the laws of history and 
class struggle, so much the more do we conform to dialect materialism. 
The more insight we have into dialect materialism, the greater will be 
our success (Arendt, 1958: 346). 
The sources of the ideology of a Nazi or Bolshevik ideologue had its origin in history.  
Although both ideological articulations point to the same superhuman force as the 
source of thought, Nazi phraseology uses almost the same words as are used by the 
discursive practices of the Islamist organisations. The concept of Nazi God, however, 
is different from the Islamic radicals.  Bormann expresses the concept in a secret decree 
of the Party Chancellery, circulated to all Gauleiters on 7 June 1941, as under: 
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When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not 
understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual 
opportunists, a human type being, who sits around somewhere in the 
sphere. The force of natural law, with which all these innumerable 
planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty or God. The claim 
that this world force (…) can be influenced by so-called prayers or other 
astonishing things is based upon a proper dose of naiveté or on a 
business shamelessness (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol 1: Chapter 7). 
In all such ideological articulations (Islamic ideology included) man is not left with any 
other option but to submit to these historically experienced superhuman laws. The Nazi 
pamphlets, issued for the “ideological indoctrination” of cadets, time and again 
reminded them about this inevitable fact. One such pamphlet (1942) reads: 
The laws of nature are subject to an unchangeable will that cannot be 
influenced. Hence it is necessary to recolonise these laws (…) While 
man struggle against the iron logic of nature, he comes into conflict with 
the basic principles to which alone he owes his very existence as man 
(…) We shape the life of our people and our legislation according to the 
verdicts of genetics (Quoted from Arendt, 1958: 343).  
Contrary to the popular perceptions, ideological mindset follows the law and “obey(s) 
strictly and unequivocally (…) the “Laws of Nature or Laws of History” (Arendt, 1958: 
461). To the ideologue, everlasting victory is only possible if we follow the 
superhuman linked historical law (natural or divine laws are also historical laws in the 
sense that it is the history which proves their existence). The purpose of invoking 
superhuman laws is twofold: one, it gives required legitimacy to the ideological rule; 
two, it allows the ideological mindset to defy existing positive laws, as it draws 
legitimacy from a higher source and, hence, can do away with the petty legality of the 
positive laws. 
Positive laws give stability, hedge against unpredictability and assure freedom of 
movement to human affairs. Nevertheless, for an ideologue, “even the most unjust legal 
rules are an obstacle” (Arendt, 1958: 457). Ideological lawfulness applies the Laws of 
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History or Laws of Nature directly to mankind; without translating these into the 
standards of right or wrong. This “direct reign of justice” does not take into account 
the individual behaviour of men (Arendt, 1958: 457).   
The ideological mindset does not substitute a set of laws with another law but defies 
all laws, including its own positive laws. “It promises to release the fulfilment of law 
from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on earth because it claims to 
make mankind itself the embodiment of the law” (Arendt, 1958: 462). 
The construction and subsequent invocation of the Laws of Nature (race) or History 
(class struggle) are ruthless and inflexible. The ideologue is supposed to clear 
everything which is hindering the realisation of these superhuman laws. The distinction 
between man and the law is obliterated—which is the hallmark of positive laws—and 
man himself is made “an active unfailing carrier” of the law (Arendt, 1958: 457). In 
the ideological mindset, it is the action of the man which hinders the movement of 
eternal laws, therefore, in order to allow the movement of eternal laws, the ideologue, 
who is the obedient servant of the eternal laws, must clear all hindrances in their path. 
Man must conform to the eternal laws.  
It is, however, not possible for every man to understand the true will of the Almighty 
as translated into eternal laws. Man being subjective shall tend to draw different 
interpretations of the same law. Different interpretations would be a sign of man’s 
freedom. Individual freedom, whether in the physical realm or thought is against the 
grain of the ideological mindset.  
The ideological mindset resolves this problem through the “leader principle”.  In this 
principle, the leader embodies the will of the Almighty. The will of the leader is the 
will of the Almighty. All actions of the followers must conform to the essence and will 
of the leader, rather than the petty laws and rules. No law or rule should be allowed to 
interfere with the will of the leader.  One Nazi assertion in “Nazi Conspiracy” explains 
the role of the leader as follows. 
The Fuehrer unites in himself all the sovereign authority of the Reich; 
all public authority in the state as well as in the movement is derived 
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from the authority of the Fuehrer. We must speak not of the state’s 
authority but the Fuehrer’s authority if we wish to designate the 
character of the political authority within the Reich correctly. The state 
does not hold political authority as an impersonal unit but receives it 
from the Fuehrer as the executor of the national will. The authority of 
the Fuehrer is complete and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the 
means of political direction; it extends into all fields of national life; it 
embraces the entire people, which is bound to the Fuehrer in loyalty and 
obedience. The authority of the Fuehrer is not limited by checks and 
controls, by special autonomous bodies or individual rights, but it is free 
and independent, all-inclusive and unlimited, who in his personality 
embodies the idea which sustains all and whose spirit and will, 
therefore, animate the entire community” (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol 1: 
Chapter 7; 2780-PS).  
The pledge of the Nazi party members asserted that the “Fuehrer is always right” 
(Arendt quoted from Ley, 1936: 8). It is, however, interesting to note that four years 
earlier the same pledge in “Dienstvorschrift fuer die P.O. der NSDAP (1932: 38) 
[adopted from Arendt] had a different phraseology. It then read: “Hitler’s decision is 
final”. Difference in phraseology may be linked to the level of totalitarian 
organisation’s hold on the affairs.  
Nazi pledge that “Fuehrer is always right” point to another peculiar aspect of the 
ideological mindset: namely, in this thinking, the leader can neither be defeated nor can 
make a mistake. A defeat or misjudgement of the leader is always interpreted as a new 
beginning.  The communist party, at least for the initial two years, refused to accept 
that Hitler’s victory in 1936 was actually the defeat of the German Communist Party. 
The ideological rule in one country with well-defined boundaries is a dilemma for the 
movement. Arendt summaries this danger in the following words: 
To a totalitarian movement, both dangers are equally deadly: a 
development towards absolutism would put an end to the movement’s 
interior drive, and a development towards nationalism would frustrate 
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its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive 
(Arendt, 1958:389). 
In order to address this dilemma, the movements go into “permanent revolution” 
(Arendt, 1958:389) mode. This mode helps them satisfy the requirements of domestic 
politics and maintain their claim to global domination.  
2.6.2 The Claim to Global Domination 
The Ideological mindset thinks transnational. It does not settle for total control of a 
state, rather, looks beyond its geographical boundaries and thinks that in order to fulfil 
the ideological claims, they need to dominate the world. Hitler in his Reichstag speech 
of 30 January 1939 declares: 
One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it certainly 
cannot be the intention of Heaven to give one people fifty times as much 
space (“Grund und Boden”) on this earth as to another. One should not 
permit himself to be diverted in this case by political boundaries from 
the boundaries of eternal justice (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol: Chapter7). 
This claim springs from the ideological conviction that “the law of nature or law of 
history, if properly executed, is expected to produce mankind as its end product; and 
this expectation lies behind the claim to the global rule of all totalitarian governments” 
(Arendt, 1958: 462). Therefore, the ideological mindset suppresses narrow nationalism. 
The state is just a means to achieve the ideological aim. Hitler consistently asserted that 
“the state is only the means to an end. The end is the conservation of race” (Reden, 
1939: 125).  Arendt further notes that ideologues “discard national sovereignty and 
believe, as Hitler once put it, in a world empire on a national basis. They are not  
satisfied with a revolution in one country but aim at the conquest and rule of the world” 
(Arendt, 1958: 358, 359).   
In “Nazi Conspiracy”, a transcript of SS meeting held at the SS Headquarters on 
January 12, 1943, suggests that the word “nation” should be eliminated as it was 
insufficient for the Germanic People (Document 705, V: 515).  Dossier Kersten quoted 
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Himmler that “[t]he Fuehrer does not think in German, but in Germanic terms”. It was 
a global race transcending manmade national boundaries. For a Nazi ideologue, the 
exclusive Aryan race should be contrasted from all other people; and its most absolute 
contrast was with the Jew. Hitler confirms in Mein Kampf that “the most extreme 
contrast to the Aryans is the Jew” (Book 1, Chapter xi). To him, the Jews were ruling 
the world through conspiracies. Liquidation of this species (the Jews) shall pass the 
global rule to the rightful species (the Aryans).  
Hitler thought he had a clear idea about the Germanic people, as he articulated in 1923 
that “[t]he Germanic people consists for one-third of heroes, for another third of 
cowards, while the rest are traitors” (Baynes, 1942:76). It was obvious from Hitler’s 
assertion that what was waiting for certain categories of the Germanic people as well. 
They were earmarked, albeit lower in order, as part of the “dying races”.  
The Ideologue does not differentiate between local and foreign populations. They plan 
the events in foreign lands with total disregard to any issues of sovereignty. For them, 
independent states are just like the provinces of a global state. An ideologue thinks that 
domestic and foreign political categories are just man-made abstractions, the 
superhuman law applies everywhere equally.  
Politically, the ideologue abhors a definite political goal. Anything which does not 
discuss “ideological questions of importance of centuries” (Arendt, 1958: 470) or 
subscribe to global domination is an abstraction to the ideologue. A Nazi Party 
Organisation Book reads “[t]he Party includes only fighters who are ready to accept 
and sacrifice everything in order to carry through the National Socialist ideology” (Nazi 
Conspiracy, Vol 1: Chapter 7; 2774-PS). Hitler was clear that the ideology of global 
domination would require violence. He said:  
Only a part of the people will be really active fighters. But they were 
the fighters of the National Socialist struggle. They were the fighters for 
the National Socialist revolution, and they are the millions of the rest of 
the population. For them, it is not sufficient to confess: “I believe”, but 
to swear: ‘I fight” (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol 1: Chapter 7; 2775-PS). 
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The ideology thus not only stresses total intellectual commitment to its fictitious world 
but also calls for violence and action.  
2.6.3  Violence and the Call for Action 
The role of violence in human history is too obvious to overstate. Arendt has dealt with 
the phenomenon in her book “On Violence” (1970). Violence, i.e., “acting without 
argument or speech and acting without counting the consequences” (Arendt 1970: 64), 
in Arendt’s writings, is opposite to power. Power is a political phenomenon and is 
generated wherever “men act in concert” (Burke quoted by Arendt, 1958:474). 
Violence is also important for the function it plays in a phenomenon. Absolute power, 
however, is exercised without violence. Use of violence indicates a corresponding lack 
of power (Arendt, 1970: 63-67). The ideological organisations need violence for 
effective propagation of their claims. “Power formations which have their origin in 
mere propaganda are fluctuating and can disappear quickly unless the violence of an 
organisation supports the propaganda” (Hadamovsky, 1939:21).  
An ideological mindset, however, is not interested in power for its own sake. Himmler, 
in a SS pamphlet, “Die SS”, Schriften der Hochschule fuer Politic (1939) says “[t]here 
is no task that exists for its own sake”. The pamphlet repeatedly emphasises “the 
absolute necessity for understanding the futility of everything that is an end in itself” 
(Arendt, 1958: 318). Generally, violence appears in relation to power. Ideological 
violence is independent of the state of power; it is for the sake of an ideology. Hitler is 
quoted as saying: 
The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an impairment of the 
fighting spirit. The conviction that it is right to use even the most brutal 
weapons is always connected with the existence of a fanatical belief that 
it is necessary that a revolutionary new order of this earth should 
become victorious. A movement which does not fight for these highest 
aims and ideals will therefore never resort to the ultimate weapon (Nazi 
Conspiracy, Vol 1: Chapter7). 
The ideological mindset is well aware of the role violence plays in social restructuring. 
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Hitler can be seen thrilled with the outbreak of the First World War in his book Mein 
Kampf, Book 1; Chapter V. Himmler thought violence furthers the ideological 
objectives. He believed that “the most severe selection procedure is brought about by 
war, the struggle of life and death. In this procedure, the value of blood is shown 
through achievement. War, however, is an exceptional circumstance, and a way had to 
be found to make selections in peace” (Hafkesbrink, 1948:43).  
In peace times, this mindset takes an extreme and violent position concerning its 
ideological claims. The actions committed in pursuit of this position are so violent that 
the ideologue is no more acceptable in the normal world. Goebbels writes in his diaries 
(1942-1943) that “[o]n the Jewish question, especially, we have taken a position from 
which there is no escape(…)Experience teaches us that a movement and people who 
have burned their bridges fight with much courage than those who are still able to 
retreat” (Lochner, 1948: 266).  
Some violence, in pursuit of a position, is an everyday experience of every human 
being. Violence, in this sense, is a natural and “rational” human behaviour and stems 
from our sense of rage. Sometimes, the spontaneous violent response generated by the 
rage is the only remedy to rebalance the scales of the injustices. Violence, however, 
turns irrational from a rational emotion, once it is deliberate, planned and directed 
against the substitutes (Arendt, 1970: 65-66). 
One of the sources of the violent behaviour of the ideologue lies in the rage that is 
generated against apparent injustice and hypocrisy. The ideological mindset is logically 
very consistent and does not have a place for injustice or hypocrisy.  It is at peace with 
itself and has found a way (ideology) to resolve the contradictions of the real world. 
Ideological mindset acts (mostly violently) for the sake of consistency, which they have 
acquired exclusively.    
Violence is important because of the function it plays. Sometimes the ideologue, even 
at the cost of his/her annihilation, uses violent behaviour to unmask the hypocrisies of 
the dominant powers which have managed to rule without overt means of violence. The 
devious manipulator, who plays with the words, should be provoked to be seen in its 
true colours. This function of violence has also been noted by Spender who writes that 
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“they have frequently recommended provocations of the police as a strategy for 
‘unmasking’ the violence of the authorities” (Spender, 1969: 92).    
For an ideological mindset, violence is a means to an end; the end being the realisation 
of the ideology. Violence, in this sense, shall always be in need of justification and 
guidance. While ideological mindset draws its legitimacy from the past, violence is 
justified for a future ideological world which matches with the distant past. So that the 
whole historical process, from the past to the future, can be ironed out in the light of 
only one interpretation. The ideological mindset, in the Arendtian sense, calls for 
action. This movement for action is inherent in ideologies.  
Past ideological rulers such as Hitler and Stalin who transformed their ideologies into 
weapons for the elimination of enemies used very simple and inconspicuous premises 
such as “dying classes” or races which are “unfit to live”, therefore, need to be 
eliminated through violence. Anyone who is in agreement that there are things like 
“dying classes” but then does  not draw the conclusion of their elimination or believes 
certain races are superior to others and the right to remain alive is linked with race, and 
do not draw the logical conclusion for exterminating “unfit races”, is seen as either a 
coward or a stupid (Arendt, 1958:471-473).  
After doing the needful, i.e., violence, the ideologues not only glorify and boast about 
their past crimes but enthusiastically forecast the future ones as well. The Nazis “were 
convinced that evil-doing in our times has a morbid force of attraction” (Borkenau, 
1940: 231). A gruesome act, conducted against all moral standards in pursuit of an 
ideological aim, not only seems objective but also increases its propaganda value. The 
objectivity of the violent act lies in the fact that the act cannot be linked to the personal 
interest of the character. Even today, it is indeed very difficult to find a correlation 
between violent acts of the present-day Islamic radicals and their personal interests.  
An absence of personal interest is typical of ideological violence. An ideologue does 
not appear to be a “power-hungry” individual who uses violence for their personal 
interest. Even power, which is the essence of almost all forms of governments, is 
attractive to the ideologue only for the role it can play in the realisation of the 
ideological aim (s).  
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The ideologue is not interested in their own welfare—the very source which is 
supposed to tie them to social, political and economic structures. Selflessness is typical 
of the ideological mindset. Arendt rightly identified the severity of this selflessness 
when she said that “compared with their non-materialism, a Christian monk looks like 
a man absorbed in worldly affairs” (Arendt, 1958: 313-316).   
The ideological character is so superfluous and selfless that they would willingly help 
in any ideological action, even if that action means their own execution. A Nazi or 
Bolshevik will not be shaken by any violent acts committed against their own people. 
Present-day violent Islamic ideologues amply exhibit these traits. The level of 
selflessness is also used as a yardstick to assess the ideological commitment of the 
character. Anton Ciligia, an engineer, experienced this method during the trials of 
foreign engineers in Russia year. He narrates:   
All the time the authorities insisted on my admitting having committed 
acts of sabotage I had never done. I refused. I was told ‘if you are in 
favour of the Soviet Government, as you pretend you are, prove it by 
your actions; the Government needs your confession’ (Ciliga, 1940: 
153). 
The ideologue is expected to fulfil all the ideological expectations and lose all interest 
in oneself. Himmler, who organised and indoctrinated the SS men, explained the 
selflessness of the Nazi ideologue in a speech. He says: 
They are not involved in ‘everyday problems’ but are only interested 
“in ideological questions of importance for decades and centuries, so 
that the man knows he is working for a great task which occurs but once 
in 2000 years (Nazi Conspiracy, Part V: 616).   
The ideologue does not take action for the sake of it; least of all for their own personal 
interest. Everything the ideologue does has a higher ideological purpose. Arendt sites 
SS’s watchword, “there is no task which exists for its own sake”. She also notes a 
quotation from an internally distributed pamphlet. The quotation, translated from 
German, emphasises, “the absolute necessity for understanding the futility of 
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everything that is an end in itself” (Arendt, 1958: 473 -475).  
Apart from the absence of personal interest, ideological violence is distinguished by 
another aspect, i.e., the perversity of its total domination.  Totalitarian domination is 
not content with the external subjugation of its subjects but demands absolute internal 
surrender as well.  
The idea of domination in the ideological mindset is so complete that no means of 
violence alone can achieve it. Ideological domination is not satisfied until and unless 
every single human being is dominated in every sphere of their life. A continuous and 
endless struggle is required to fashion man as per the ideology.  While answering 
criticism that, even after rise to power, National socialists are still talking about “a 
struggle”, Dieter Schwarz explained that “National Socialism as an ideology will not 
abandon its struggle until (…) the way of life of each individual German has been 
shaped by its fundamental values, and these are realized every day anew” (Arendt, 
1958: 390). 
For the ideological mindset, man being spontaneous and unpredictable should be so 
fashioned that they become the true carrier of the supernatural law. Violence is 
legitimate and essential to bring about the required change in man and the 
circumstances. The man must be stabilised and dehumanised. For an ideological 
mindset, terror is the only method to dehumanise the man; dehumanise in the sense that 
although the man does not become animal-like but does abandon all human actions and 
reactions. The totality of terror is achieved when it manages to eliminate all opposition 
and takes away all freedom of man.  Terror pronounces on the spot death sentences in 
order to clear the path for the movement of the Divine Law; the path which was 
hindered by the undesirable actions of the free man (Arendt, 1958: 465-468).   
While total terror is employed to eliminate external freedom of man, “self-coercive 
force of logicality [a kind of internal violence] is employed” to deprive the man of 
internal freedom. Internal freedom lies in the ability of the man to “think”.  Thinking 
being purest and freest of all human activities is opposite to the ideological mode of 
thinking—which does not think but follow a chain of logical deductions derived from 
a premise. Man’s thinking is akin to a new beginning. The new beginning is the only 
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way the man can escape the tyranny of the ideological logicality (Arendt, 1958:472 – 
474). Each new beginning can presuppose a new premise, which can be the start of de-
radicalisation of the previous ideology. In the existing mindset, an ideologue shall 
continue pursuing violent means to eliminate an objective enemy.   
2.6.4  The Objective enemy 
For the ideological mindset, the enemy is absolute and objective. The enemy’s 
subjective behaviour motivated by fear or any other motive has nothing to do with their 
status. It is the superhuman law expressed in the ideology that has declared certain 
people as objective enemies (Arendt, 1958: 424).  
The Ideological mindset also replaces a suspect with an objective enemy, i.e., 
replacement of a suspected infraction with an objective crime. As the ideology has 
categorised certain people as objective enemies, to an ideologue, it is just a matter of 
time that the suspect commits a crime. The ideologue thinks that they should act before 
the crime is committed. As the ideology has objectively defined the crime, therefore, it 
is not difficult for the ideologue to anticipate that a crime is about to be committed by 
a suspect type. Arendt narrates a story related by C. Pobyedonostzev as an example of 
the objective enemy. The event is related to a Russian General Cherevin of Okhrana, 
who was asked to explain the situation as the opposing party, who was about to lose a 
case, had hired a Jewish Lawyer. The General stated that: 
The same night I ordered the arrest of this cursed Jew and held him as a 
so-called politically suspected person (…) After all, could I treat in the 
same manner friends and a dirty Jew who may be innocent today but 
who was guilty yesterday or will be guilty tomorrow? (Arendt, 1958: 
426).  
An individual can also be suspected due to their resemblance with certain objective 
criteria. The ideologue can logically conclude that due to their suspect type personality, 
which matches the objective enemy, they can be suspected of planning an imagined act.  
In the Moscow trials, the logical anticipation of a crime yet to be committed by a 
suspected (objective) enemy, was stretched to remarkable limits. During the trials, 
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Stalin somewhat employed the following reasoning against the suspects.  
They may want to overthrow me in a crisis—I shall charge them with 
having made the attempt (…) A change of government may weaken 
Russia’s fighting capacity: and if they succeed, they may be compelled 
to sign a truce with Hitler, and perhaps even agree to a cession of 
territory (…) I shall accuse them of having entered already into a 
treacherous alliance with Germany and ceded Soviet territory 
(Deutscher, 1949:377).   
In the same vein, Frank quotes a Nazi ideologue in Nazi Conspiracy as follows: 
A complete catalogue of attempts ‘dangerous to the State’ can never be 
drawn up because it can never be foreseen what may endanger the 
leadership and the people sometime in the future (Quoted from Arendt, 
Frank, 1939:881). 
For an ideological mindset, if the laws of some superhuman force (History or Nature) 
have pronounced “inferior races” or “dying classes” to be the objective enemies, 
“[g]uilt and innocence become senseless notions; ‘guilty’ is he who stands in the way 
of the natural or historical process which has passed judgement over ‘inferior races’, 
over individuals ‘unfit to live’, over ‘dying classes and decadent peoples’” (Arendt, 
1958: 465).  
It is the task of the ideologue to find or nominate certain people as “dying classes” or 
objective enemies of the ideology. As the ideologue considers themselves as a mere 
interpreter of a divine process which will take its course regardless, their political 
statements are delivered in the form of a prophecy. Ideologue’s prophecies are their 
future intentions. Two examples are relevant here to prove this point. Hitler famously 
prophesized in 1939 that “I want today once again to make a prophecy:  In case the 
Jewish financiers (…) succeed once more in hurling the peoples into a world war, the 
result will be (…) the annihilation of Jewish race in Europe” (quoted from Goebbels’ 
diaries by Lochner, 1948: 148). Translated into plain language, the statement meant: I 
have recognised the objective enemy and war is necessary to eliminate them. 
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Similarly, Stalin once decided to liquidate party deviants, declared them as the 
representatives of the “dying classes” in his famous speech to the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party in 1930 (Stalin, 1933). The phrases like “dying classes” or 
“dying races” sharpen the focus of the audience and contextualise the issue concerning 
a historical process. When Stalin was declaring certain opponents as “dying classes”, 
he was, in fact, prophesizing their liquidation.  In other words, the time had come to 
liquidate the objective enemies of the ideology. The liquidation is fitted into the 
ideological realisation of the historical process. Declaring somebody as the objective 
enemy of the ideology is one of the greatest discretions in the hands of an ideological 
leader.  
For the ideological mindset, any sentiments of sympathy or support are equally useless 
as ideological terror selects its victims and executioners according to the objective 
standards. These standards are independent of “candidate’s convictions or sympathies”, 
and have nothing to do with individual thoughts or actions (Arendt, 1958:467-468). In 
the ideological mindset, man is dispensable, selfless and can be tasked objectively to 
play the role of an executioner or a victim. On the one hand, violence is employed to 
realign the reality with the understanding of the ideological mindset; on the other, the 
tyranny of the ideological logicality is employed to reject the existing reality. The 
ideological mindset rejects everything different from its thinking, i.e., factual reality.   
2.6.5  Rejection of Factual Reality 
The ideological mindset rejects reality. It does not subscribe to the plurality and 
uniqueness of everyday experiences of life, rather wants to see consistency in world 
affairs. Logical reasoning is employed to achieve this imagined consistency. Logical 
reasoning, says Arendt, not as a necessary check on the arbitrariness of the totalitarian 
rule, but as a tool to control the thought, i.e., to reject everything inconsistent with the 
idea or the premise of ideology. If some statements have two proclamations, which 
contradict each other, we know that we have gone wrong somewhere; and to reconcile, 
we need to think them all over again. The ideological mindset is fashioned to suppress 
any such response. It does not promote reflection, and rather it gleans out any view, 
judgment or fact which is in tension with the ideology itself (Arendt, 1958:469).   
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The ideological mindset is not interested in what is (i.e., the factual reality); rather it 
falls back either to its “super sense” or history, which is interpreted in light of the “only 
idea” of the ideology. The factual reality means the reality realised through the five 
senses. Ideological interpretations do not support things as they are, but point to the 
historical process which is in constant change. The present is just a stage of the 
historical process. The ideological mindset is “historical, concerned with becoming and 
perishing” (Arendt, 1958: 469).  In this thinking, man is merely a part of a gigantic 
process moved by nature which is evident in history. Life is historicised and created 
for the sake of historical movement. Life in itself is bereft of any meaning. 
In this sense, the ideological mindset becomes independent of all reality of daily life 
and new experiences. It insists on some truer reality which is concealed and can only 
be uncovered by the ideologue through their super sense. To the ideologue, “[t]he 
concepts of enmity is replaced by that of conspiracy, and this produces a mentality in 
which reality -  real enmity or real friendship - is no longer experienced and understood 
in its own terms but is automatically assumed to signify something else” (Arendt, 1958: 
471). This mindset thinks in terms of conspiracies and hidden agendas. Nazis used 
“‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’—a patent forgery—as a symbol of a Jewish 
conspiracy” (Curtiss, 1942).  The “protocols” were extensively used to denounce the 
Jews and to mobilise the mobs against them. The ideological mindset was not interested 
in the authenticity of the “protocols”, but as Hitler confirmed, the plausibility of the 
“Protocols” was located in the fact that “what many Jews may be doing unconsciously 
is here consciously made clear. And that is what counts” (Hitler, 1943: book 1; Chapter 
iv).  The intentions of the enemy become objectified. The ideological mindset works 
on the principle that anyone who is not included is excluded. This principle was laid 
out by Hitler as early as 1922 when he said: 
The gentlemen of the right have never yet understood that it is not 
necessary to be an enemy of the Jew to drag you one day……to the 
scaffold…….it is quite enough……..it is quite enough not to be a Jew: 
that will secure the scaffold for you  (Nazi Conspiracy, Vol 1: Chapter 
VII; 490).     
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The ideological mindset has a great capacity for extreme contempt for the facts. 
Koneird Heiden in his “Der Fuehrer: Hitler’s Rise to Power” states that Hitler could 
not show “demonstrable reality in all his utterances” and was “phenomenal[ly] 
untruthful” and demonstrated complete “indifference to the facts which he does not 
regard as vitally important” (Heiden, 1944: 368, 374). 
The ideological mindset, however, is not content with the rejection of the factual reality 
as such, but when in power makes every effort to transform the reality in line with its 
fictitious ideological world. Propaganda supported by terror is used to transform 
reality. They neither believe in the reality of their experience nor their eyes and ears 
but only in their imagination, i.e., the “super sense”. Such imagination is lured by 
anything consistent and universal. They are not convinced by the facts—whether true 
or invented—but the consistency of the system. Repetitive propaganda is very 
attractive to such a mindset as repetition itself substitutes the facts for the sake of 
consistency. To an ideologue, facts as such are just the examples of divine laws, and 
ideological propaganda can explain all accidents in light of an all-encompassing 
omnipotent first cause. In an ideological sense, however, propaganda and terror are two 
sides of the same coin. For the ideological mindset, “terror without propaganda would 
lose most of its psychological effect, whereas propaganda without terror does not 
contain its full punch” (Bamstedt, 1945: 164). Nazi theorist Eugen Hadamovsky 
supports the idea of using violence for the sake of propaganda. In his opinion, violence 
and propaganda are mutually supportive (Hadamovsky, 1939).  
In efforts to transform factual reality, totalitarianism would take definite steps to 
support its ideological propaganda. In Soviet Russia, for example, “at that time, it was 
officially announced that unemployment was ‘liquidated’. The result of the 
announcement was that all unemployment benefits were equally ‘liquidated’” (Ciliga, 
1940: 109). Similarly, when Nazis liquidated Polish intellectuals, who, in Hitler’s 
words can be “wiped out without qualms” (Poliakove, document no: 2472), the reason 
was not to terrorize the population but to conform to the fictitious reality of the 
ideology, which stated that Poles had no intellect, and that superior “Germanic blood” 
must be saved. The purpose of Himmler’s “Operation Hay” started on 16 February 
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1942 was to take “Germanic children” from Poles and hand them over to families “that 
are willing [to accept them] without reservations, out of love for the good blood in 
them” (Nuremberg Document, R 135, Centre de Documentation Juive, Paris).  
Karl Brandt, a physician, charged by Hitler to execute the program protested 
vehemently when he was suggested that the project aimed to eliminate superfluous 
food consumers. He opined that Nazi party members who toed such a line were clearly 
rebuked. He testified during “Medical Trial: The US against Karl Brandt et al. Hearing 
of May 14, 1947” that the considerations for eliminations were purely “ethical”.  
Likewise, records show that military staff repeatedly reminded that deportations of 
millions of Jews and Poles were against the “military and economic necessities” 
(Poliakove, document No 321).  
The ideological mindset is fond of using a “super sense” and may not take into account 
economic, political or common-sense considerations while taking decisions. Such a 
mindset is concerned with only one consideration, namely, to prove that its ideological 
predictions have come true. It was this consideration which convinced organised Nazis 
in the last days of the war to ensure as complete a destruction of Germany as possible, 
so that their prediction may come true that Germany would be ruined in case of a defeat.  
Real enmity grows out of a sense of injustice; it has an object which has committed the 
injustice. Real enmity is naked, direct, real and generally visible. Principally, every 
kind of injustice or aggression has a different enemy. In the conspirational sense of an 
ideology, the enemy never changes. The ideological mindset only focuses on that part 
of the reality, which is recognised by ideology. For the ideological mindset, it is 
legitimate to ignore or twist the factual reality in order to uncover the ideological 
claims.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter lays the foundations of an analytical framework aimed at conceptually 
understanding the Islamic radicalisation and its central character through the 
Arendtian criteria of ideology. Arendt has engaged with the notion in her various 
works, especially “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958).   
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Thinking and its manifestations are a speciality of Arendt. Thinking, in Arendt, is 
understood as a phenomenon in a political context. Arendt argues that a lonely man 
either thinks everything to the worst or stops thinking. In both cases, they may 
surrender their thought to the “mighty tentacles” of a totalizing ideology. She argues 
that an ideologue under the influence of ideology develops a distinct mode of thinking. 
This mode of thinking has certain characteristics or elements. Arendt traced these 
elements through the “characterology” of an ideological mindset. She assumes the Nazi 
and Bolshevik ideologue as an ideal character type for the “characterology” of an 
ideological mindset. Arendt interpreted these elements of ideological mindset through 
the actions of the characters (Arendtian “action” includes spoken or written word). The 
elements which characterise an ideological mindset are: the superhuman source as the 
origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; the 
objective enemy; and rejection of factual reality.   
Following Arendt, in succeeding chapters, I shall locate these elements through the 
“characterology” of the mindset of the Islamic ideologue. I shall argue that the 
discursive practices constructed by the three Islamist organisations, once interpreted, 
exhibit Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. The constructed character thinks in 
a similar pattern as the past ideologue, i.e. the Nazi/Communist ideologue. Next, I shall 
explain the method of my inquiry before I commence the analysis of Islamist 











Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Although, I deduce the five essential elements of ideological thinking from my readings 
of Arendt’s writings and especially “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958), I 
consciously deviate, in some aspects, from her theory and method of inquiry (as 
interpreted in Sigwart 2016, i.e. characterology). This deviation is based on plausible 
reasons and has certain implications for the findings of this research.  
In Origins, it is Arendt’s standard method to construct important characters which 
represent the “spirit” of the time and “essence” of the structural phenomenon. Through 
this characterology Arendt focuses on the significance of the structural phenomenon, 
which mediates and guides the conduct of her exemplary character(s). In this sense, she 
is more inclined to note the performative and contextual aspects of the characters. This 
focus enables her to articulate the main structural elements namely, antisemitism, 
imperialism and ideology, which crystallised into the phenomenon of totalitarianism. 
Fundamentally, Arendt “proceeds from some typical theoretical questions: What 
happened? Why did it happen? How could it have happened? (Arendt 1968a: xxiv 
quoted by Buckler, 2011).  
In a deviation from the Arendtian emphasis, this research focuses on the character 
itself. Specifically, it is trying to identify the set of essential ideas that comprise the 
mindset of the violent character of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation. This 
research inquiry is limited only to the question: what does the mindset of the 
constructed abstract character of the phenomenon comprise of? This deviation is 
necessary as this thesis is trying to deduce the standard profile of the character, i.e. 
Islamic ideologue, which is based on the assumption that such a standard profile 
consists for a typical mindset. This study’s focus also entails an important 
methodological departure from the Arendtian method employed in Origins. Arendt 
employs inductive rationality to theorise her understanding of the phenomenon, 
whereas this research deduces the elements of an ideological mindset from the 
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empirical material through an existing (Arendtian) theoretical framework, hence, it is 
a deductive method.  I assert that deductive rationality of this research, though inspired 
by Arendt, has a value in its own right as it is likely to extend a strong theory to another 
character that has been produced by another phenomenon namely, Islamic discourses 
producing radicalisation, which has not yet been analysed using Arendt. This 
methodological difference has certain implications for the findings of this research. 
Firstly, a researcher with a different theoretical framework may read the empirical 
material differently and come up with different kind of findings. In this sense, the 
findings of this research assume an agreement with the Arendtian articulations of 
ideology. Specifically, it assumes the separation of religion and ideology as an 
analytical category. The findings of this research would imply that certain Islamic 
theological interpretations are not religious but ideological in nature and inspire 
violence. Whether these interpretations are mainstream or not is a complex 
investigation and would require epistemological and ontological positioning on the 
idea of ‘mainstream Islam’, which is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Secondly, 
although this research in its conclusion does note certain deviations, in the thinking of 
the Islamic radical, from the Arendtian theory, yet such observations (on the deviations) 
are still deductive in nature and remain tied to the Arendtian theory. Hence, this 
research is conscious of the fact that, although the research is grounded in a strong 
theoretical framework, the same framework does limit its methodological flexibility as 
compared to an inductive method. A researcher approaching the same empirical 
material through inductive methodology may name the ideas exhibited by the 
constructed character differently but shall lose the advantage of drawing conceptual 
parallels between the past ideologues, i.e., Nazi and Communist ideologues, and the 
contemporary Islamic ideologue; a comparison that becomes possible through the 
Arendtian theory.   
Thirdly, this research deduces the ideas mentioned in the MILIR (see Chapter 9) from 
the empirical material published by the Islamist organisations. The ideal character 
constructed by these discursive practices is not only a cognitive realisation but also 
engages with the contextual and performative aspects of the action in the real world. 
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The analysis chapters (chapter 4 to 8) highlight the performative and contextual aspects 
of the character as the analysis progresses.  
This chapter discusses the methodological approaches I employ to analyse the 
empirical material that is produced by three terrorist organisations in their discursive 
practices. These approaches pay special attention to embedded themes in the written 
texts. I take the online magazines published by three Islamist organisations (AQ, IS 
and TT) as space where these organisations discursively construct an ideal type of a 
character, whom I call the Islamic ideologue. In the first part of the chapter, I follow 
Sigwart in conceptualising “characterology” as a method of inquiry from Arendt. I 
explain why it is important to construct and study characteristics of an ideal type of a 
character that is linked to a complex phenomenon such as Islamic radicalisation. In 
the second part, I elaborate on the technique that I use to work on the exemplary written 
texts selected from the magazines. I use theory led thematic analysis technique to 
interpret the exemplary passages that construct the ideal type character. The objective 
is to find whether the ideal type constructed by the Islamist organisations carry all the 
Arendtian theorised elements in its mindset. The last part of the chapter elaborates on 
how and why I select my source material. This may raise some questions about source 
selection and the advantages and disadvantages of thematic analytic techniques for 
reading the characteristics of an abstract character constructed through written texts. I 
am careful to claim that I have comprehensively addressed these issues, and I provide 
a determined defence of my approach. I also stress that my empirical chapters (Chapter 
3 to 7) should be seen as illustrations of the theoretical framework and analytical 
argument explained in the first two chapters. This is a theory-led qualitative approach 
that is designed to reconceptualise the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation.  
3.2 Conceptualising “Characterology” as the Method of Inquiry 
In “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958), Arendt employs a distinct method of 
inquiry. She shapes this method into a critical method of political analysis. The method 
not only illuminates the “elemental structure” of totalitarianism, but it also renders a 
critic of the phenomenon itself, thus sensitising the reader to the “immediate practical 
implications” of an unprecedented occurrence (Sigwart, 2016: 271). Although it is 
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possible, according to Sigwart, to find some commonality of tradition in Arendt within 
the oeuvre of Charles de Montesquieu and her teachers, namely Martin Heidegger and 
Karl Jaspers, Arendt is, however, unique in her way of theorising. It is this uniqueness 
of Arendt’s way of theorising that has become the main cause of criticism by her rivals.  
The main problem originates from the persistent efforts to categorise the Arendtian 
methodology within the known political philosophies and traditional schools of thought 
(Vollrath and Fantel, 1977: 160). One can note the strong traditional epistemological 
language in the critique by her opponents. According to Ernst Vollrath, her critics 
describe her “as a proponent of a normative attitude, a neo—Aristotelian, an adherent 
of obsolete doctrines of natural right, as a philosophical anthropologist; or to simplify 
matters, as a political essayist, a hyperbolic commentator on timely events, or, a 
historian without methodological training” (ibid). Methodological ambiguity, in the 
traditional sense, is an area noted by almost all the scholars who chose to reflect on the 
Arendtian methodology.  
Steve Buckler, for example, opines that “Arendt’s methodological commitments are 
neither immediately nor easily identifiable and her remarks on the subject were 
occasional and elusive” (Buckler, 2011: 2). Arguably, such an ambiguity is not a lapse 
on the part of Arendt but a deliberate and conscious departure from traditionalism in 
line with her understanding of the very nature of politics. She “wished to look at politics 
with eyes unclouded by philosophy” (Buckler, 2011: 1). Understandably, the political 
actions of the political characters are supposed to be contextual and performed in 
peculiar conditions of the time (Sigwart, 2016). Therefore, Arendt chose “to think in a 
mode that would reacquaint us with the distinctive fabric of political experience, 
gaining greater proximity to the political through the development of a manner of 
speaking that answers more closely to the discursive conditions of the public realm 
itself” (Buckler, 2011: 6). Arendt approaches the phenomenon of totalitarianism 
through a discrete method of inquiry. 
Therefore, at first instance, it is indeed difficult to locate Arendt’s work on 
totalitarianism and ideology in some explicit methodological understanding. It seems 
that the effort suffers from the absence of an explicitly explained conceptual 
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framework. However, Arendt is not only aware of this dimension, but it appears that 
she has deliberately avoided the methodological formalities (Sigwart, 2016: 265). She 
acknowledges the fact that her work “does not belong to any school and hardly uses 
any of the officially recognised or officially controversial instruments” (Arendt, 1953: 
77).  For Arendt, it is more important to understand the political reality of an 
unprecedented phenomenon like totalitarianism than the method through which such a 
reality has been understood (Sigwart, 2016: 265). She is quite sceptical about putting 
too much emphasis on methodology and believes that as a result of social scientists’ 
over-emphasis on methodology during their academic quarrel “methodological 
problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental issues” (Arendt, 1953: 77). For 
Arendt “Inquiry Method” means “such mental processes as deducing, inducing, and 
drawing conclusions whose logical rules . . . can be learned once and for all and then 
need only to be applied” (Arendt, 2006: 13). Arendt calls methodological procedures 
an “experience in how to think”, which can be learnt “like all experience in doing 
something, only through practice, through exercises” (Arendt, 1968/2006: 13). One 
may note that her thoughts are not very conventional, especially with regards to the 
questions of methodology.   
In a reply to Eric Voegelin, who is the first commentator on her Origins, Arendt 
acknowledges that she “failed to explain the particular method which I came to use, 
and to account for a rather unusual approach …. to the whole field of political and 
historical sciences as such” (Arendt, 1953: 77). Arendt calls her method “unusual” as 
it does not fit neatly into the Anglo-American theoretical tradition of the time. It is 
worth pointing out that in some instances her critics failed to appreciate the real focus 
of her work (Sigwart, 2016: 265-270).  
Sheila Benhabib also notes the “redemptive power” of the Arendtian narrative. She 
argues that Arendt in Origins “is searching for the ‘elements’ of totalitarianism; for 
those currents of thought, political events and outlooks, incidents and institutions, 
which once the ‘imagination of history’ has gathered them together in the present reveal 
an altogether different meaning than what they stood for in the original context” 
(Benhabib, 1990:172). Arendt appreciates the novelty of the totalitarian phenomenon 
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and then from that position studies the history backwards to locate the elemental 
threads of the phenomenon in the political and social space of the time (Crick, 
1977:120). Would it have added to the methodological clarity of Origins, had Arendt 
explicitly said what she was doing? Arguably, “she selects what is relevant to 
understanding the mentality of the Nazis and the Communists under Stalin; and she is 
not writing a general account of nineteenth-century extreme political sects” (Ibid). 
Arendt successfully illuminates the elements of a novel mindset at the centre of the 
totalitarian phenomenon, yet she “say[s] nothing helpful to the reader faced with a work 
so large, so unusual, so diverse, so outside the Anglo-American scholarly tradition, 
about her presupposition” (Crick, 1977:122). She, however, reflects on the nature of 
her ideas in her later works. Bernard Crick notes this shift and argues that Arendt 
clarifies her assumptions about human freedom, the political, and the capacity for 
action in The Human Condition (1958); the possibilities of deliberate social change in 
On revolution (1963);  freedom and normative practice in Eichmann in Jerusalem 
(1963); and the nature of authority and power in On violence (ibid). Therefore, if her 
“books are read as each taking up a theme that emerges in Origins, but is left unresolved 
or insufficiently clarified, then we see her writings in true perspective and as 
constituting a whole” (Crick, 1977:123).  
Nevertheless, Arendt’s remark about her methodology has at least two interesting 
implications: First, “her comment suggests that she indeed exercises a distinct method 
of inquiry in Origins” (Sigwart, 2016: 265,266). She chooses to call her method a 
“rather unusual” approach. The expression “unusual” indicates the distinctiveness of 
the method and affirms the realisation that it was difficult to categorise her 
methodology with the help of Anglo-American Schools of Thought of her time (ibid). 
Principally, it appears that Arendt is not comfortable with the idea of formally laying 
out one’s method of inquiry in the research; therefore, we are unable to find an 
explicitly laid out methodology in her writings. At the same time, it is, however, unfair 
to conclude that Arendt’s writings are without a methodology when we know that she 
most certainly used a methodology which she described as unusual.  
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Second, Arendt concedes in her reply to Eric Voegelin that the plausibility of her 
argument would have been further strengthened, had she cared to elaborately explain 
the elementary assumptions of her “unusual” approach. In Origins, apart from 
ambiguity with regards to methodology, Arendt has also refrained from explicitly 
explaining the fundamental assumptions of the inquiry (Sigwart, 2016: 266). Both 
assumptions, once reviewed together, do suggest that Arendt did use a methodology in 
Origins which was “unusual” and implicit. These assumptions open up a “potentially 
rich source of inspiration regarding the methodological foundations of political 
theorising” (Ibid).   
Sigwart conceptualises Arendt’s methodology as implicit in Origins (Sigwart, 2016) 
and employs reconstructive interpretation to unearth the method used in the study. He 
“reconstruct[s] the Origins as an implicit ‘exercise’ on the question of ‘how to think’” 
(Sigwart, 2016: 266). Sigwart borrows from Lysa J. Disch’s (1993) in describing his 
attempt, namely, “to tell a story that Arendt did not tell because she considered it 
inappropriate to do so” (Disch, 1993: 665). Sigwart argues that 
there indeed is an only vaguely articulated and partly rather 
underspecified, yet decisive methodological motive woven into 
Arendt’s analyses which substantially shapes the study’s general frame 
of reference. I denote this motive as Arendt’s “characterological” 
method of political theorising (Sigwart, 2016: 266).  
Theoretically, “characterology” is aligned with “realist” or “non-idealist” approaches. 
These approaches emphasise the practicalities of historical explanations of political 
theory when it engages with “concrete practices of politics” within a specific 
framework of institutions and structures (Sigwart, 2016: 275; Galston, 2010). A “non-
idealist” social theorist would focus on the practicability of the facts as they exist. 
Nevertheless, both, the idealists and realists, understand that sometimes an imaginative 
journey into the future is essential to recreate certain ideal situations to assess a 
character’s response to the changed circumstances. Beyond this point, the realists (in 
contrast to idealists), however, argue that the theory should not stretch the 
circumstances to the extent that it presents the world radically different from the 
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existing one. The “non-idealist” approaches lay more emphasis on the probability and 
feasibility aspects of the human experience and argue that the possibility that all 
humans will appreciate a certain value or attribute equally is very low. Likewise, as the 
influence of a specific social phenomenon would differ from one individual to another, 
therefore, it is unlikely that all members of a community would engage with the 
disposition with the same intensity. An outward empirically verifiable disposition, in 
this sense, is a real and concrete disposition displayed by a certain character type.   
The employment of “non-idealist” approaches in explaining an unprecedented 
phenomenon by Arendt is understandable. Sometimes, a unique phenomenon needs a 
unique method to understand it. Arendt’s “decided refusal to join the fashionable trends 
emerging from the desperate efforts of current political theorists to appear properly 
‘scientific’, however, led her to, ironically, characterise her thinking style as ‘my old-
fashioned storytelling’” (Vollrath and Fantel, 1977: 160,161).  
Using this “old fashioned storytelling” method, now described as the 
“characterological” method of political theorising by Sigwart, Arendt manages to 
interpret significant empirical material comprising biographical narratives, official 
reports, historical records and other literature to tell the story of the totalitarian 
phenomenon. Epistemologically, this is done under a theoretical framework of 
“interpretive connection of structural elements with an individualistic and ideographic 
perspective on political phenomena” (Sigwart, 2016: 266). The framework suggests 
that the concepts that are central to the phenomenon i.e., structural concepts, such as 
ideology have an intimate and reciprocal connection with the individual dispositions. 
The connection between individual perspectives and the structural phenomena is, 
however, in need of interpretation.  
The conceptual connection between the structural concept and individual disposition is 
comprehended through conceptually constructing exemplary character types. The 
exemplary character type is the living embodiment of the structural phenomenon such 
as ideology that is being examined in this research. These ideal-type characters are 
central to the “characterology” as a method of inquiry. Sigwart asserts that these 
character types “articulate the practical significance of elemental social, political, and 
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historical patterns by highlighting the intimate, reciprocal, and dynamic relation 
between individual dispositions and actions and their structural context” (Sigwart, 
2016: 266). These character types take specific and concrete positions on social 
understandings of the historical and political narratives. The dispositions are informed 
by their understandings of the structural narrative and pattern. The character types’ 
dispositions are like a focal point for the structural concept and the action. In their 
dispositions, the character types make sense of the ideology (the structural concept) 
and initiate the informed action.   
The action of an ideologue, informed by ideology, can empirically materialise in two 
forms. One, it can be in the form of concrete physical action, and two, it can be in the 
shape of a written/spoken word or a symbol. The latter form, which can also be called 
the narrative method, can hermeneutically expose the basic elements or characteristics 
of a phenomenal condition like a radicalised or ideological mindset.  
The “characterological” approach is also premised on certain other useful concepts. For 
example, the idea that the structural concept has a definitive relationship with the action 
of the character type. This relationship is not stagnant but dynamic and reciprocal. 
After having engaged with the ideology, the character type interprets and fixes its sense 
and meaning in their thought. During the conceptual understanding of the ideology, a 
dialogue of thinking takes place between the self of the character and the concept, i.e., 
ideology. Ideally, such dialogue of thinking takes place in two in one, i.e. me and 
myself, situation. However, as the character has replaced “me” with an ideology, the 
dialogue becomes meaningless. The other self of the ideologue, which is now a non-
negotiable ideological mindset, mimics a dialogue. This dialogue is not in the form of 
any contest or argumentation but only to think the ways to reorder the thought. The 
thought is no more guided by an independent logic and rationality, but only by the 
logicality of the ideology. The character stops thinking and submits to the “mighty 
tentacles of the logicality” (Arendt, 1958: 472). Under the influence of ideology, the 
thinking pattern of the character changes permanently. This change in thinking 
patterns is the result of the assimilation of the ideology. I call this thinking an 
ideological mindset. The character has been radicalised to become an ideologue, and 
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most of their actions are a result of the changes specified above, i.e., the ingrained 
thinking pattern informs them.  
The ideological mindset has certain characteristics. Interestingly, these characteristics 
of the ideological mindset are more or less common to all ideologues irrespective of 
the nature of the ideology. A focus on the conceptual characteristics of a radicalised 
person's mindset can help us to identify certain peculiar characteristics, which are 
common to all ideologues. These characteristics of an ideological mindset can be 
hermeneutically gleaned from the action or the narrative of the character type, i.e. the 
ideologue.   
The “characterological” approach has certain fundamental conceptual cornerstones. 
First, the approach supports the idea that there is a dynamic, mutually constitutive and 
reciprocal relationship between the action of a character and the abstract concept. 
Second, it interprets concrete incidents and narratives to construct a representative 
character type. This character type then acts as a methodological category to mediate 
between the action and the elementary structural concept (Sigwart, 2016: 274, 275). 
Third, it allows us to deconstruct the conceptual thinking of a “representative character 
type” to understand their mindset.   
The “characterological” approach aims at defining the structural aspects of a 
phenomenon by recognising the typical “individual dispositions of action” (Sigwart, 
2016: 267) and by articulating these actions in ideal character types. In line with the 
“characterological” approach, this research is focusing on the ideological aspects of 
the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation. I explain this phenomenon through the 
narratives of Islamist organisations. This approach provides a theoretical framework 
which takes into account the significance of structural patterns (like ideology, in this 
case) while at the same time draws on the concrete, dynamic and empirical political 
action, as narrated by the Islamist organisations. Political “characterology” assesses the 
individual character types in action while affording them freedom in their settings; it 
connects the structural concept to empirical evidence.  
The “characterological” approach augments the very few studies that have conducted 
empirical research to understand the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation with the 
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particular focus on its central character. The approach, however, is based on certain 
specific assumptions. For instance, it assumes that certain character types express 
politically noteworthy social concepts like ideology through their narratives and 
concrete actions at the practical level, and these exemplary character types “are 
composed of peculiar sets of individual dispositions” (Sigwart, 2016: 267). As the 
character types readjust their actions in line with the “peculiar sets of individual 
dispositions”, ideology does not remain abstract at the level of individual action or 
narration. The ideal type of ideologue takes a definitive position in their textual 
expressions. In other words, an ideologue is an actor agency which transforms an 
abstract concept of ideology into concrete and practical action informed by a peculiar 
mindset. The practical action of an ideologue can take many forms like: physical, 
visual, written or spoken word.    
The practical action of an ideal type of ideologue is, however, problematic. It is 
problematic because it flows from a fictitious and distorted mindset. It is also possible 
that an illusionary worldview might be shared, more so, by other members of the 
character’s wider group, social network or society. What distinguishes the Islamic 
ideologue from other members of their community, however, is their seriousness to 
operationalise this conceptual construction. In other words, this character type is very 
serious in eliminating any tension between the abstract concept and action. 
Paradoxically, it is also this action-oriented seriousness that enhances the social 
position of the character in Muslim communities. The level of social acceptance of the 
Islamic ideologue in the Muslim communities is a strong indicator to assess the level 
of importance the communities attached to a particular ideology. This assumption is in 
line with the Arendtian insistence on the empirical concreteness of the action in 
political theory. Methodologically, the assumption implies a dynamic relationship 
between the “practical logic of political action” and its “structural context” (Sigwart, 
2016: 267). Political action at an individual level makes sense once viewed in a 
structural context.  
According to the Arendtian understanding, the relationship between action and the 
structural concept is not unilateral or causal but reflects a complex mutuality. In this 
100 
 
sense, ideology, if understood as a structural phenomenon fuelling violence in Muslim 
societies, should be comprehended in personal and concrete expressions of individual 
dispositions of action or narration.  
In their political and social engagements, as the individuals actively attempt to relate 
to the structural environment of the society, they also translate the “structural pattern” 
of the society through concrete actions or narratives. In this process, certain 
representative character types claim to have acquired the “spirit” of these structural 
patterns in their personal dispositions of action (or narration) (Sigwart, 2016: 269). This 
claim, of having acquired the “spirit” corresponding to structural concepts, also gives 
the character a kind of monopoly over the interpretations of the abstract concept. If the 
ideology, for example, is the structural concept under review, the ideologue goes 
beyond the stated laws of the ideology in their claim of understanding the “spirit” or 
essence of these laws.  
This conceptual claim of understanding the essence of ideology on the part of the ideal 
type might be a point of distinction between ideology and religion. At this point, the 
ideal type moves beyond the stated laws of the religion Islam. The character is turned 
into an Islamic ideologue from a religiously observant Muslim.  The Islamic ideologue 
justifies his/her behaviour with the help of the essence of the ideology. The idea of the 
essence helps the ideologue to resolve the tension between the radical concept and their 
personal disposition. An ideological mindset is always aligned with the essence of the 
ideology.   
In Origins, Arendt analyses a dynamic relationship between a structural concept and 
an individual disposition. However, the idea of such a relationship does not exist a 
priori in her studies, but she elaborates this in and through her studies. In her endeavour 
to explain this relationship, she conceptualises certain representative character types 
which she considers as “living embodiments” or “living symbols” of the basic 
structural idea (Arendt, 1958: 71, 189). While selecting and then studying ideal 
character types, Arendt methodologically translates “structural concepts into more 
concrete and practical terms of a political theory of action” (Sigwart, 2016: 267).  
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In Origins, Arendt studies many character types, such as the ideologue, the bourgeois, 
the Jewish character, the mass-man, the bureaucrat, the imperial character, and others. 
These character types are realised in concrete individual conceptual dispositions and 
their practices when they relate themselves to society.  
For example, the Jew of the time is expressed in the “characterology” of the parvenu 
and the pariah. The conceptual “principle of action” for the parvenu is “honour”. 
Accordingly, as external signs of distinction, this character type strives for privilege, 
reputation and distinction (Arendt: 1994, 335, 336). The parvenu is political and 
represents the “spirit” of the peculiar political position of Jews of the time. Arendt 
constructs “the conceptual Jew” to conceptualise the history of antisemitism. “The 
conceptual Jew provided the critical energy for Arendt’s (...) theoretical reflections on 
antisemitism” (Judaken: 2012, 173). The character of the Jew is constructed in both 
roles i.e. as the originator as well as the victim of modernity. In the Arendtian 
conception, the identity of “the conceptual Jew” is quite an unsettled one when viewed 
with the help of Jewish traditions (Judaken: 2012, 174). The prevalent social structure 
of the time excludes Jews from being fully integrated into society as equal members. 
The parvenu, left with no option, develops a mindset which “follows the peculiar social 
logic of distinction”. The parvenu mindset is equivalent to “subject” disposition as 
described by Montesquieu in monarchical societies (Sigwart: 2016, 271). In a hostile 
society, the parvenu must protect their “honour” through privilege and “reputation”. 
Therefore, the character’s mindset was influenced by the prevailing structural ideas. 
Arendt treats these conditions, which forced the parvenu to adopt a particular mindset 
as early symptoms of the structural concept of anti-Semitism. The parvenu mindset, 
however, became dysfunctional in the changing political environment of the 19th 
century. The character of the parvenu failed to adjust their behaviour to the structural 
ideas of the century and fell out of tune for the time. The Character’s failure, in itself, 
indicates a change in the structural ideas and concepts of the time. Arendt’s 
“characterological” scenery sketches different character types to understand certain 
structural concepts like anti-Semitism, racism, imperialism, all of which crystallised 
into totalitarianism at the critical juncture of the 20th century. Interestingly, an anti-
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political orientation of Arendt’s many characters also tells the story of the absence of 
a “citizen” as a character type in 19th century Europe (Sigwart, 2016: 272).     
Likewise, for Arendt, the mindset of a character type in the personal disposition of a 
Nazi or a Communist ideologue indicates the presence of a mediating structural concept 
as well, i.e. an ideology. Arendt studies deeply the mediating structural concept of 
ideology to understand the mindset of the character, i.e. the ideologue. Arendt 
interprets narratives and biographical accounts of the exemplary characters to arrive at 
the peculiar characteristics or elements of an ideological mindset.  Arendt understands 
the peculiar elements of an ideological mindset or ideologue through the interpretations 
of actions and discursive practices of the Communist and Nazi ideologue. In her 
endeavour to trace the discursive practices of the character type, Arendt relies heavily 
on primary resources. These resources include the inquiry report known as Nazi 
Conspiracy, Nazi publications, Nazi and Communist propaganda/training material, 
speeches, interviews, newspapers and party manifestos of both the organisations. Apart 
from the secondary material, Arendt reinforces her argument with two exceptional 
direct sources available to her. These are: First, her own life experience in Germany 
with the Nazi ideologue and second, her direct exposure to an exemplary ideologue, 
namely Eichmann, during his trial in Jerusalem. Although, the Eichmann trial was held 
several years later than her “characterological” exercise of a Nazi ideologue in the 
Origins, yet the Eichmann experience only reconfirms her earlier findings, and she 
does not revise any of her thoughts on ideological mindset.  What’s more, the Eichmann 
trial only confirms the assertion that ideological radicalisation is more of a mental 
phenomenon than the physical appearance of a character, and such a character is 
indistinguishable from ordinary fellow human beings.  
While studying these exemplary character types, Arendt discovered a unique thinking 
pattern which had its origin in the ideology and informed the action and the discursive 
practices of the ideologue. This thinking pattern or mindset was common in both the 
character types, i.e. the Nazi and Communist ideologue, although the geography and 
the ideology separated them.  
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I argue that, apart from the character’s “representative disposition” as an ideologue, 
Arendt sufficiently explores the elements of the character’s (ideologue’s) mindset as 
well. Arendt not only introduces us to the ideologue but also digs deeper and guides us 
to a mindset which is the essence of this character. It is here, in the realm of thought, 
that all ideologues, irrespective of their background and gender, have a strange 
commonality.  They all think similarly. They have a peculiar mindset, which can be 
deciphered with the help of Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. In this sense, 
the study argues that the mindset of the “representative disposition” of the Islamic 
ideologue is ideological, like the Nazi and the Communist ideologue; and elements of 
Arendtian ideological mindset can be traced in this character type by interpreting the 
character’s empirical textual expressions.   
Although conceptualising the elements of the mindset of the Islamic ideologue as an 
ideal type through the Arendtian theory is central to this research, it is pertinent to 
reflect on the situation of the Islamic ideologue as a character type in the social and 
political realm of society as well.  
The Islamic ideologue as a character type originates from and belongs to the Muslim 
communities. The character has predominantly religious leanings and is inflexible in 
their interpretations of the religion. The character (wrongfully) thinks that they are 
guided by the religion of Islam. The character tries to spend most of their time in 
religious pursuits. They are politically very active, and most of the time they are 
associated with some organisation that legitimises violence for a political change. 
Being very punctual in the religious rituals, the character is viewed as a pious person 
by the ordinary Muslim community members.  
The character is neither distinguishable by economic, social and ethnic background 
nor by any plausible criteria of gender, age and education. They are socially very 
amicable and look very ordinary. The character considers themselves as part of the 
wider Ummah (an imaginary worldwide Muslim community). The character is filled 
with self-righteous pride and interprets events in a binary sense, i.e. Islamic or un-
Islamic. The ideology serves as the “principle of action” for the character. They hinge 
their worldview on an ideology, which is not in sync with the contemporary political 
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and social structures. The Islamic ideologue articulates the peculiar essential and 
personal meaning of the “spirit” or “essence” of the structural concept, namely 
ideology. Although Origins is the best example where Arendt has used her interpretive 
method of relating the person to the structural concept and its engagement with the 
“principle of action”, she has substantially engaged with this method in her other 
writings as well (Cane, 2015: 68-71).  
The “characterological” method of political theorising helps lay the empirical 
foundations of the study. The lack of empirical research in Islamic radicalisation 
debate is one of the main reasons this study has been conducted. “Characterology”, as 
a methodological framework, binds abstract theoretical analysis to concrete personal 
experiences expressed through narratives or actions. This relationship is further 
substantiated by exemplary empirical textual constructs of actual individuals who 
represent character types in Islamist organisations. The inclusion of biographical 
accounts and textual constructions in this methodology, therefore, are not any 
“idiosyncratic digressions ... but [are] integral parts of the analysis itself” (Sigwart, 
2016: 267, 268). Through these textual constructs, the character types reflect on their 
fundamental arguments. An interpretive analysis of individual stories and narratives in 
the “characterological” context does help in deciphering the elemental structure of an 
ideological mindset. It is also useful in understanding the intimate connection between 
the personal disposition of the character, i.e. the elements of ideological mindset and 
the structural concept, i.e. ideology.  
Arendt, however, advises a distanced position as an academic to fully grasp the explicit 
relationship between the character and the structural concept that influences the 
character's behaviour. She thinks that “alienation” helps in understanding the “story’s 
theoretically essential aspects” (Arendt, 1962:2). A kind of “alienation,” argues Arendt, 
is necessary to guard against the common sense understanding of the story. Common 
sense understanding may result from the immediate involvement of the observer with 
the event. Such understanding may be close to a popular viewpoint but may obscure 
theoretically significant aspects of the story. Therefore, a distanced position can serve 
as a methodological means to focus attention on the explicit description of the 
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conceptual currents of the story. For example, the isolated acts narrated in the 
magazines, in itself, are open to endless interpretations, therefore, “these acts and 
stories need to be contextualised and interpreted” through a “method of insulating, 
distilling and hence alienating interpretations” so that it becomes possible to trace a 
theoretical pattern in them (Arendt, 1962: 2-10). Therefore, this study treats the 
narratives of the three Islamist organisations hermeneutically to trace the theoretically 
essential elements which can relate the radical minds to a theory-driven five elements 
of the ideological mindset. It is necessary to contextualise and interpret the actions and 
stories if we want that “the figure in question… to perform the function, we assign to 
the exemplary characters” (Arendt, 1978: 169). The narratives not only tell personal 
stories but also help in the “transformation of a historical figure into a model” which 
reflects a “representative function” (Arendt, 1978: 169).  
“Characterology” relies heavily on concrete empirical instances flowing out of the 
abstract structural phenomenon like ideology. Arendt emphasises that “the curve which 
the activity of thought describes must remain bound to the incident as the circle remains 
bound to its focus” (Arendt, 1962: 10).  This relationship between thought and concrete 
incident is central to Arendtian political theory. In Arendtian sense, the empirical 
incident (whether in the shape of action or narrative) should link up to the theory or 
vice versa; the theory should be able to explain the incident. If the ideal type of an 
Islamic ideologue thinks ideologically then the discursive practices constructed by the 
Islamist organisations, once interpreted, should yield certain theoretically plausible 
elements of ideological mindset. Arendt resists the abstraction of theories and asserts 
that “theory must be relentlessly and ruthlessly concrete” and should be able to deal 
with “events and action which have taken place in fact” (Wolin, 1977: 93).   
In Origins, Arendt does not approach the structural phenomenon of totalitarianism 
directly but “dispensing with such structural definitions, she develops them in the form 
of a broad empirical casuistry of symptomatic ‘instances’ and exemplary character 
types” (Sigwart, 2016: 268). Such an Arendtian technique is very relevant to this study. 
This method allows us to bypass numerous definitional debates of the phenomenon of 
Islamic radicalisation. Thus, focusing our attention on the character’s mindset, which 
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informs the character’s actions and narratives. This mindset expresses itself 
empirically in the literature of the Islamist organisations. A contextualised theory-
oriented interpretation of such textual constructions can lead us to the ideas of the 
mindset that are constructed by a structural phenomenon, namely ideology.   
The method also caters for the “significance of human behaviour” (Arendt, 1958: 8). 
For this inquiry, “human behaviour” means the behaviour as noted by the organisations 
in their magazines through written texts. Arendt approaches the “human behaviour” 
with “situated impartiality” (Judaken, 2012: 175, 176). Through “situated impartiality” 
Arendt “sought a plural and perspectival approach to her narratology” (Judaken, 2012: 
175). In this sense she “recreated the past as a shared world where the historian never 
represented only one view on that past”; rather, she insisted on multi-perspectivity and 
many versions of historical truth (Ibid). Thus “situated impartiality” is “neither an 
objectivism nor a relativism, neither a historicism nor a presentism”. It is pluralist and 
perspectivist in the sense that it engages with the “complex matrix of meaning”, which 
informs human behaviour (Ibid).  
In this sense, the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation can reveal the 
character’s political understanding of their relation to the world. The individual 
behaviour of the Islamic ideologue directly flows from their understanding of the 
world. They directly translate the “essence” of the ideology through a peculiar 
behaviour. The ideology, as the structural concept, has long before removed any 
uncertainty in the character’s mindset; an element of uncertainty could have helped 
the ideologue to modify their behaviour. In their discursive practices, individual stories 
of the Islamic ideologues leave behind identifiable signatures. Interpreting these 
signatures can help us identify a theoretically plausible pattern of thought in the radical 
minds. This pattern of thought can be hermeneutically distilled from their textual 
expressions. The pattern of a character’s mindset is probably more explicit in textual 
narrations than in action as it is easier to construct an idealised behaviour in the textual 
narrations than in action. Many uncontrollable external factors may influence the action 
at the point of delivery.  
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The research theorises that, when ideology is understood in Arendtian sense, all 
ideologues are substantially similar in their mindset and that an ideological mindset has 
certain elements of thought which can be traced empirically through the 
“characterology” of this mindset.  
This study assumes that the three Islamist organisations resemble totalitarian 
organisations of the twentieth century, namely, Nazism and Communism. If they 
succeed, the Islamist organisations shall establish a totalitarian form of government. 
Eric Voegelin in a review of “The Origins of Totalitarianism” concludes:    
[t]he investigation inevitably will start from the phenomena, but the 
question of theoretically justifiable units in political science cannot be 
solved by accepting the units thrown up in the stream of history at their 
face value. What a unit is will emerge when the principles furnished by 
philosophical anthropology are applied to historical materials. It then 
may happen that political movements, which on the scene of history are 
bitterly opposed to one another, will prove to be closely related on the 
level of essence” (Voegelin, 1953: 85). 
This research reaffirms Voegelin’s assertion in its entirety. The investigation is centred 
on the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation. The research does not take 
the constructed character namely, the Islamic radical at face value. My argument is 
that the discursive practices of the three Islamist organisations construct a character 
that exhibits all the five elements of Arendtian ideological mindset and that the 
elements of such construction are traceable through a “characterological” approach. 
The constructed character type has adequate signatures of a distinct intellectual fabric 
woven in an ideology which is empirically traceable.  
Employment of “characterology” to understand the “essence” of an abstract concept 
and its disposition is, however, not unique to Arendt only. Others such as Max Weber 
have also employed such a method in their social and political theory. Weber’s ideal 
types have “an objective basis in the very nature of thought itself” (McIntosh, 1977: 
265). A “deep structure” of human thought emerges as humans try to understand and 
deal with the world, they live in. It is important for social scientists to note this “deep 
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structure” while validating their understanding of a social (and political) action (ibid). 
Arendt and Weber, however, differ in the conceptual construction of the ideal types. 
This difference may be due to their dissimilar understanding of politics and action 
(Baehr, 1999: 317—323). Weber and Arendt agree that the “spirit” of a conceptual 
connection between action and society can be grasped by the construction of an ideal 
type of an individual character. Sigwart argues that Weber used the “characterology” 
of Benjamin Franklin to explain the “spirit of capitalism”. Epistemologically, Weber 
favours abstract hypothesis construction along with the ideal character types to 
represent the “spirit” of “the institution’s functioning logic” (Sigwart, 2016: 269). 
Arendt, on the other hand, “aims at hermeneutically ‘distilling’ her theoretical concepts 
directly from the empirical material itself; an interpretive method which Weber (…) 
explicitly denied” (ibid).  
Sigwart credits the use of similar framework to others as well, such as Erich Fromm in 
his Escape from Freedom (1940), Theodore W. Adorno et al. in their The Authoritarian 
personality (1950) and David Riesmann et al. in their The Lonely Crowd (1950). 
Sigwart contends that despite sharing some common ground, Arendt’s approach differs 
from these studies. While Reismann’s perspective is predominantly social, Fromm 
deals with psychoanalytical and sociological questions while analysing his 
“authoritarian character”. The authors of Authoritarian Personality focus on 
psychosocial elements of the authoritarian personality (Sigwart, 2016: 5). Arendt, 
however, in Origins is predominantly concerned with the political aspects of her 
characters.  
The “characterological” analysis makes it possible to operationalise the otherwise 
abstract and faceless concepts as living concepts. Ideological mindset, being one of 
such concepts, can be operationalised in the “characterology” of an Islamic ideologue. 
The ideal type of an Islamic ideologue serves as a reference point for the adherents of 
the Islamic ideology. The power that helps the Islamic ideologue to organise life is 
drawn from the concrete realisation of the abstract concept. Ideology, however, does 
not remain an abstract concept for the character, but they become the living 
embodiment of the ideology for themselves and others.  
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The current Islamic radicalisation debate has not only missed the study of a dynamic 
and reciprocal “relationship” between a structural concept, namely ideology and its 
central character but has also failed to grasp a standard profile of this character’s 
mindset. This thesis fills this gap.  
 
3.3 Explaining Methodology - Thematic Analysis Technique  
Qualitative approaches are diverse, nuanced and complex (Holloway et al., 2003). 
Thematic analysis is an expansively used qualitative analytic method (Boyatzis, 1998; 
Roulston, 2001). It is a technique of finding, analysing and recording patterns, i.e., 
themes within available data (Boyatzis, 1998). Some scholars consider thematic 
analysis as a tool, rather than a traditional method that is used as a process within a 
“major” analytic approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Ryan et al., 2000). This thesis agrees with 
such studies that mention thematic analysis as a tool within a broader qualitative 
analytic methodology. I use the thematic analysis technique to supplement the study’s 
major analytic approach, which is “characterology”.  
Drawing from the previous part of the chapter where I explain reasons for the suitability 
and usefulness of the “characterological” method of analysis in conceptualising a 
complex phenomenon such as Islamic radicalisation, in this part I explain the need and 
suitability of the thematic analysis technique as it can detect the themes and subthemes 
woven in the written words of a language. Most fundamentally, in this study what 
qualifies as a subtheme are those words, phrases and texts in the written language that 
essentially carry something important once seen through the lens of an Arendtian 
element of an ideological mindset. The subtheme must reflect meaning and a pattern in 
the texts. I consider the five Arendtian elements as five themes. Therefore, just for 
analytical clarity, I call the detected themes in the magazines as subthemes.  The 
thematic pattern means the prevalence of a subtheme in the entire data. Prevalence is 
not assessed through some occurrences of a subtheme but through the ownership and 
conviction about an idea expressed through language by the Islamist organisations. It 
essentially, however, means that the idea expressed through a subtheme has not been 
denied in the entire set of the data. It is a qualitative judgement. To support my 
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judgement, I quote a sufficient length of a text from the magazines that allows a reader 
to make their judgment about a subtheme that is linked to the quoted texts. Long 
quotations in the analysis sections, therefore, are part of the study design. I further 
supplement the derived ideas with additional quotes from the magazines that are woven 
in the ensuing analysis. I also quote and note instances where the organisations present 
a subtheme in a different language, or it conveys a different sense of meanings. This is 
indeed the case as three different organisations are participating in the discursive 
practice. I do note and reflect on the similarities and differences in my analysis 
wherever I note such instance(s). This analytical differentiation is very useful, as in the 
MILIR, I can reflect on the intensity of an idea in a particular organisation.  
As my empirical material consists of the written texts in the online magazines of the 
three Islamist organisations, I needed a technique that can find the thematic map of all 
the ideas, which are aligned with the five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. 
The purpose is to construct a thematic map of the mindset of the ideal type character, 
i.e. the Islamic ideologue that the Islamist organisations construct in their discursive 
practices through written words. Through this technique, I detect 38 ideas/themes (see 
the table in Chapter 9) that represent the standard profile of the mindset of the Islamic 
radicals. 
I use the thematic analysis technique due to its inherent flexibility. It is compatible with 
both inductive methods and deductive methods. This research, although decidedly 
deductive—it essentially follows a theoretical framework and a clear lens in the shape 
of five Arendtian themes of an ideological mindset—also inductively notes the 
instances that are symptomatic of an ideological mindset but are expressed in a 
different language than the Arendtian language. This is not a departure from the theory 
led analysis, because the symptomatic themes in the written language were guided by 
the theoretical lens. However, most of the headings of the paragraphs that appear in an 
analysis chapter flow from an Arendtian element of ideological mindset, and use the 
same language as used by Arendt in her writings. A kind of mixing of inductive 
instances with the deductive ones is possible in thematic analysis and is compatible 
with the strong theoretical framework of the study. In my opinion, the application of a 
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strong theoretical framework such as Arendt's should not suffer from some definitional 
demarcations of analytic techniques.   
I start by writing one chapter for each Arendtian element of the ideological mindset. I 
read the magazines to find exemplary texts that thematically align with an element of 
the ideological mindset. As a first step, I decide five colour codes for five elements. As 
I read the texts, I apply the colour codes to symptomatic and exemplary texts that align 
thematically with an element. I then sift all the texts under the relevant Arendtian 
element that forms the chapter heading. I reread the separated texts under an element 
alongside the Arendtian theoretical articulations, as explained in Chapter 1. Sometimes 
I read both the separated text and Arendtian theorisation several times. Through this 
exercise, I generate subthemes that resonate with an Arendtian element of ideological 
mindset. The subthemes, derived from an element, form the paragraph headings in a 
chapter. The subthemes, which are mostly the paragraph headings, are the ideas that I 
use to construct “The Map of Ideas linked to Islamic Radicals” (MILIR) in Chapter 9.  
After generating the wordings of the subthemes linked within an element, the search 
for exemplary texts in the magazines moves to another level. I decide a keyword that 
is central to the language of a subtheme. I use this keyword to apply a computer-assisted 
search in all the English language magazines. I use Adobe Acrobat Pro DC software 
for the search. This software presents all the instances where the keyword has been 
used in the texts in the magazines. I use this method to confirm and supplement the 
manual search of the exemplary texts. This dualisation in the research is useful in 
ensuring that all symptomatic texts of the empirical material that carry a theme are read 
and accounted for. This software, however, is not available in the Urdu language. 
Therefore, the Urdu texts are searched for manually. To ensure that I do not miss the 
symptomatic instances where a subtheme is present in the Urdu magazines, I made a 
master list of all the content lists of the magazines. As I have read all the Urdu 
magazines, I can understand from the title of an article about the presence of a particular 





3.4 Selecting and Interpreting Sources   
This section has two purposes. Firstly, it outlines the source material I draw from and 
use as the empirical evidence of Islamist organisations’ discursive practices. Secondly, 
it explains how I justify the selection and note the methodological limitations that arise 
from it.  
I adopt the definition of “discursive practices” from the discourse scholar Norman 
Fairclough who is known for the development of his Critical Discourse Analysis. 
Fairclough defines “discursive practices” as “the production, distribution and 
consumption of texts” (Fairclough, 2010; 1992: 5, 73). Michael Shapiro also notes 
language (written or spoken) as “discursive practices” (Shapiro, 1981: 18, 27). Rather 
than following the traditional style of interviewing known Islamic radicals—the 
approach most of the studies on Islamic radicalisation adopted – I decided to analyse 
the online magazines published by three Islamist organisations. This approach had 
some advantages over the interview-based approach in the context of a complex 
phenomenon such as Islamic radicalisation. The interview-based methods of gathering 
the standard characteristics of a radicalised person proved inadequate, as a randomly 
selected sample of radicalised persons may not exhibit all the elements of a mindset 
that the Islamist organisations present and aspire to. Such efforts may locate partial 
elements of the radicalised mindset that are, also, embedded in the subjective contexts 
of the characters. I, however, suggest that a separate research effort with the theoretical 
framework of this study using an interview-based approach would help to confirm and 
supplement the findings of this research.  
I select six online magazines of the three Islamist organisations. Azan, Inspire (both 
English) and Hitteen (Urdu) are published by Al-Qaida (AQ); Dabiq and Rumiyah 
(both English) by Islamic State (IS); and Shariat (Urdu) by Tahreek-e-Taliban. Four 
magazines are published in English and two, Hitteen and Shariat, are in Urdu. The 
decision to select material from a different language, namely Urdu has certain 
advantages. It became possible to compare and analyse the presence of the elements of 
the ideological mindset in the discursive construction of another language. It supports 
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the argument of the thesis that at a fundamental and abstract level, all ideologues 
exhibit a similar mindset. It enhances the wider appeal of the research. 
The English language used by authors in the magazines is not ideal. The authors, at 
places, are not very particular about the grammatical aspects of the language. I, 
however, quote exemplary texts from the magazines verbatim. The aim is to convey 
the underlying thematic message in the texts. I also support this aim by quoting the 
texts in sufficient length. Long passages help in comprehending different strands of a 
theme, and may allay the allegations of cherry-picking, which is generally a convenient 
observation in a qualitative research such as conducted by this study.      
All three Islamist organisations, selected for this research, are well known. AQ is one 
of the most well-known organisations due to its role in the 9/11 attacks. AQ is also the 
mother organisation, as the analysis confirms, in initiating the “process” of Islamic 
radicalisation. The organisation is international in its operations and has cells in many 
countries around the world. The second terrorist organisation, namely IS, is also well 
represented. It appeared comparatively more recently than the other two organisations. 
Although it is predominantly based in Syria, it has cells in different countries. IS 
governed many parts in Syria from 2014 to 2018. The third organisation namely 
Tahreek-e-Taliban [the movement of religious students] (TT), is based in Afghanistan. 
It ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. At present, they claim they have a Government 
in Exile and are fighting the international coalition forces in Afghanistan. Shariat is 
their official magazine published to propagate their views.  
All said three organisations, however, follow the Sunni school of thought in Islam. The 
selection of empirical material consisting of the magazines published by the Sunni 
organisations is justified because the contemporary Islamic radicalisation is widely 
identified with Sunni (Salafi) Islam (Aly et al., 2012:851; Cook, 2009: 184-185). 
Although the Shia school of thought in Islam is represented by separate organisations 
such as Hizballah, which are also associated with certain acts of terrorism, the Shia 
organisations are not part of the current and popularly known wave of Islamist 
radicalisation. Fundamentally, Shia Islamist organisations are mostly involved in 
regional conflicts, whereas Sunni Islamist organisations have a global presence. 
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Approximately 10 to 13 percentage (PEW Research Center-2009) of world Muslim 
population follows Shia Islam, yet none of the violent Islamists identified in terrorist 
attacks in the West has shown their allegiance with Shia Islam. Rather, as the empirical 
chapters of this research show, the texts in the magazines view Shia organisations as 
part of ‘them’. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the current Islamic radicalisation, 
which is under consideration here, is a phenomenon stem from the Sunni interpretations 
of Islam. A further inquiry, however, may compare the ideal character constructed by 
the discursive practices of Shia organisations with that of this study. I, however, think 
that if analysed through the Arendtian theoretical rationality applied in this research, 
the character constructed by Shia organisations in their discursive practices is also 
likely to exhibit similar mindset as that of constructed by the Sunni organisations.    
The question arises that, even if it is accepted that these six magazines represent the 
dominant groups that are involved in Islamic radicalisation, how can we be sure that 
these are also influencing the minds of Muslim people? I admit that this study does not 
capture the area that deals with the question, i.e. how much these magazines influence 
the minds of the Muslim people. Yet the decision concerning this selection stands for 
three reasons. Firstly, there are separate and numerous studies that have measured the 
influence of terrorist organisation’s online propaganda (Canway, 2006: 283-298; 
Macdonald, 2015: 10-34; Denning, 2011: 194-213; Lieberman, 2008; Gendron, 2007, 
White, 2012). These studies conclude that online propaganda material significantly 
influences young Muslim people. These studies also captured the confessions of young 
people who admitted to being radicalised by online propaganda material. Secondly, 
Islamist organisations publish these magazines to propagate their mindset. The 
continuous publication stretched over five years of these publications proves that the 
organisations think that the magazines are serving the purpose. Thirdly, all the 
magazines except the Taliban Shariat Magazine (Urdu) are banned by the UK and other 
governments. The UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office, which publishes 
guidelines on “online radicalisation”, states that “[the terrorist organisations] are 
increasingly reaching out to young people using the web as a tool for recruitment and 
radicalisation (…) [a] national survey of 11-24 years old has highlighted that groups 
such as ISIL reach a larger global audience, with boarder and dynamic messages” 
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(National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2015). The terrorist involved in the 
London Bridge attack previously possessed “copies of the Al-Qaida English-language 
extremist magazine Inspire” (The Guardian, 30 Nov 2019). The act of banning 
indicates that these magazines are influencing the minds of the targeted groups. 
Accessing these magazines in the UK is banned by law. I had to follow a Newcastle 
University special protocol to access the online magazines. The protocol starts with an 
academic research request, through supervisors, to an academic committee with 
detailed justifications of the request. The academic committee’s approval initiates a 
procedure that informs the university Departments of Security, Student Wellbeing and 
IT. A University PREVENT Team member interviews the researcher to assess the 
suitability of the request to access the banned material. After the authorisation, IT Team 
makes special arrangements to ensure the security of the downloaded material. The 
Student Wellbeing Team remains in touch, through PREVENT Team, to support the 
researcher in case the reading of the empirical material causes any distress to mental 
health. I am indebted to my supervisors who helped me at every step of the effort. I 






































Chapter 4: The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the first analysis chapter where I approach the discursively constructed ideal 
types by the three Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT in the texts of their 
online magazines. The objective is to detect the elements of the mindset of the 
character constructed by these discursive practices through the Arendtian theoretical 
lens. In this chapter, I analyse the first of the five essential Arendtian elements of 
ideological mindset, namely ‘The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought’. I read 
the magazines to find the exemplary texts that carry the theme of a superhuman source. 
I isolate these texts and reread these using the Arendtian theorisations (see Chapter 1). 
Through this exercise, I generate subthemes that form the chapter paragraph headings. 
Under each subtheme, I analyse the texts of all the three organisations. I compare and 
note instances of thematic concurrence or otherwise across the three organisations. I 
also reflect this aspect of the analysis in ‘The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals’ 
(MILIR). MILIR reflects the intensity of an idea in an organisation, which is essentially 
a qualitative judgement based on my reading of the entire empirical material (see 
Chapter 9).     
In this chapter, I also slightly digress from my standard format of analysis with regards 
to the empirical material. In the remaining four chapters, I strictly limit the empirical 
material to the magazines produced by the three-terrorist organisation. In this chapter, 
however, I consult some wider Islamic literature to clarify the idea of sovereignty. This 
is necessary because the idea of “sovereignty of God” is common in both types of 
mindsets, i.e., the religious mindset and ideological mindset. However, the presence of 
one or some ideas in a mindset is not enough to categorise it as ideological; rather, it is 
the presence of all the five Arendtian elements in the mindset to categorise it as 
ideological.  This digression, however, is only confined to clarify the origin of the idea 
of “sovereignty of God”; the analysis retains its focus on the texts in the magazines. In 
this chapter, I also apply certain additional linguistic categories, namely deixis, as these 
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techniques are useful in explaining certain themes in the language, which otherwise 
remain obscure.  
Understandably, epistemic explanations of a knowledge claim pre-supposes certain 
assumptions of the explanation. A source of thought positioned in human philosophies 
is most certainly, challengeable, arguable and changeable; and further, it could be 
argued to be subjective and falsifiable. Such claims are a product of human thinking. 
However, if the source of thought is perceived to be superhuman or eternal, as in the 
case of the constructed character, it may be assumed as objective and non-
challengeable. In such a case, the source is an external phenomenon that is independent 
of human thinking. Since the source is eternal, the laws flowing from this eternity 
should also exhibit eternity. AQ articulates that “[w]hat was false yesterday might 
become true tomorrow – and this is a farce because it would implicate that nothing is 
absolutely true or absolutely false. So, homosexuality, abortion, extramarital relations 
were wrong yesterday but are right today! In effect, Islam – because it is revealed by 
Allah - is perpetual in its definitions of rights and wrongs which do not change over 
time” (Azan, Issue 6: 11). The human role, in this case, is to understand these eternal 
laws and tailor his/her actions according to (the “essence” of) the laws. The human 
faculties of logic and reason should not be used to question the eternal laws, and thus 
improve upon their acceptance, but should be used to reason out any contradiction 
between the eternal laws and the subjective human condition.  
Especially, if one’s life is prone to accidents, a human may read superhuman meanings 
into all such happenings so that God’s hand can be traced to the accidents. As a rational 
understanding of such happenings is beyond the knowledge and understanding of such 
believers, the confused victim, unable to think and thus understand the true perspective 
of the situation, starts taking pride in their suffering. Further, in the character’s 
understanding, the misfortune and evil of the suffering are then identified with destiny. 
A destiny is drafted by a superhuman entity for the character, and they are expected to 
accept this treatment with dignity and perseverance. Such a position blocks the 
character’s rational self from entering into an internal dialogue and becomes 
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ideological—in my estimation, an open internal dialogue has the potential to de-
ideologise the ideological mindset (see Chapter 1).     
As per the Arendtian notion of ideology, a perceived superhuman source of thought is 
an essential element of the ideological mindset. The past characters, i.e. Nazi and 
Communist ideologues, attributed “nature” and “history” as the sources of their thought 
(see Chapter 1). The Islamist organisations claim a superhuman, namely God, as the 
source of their thought. The organisations perceive that this source is more explicit and 
revealing than “nature” and “history”; the source of all sources and the very creator of 
“nature” and “history”. The superhuman sources do not speak directly to an ideologue 
in the common language; rather, the ideologues deduce its presence from certain eternal 
laws.  
Textually, God in the magazines is represented by three types of texts, namely, the 
word of God, i.e. the Quran and other revealed scriptures, the sayings of the Prophet11 
and the interpretations of righteous ulema (true scholars). The discursive practices 
consult all the three resources as the sources of thought. In this chapter, I shall analyse 
the texts in the magazines under seven subthemes, namely, the nature of the 
superhuman source; the sovereignty of the superhuman source; the philosophy of the 
superhuman source, the independence of superhuman source from “consensus iuris”, 
the non-separation of religion from politics; freedom as an antithesis to the superhuman 
source; and the Islamic ideologue as a free man fighting for freedom.   
 
 
11 Prophet Muhammad’s interpretations are preserved in the books entitled Ahadees. 
The books of Ahadees were compiled around 250 years after the prophet’s death. The 
compilers took great care while compiling the sayings of the prophet. They invented a 
scientific method to ensure the authenticity of the narration. The central emphasis in 
such compilations is laid on the truthfulness of the narrator. There are clear categories 
of narrators based on their truthfulness. Before categorising a narrator, his/her entire 
life events were scanned through available knowledge and specific enquiry. The 
information about the category of a narrator was documented carefully for reference in 





4.2 The Nature of the Superhuman Source 
The Islamist organisations’ constructions in the texts of their magazines attribute all 
thought and action to a superhuman source.  AQ published Azan Magazine quotes from 
the Quran to explain the nature of the superhuman source in the following text.  
Blessed indeed is Allah, The Creator of the Heavens and the earth who 
created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them. He 
regulates the affairs of His creation and provides sustenance for each 
and every being that He created. His is the dominion that extends over 
the spread of this universe and He makes none to share in his Decision 
and Rule (Azan, Issue 3:23). 
The text advances the theme of a superhuman source, i.e., Allah as the first cause of 
all the causes. All other knowledge claims “refer instead to opinions, desires and 
customs that people themselves invented, all of which have no basis in Allah’s religion” 
(Azan, Issue 5:19). Therefore, for the organisation, a knowledge claim is entertainable 
only if it flows from the superhuman source — Allah.  
Allah or God is the idea that is supposed to explain fundamental queries about this 
universe. The idea of God explains not only the creation of the cosmos but also all 
historical and current action. It is the first premise of the Islamic ideology that lays its 
foundations in the historical experience. In the ideological mindset, the first premise of 
ideology is a self-evident truth that is based on historical experience (Arendt, 1958: 
468). In the Arendtian criteria of ideology, one has to believe in the first premise of 
ideology to initiate the ideological mode of thinking. It was also the case with the past 
ideologues, i.e. Nazis and Communist ideologue. The Nazi believed in “nature” that 
operates natural laws, and the Communist believed in “history” that operates historical 
laws (Arendt, 1958: 469). Likewise, to be an Islamic ideologue, one has to accept the 
first premise mentioned in the above text. All other sources of knowledge are “nothing 
but whimsical thoughts and ideas stemming from imperfect human intellect, without 
any Guidance or Sanction by Allah” (Azan, Issue 6: 11). All three organisations are 
unanimous in the first premise of ideology. The Islamist organisations pretend that all 
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their actions are anchored in this first premise. They do not consider any other motive 
for their action. The TT published Urdu magazine Shariat narrates this ideological 
belief in an article entitled “Jihad an Ideology” as follows. 
 
 
[Translation by the author] We do not fight based on men and material, 
but our struggle is just for the sake and pleasure of Allah. So, we will 
continue our fight irrespective of the strength of the opponents (Shariat, 
Issue 13: 28).  
The theme of action is inherent in the idea of God, as the quoted text mentions that “He 
Regulates the affairs of His creation and provides sustenance for each and every being” 
(Azan, Issue 3:23). The Islamist organisations anchor all their thinking in a superhuman 
source that is independent of human action or inaction and is the creator of everything 
in the universe. Allah is also the source of thought of a common religious Muslim. The 
fundamental difference between the two, i.e. a religious mindset and an ideological 
mindset, lies in the understanding of the nature of the idea of the superhuman source, 
i.e. God12. An ideologue uses the idea of a superhuman source to explain simplistically 
 
12 In a religious person’s perception: God, person and revealed laws are three separate 
entities. The revealed laws are designed to guide man towards a civilised behaviour. 
The purpose of revealed laws, for a religious mindset, is to provide a stable alignment 
where they may anchor their normatively judged actions such as morality and 
acceptable behaviour. In the religious mindset, man being the centre of the creation 
enjoys considerable autonomy in decision-making. Major religions have different 
conceptions of the Divine Laws. In the ideological mindset, however, the Divine Laws 
are eternal, inflexible and independent of subjective sociology (Arendt, 1958: 462-
465).  In addition, the Islamic ideologues do not recognise any space between God, the 




“the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, [and] the uncertainties of the 
future” (Arendt, 1958: 468). The idea of ideology helps an ideologue to stay consistent. 
This need for consistency “springs from our fear of contradicting ourselves” (Arendt, 
1958: 473). Particularly, the theme in the text rejects all the alternate knowledge claims 
of factual reality concerning the origin of the universe, and authoritatively states that a 
superhuman source created it. Thus, abridges a complex reality for the simplistic 
comprehension of the ideological mindset. I discuss ‘Rejection of Factual Reality’ as a 
separate element of ideological mindset in Chapter 8. After constructing the primary 
premise of the ideology, the Islamist organisations deduce certain logical conclusions 
from it. The AQ published text, therefore, continues in the next paragraph:   
It is only logical that Allah’s Law be applied to the entirety of this earth 
and that all systems of human life upon it be brought under the 
regulation of Allah’s Revealed Law, i.e. the final Shariah legislated 
upon Prophet Muhammad and his followers – the Quran and the 
Sunnah, (Azan, Issue 3:23). 
 
a space between them. This space allows the man their freedom, e.g. the freedom, even 
to reject the laws. The Quran explicitly states, “there is no compulsion in religion” 
(Quran, 2: 256). The faculty of thinking in humans needs this space for its operation, 
and freedom to think is contingent upon a space for the activity of thinking. This 
freedom to think or lack of it could be considered as a distinguishing mark between a 
commonly religious person (Muslim) and an Islamic ideologue. The Islamist 
organisations despise any suggestion of freedom. They construct that there is no space 
in man and the revealed law. For them man is not a separate entity from the law, rather 
he/she is a mere carrier of the law. An ideal type character is supposed to be an 
embodiment of the revealed law. The supposed eternal laws, being independent of 
human action or inaction, are eternally destined. Humans are condemned to follow the 
course. Any suggestion of freedom of thinking is apostasy and irtidad (rejection of 
Islam); Murtadz, therefore, is a person who leaves Islam. Another major difference 
between a religious person and an ideologue is the nature of the idea of God. A religious 
person is interested in the nature of God — God as a revealed and approachable entity. 
A Muslim would like to investigate the nature of God, i.e. to know the attributes of 
God and would endeavour to communicate with him. For them, God establishes an 
intimate and personal relationship in the depths of one’s thinking (soul). In this sense, 
God is predominantly personal and less political. An Islamic ideologue, on the 
contrary, is interested in an idea (of God) that can explain the gaps in their conception 
of the world; God, for them, is predominantly political in nature. 
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No sooner has the mindset accepted the superhuman source for the thought (and 
action), then it is required to follow the logical implication of the premise. The logical 
implication is an instigation for an action, which is inherent in the source of the 
ideology. To guide the action, the superhuman source has revealed a law, i.e. the Divine 
Law. I discuss this aspect as the third element of the ideological mindset, namely 
‘Violence and the Call for Action’ in Chapter 6. As the superhuman source is eternal 
and “His is the Dominion that extends over the spread of this universe” (Azan, Issue 3: 
23), the character is required to enforce the eternal law over the entire universe. I 
discuss ‘The Claim to Global Domination’ as the second element of the ideological 
mindset in Chapter 5. Humans are blessed with this unique privilege to operationalise 
the Divine Law in themselves. The TT published Urdu language magazine Shariat 
further explains the relationship between God and man. The magazine writes,  
 
[Translation by the author] Islam is very clear and equivocal on the 
issue. It states that sovereignty belongs to God; man is his vice-regent 
on earth; God’s Law shall be implemented as per God’s will. Follow the 
law of human nature and subordinate reason to revelation. On the 
contrary, the West says that reason is central in the decisions of right 
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and wrong. Society and reason should be the final arbiter to decide about 
permissions and restrictions (Shariat, Issue 63: 17). 
The theme of a superhuman source of thought, which should have priority over reason, 
is repeated in the text mentioned above. The Islamist organisations do not confine 
themselves to the word of God as the superhuman source but also include the word of 
the Prophet and the word of righteous scholars in this source (Azan, Issue, 3: 23). A 
text in the pages of Azan Magazine persuades the readers to interpret reality through 
the words of the Prophet and the righteous scholars. It reads, “[l]et us go through each 
of these stages through the truthful and blessed words of Prophet Mohammad and the 
righteous scholars” (Azan, Issue 4: 12). Although the terrorist organisation pretend that 
they anchor all thought in a single superhuman source, in practice, they construct three 
parallel sources as the origin of their mindset. IS constructs the character that is 
supposed to believe that the Prophet did not speak on his own accord but dutifully 
conveyed what had been revealed to him by God, and “[t]he scholars are conveyers of 
the orders of Allah and the orders of His Messenger” (Rumiyah, Issue 9: 23). AQ also 
thinks that “[t]he greatest treasure of this life is knowing Allah, loving Him, reflecting 
upon his amazing Attributes and spending this whole life serving Him. Knowing Allah 
involves discovering one’s purpose of life” (Azan, Issue 4: 12). The discursive practices 
of all the three organisations in the magazines, however, lay special emphasis on the 
idea of the sovereignty of this superhuman source of thought.    
4.3 The “Sovereignty” of the Superhuman Source  
The idea of “sovereignty” is the fundamental idea that separates the ideological mindset 
from the modern secular political thought. The discursive practices reject any claim of 
sovereignty by a human being, an “artificial person” of a state or an assembly of a 
people. “[T]here is a vast difference between the Islamic and the Western political 
method because both stem from entirely different premises. Islam enjoins collectivism 
based on faith in Allah (La ilaha ill Allah) while the West seeks collectivism based on 
land and the (false) sovereignty of other than Allah (Azan, Issue 4: 18). The sovereignty 
of God is the idea that is equally shared by ideological as well as a non-ideological but 
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(Islamic) religious mindset. It is therefore important to understand the nature and origin 
of this idea to conceptualise a distinction between the two mindsets.  
In the wider Islamic literature, the idea of the sovereignty of God is a derivation of 
different passages from the Quran. The Quran repeatedly mentions the power, the 
authority, and the majesty of God. The Quran states “Authority (Al-hukm) belongs to 
God alone” and “it is God’s prerogative to give authority (Al-mulk) to whom He wills 
and to take it away at His pleasure” (Zaman, 2015: 389-418).  
The terms like Al-hukm and Al-mulk have been variously interpreted as the sources of 
the modern concept of sovereignty in the Islamic thought. In medieval Islamic tradition, 
the term mulk is referred to as the possession of dominion, as Prophet Mohammad 
prayed that “dominion over Persia and Byzantium be given to his people” (Al-Tafseer-
al-Kabir, viii: 4). Some interpreted the term as the God-given ability of faith through 
which a believer can achieve total submission to the will of God. While others 
understood it as a Prophetic authority designed by God in a manner that the followers 
of the Prophet shall be honoured when the errant are debased (ibid). A well-noted 
Quran and Hadees scholar Baghawi (d. 1122) explains that “God has said in one of His 
books: ‘I am God, the king of kings and the master of kings. The hearts of kings and 
their forelocks are in my hand. If my servants obey me, I make the kings a mercy for 
them; and if they disobey me, I make the kings a punishment for them. So, do not 
concern yourself with reviling the kings but turn instead towards me and I will dispose 
them favourably towards you’” (Nimr et al.,1993: 23). The superhuman source has 
complete control of the worldly authority invested in kings.  
Although political authority seems to be inherent in the term Al-mulk, it is not limited 
by it. Al-mulk, for medieval Islamic scholars, meant “the endowment of Prophethood, 
the possession of knowledge, intellect, health and praiseworthy dispositions, power and 
the ability to implement [things], the power of love, and the possession of wealth” 
(Razi, al-Tafsir, viii: 7). Al-mulk, therefore, is an attribute of a superhuman entity who 
endows all political as well as personal favours according to his/her preferences.   
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Likewise, the term Al-hukm, i.e. God’s authority, has been understood as diverse by 
others. For example, a very influential tenth-century commentator, Tabri, understands 
the term to mean that “God alone is worthy of worship” (al-Jalali, 1962:154). Qurtabi 
(d. 1273), an Andalusian scholar of repute, explains the term to mean that God “is the 
creator of everything” (Jami, ix: 192). Some medieval scholars such as Fakhr al-din al 
Razi (d. 1210), did raise the theological argument against the idea of free will to argue 
that God exclusively controls all the material and immaterial possibilities in life (Al-
Tafsir, viii: 7–8).   
Principally, political authority, which is sometimes not very explicitly expressed, is 
part of the Islamic understanding of Al-mulk and Al-hukm. The Islamist organisations’ 
conception of God’s sovereignty is rooted in these two terms. The ideological 
conception of the idea of the sovereignty of God has been shaped by two twentieth-
century Islamic scholars, namely Sayyid Qutb (d.1966) of Egypt and Sayyid Abul A’la 
Maududi (d. 1979) of Pakistan. It is, therefore, important to conceptualise how these 
two scholars discussed the idea. 
4.4 The Philosophy of the Sovereignty of God  
The discursive practices by the Islamist organisations with regards to the idea of the 
sovereignty of God are influenced by the interpretations of Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid 
Abul A’la Maududi. Qutb’s interpretations of the holy texts rhetorically use the modern 
concept of sovereignty, i.e. God’s power (al-mulk) and God’s authority (al-hukm). He 
explicitly lays down the foundations of the idea of the sovereignty of God in the 
following passage. 
Authority belongs to the exalted God exclusively by virtue of His 
divinity. For sovereignty (al- hakimiyya) is among the characteristic 
features of divinity. Whoever lays a claim to sovereignty — whether it 
is an individual, a class, a party, an institution, a community or humanity 
at large in the form of an international organisation — dispute the 
primary characteristic of His divinity. And whoever does so is guilty of 
unbelief in the most blatant manner . . .. Laying claim to this right [to 
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sovereignty] does not necessarily take a particular form, which alone 
might be deemed to remove the claimant from the fold of ‘the true faith’ 
(al-din al-qayyim [Quran, 12.40]). Rather, one lays claim to it simply 
by deriving laws from a source other than [God] (Qutub, Vol IV; 
1974:1990). 
The passage mentioned above carries the theme of a superhuman source (God) as the 
source of thought and action. The term Qutb refers to as sovereignty is a modern 
derivative of the term hukm, which means authority or judgement. Qutb conceives the 
term sovereignty as a political concept. This conception of the sovereignty of God that 
links the ideas of law, state and Islam is at the heart of the ideological mindset. AQ 
warns the readers to be aware and “[u]nderstand the heinous crime of those who forsake 
the Hakimiyyah (sovereignty) of Allah and implement laws on the earth that do not 
have any authority from Allah” (Azan, Issue 5:4). The character is supposed to believe 
that it is a crime to follow any law other than Allah’s law. Qutab further clarifies the 
idea of the sovereignty of God as follows.  
In the Islamic system, it is the community that chooses the ruler, thereby 
giving him the legal right to exercise authority according to God’s law. 
But [this community] is not the source of sovereignty which gives the 
law its legality. God alone is the source of sovereignty. Many people, 
including Muslim scholars, tend to confuse: the exercise of power and 
the source of power. Even the aggregate of humanity does not have the 
right to sovereignty, which God alone possesses. People only [have the 
right to] implement what God has laid down with His authority. As for 
what He has not laid down, it has neither authority nor legality (Qutub, 
Vol IV; 1974: 1990).  
Medieval scholars, however, did not have such a binary view as far as the 
operationalisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God was concerned. Qutab and other 
radical scholars envisioned a different operationalisation of the idea.  
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Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of subcontinental Jamaat-e-Islami, is one of 
the most influential Islamist of the past century. His interpretations of the holy texts 
widely affected the contemporary Islamic radicalisation in the Islamic world in general 
and in South Asia in particular. Maulana Maududi is a perfect example of a 
phenomenon which we nowadays call as non-violent extremism, i.e. the character 
shares the mindset of the violent radicals but has not yet operationalised the mindset. 
While interpreting the term Al-hakm, Maududi writes, “sovereignty (hakimiyyat) rests 
only with God. God alone is the lawgiver. No human being, not even a Prophet, has 
the right to command and prohibit on his own” (Maududi, 1941, 1981: 27). Maududi 
goes further and says:  
If a person considers anyone’s command to be binding without its 
carrying the support of God’s command, then that person is guilty of 
associating partners with God in the very same manner as does someone 
who directs his prayers to other than God. If anyone claims in a political 
sense to be ‘the holder of all control’ [(malik al-mulk) Q 3.26], the 
sovereign (muqtadir-i a`la) and the absolute ruler (hakim `alal-itlaq), 
then his is a claim to divinity in just the same manner as the claim of 
someone, in metaphysical terms, that he is that person’s [ultimate] 
master, deity (karsaz), support, and protector (Maududi, 1981, 1941: 
28). 
Maududi’s articulations carry the theme of God as the source of all thought and 
legitimacy. To be a good Muslim, one must reject all institutions of legitimacy other 
than God (Malik al-mulk).  
Another contemporary of Maududi, Abul-Kalam Azad (d. 1958) sensed the centrality 
of the idea in the Muslim thought; therefore, he took it upon himself to use the 
interpretive framework to articulate the idea of the sovereignty of God for the Muslims. 
To clarify the confusion associated with the ideas of temporal authority and God’s 
authority, Azad, in 1913, published an article entitled “Authority belongs to God 
alone”. He writes: 
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Today, an intense war is taking place between the government of God 
(khuda ki hukumat) and human kingdoms. Satan’s throne has been 
placed over the largest portion of the earth. The inheritance of Satan’s 
household has been distributed among his worshippers and the army of 
the “great deceiver” (Dajjal) has spread everywhere. These satanic 
kingdoms seek to utterly destroy God’s government. On their right side 
is the bewitching paradise of worldly pleasure and honour, and on their 
left rages the clearly visible hell of hardship and corporal punishment. 
These unbelieving and dark deceivers open the doors of their sorcerous 
paradise for any son of Adam who denies the kingdom of God (khuda 
ki badshahat) (...) and they push anyone who affirms God’s kingdom 
into the hell of their satanic torments and corporeal punishments 
(Quoted by Zaman, 2015: 7). 
Azad did not use the modern phrase “sovereignty” in his articulations but instead refers 
to the idea as God’s government. Curiously, the rhetorical language used by a 
mainstream Muslim scholar as early as 1913 bears a close resemblance to the language 
used by the Islamist organisations in their propaganda literature.  
The conceptualisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God helps to understand the 
nature of the superhuman source. God’s sovereignty means that if the laws of 
government conflict with the perceived laws of the ideology (God), the latter should 
prevail. In this sense, once the idea of the sovereignty of a superhuman entity is 
operationalised, it has certain practical implications.  
The contestation over the nature and limits of God’s sovereignty and its relationship 
with the temporal political dispensation is a question which could not be settled in the 
Muslim thought. Consequently, a “devout Muslim” is bound to get confused. The 
religious scriptural interpretations prepare the common Muslim for the rejection of any 
sovereignty other than God. Under such conditions, a “devout Muslim” may think that 
they do not have any option except to compromise with the modern political 
arrangement while keeping alive a desire to establish the Kingdom of God, whenever 
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the opportunity arises. This confusion with regards to the sovereignty of God in the 
Muslim thought is the area which is being exploited by the Islamist organisations in 
their recruitment drives.    
Apart from the confusion over the idea of the sovereignty of God itself, the 
interpretations of holy scriptures are another controversial area. The question of 
legitimate authority to interpret God’s laws for the state is also unresolved. If the 
sovereignty belongs to God and not to a parliament, which represents the will of the 
people, then the word of God should be interpreted in the light of the will of God. So, 
can we equate the will of people with the will of God? Arguably, the will of the people 
implies that the destiny of man is unscripted and that they are free to adopt a rational 
course of action. On the contrary, the ideological mindset follows an imagined grand 
plan scripted by the superhuman sourced laws. The will of people has no role in the 
ideological mindset.   
The ideological mindset encourages man to endeavour to understand and conform to a 
superhuman scripted design. Such an understanding of the idea of the sovereignty of 
God once operationalised in the real-world politics of a country shall propel the 
ideology to take centre stage in the affairs of that country. The idea of the sovereignty 
of God as constructed by the Islamist organisations is, therefore, problematic. It is the 
concrete operationalisation of the idea(s) of ideology in the real world that highlights 
the inherent tension between an ideology and its practical manifestation.  
However, the discursive practices in the magazines are alive to the contradictions 
between the will of God flowing from the idea of sovereignty and the will of people. 
In line with the Arendtian ideological mindset’s desire for consistency, the Islamist 
organisations cannot ignore this contradiction. They eliminate the contradictory idea, 
i.e. the will of people, by declaring it against the laws of the superhuman source. The 
Arendtian ideological mindset is consistent, simplistic and links all thought to a 
superhuman source. AQ constructs the same theme in Azan Magazine as follows.    
This means that Sovereignty and Kingship belong to Allah Alone, and 
this Sovereignty is established by the human being as a legislative 
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system on earth which is an expression of the Sovereignty of Allah, in 
consistence[sic] with the rest of the universe. So, Allah is The 
Sovereign, and His Sovereignty is established on earth by man’s 
implementation of Allah’s Law in his collective life, and this is the 
passing of the Hakimiyyah from the “existential” circle to the 
“legislative” real (Azan, Issue 6: 30).  
The Islamist organisations seem to have found a way to resolve the tension between 
the idea of the sovereignty of the superhuman source and its operationalisation in the 
real world; they do not mention any consent of the people, or in Arendt’s words, 
“consensus iuris”.   
By eliminating the idea of the will of the people and declaring humans as part of a 
“legislative system”, the Islamist organisations confirm the Arendtian assertion that 
humans are a mere carer of the eternal law and part of a grand process (Arendt, 1958: 
462-464). AQ constructs a character that is supposed to believe that “God’s 
Sovereignty is established on earth by man’s implementation of Allah’s Law in his 
collective life” (Azan, 6: 30). This direct rule is independent of man’s subjective 
behaviour. As this thinking draws its legitimacy directly from the sovereign source — 
the source of all positive laws, therefore, it need not care about the petty legality of the 
“legislative process”. It is far more obedient to the superhuman sourced law while 
passing it “from the ‘existential’ circle to the ‘legislative’ real” (Azan, Issue 6: 30). 
Therefore, the constructed character must be prepared to sacrifice every vital 
immediate interest for the implementation of what the organisations consider Allah’s 




[Translation by the author] It should be clearly understood that Islam, 
and not nationalism, is the essence of a state. A nation or country can be 
sacrificed for Islam but not vice versa. God’s law is eternal, which 
means that if Sharia Law is the dominant law in a country, the country 
shall be treated as Dar-ul-Islam [the home of Islam] but if the same 
country is governed through any other law, it shall be treated as Dar-ul-
harab (the home of battle); migration shall be mandatory from such a 
country. That means judgements through Divine Law has priority over 
judgments through nationalism. There is a continuous war between 
Godhood and nationhood.  
History is a witness that Prophets never compromised on the 
propagation of truth. On occasions, they rebelled against their nations 
but upheld the call to the sovereignty of God. How can they hide the 
truth when God has appointed them? In the propagation of Allah’s Law, 
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they do not care about anyone, including the people in authority 
(Hitteen, Issue 8: 178).  
The main theme in the texts mentioned above constructs a character that is supposed 
to show total disregard to any notion of consent or will of people in the 
operationalisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God.  Such a character can do away 
with the will or consent of the people, which Arendt refers to as “consensus iuris”.     
4.5 Superhuman Sourced Law is Independent of “Consensus iuris”  
“Consensus iuris” is the wider consent of the people for the law. All laws, including 
the most tyrannical laws, can function under some conditions of “consensus iuris”. 
“Both moral judgement and legal punishment presuppose this basic consent; the 
criminal can be judged justly only because he takes part in the “consensus iuris”, and 
even the revealed law of God can function among men only when they listen and 
consent to it” (Arendt, 1958: 462).  The superhuman-sourced law has a fundamental 
difference with other concepts of law; it is independent of any “consensus iuris”. 
Although the Islamist organisations claim that they replace secular law with eternal 
law, e.g. Sharia Law, but in the discursive constructions, they defy all forms of 
consensus. In their perception, Allah’s law does not need any “consensus iuris” for its 
execution because it is independent of all action and consent of people. They not only 
defy “consensus iuris” but reject all notions that are manifestations of “consensus 
iuris”, such as the notion of democracy.    
Inherently the democratic system of governance is sceptical of a superhuman source 
of thought. It functions, at least in theory, on the notion of the will of people. Because 
the Islamist organisations are well aware of the potentiality of “consensus iuris” in the 
notion of democracy, they are, therefore, very sensitive to such a possibility. AQ 
explains,          
[t]hey say that democracy is of “expression”. This apparently nice 
sounding idea is actually the antithesis of Islam. Islam teaches man the 
worship and servitude of Allah, whereas democracy teaches man all-out 
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freedom in which even the most misguiding and blasphemous opinions 
are considered to be of the “fundamental rights of man”; democracy 
accepts it even if someone insults Allah, His Messenger or the Laws of 
Shariah. In a democracy, there is nothing which cannot be criticized or 
commented upon (Azan, issue 1:61). 
The theme in the text contrasts the idea of God with free expression. The ideological 
mindset does not accommodate any alternate expression of reality. Democracy, 
therefore, is singled out because of its propagation of space for freedom of expression, 
which is a form of “consensus iuris”.   
The superhuman sourced thought process rejects all knowledge claims that do not flow 
from the anchoring idea—i.e. God. This mindset does not recognise any freedom of 
expression. Such attempts are labelled as “misguided” and “blasphemous”. AQ 
condemns democracy because it allows “even if someone insults Allah, His Messenger 
or the Laws of Shariah” (Azan Issue, 1:61). The Magazine quotes Sayyed Qutab (one 
of the most influential scholars) to lend further authenticity to the disapproval of the 
idea of democracy. 
No doubt in all of the systems of the world, men take each other as gods 
besides Allah. No man-made system is free from this corruption from 
the most ideal democracy to the worst dictatorship (…) The most 
obvious aspect of Uluhiyyah (Lordship) is to enjoin obedience upon the 
subjects, to legislate for them a code of life and a criterion. Hence, if a 
person or a system seeks to subjugate human beings to its obedience, 
and it creates for them a code of life, a criterion, laws (for right and 
wrong), obligations and rights etc., then that person or system has 
declared itself a partner to Allah ‘The Exalted’ in one of His Most 
Precious Attributes; and it has declared its own (false) godhood (Azan, 
issue 1:61). 
Sayyed Qutub’s interpretations have played a major role in developing the mindset of 
Islamic radicals. In line with Qutub’s interpretations, AQ considers any attempt by 
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people to legislate a system of governance as claiming godhood (Azan, issue 1:61). The 
theme in the above-quoted text rejects all the progress made by humans on account of 
systems of governance in history. It is a rebellion, as humans are supposed to be mere 
executioners of the superhuman-sourced law. The Islamist organisations construct a 
character in the magazines that is supposed to completely surrender freedom to think, 
consent or legislate in favour of the superhuman-sourced law. Democracy, therefore, 
being the formal mode of consent, is the foremost opponent of the ideological mindset. 




[Translation by the author] Democratic freedom means insulting Islam, 
abrogating Islam, insulting Islamic traditions and Islamic scholars. 
Democracy means that any business that earns a profit, including 
prostitution, is considered good. Democracy means using pen and 
speech for the promotion of sexuality as it is considered the standard of 
development and enlightenment. To sum up, the notion of democracy 
does not have any space for eternal laws. Truth and falsehood have 
equal weight and decisions are based only on peoples’ opinion, feelings 
and desires (Shariat, issue 17:24). 
Fundamentally, the ideological mindset rejects all expressions of formal or informal 
“consensus iuris”. AQ, through an article entitled “The Religion of Democracy” in the 
pages of Azan magazine, names such “consensus iuris” as “freedoms” inherent in the 
notion of democracy.  
It may be possible for democracy to be interpreted and understood in 
more than one manner. However, in all the interpretations that may be 
done - despite all the conflicting points - the following seven 
fundamentals are always retained. These are: 
1) La ilaha illal Insaan (There is no god but man): The declaration of 
Kufr. 
2) The satanic principle of “freedom of belief”. 
3) The false principle of accepting the judgment of the people in mutual 
disputes. 
4) The blasphemous principle of “freedom of expression”. 
5) The polytheistic principle of separating Dunya (world, life) from 
Deen (religion). 
6) The disastrous principle of the freedom of formulating “parties”. 
7) The misguiding principle of obedience to the “majority opinion” 
(Azan, issue 1: 60). 
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A common theme in all the rejections as mentioned above by the Islamist organisations 
is the denunciation of “the freedom to consent” or “consensus iuris”. The Islamist 
organisations summarise their ideas about the freedom to consent or “consensus iuris” 
in those seven “fundamentals of democracy”. All the metaphors used in the text to 
enumerate the supposed “fundamentals of democracy”, i.e., satanic, false, 
blasphemous, polytheistic, disastrous and misguided are used to denounce the 
expressions of fundamental freedoms and “consensus iuris”.  
There may be a lexical value in the use of any particular metaphor for a certain 
fundamental, but I interpret these statements for their thematic value, i.e. an implied 
message of anti-freedom and an anti “consensus iuris” tone. In the succeeding 
paragraphs, I interpret these governing principles of democracy to conceptualise the 
linkage between superhuman source, “consensus iuris”, freedom and democracy.  
The first principle in the text questions all the activity centred on people and their 
welfare. The ideological mindset does not conceive humans as the centre of human 
activity; rather, this coveted place is reserved for ideology, and humans act as an 
instrument for the implementation of a grand design.  
The term “Kufr” is, therefore, used in the texts for all the deviant thinking that is not in 
line with the ideological mindset. The Islamist organisations extensively use this term 
in the magazines for grouping together the category of ‘them’. We shall come across 
this term frequently with wider meanings in the following chapters.  
AQ articulates that the formal system of “consensus iuris”, i.e. democracy “is founded 
on the principle that people are the source of all authority” (Azan, Issue 1:61). In their 
perception, the concept of “consensus iuris” is the declaration of a human being as a 
god. “[I]n democracy, the highest authority is the human being, not Allah. It is the 
masses who become lords ilah (deity)” (Azan, Issue 1:61). The theme of denunciation 
of consent and freedom continues in the next narrated fundamental of democracy, i.e. 
“freedom of belief”.  
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AQ constructs the theme that “the building of democracy is established on the freedom 
of belief. In the democratic system, every person has the freedom to have whatever 
belief he so desires to have, and to adhere to whatever religion he wishes” (Azan, Issue 
1:62), or the adherent may “return to his old religion or revert to another one if he so 
desires” (Azan, Issue 1:62). Such liberty is not permissible in the ideological mindset. 
The ideological mindset does not tolerate man’s freedom of choice and considers it as 
an act of disloyalty to the superhuman source. It is very harsh on any such act of 
freedom and pronounces that “if a Muslim return to disbelief and apostatizes from the 
religion, then he is to be killed (Azan, Issue 1:62). The transgressor has only two 
options, either “he comes back [to the ideology], or he is killed” (Azan, Issue 1:62).  
Therefore, the second principle focuses on the notion of absolute truth. This mindset 
argues that, as the absolute truth has been revealed, there is no space for any other claim 
of truth. Absolute truth is non-negotiable and must be conveyed to the ignorant. Hence, 
for the character, “the satanic principle of ‘freedom of belief’” (Azan, Issue 1: 60) 
means, allowing the ignorant to follow the falsehood and thereby undermining their 
welfare. Therefore, the Islamic ideologue, being the blessed one and the most informed 
one, takes upon themselves to shepherd the misguided souls back to the truth. I discuss 
ideologue’s zeal for action in a subsequent chapter entitled ‘The Call for Action and 
Violence’ (see Chapter 6).  IS is in complete agreement with AQ and TT in denouncing 
“freedom”. In an article entitled “Why We Fight You and Why We Hate You” IS 
articulates,  
[w]hat’s equally if not more important to understand is that we fight 
you, not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom 
in this life and salvation in the Hereafter, freedom from being enslaved 
to your whims and desires as well as those of your clergy and 
legislatures, and salvation by worshiping your Creator alone and 
following His messenger. We fight you in order to bring you out from 
the darkness of disbelief and into the light of Islam, and to liberate you 
from the constraints of living for the sake of the worldly life alone so 
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that you may enjoy both the blessings of the worldly life and the bliss 
of the Hereafter (Dabiq, Issue 15: 33). 
The text repeats the theme that the superhuman-sourced law can operate without any 
“consensus iuris”. The terrorist action of reforming people need not take into account 
any “consensus iuris”.  The Islamist organisations conceive a special purpose of 
violence, i.e. the ideological reformation of humans. Therefore, IS emphasises that their 
fight is “not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life 
and salvation in the Hereafter” (Dabiq, Issue 15:33).  
In doing so, the Islamist organisations are not bothered about any “consensus iuris” as 
the self-assured tone of the message in the theme conveys that they think they must 
impose their brand of ideology for the salvation of the ignorant. In their perception, the 
violent Islamic action is not for a material gain, but its fundamental purpose is the 
reformation of humankind. In other words, the Islamist organisations’ action is for 
enforcement of a mindset that interprets factual reality through the superhuman source. 
People-centric notions like “consensus iuris” are irrelevant to the ideological mindset.  
Therefore, AQ denounces the third fundamental as “[t]he false principle of accepting 
the judgment of the people in mutual disputes” (Azan, Issue 1: 60). Such an attempt for 
a “consensus iuris” is condemnable by the organisation because “it is the people who 
hold the right to judge in the various disputes between human beings; no law, no 
revelation and no Divine Book shall be used to give judgment” (Azan, Issue 1: 62). The 
ideological mindset judges all events through the ideology; therefore, for the Islamist 
organisations, it is unacceptable to “see today that in the course of mutual disputes, 
various democratic parties threaten each other with taking the other to the ‘court of the 
people’ and holding ‘public opinion’ as the final judgment in their matter” (Azan, Issue 
1:62). In the Islamist organisations’ perception, any such principle that refers to 
“consensus iuris” is a contempt of the superhuman source as “without doubt, seeking 
judgment from the people or from other than Allah is to accept the lordship of the 
Taghut (a false deity worshipped besides Allah that accepts to be worshipped) ( …) 
Every law and every command other than the Law and Command of Allah is included 
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in the definition of Taghut” (Azan, Issue 1:63). The rejection of people-centric 
solutions is so strong that “people who even wish to go for judgment in their disputes 
to the Taghut” (Azan, Issue 1:63) must be condemned. It is the right of the superhuman 
source, i.e. Allah “who Holds the Right to Judgment in all conflicts and disputes, i.e. 
all disputes must be solved by the Laws and Commands of Allah (Shariah)” (Azan, 
Issue 1:63); on the contrary, “democracy says: in whatsoever you differ, the decision 
thereof is with the people (or the majority). No authority has the right to give judgment 
other than the people” (Azan, Issue 1: 63).  
In principle, the ideological mindset advances the centrality of the superhuman source 
in all their conceptions and rejects the people-centric notions like “consensus iuris”, 
democracy or freedom.  
The fourth denunciation of democracy by Islamist organisations refers to the “freedom 
of expression” (Azan, Issue 1:60). The Ideological mindset does not tolerate alternative 
views; the word “alternative” presupposes a space - a space where another 
understanding of reality exists, and such freedom thinking is absent from the 
ideological mindset. “Freedom of expression” needs space in mind for the both, in 
imagining and in the reception of alternative ideas. It also means a different view or 
interpretation of an idea. Ideology, to an ideologue, cannot be explained differently. 
The freedom of expression, therefore, must be resisted at every level.  
The denunciation of the fifth principle in the text mentioned above, namely, the 
separation of Dunya (political world) from Deen (religion) has a specific context. The 
Islamist organisations construct the idea that Islam is a complete religion, and it should 
not be separated from politics.  
4.6 No Separation of Religion from Politics 
The Islamist organisations are against the separation of religion from politics. They 
construct it as a Western idea. As all thought is anchored in the superhuman source, 
political thought is neither an exception nor a separate analytical category. Islam, in 
their conception, is a complete religion. It is comprehensive enough to guide man; 
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therefore, one should not look beyond the superhuman source for any guidance. AQ 
engages with this theme in the following text.   
This separation of religion from the life that democracy stands on is an 
utter falsehood. The one who believes in it commits Kufr (disbelief). 
This principle is against all those clear verses and Ahadith [sayings of 
the Prophet] which clearly state that Islam shall rule in government, 
politics, economics, societies, legislations and judiciaries. Islam is not 
limited to a few rituals of worship to be done inside some specific 
buildings. Hence, this false principle that separates Islam from human 
life is utter disbelief in the religion of Allah (Azan, Issue 1:64).  
The subtheme that Islam as a religion cannot be separated from politics is common in 
all the Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT. The idea is traceable to the early 
days of Islam, where religious and political authority was combined. The idea is very 
much part of mainstream Islam as well. The main theme that anchors all thought in a 
superhuman source is also part of the mainstream religious mindset. That is why the 
texts of all the three Islamist organisations propagate the subtheme in similar 
constructs. For example, TT constructs the subtheme in Shariat Magazine as follows.  
 
[Translation by the author] The West aims to trivialise the Islamic 
jurisprudence. Further, they endeavour to separate religion from 
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politics. It is being constructed (wrongly) that Islam is nothing more 
than a set of moral values; it is very enlightened religion, and that it 
should stay away from complexities of politics, economy and 
international relations (Shariat, 56:32). 
The TT constructs the theme in a language that conveys the sense that the separation 
of religion from politics is a Western conspiracy. The ideological mindset rejects all 
sources of thought that do not flow from a superhuman source. They consider the idea 
of the separation of religion and politics as not organic to the Muslim world but belongs 
to Western philosophy. To distance comprehensively from the idea of separation of 
religion from politics, AQ introduces another linguistic category. They use the word 
Deen instead of religion. In the following text, they explain the linguistic difference 
between the two words.  
The word Deen in the Divine Texts is often translated as “religion” in 
English. However, Deen has a far more encompassing meaning in the 
Arabic language than “religion” in the English language. Religion 
generally means a set of rituals and beliefs that are practiced 
individually; however, religion may not necessarily be the law 
implemented in the land. However, the word Deen encompasses both 
religion and law (in contemporary vocabulary)– in fact, Deen is the 
socio-economic-political-religious system that governs both the 
individual and collective life of its adherents and in this sense, Islam is 
definitely a Deen and not just a religion (Azan, Issue 4: 50). 
The subtheme that Islam can exclusively manage “the socio-economic-political-
religious system that governs both the individual and collective life of its adherents” 
(Azan, Issue 4: 50) is the basis for the assertion that Dunya (political world) cannot be 
separated from Deen (religion). Such an understanding extends the jurisdiction of the 
superhuman-sourced eternal law to all aspects of life, thus handing over a complete 
script, which has to be implemented in its entirety, to an ideologue.  
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As the Islamic ideology covers all the aspects of life comprehensively, there is no need 
to have political parties representing different political manifestos; hence, the 
denunciation of the political parties by the Islamist organisations as the supposed sixth 
“fundamental of democracy”. In the ideological mindset, it is impermissible to allow 
any freedom for political organisation. The Azan Magazine engages with the theme in 
its pages as follows.   
Democracy holds that human beings have the complete freedom to 
formulate political parties, groups and organizations etc. regardless of 
whatever belief, ideology or morals that they may possess. This 
principle of democracy is also rejected by Islam, because: by accepting 
this principle, it is being testified that groups which possess Kufr 
(disbelief) and Shirk (polytheistic) beliefs can exist and can spread their 
corrupt beliefs among the masses. Of course, this goes against 
innumerable commands of the Quran and Hadith. The Quran and Hadith 
teach us to reject Kufr, to stop Munkar (evil, polytheism, disbelief) from 
spreading and to stand firm against all evils. Our religion does not allow 
us to let these misguiding and corrupt ideologies (or their upholders) to 
exist and spread, let alone recognizing the authority of their existence 
(Azan, issue 1: 64).  
Any attempt to articulate the “consensus iuris” through the freedom of political 
organisation is rejected by the Islamist organisations because “by accepting this 
principle, it is being testified that groups which possess Kufr (disbelief) and Shirk 
(polytheistic) beliefs can exist and can spread their corrupt beliefs amongst the masses” 
(Azan, issue1: 64). The theme of freedom, and by extension democracy, is incompatible 
with the ideological mindset because it does not prejudge action based on ideology. 
The ideological mindset declares all other ideologies and belief systems as “misguided 
and corrupt”. Consequently “[t]he present governments and politics, by giving people 
the Divine authority to legislate, have made the human society a victim of immorality, 
misdeeds and mutual dissension; and they have made world peace meaningless” (Azan, 
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Issue 6:33). Such assertions foreclose avenues of discussion on all the issues that have 
been prejudged by the ideology.  
The refutation of the seventh principle, i.e. the principle of “obedience to the majority 
opinion” (Azan, Issue 1:60), is in line with the ideological mindset. The majority 
opinion does not matter in such a mindset. In the Islamist organisations’ construction 
“that which conforms to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger - is the 
truth, regardless of the number of its adherents. And whatever is contrary to the Book 
of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger is false even if the entire humankind agrees 
upon it” (Azan Issue, 1: 65). AQ further pronounces that “to obey the majority of the 
people of earth is to be misled away from Allah’s Path, because the majority is upon 
misguidance” (Azan Issue, 1: 65).  
The “freedom” for the Islamist organisations, is not linked to free choice; rather, the 
notion of “free choice” limits “freedom”. AQ in an article entitled “The Real Freedom” 
in the Azan Magazine summarises this mindset.   
From amongst the polluted ideologies that have afflicted people the 
entire world over throughout the course of the tyranny carried out by 
the forces of kufr, is the notion that the people can choose whether to 
follow the truth or to embark upon falsehood. This ideology teaches that 
no one has the right, regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed 
or set of morals on anyone else, even if that creed or set of morals is the 
truth revealed by Allah. They went to the extent of attributing this 
‘methodology of free choice’ to the religion of Allah ta’ālā, and to the 
call of the Prophets, peace be upon them (Azan, Issue 3: 37).  
The theme in the text mentioned above rejects any suggestion of “consensus iuris”. The 
ideological mindset is so convinced about the benefits of anchoring one’s thought in a 
superhuman source that it appears surprised over the suggestion that the 
“‘methodology of free choice’ can be applied to the religion of Allah taala” (Azan, 
Issue 3: 37). This mindset does not conceive of the idea of “freedom of choice”, as the 
ideology has already decided truth and falsehood for its adherents; therefore, opting for 
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the falsehood is not a choice. As mentioned earlier, the reality for this mindset appears 
in binary terms, i.e. true claims and false claims. Implicitly, the Islamist organisations' 
mistrust the human faculty of thinking, as in their perception an option for a “free 
choice” would lead people to wrong choices. 
Fundamentally, all three Islamist organisations construct the themes and subthemes 
linked to the first element of the Arendtian ideological mindset in a similar language. 
For example, IS endorses the construction of the other two organisations in the 
following text. 
These new proponents of choice had forgotten that many of the Ummah 
who held onto the name Islam had left through their deeds much of 
Islam’s attributes. Therefore, giving the people’ choice was no longer a 
possibility in this new state of affairs. Rather, the guiding principle 
became that every time choice is allowed, it will result in misguidance, 
either in the present or in the future (Dabiq, Issue 2: 5).  
The discursive practices construct a character that is supposed to believe that “free 
choice” is problematic, as it leads to “the psychological and physical slavery” (Azan, 
Issue 3:38). In principle, the notion of freedom of choice cannot co-exist with an 
ideology. The role of man in such an arrangement is not to exercise freedom of choice 
but to be the obedient servant of the superhuman-sourced eternal law. Therefore, 
freedom for the character is an antithesis to the idea of a superhuman source.  
4.7  Freedom as Antithesis to the Superhuman Source  
The discursive practices of the three Islamist organisations in the magazines construct 
a superhuman source that is against all types of freedoms and displays a typical 
contempt for this notion. The acceptance of a superhuman source of thought means the 
surrender of the character’s liberties, especially the freedom to think. The idea of 
“freedom” is very important in conceptualising the ideological mindset as an agreement 
with the discursive practices’ idea of freedom means a high chance for the presence of 
an ideological mindset in a character.  
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In the Islamist organisations' construction, the notion of freedom is an antithesis to the 
idea of a superhuman source as the origin of thought. A potentiality lies in the idea of 
freedom to do away with the requirement of an essential superhuman source of 
thinking. Unable to do away with the idea and its potentiality, the Islamist organisations 
appropriate the meaning of the idea itself. Freedom, for the Islamist organisations, 
means the total surrender of one’s thinking and action to the dictates of the superhuman 
source. IS insists that they need to “liberate the Ummah from oppression, tyranny and 
man-made laws and bring it real freedom under the shades of Islam” (Inspire, Issue 
9:4). For them, there is no freedom short of total submission to the superhuman source, 
as they draw all meaning to life from this source.   
“Freedom”, for the Islamist organisations, has a radically different meaning. The 
ideological mindset “operate[s] according to a system of values so radically different 
from all others, that none of our traditional legal, moral or common sense utilitarian 
categories could any longer help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict their 
course of action” (Arendt, 1958: 460). This is the case in the discursive practices by 
Islamist organisations. AQ in an article entitled “The Modern Secular Enlightenment” 
in the Azan Magazine constructs the meaning of “freedom” as follows.  
By “freedom” they meant that man is free to do what ever he wants in 
this life, and he possesses the freedom to decide rights and wrongs. This 
false supposition of freedom stems from the denial of God and man’s 
reality of being a slave of God. In reality this definition of freedom 
actually means slavery, which makes man a slave of his own desire or 
the desires of other human beings instead of a slave of Allah (…) When 
man is declared the central character in the Universe and freedom is 
declared ideal then what follows is that man’s intellect alone is the 
criterion between right and wrong. The result is that man worships 
himself or his own desires (Azan, Issue 6:29).  
The AQ published text mentioned above lays out an important theme of the ideological 
mindset. I employ a linguistic technique, namely deixis, to conceptualise the themes 
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and subthemes constructed in the text. Deixis is useful in conceptualising the implied 
meaning. In such expressions, the speaker is at the “deictic centre”, and others are 
positioned in relation to the speaker.  A well-known linguistic Charles J. Fillmore 
describes deixis as “the name given to those aspects of language whose interpretation 
is relative to the occasion of utterance: to the time of utterance, and to times before and 
after the utterance; to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance; and to the 
identity of the speaker and the intended audience” (Fillmore, 1966: 220).  
The deictic expressions in the text such as “they meant”, “whatever he wants” and “this 
life” are the major expressions of the construction on “freedom”. The deixis “they” 
represents all the competing narratives, especially Western notions of “freedom”. AQ 
simplistically summarise all the other narratives of freedom as conveying only one 
idea, that is, humans are free to do whatever they want to do. As the notion of 
“freedom” is an anathema to the ideological mindset; therefore, the Islamist 
organisations are very sensitive to any idea of decision making based on rational or 
logical thinking. Interestingly, the organisations are aware of the potentiality in logical 
thinking. Humans’ claim and ability to interpret the factual reality through their 
intellect and logical reasoning, which is independent of any superhuman source, is 
unacceptable to the ideological mindset. To silence this potentiality, they immediately 
summon the fundamental premise of the ideology, i.e. the idea of God.  
Nevertheless, implicitly, the Islamist organisations acknowledge that an internal source 
of thought exists within man. The Islamist organisations often contrast this idea of 
internal intellect with the idea of an external superhuman source of thought. In the 
above mentioned text, AQ asserts that “when man is declared the central character in 
the Universe and freedom is declared ideal then what follows is that man’s intellect 
alone is the criterion between right and wrong. The result is that man worships himself 
or his own desires” (Azan, Issue 6:29). The magazines reserve much space to root out 
the idea of freedom to think.   
Another deixis expression in ‘this’ life appeals to the wider religious beliefs, which 
consider this life only as a temporary abode of humans. The deixis ‘this’ not only 
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mainstreams the idea of the transience of life but also answers a logical question that 
arises when humans are encouraged not to think. The theme in the text implies that the 
faculty of thinking is not for ‘this’ life, but for ‘that’ life, i.e. the hereafter. Logically, 
if there is ‘this’ life, then somewhere must be ‘that’ life. In the discursive constructions, 
humans shall be allowed to do whatever they want to do in ‘that’ life. The incentivised 
‘that’ life “of eternity (in Jannah)” is available to only those pure ones who close all 
their thinking faculties in ‘this’ life and follow the ideology. The ideological mindset 
not only forbids thinking in personal and private life but in collective political life as 
well.  
I note that in the TT published Urdu texts the articulations of the idea of freedom are 
less philosophical and more conventional than the other two organisations.  TT in the 
Shariat Magazine states: 
 
 
[Translation by the author] Freedom means the ability to live on one's 
land with independence and self-reliance in line with the principles of 
humanity, where man is not dependent on others. Freedom is a gift, and 
life is full of difficulties without freedom.  Our Afghan brethren shall 
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take it very hard when they are told that you are not independent and 
self-reliant. It can be judged from the act of the Afghans that they prefer 
independence over slavery, but unfortunately, we are not independent 
and self-reliant and are living under the shadow of aggression (Shariat, 
Issue 56: 21).  
I contrast the TT conceptualisation of the notion with the articulation constructed by 
AQ. AQ conceptualise the notion of freedom in more philosophical terms. A text in the 
AQ published magazine Azan constructs the idea of freedom as follows.  
Free yourself from the shackles of this worldly life and physical 
pleasures. Yearn for freedom from your constricted desires and embrace 
the expanse of eternity in Jannah (Azan, Issue 4: 23). 
In the discursive practice of the Islamist organisations, the metaphors of ‘worldly life’ 
and ‘physical pleasures’ are often used to represent the empirical world. The followers 
are encouraged to reject the ideas of empiricism and the associated knowledge claims. 
True freedom, for this mindset, is not the commodity of this world but would be 
available in a life after death. Therefore, the followers must disengage from all social 
activity that is not sanctioned by the ideology. This is the first step to encourage a 
recruit to opt for loneliness, and “loneliness” is one of the conditions that help in 
developing the ideological mindset (Arendt, 1958: 474—479). In the ideological 
mindset, thinking and free choice are problematic. The Islamist organisations, 
therefore, suggest a way out of the problem of free choice or “consensus iuris”. The 
solution lies in surrendering the thought to the superhuman-sourced ideology and 
reinterpreting the meaning of the notion of “freedom”. AQ articulates,  
[a] person becomes a real slave of Allah by bowing down to none but 
the Creator - Allah. This freedom is experienced by the thousands of 
Mujahideen who are spread all around the world, and the hundreds of 
thousands of Muslims who are joining the ranks of Mujahideen to break 
the shackles of the psychological and physical slavery that has been 
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imposed upon them by the Crusader-Zionist enemy over the decades 
(Azan, issue 3: 38).  
The theme in the text offers a solution to the problem of ‘free choice’. The solution is 
simple: leave the ambiguity of the free choice, endorse the ideological mindset and join 
the ranks of the organisations. Such action will grant the character “freedom” and 
liberate them from the “psychological and physical slavery” (Azan, Issue 3: 38). This 
is a suggestion to the character to rebel against the existing order everywhere. The 
texts in the magazines suggest that all those who have opted for this path have 
experienced the suggested liberation. A Mujahid in the pages of AQ published Azan 
Magazine explains his feelings as follows.   
The minute I walked in the tribal belt, I could feel the freedom that this 
place has got. I am no longer chained by any man-made law and nor am 
I subject to the tight procedures of homeland security or “NSA”. I am a 
free man – bound by the Law of Allah Alone – who is the Creator of the 
heavens and the earth and none else. I pay no taxes; the only passport I 
need here in Waziristan is LA ILAHA ILALLAH MUHAMMAD UR 
RASOOL LLAH (None has the right to be worshipped except Allah and 
Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah) (Azan, issue 3:34). 
The theme in the text mentioned above emphasises that freedom comes from defying 
all positive laws made by man; the only acceptable laws are the eternal laws of the 
ideology. The ideological mindset neither recognises international boundaries nor 
international or local law. They want to live in a land that belongs to no one, is devoid 
of all positive laws and applies the superhuman-sourced law directly to humanity. In 
their perception, no law is compatible with the eternal law, as “[t]he religion of Allah 
cannot be stitched together with any man-made religion, philosophy or ideology. Islam 
came down to rule, and it cannot be ruled over” (Azan, Issue 5: 4). AQ repeats their 
unique understanding of “freedom” in the pages of Azan Magazine by emphasising that 
“[w]e are free from this ‘New World Order’, its bogus ‘Charters’, its ‘Democracy’ and 
its putrid ‘Constitutions’” (Azan, Issue 5: 4).  
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In pursuit of a unique understanding of the notion of “freedom”, the Islamist 
organisations perceive themselves as free people fighting for freedoms. This mindset 
also conceives the implementation of the superhuman sourced law as a resistance 
movement.  
4.8 The Islamic Ideologue as a Free Man Fighting for Freedom(s)  
The notion of “freedom” in the magazines is also a theme of resistance. It takes a 
particular political tone while discussing freedom as a resistance movement against the 
existing international world order. The discursive practices construct the ideal type of 
the Islamic ideologue as a freedom fighter, who is fighting for the freedom of the 
oppressed and downtrodden for the sake of superhuman source — God. AQ supreme 
leader Ayman u Zuwahiri asserts this theme in an article entitled “On Bangladesh and 
the Situation of Muslim Ummah” in the Azan Magazine.  
When the people of Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia demand freedom 
from foreign occupation and secular rulers and decide to implement 
Shariah, imposing economic sanctions become a ‘necessity’. They are 
then met with a full-fledged military onslaught, in which the leading 
international criminals and their local surrogates take part. Their 
villages and homes are reduced to ruins. Their women and children are 
killed. In short, they are unable to establish the Shariah because they are 
‘terrorists’ and ‘enemies of freedom’. But when Salman Rushdie, 
Tasleema Nasreen, and Ali Rajab Haider insult Islam, the Prophet of 
Islam, and the beliefs of Islam, they are treated as heroes who must be 
defended, honoured, and given awards. They even get warm receptions 
in the White House or Ten Downing Street! Why? Because they are 
icons of freedom who are defended by the West and the enemies of 
Islam (Azan, issue 5: 29). 
After Usama Bin Laden, Zawahiri is the supreme head of AQ. The ideas mentioned 
above are loaded with often-repeated rhetoric. Thematically, the text advances the 
theme of resistance against an unjust oppressor. The time deixis “when” and person 
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deixis “they” and “who”, once interpreted along with the metaphors used in the 
paragraph, substantially reveal the themes of the mindset Zawahiri is constructing.  
By using the time deixis “when”, Zawahiri combines different political situations in 
different areas into one situation. The time deixis “when” as used rhetorically 
eliminates any difference in the timeline of the political situations in Afghanistan, Mali 
and Somalia. It reduces the complexity of the situation and simplifies it for the target 
audience. By combining the three Muslim majority countries in the same time deixis, 
he legitimises by close proximation the Islamic violence in those countries and calls 
this violence as “freedom” for the people of those countries, i.e. freedom from foreign 
occupation and “secular rulers”.  
“Secular ruler” is often the repeated metaphor in the texts. The Islamist organisations 
use this metaphor for the political leadership of Muslim majority countries, who govern 
through any system other than the approved Sharia Law. In line with the ideological 
claim, Sharia Law is the law revealed by a superhuman source, and the ideological 
mindset does not need arguments for the legitimacy of the claimed laws. It is 
preordained that such law is the right law for humanity. “secular rulers” are, therefore, 
those rulers in the Muslim lands who have digressed from their duty to God and his 
law. The Islamist organisations themselves assess this digression. AQ thinks that 
secular rulers are “Muslim rulers who stand by in support of these countries against the 
Muslim people” (Inspire, Issue 17:61).   
The IS agrees with the conceptualisation constructed by AQ and considers Sharia Law 
as the only legitimate law, which can ensure human “freedom”. As the “secular rulers” 
are unaware of the fact that their rule is illegitimate, they must be made to realise this 
fact through all available means. “The Ummah today has been afflicted by the 
treacherous, apostate rulers and leaders who have even violated the rights of Allah in 
addition to the rights of His creation. And it is known that the authority of these rulers 
is invalid and that it is obligatory to oppose them and wage war against them” (Dabiq, 
Issue 12:9). The metaphor “secular rulers” denotes a categorisation of ‘them’ in the 
identity construction rhetoric. “Secular rulers” is a simplistic and convenient 
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categorisation to exclude the vast majority of moderate Muslims from the ‘us’ category. 
The ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisation is essential for the ideological mindset. It matches 
with the simplistic and binary mindset informed by ideology.  
The metaphor “secular rulers”, however, has a deeper appeal as well. For the 
constructed ideal type of an Islamic ideologue, the term “secular rulers” is a proxy for 
a modern nation-state and its complex governing institutions. As the Islamist 
organisations draw legitimacy from the past, where such governing institutions were 
named differently, they feel alienated from and unattached to the Western named 
modern state institutions. For example, Islamist organisations prefer to use the word 
Qazi instead of a judge when referring to a judicial person. IS thinks that “[w]ith the 
spread of Christianity on a large scale in this region under the sword of Crusader 
colonialism and with support from it, and with this continuing until the current period, 
wiping out Islam in this region was among the most important declared goals of the 
mushrikin [polytheists]. They attempted to place pressure on the Muslims using every 
means in order to change their religion and remove them from the land” (Rumiyah, 
Issue 10:37). It may be argued that the colonisation of the Muslim majority territories 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century abruptly changed the evolutionary course of 
the Muslim historical institutions of governance. The new Western named institutions 
of governance could not gain legitimacy in the minds of the conservative Muslims. AQ, 
in line with IS also thinks that the colonisers “hired local people in the new population 
period and trained them in their particular ideology” (Azan, Issue 5: 15). The period of 
colonial disruption in the Muslim lands served as an impetus to the nostalgic feelings 
of a glorious past, to which the Islamist organisations are trying to lead the ordinary 
Muslims.   
Person deixis “they” and “their” in the textual constructions are the categories of 
“them”. However, sometimes in rhetorical and dramatic language, as used in the above-
quoted text, such deixis represent opposite meaning. This is done to dramatise the 
rhetoric so that the utterance gets a significance. The “they” and “them” deixis in the 
first half of the above-quoted text rhetorically point to the resistance and sufferings of 
the ideal type characters, who are the freedom fighters.  The rhetorical sentence in the 
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text, i.e. “because they are the ‘terrorists’ and ‘enemies of freedom”’ (Azan, Issue 5: 
29) means the opposite to the apparent wordings of the language, i.e., ‘they’ (the ideal 
type characters) are not terrorists but are the freedom fighters.    
In the second half of the quoted text, Zawahiri repeats his technique of using the deixis 
in a context. In line with the first part of the paragraph, he combines critical writings 
of Salman Rushdie, Tasleema Nasreen, and Ali Rajab Haider through time deixis 
“when”. Time deixis “when” has also identified the writers mentioned above as part of 
‘them’. The ideological mindset, through such linguist techniques, simplifies the 
cognitive understanding of the targeted concept. Writings of Salman Rushdie, 
Tasleema Nasreen and Ali Rajab Haider differ in subject matter, time and space, yet, 
time deixis “when”, simplistically combines the three writers into a specific time frame. 
The deixis serves the purpose of the ideological mindset, i.e. to forcefully shut any 
alternate views of social reality.  
The selection of the three writers in the text is significant due to two reasons. Firstly, it 
balances against the selection of three Muslim countries for the comparison. Secondly, 
as all the three writers have a Muslim background, it is also an effort to delegitimise 
any alternate explanations within the Muslim world. The ideological mindset is trying 
to neutralise a potential challenge from the modern state institutions and the critical 
Muslim thinkers. The construction in the text is an attempt to simplify the complex 
social reality for the consumption of the ideological mindset.     
In the quoted textual construction, Zawahiri frames the Islamic ideology in ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ categories by predominantly using time and person deixis with the blending of 
a metaphor. By suitably combining the linguistic techniques, he conveys the core theme 
to the constructed character, i.e. the Islamic ideologues are the freedom fighters, as 
they believe in a superhuman sourced Divine Law. The freedom fighters are being 
opposed by a conspiratorial alliance comprising Western powers, Muslim secular rulers 
and writers.   
The Islamist organisations construct the adoption of Sharia Law as synonymous with 
the notion of “freedom”. A simplistic and binary view of international politics informs 
155 
 
the political analysis of the ideological mindset.  AQ continues with the theme of 
“freedom” as a resistance movement in an article entitled “Destroying the Country 
Idols” as follows.  
If one researches and ponders deeply, it becomes really clear that the 
imperialistic powers are behind it. They hired local people in the new 
population period and trained them in their particular ideology; on the 
one hand, they gave increase to their period of rule and used them 
against their fellow-country Mujahideen who were fighting for 
freedom, while on the other, they left, as their inheritors, such people 
who were not only the protectors of the systems, ideologies, societies 
and constitutions implemented by these powers, but who also served, 
through proper  planning, to stop any and  all attempts to establish Islam 
(Azan, Issue 5: 15).  
The ideological mindset understands an alternate social reality as a conspiracy. In the 
text mentioned above, AQ again focuses on the theme of “secular rulers”, who should 
be identified as the conspirators opposing the freedom fighters (Islamist organisations). 
The magazines devote much space to this theme. The theme is on the lines that anyone 
among the Muslim people who do not share the ideological mindset of the Islamist 
organisations is a conspirator. Such conspirators are working in an organised manner 
in league with the imperialistic (Western) powers with a well-defined purpose of 
defeating the Islamic ideologues.   
The Islamist organisations simplistically reinterpret the complex experiences of the 
Muslims in their colonial histories. In such reinterpretations, they construct the themes 
of resistance by Mujahideen. Mujahideen, a plural form of Mujahid, is an Islamic term 
reserved for the people fighting in the cause of Allah. By naming the contemporary 
ideal type characters as Mujahideen, the Islamist organisations not only appropriate 
Muslim history in their favour but also legitimise their violent actions through religious 
phraseology. Another text in the AQ published Inspire Magazine uses deixis to 
emphasise the theme of a freedom fighter. 
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What is happening in Yemen today is but a small portion of what has 
befallen our brothers in Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq. They are a 
continuation of violations and crimes driven by an all-encompassing 
hatred for every honourable and proud Muslim who seeks the freedom 
of Islam, the justice of Shari'ah. Allah says: {They shall keep fighting 
you until they turn you away from your faith, as much as they 
can}[2:218]. True was Allah when He said: {And never will the Jews 
or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion} 
(Inspire, Issue 17: 4). 
AQ is promoting the theme of freedom fighter using deixis in the text mentioned above. 
The deixis expression “what” in the sentence, “what is happening in Yemen…”, is 
aimed at creating two effects. Firstly, it simplifies the complex reality for the character. 
As I explain elsewhere, that ideological mindset understands the factual reality in a 
binary sense; it is incapable of conceiving the reality in shades of grey. The reality for 
such a mindset is simple; it is either white or black, i.e. either true or false. The deixis 
“what” rhetorically simplifies the situation for a character. The character is no longer 
required to study the complex situation in Yemen; rather, they need to understand the 
implied meaning in the expression of “what”. The ideological mindset will interpret 
the factual reality of Yemen in light of the ideology. The mindset will also judge it as 
being right or wrong through the same criteria.   
Therefore, secondly, the first deixis expression of “what”, once combined with the 
latter expression of the same deixis in the first sentence of the text, gives legitimacy to 
the understanding of the situation in Yemen by understanding the situations in 
Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq. The ideological mindset has already interpreted the 
situation in the three countries in ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories. The rhetorical use of deixis 
has made the theme appear sensible for the ideological mindset of an otherwise 
confusing situation in Yemen. The deixis “they” in the next sentence further clarifies 
the ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories. Thematically, “they”, in the second sentence, are clearly 
part of the enemy category as “they” are opposing the freedom fighters, who are 
fighting for a type of “freedom” that is sanctioned by a superhuman source. In the 
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ideological mindset, the type of “freedom” that is sanctioned by the superhuman source 
is the superior type of “freedom” than the “freedom” that is perceived through rational 
thinking.  
Another deixis expression “they” in the above-quoted paragraph is directly translated 
from the Quran. The Islamist organisations liberally use Quranic quotations to lend 
authority and legitimacy to their discursive practices. The text also conveys the theme 
that the understanding of the Islamist organisations of the deixis “they” is aligned with 
the essence of superhuman sourced law. God in the quotation has informed the Islamist 
organisations that ‘they’ are fighting with ‘us’ — the freedom fighters, due to the faith; 
and that ‘they’ will continue to fight ‘us’ until ‘they’ eliminate the category of ‘us’.  
The Arendtian ideological mindset predicts future actions in the form of prophecies. 
The Quranic quotation implies that ‘they’ and ‘us’ shall always conflict until ‘they’ 
identify themselves as Jews and Christians, and ‘us’ identify themselves as Muslims. 
As this prediction is sourced to an eternal superhuman source, people have no control 
over its operationalisation. It is a prediction of eternal conflict. The Islamic radicals are 
destined by the superhuman source to eliminate the category of ‘them’, which is also 
represented by the existing international system led by America. The Islamist 
organisations urge the character to “continue to focus efforts against it until the world 
gets rid of this international system led by America and until Muslims enjoy freedom 
to practice their faith, freedom to apply the Laws of Allah and until Muslims secure 
themselves, wealth and resources from the hands of America” (Inspire, Issue 17: 12). 
This conflict can only cease when and if the Islamic ideologues dominate the world.  
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the discursive constructed by three Islamist 
organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT, in the texts of their online magazines. The 
objective of the analysis was to detect the themes and subthemes used in the discursive 
construction of the ideal type of an Islamic ideologue through the lens of Arendtian 
theorisations on ideological mindset. Arendt theorises five essential elements of the 
ideological mindset (see Chapter 1). In this chapter, I quoted texts from the magazines 
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published by the three Islamist organisations that carry the first element of the 
ideological mindset, namely “The Superhuman source as the Origin of Thought”. I 
noted that all the three Islamist organisations equally constructed a character that is 
supposed to attribute a superhuman source, namely God, as the origin of their thought. 
I argued that, contrary to the Islamist organisations’ claim that their thought originates 
from a single superhuman source, the Islamist organisations in their discursive 
practices consult three types of texts indiscriminately as the sources of their thought. 
The texts include the Quran, the Ahadees and the interpretations of righteous scholars.     
I analysed the chapter theme under seven subthemes that formed the paragraph 
headings. Fundamentally, the character constructed by the three Islamist organisations 
is supposed to believe that all thought that is attributed to other than their superhuman 
source is essentially false. All sovereignty belongs to the superhuman source. 
Therefore, no government can claim sovereignty for itself. “God’s Sovereignty is 
established on earth by man’s implementation of Allah’s Law in his collective life” 
(Azan, 6: 30). The sovereignty of God, in the discursive practices, is the idea that is 
equally shared by the ideological as well as the Islamic religious mindset. By engaging 
with the wider Islamic literature, I demonstrate that although the idea is shared by both 
the types of mindsets, the conception of the ideological mindset is different from the 
religious mindset. The ideological mindset does not envision any space between God, 
the Divine Law and human being. This does not mean that the ideological mindset 
considers them a single entity, but they do not allow any freedom to humans to think.  
The superhuman sourced law, which is the manifestation of the will of the 
superhuman-source, is independent of any “consensus iuris”, i.e. the wider consent of 
the law. The ideological mindset believes that Divine Law does not need any 
“consensus iuris”, as it is independent of all action and consent of humans. They not 
only defy “consensus iuris” but reject all the notions that are the manifestations of 
“consensus iuris”, namely, the will or consent of people, democracy and freedom.  
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The discursively constructed character does not believe in the separation of religion 
and politics. For this mindset, Islam is self-sufficient, complete and can resolve all 
matters; it does not need any outside source to guide its affairs.  
The discursive practices engaged very frequently with the notion of freedom and allied 
expressions such as democracy and free choice. Unable to get rid of the inherent 
potentiality (of discarding the superhuman source as the origin of all thought and 
action) in the notion of freedom, the organisations, uniquely, change the commonly 
understood meaning of freedom. They interpret freedom as applying the Divine Law 
literally to oneself and the world. Such an application shall free humans from the 
shackles of desires, ambitions as well as conflict.  
In this chapter, I do not note any substantial difference in the discursive constructions 
between the three Islamist organisations, even though the character is constructed in 
two different languages by three separate organisations. The only difference the 
analysis noted is with regards to the idea of “freedom”. TT conceptualise the idea of 
“freedom” more in a conventional sense as compared to AQ and IS, which are more 
philosophical and attach a deeper connection between the superhuman source and the 
idea of “freedom”.  It is possible to claim that the three organisations consider the same 
superhuman source as the origin of their thought. Nor do they substantially differ in 
the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this idea. This argument also lends 
credence to another claim, namely that the idea of a superhuman source as the origin 
of all thought is a mainstream idea amongst Muslims. Being an experiential reality, the 
idea of a superhuman source serves as the fundamental premise of Islamic ideology. In 
the Arendtian criteria of ideology, the first premise of ideology is based on a widely 
shared experience. It is the seriousness of the character that guides which of the two 
paths, i.e. the ideological or non-ideological mindset, the character shall adopt. Since 
many in the world are either non-serious or incapable of understanding the true nature 
of the superhuman source, it is, therefore, incumbent upon the ideologue to spring into 
action and realign the world as per the will of the superhuman source. Such a possibility 
cannot materialise in the true sense until and unless the ideologues dominate the world. 
The claim to global domination, therefore, springs from the first element of the 
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Arendtian ideological mindset. In the next chapter, I shall deal with the second element 




















Chapter 5: The Claim to Global Domination 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 2, ‘The Claim to Global Domination’ is the second essential 
element of a character’s mindset that can be categorised as ideological in the Arendtian 
sense of ideology. In this chapter, I continue to analyse the texts in the magazines of 
the three Islamist organisations to ascertain whether the character constructed by the 
organisations carry this element in their mindset. If this is the case, what is the extent 
of this presence? I detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts that carry the theme of a 
claim to global domination from the texts in the magazines.       
I separate the exemplary texts from the magazines that carry the theme of ‘The Claim 
to Global Domination’. I then reread the separated texts using Arendt’s theorisations. 
Through this exercise, I generate subthemes that are clustered around the chapter 
theme. The language of the subthemes comes from both the sources, namely the 
empirical texts and the language used by Ardent in her theorisations. The subthemes 
form the paragraph headings. In this chapter, I analyse the chapter theme, i.e., ‘The 
Claim to Global Domination’ under six subthemes: Engaging with Important 
Ideological Questions Over centuries; superfluousness of existing international 
boundaries; contempt for a nation-state; the global state under a global leader; the idea 
of a global race; and suppression of human diversity and spontaneity. I also compare 
and analyse the similarities and dissimilarities of the themes across the three 
organisations.   
The ideology—as it springs from an eternal and universal superhuman source—is not 
for one nation but the whole world. Arendt asserts that ideologues “discard national 
sovereignty and believe, as Hitler once put it, in a world empire on a national basis. 
They are not satisfied with the revolution in one country but aim at the conquest and 
rule of the world” (Arendt, 1958: 358, 359). Therefore, to be effective, the ideologues 
must dominate the world. The ideological movements suppress narrow nationalism 
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because “a development towards nationalism would frustrate its exterior expansion, 
without which the movement cannot survive” (Arendt, 1958:389). The eternal law 
anchored in a superhuman source is operating with a specific purpose; it “is expected 
to produce mankind as its end product; and this expectation lies behind the claim to 
global rule of all totalitarian governments” (Arendt, 1958: 462). The ideologues view 
history through the lens of ideology and try to answer certain ideological questions 
spread over centuries. The answers to such questions are useful for the ideological 
consistency and lend credence to their claim to global domination.   
5.2 Engaging with Important Ideological Questions Over Centuries 
The Arendtian ideologues think that they can answer “ideological questions of the 
importance of centuries” (Arendt, 1958). Such a mode of thinking is useful to the 
ideologues as it obliterates and confuses the existing political categories to the 
ideologues’ advantage. History is (re)interpreted and portrayed as not only moving in 
sync with ideology but adequately answering important ideological questions as well. 
The Islamist organisations draw on Islamic literature to articulate such questions like 
the relationship of the imagined eternal superhuman source with humans. Such 
engagement with history is important for the organisations’ positionality, as the 
ideological explanations flowing out of this engagement legitimise their claim to global 
domination for easy comprehension of the character. A text published in the IS 
Magazine Dabiq not only engages with the theme of global domination but also reveals 
the foundational framework of the ideological mindset. It reads, 
Indeed, the Gracious Lord has never left man without guidance. 
Whenever mankind strayed from His worship, He sent them a 
messenger bringing both warning and glad tidings. Those who 
worshipped other than the Creator were warned of punishment, torment, 
and eternal damnation, and those who persevered upon the worship of 
the True King were promised forgiveness, salvation, and everlasting 
bliss. But how astray mankind often chooses to be  (Dabiq, Issue 15:46). 
Thematically, the text addresses a historically constructed ideological question, 
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namely, the relationship of man with Divine Law. The text explains that Divine Law is 
primarily for the guidance of humanity. The law divides humanity into two categories, 
i.e. believers and non-believers. The Divine Law is refreshed through messengers who 
are sent by the Divine Being whenever the law is either misunderstood or corrupted. 
The law decrees rewards for followers and punishes non-followers. The subtle theme 
in the text delegitimises all other divisions of the world, e.g. political, ethnic, 
geographical, economic, and so on. The IS suggests to the character that the world 
consists of humanity, which is of two types—good and bad types. The Divine Law has 
decreed that good types, or the followers, shall dominate the bad types or non-
followers. It is, therefore, legitimate for the ideological organisations, i.e. the good 
types and followers of the Divine Being, to make a claim for global domination so that 
the Divine Law takes its course which is hindered by the actions of the non-followers.       
IS thinks that Divine Law dominated the world in the past through “the call of 
Noah(…)Then Abraham, calling his father and clan to the denial of idols and to the 
worship of the Creator,( …)after Joseph, a son of Israel, brought the grandsons of Isaac 
into Egypt, wherein they were enslaved by Pharaoh, the Lord sent Moses to rescue 
them, (…)In the end times, Jesus Son of Mary came to the tribes of Israel but was met 
with fierce opposition” (Dabiq, Issue 15:47). The acceptance, as well as the rejection 
of the Divine Law itself, is also in the knowledge of the superhuman source. Inferiority 
in numbers does not concern the ideologue; rather, it is proof of divine decree. “It is 
just as the Lord said, explaining this phenomenon of the majority’s rejection of the 
truth, ‘And most of mankind refuse [to follow anything] but disbelief (Al-Isra: 89)’” 
(Dabiq, Issue 15:47). IS suggests to the character that all these messengers over the 
centuries came with a message “often in the form of a scripture, something for the 
educated to read and comprehend, yet with the simple command of monotheistic 
worship of the Creator that even the illiterate could follow” (Dabiq, Issue 15:47). 
Unfortunately, humanity has always strayed away from the original divine message. 
“[J]ust as the Torah was not fully preserved, even altered, the Gospel was also 
corrupted. Its original was lost, with the oldest related manuscripts written only as 
commentary to the original. So instead of having an unaltered ‘Gospel of Jesus,’ one 
finds the Gospel according to Matthew, then Mark, then Luke, then John, each with a 
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unique take on various aspects of Jesus’ teachings, sometimes outright contradicting 
one another. To say the least, the authentic scripture was lost, and the people strayed” 
(Dabiq, Issue 15:48). 
Furthermore, Jesus’ message was not for the whole of humanity but only for the tribes 
of Israel. “It was reported that he [Jesus] said, ‘Do not think that I have come to abolish 
the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfil them’” (Matthew 
5:17)” (Dabiq, Issue 15:47). IS announces that now the final message to humanity has 
been sent through Prophet Muhammad “about whom He [God] said, ‘Muhammad is 
not the father of any of your men, but [he is] the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of 
the Prophets’ (Al-Ahzab 40). The God has promised that “We revealed the Reminder 
and verily We shall preserve it (Al-Hijr 9)’”  (Dabiq, Issue 15:48). The final divine 
message has divine protection and is “sent not to the Tribes of Israel alone – but to all 
of humanity. For the same Lord who sent Moses and Jesus also sent Muhammad” 
(Dabiq, Issue 15:48). 
IS constructs a character who believes that they are the true representatives of all 
religious discourses. The writers in the magazines imply that the character constructed 
by the discourse is not a new character; rather, this character was always present in 
the religious discourse since the start of history. The contemporary character, however, 
has a distinction; it is universal, perfect and does not suffer from the imperfections of 
the past character(s). It is a clever positionality, that is, by acknowledging 
imperfections of the past characters (of the religious discourses), the violent radicals 
reject all the past assessments and categorisations that can help contextualise and 
understand the present phenomena of Islamic radicalisation and its central character. 
It is typical of the Arendtian articulated ideological mindset to challenge all the existing 
categories of understandings and introduce certain new categories of analysis that are 
guided by ideology only. 
The IS construction presents a character that is not only the true embodiment of the 
Divine Law but also possesses an exclusive instrument that can interpret factual reality. 
The exclusive instrument is the monopoly over the understanding of the true essence 
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of Divine Law. The organisation constructs a character that believes in the finality of 
the Divine Law which is preserved in all its entirety and purity and that the character 
exclusively understands its true interpretations; the interpretations that capture Divine 
Law’s true essence. It is a unique privilege available to the character that is unavailable 
even to most of the fellow co-religionists.   
Therefore, as the previous centuries proved, the Divine Law shall again favour the 
character, who shall then conquer the world. As the Divine Law is for humanity, 
therefore, the character must ignore all manmade boundaries that divide humanity so 
that man can be reformed as per the essence of the Divine Law. The Divine Law, then, 
shall logically favour the reformed man. IS desires that the character should believe 
that such a favour is already in operation. IS asserts that “[w]hat we see today in these 
current rounds of the mujahidin’s war with all the nations of shirk and kufr – at the 
head of which are the Crusader nations of the West – specifically over the past two 
decades, for the banner was clear, and the goal was sincere. Thus, the affair of the 
muwahhidin continued – by Allah’s grace – to rise and to flourish” (Rumiyah, Issue 6: 
10). IS continues,   
[a]nd we have seen this being confirmed many times throughout the 
history of this blessed Jihad, which has not stopped since Allah’s 
Messenger and his noble companions commenced it. Makkah and the 
Arabian Peninsula yielded to the Muslims in a number of years, and 
they eliminated Khosrau’s empire after engaging the Persian pagans in 
long battles, during the course of which the Muslims suffered what they 
did of injuries, until eventually Allah brought down Khosrau’s throne. 
They then dealt with the Roman state, which the Muslims continued to 
attack for several centuries, until Allah permitted that it be eliminated 
and that its traces be wiped out. Then, there was what the Muslims did 
with many of the tawaghit and the nations of kufr, which the Muslims 
did not tire of fighting against, until Allah eventually permitted their 
defeat and there remained for the Muslims their religion and their lands 
(Rumiyah, Issue 6: 10). 
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The main theme in the text proposes that the operation of Divine Law is independent 
of any national boundaries. Fundamentally, it operates through Jihad and is in 
continuous motion. The Divine Law, however, does not operate with a uniform pace; 
the Divine Being strictly controls the pace of the operation. The constructed character 
has a distinction in its mindset from the past ideologues, namely the Nazi and 
Communist ideologue. The past ideologues did not differentiate between the eternal 
law and eternal being, but the organisations construct a distinction between both; the 
Divine Being is separate from the Divine Law. For the character, Divine Law is 
controlled by a Divine Being who can adjust the pace of its operation. It is this 
discretion of the Divine Being that accounts for the differing patterns of Muslim 
successes mentioned in the above text, i.e. the military successes against Arabian, 
Persian and the Roman Empires. The character is not supposed to consider non-
ideological factors, e.g. material differences while assessing the outcome of an action; 
the outcome of an action depends on the decision of the Divine Being as to how He 
chooses to operate the Divine Law. For the ideologues, ideology explains “the secrets 
of the past, the intricacies of the present, [and] the uncertainties of the future” (Arendt, 
1958: 469). Any difference that is observed in the operation of the eternal law is 
attributable to the idea of the divine will. The idea of divine will keeps the ontological 
explanations of the factual reality fluid and formless.   
The character is supposed to think that history is realised through the divine will, which 
can be understood retrospectively by understanding the operation of Divine Law. For 
them, the operation of Divine Law reveals the divine will. It was the divine will that 
dictated quick domination in Arabia but decided to take several centuries to eliminate 
Roman Empire. IS articulates that the Divine Law is in operation to endorse their 
ideology, as it helps the reformed one “to rise and flourish”.  
The two sister Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ and TT, do not present any substantial 
disagreement with IS articulated constructs, as far as the explanations of the historical 
relationship between man and Divine Law are concerned, AQ, however, also focuses 
on the resisting forces that try to operate against the historical arrangements of the 
superhuman source, i.e. the Divine Being. By historicising and naming such forces, 
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AQ identifies ‘them’ and their actions. One of the methods used by ‘them’ to resist 
AQ’s claim to global domination is to corrupt the (true) interpretation of the Divine 
Law. It is done by the Crusader-Zionists duo, who promote the corrupt idea that 
democracy and secularism are compatible with Islam.  
Oh, our dear Muslim Ummah! The Crusader-Zionists have been 
working day and night since the last few centuries to demolish Islam, as 
it was revealed to Prophet Muhammad. They seek to befool us that 
Islam can be stitched together with their Secular, Democratic “New 
World Order” and the “Constitutional” system which was only designed 
to serve their interests (Azan, Issue 5:4).  
The central theme in the above mention text rejects any suggestion that Divine Law 
and manmade law are compatible. AQ clarifies to the character that the historical 
suggestion that Divine Law is compatible with manmade laws is a conspiracy hatched 
against ‘us’. Such a mindset resonates with the Arendtian ideological mindset; it rejects 
all actions flowing out of human thinking. The character must delink human 
experience and human action.  
AQ is very explicit in naming the nations that they think are historically part of ‘them’. 
“One of the nations at the head of this war against Islam is Britain. This is a nation that 
has a long history of hatred towards Islam and Muslims. In the centuries gone by it was 
at the forefront of the fight against Islam, and now it is America’s most loyal ally” 
(Azan, Issue 5: 16).  
AQ not only names the external enemies that resist their ‘Claim to Global Domination’ 
but points to the character that they should remain vigilant to the internal enemies as 
well. The internal challenges come from Muslim leaders who do not subscribe to the 
ideological mindset. Arendtian ideological mindset rejects all explanations that fall in 
the category of alternative explanations. Alternative, in ideological mindset, is dissent 
and dissent is a betrayal. AQ pronounces that “[i]n the last few centuries, history has 
witnessed that self-proclaimed, western appointed leaders of Muslim lands betrayed 
Islam and Muslims enormously. They proved to be killers, robbers, dictators, tyrants 
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and loyal to their western lords” (Azan, Issue 6: 23).  
The above mentioned textual construct normalises and historicizes the conflict between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. The conflict appears normal and part of a tradition. AQ suggests that 
“this method of Jihad is one of the modes of conflict between ‘us’ and the West - 
something both new and old- a way of hemming in the enemy and breaking its strength, 
and this mode of asymmetrical warfare was pioneered by our predecessors centuries 
ago” (Inspire Issue 17: 49). The Islamist organisations take pride in reviving the 
centuries-old traditions linked to the historical conflict. IS records the joy of a terrorist 
who thinks he has revived a centuries-old tradition of slavery, which was hitherto 
abandoned. The IS published Dabiq Magazine quotes, 
Therefore, I further increase the spiteful ones in anger by saying that I 
and those with me at home prostrated to Allah in gratitude on the day 
the first slave-girl entered our home. Yes, we thanked our Lord for 
having let us live to the day we saw kufr humiliated and its banner 
destroyed. Here we are today, and after centuries, reviving a prophetic 
Sunnah, which both the Arab and non-Arab enemies of Allah had 
buried. By Allah, we brought it back by the edge of the sword, and we 
did not do so through pacifism, negotiations, democracy, or elections. 
We established it according to the prophetic way, with blood-red 
swords, not with fingers for voting or tweeting (Dabiq, Issue 9: 47). 
IS constructs two themes in the text mentioned above. The first theme emphasises that 
violence is integral to ideology (I deal with this element, i.e. ‘Violence and the Call for 
Action’, separately in the following chapter), while the second theme gives a glimpse 
of the organisation’s future plans, i.e. to realign the future with the past. Innovation, to 
the construction, is an illusion. The future must not innovate, but rather follow the 
ideological explanations and traditions of the past. All progress that does not follow 
this ideological rule is considered illusory. 
Such an assertion is based on a particular reading of history. AQ constructs the 
character who is supposed to believe that ‘we’ always dominated ‘them’ militarily. 
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“History shows that the usage of military force in any war - not battle - between 
Muslims and ‘Kuffar’, failed to finish the war in favour of the ‘Kuffar’” (Inspire, Issue 
12:40). Such domination was maintained in the “nine historical crusades, the Soviet's 
invasion of Afghanistan and the American invasion of Iraq” (Inspire, Issue 12:40), as 
all these wars “ended with humiliating defeats on the infidels' side, by the Grace of 
Allah” (Inspire, Issue 12:40).  
All three Islamist organisations construct a character who is supposed to understand 
and answer important historical questions through the lens of the ideology. For them, 
history is a struggle for domination of the world between two forces; the forces of good 
represented by the Islamist organisations and the forces of evil represented by “Kuffar”. 
The forces of good are strictly guided by an eternal Divine Law originating in an eternal 
superhuman source. In the Islamist organisations’ textual constructs, the position of 
Divine Law is settled; it always favoured the forces of good for their claim to global 
domination. Wickedly, however, the forces of evil have created manmade boundaries 
to frustrate and retard the global domination of ideologues. The ideologues, therefore, 
should make every effort to obliterate the superfluous manmade boundaries and 
reclaim their legitimate right to dominate the world.   
5.3 Superfluousness of International Boundaries 
The Islamist organisations think that international boundaries are artificial creations 
having the explicit aim to serve the West. In their construct, the world instead should 
be divided based on faith. AQ articulates this theme in the following text.   
All Muslims are united upon true faith in Allah, His Messenger and His 
Final Book. However, these false lines have been etched upon us on the 
basis of which entire political, military, economic and cultural 
institutions have been established that seek division between the 
Pakistani and the Indian, between the Egyptian and the Turk, between 
the Chechen and the Uzbek. There is no reality in these divides. As has 
been emphasized earlier in the article, in Islam, the divide between 
humanity is upon faith, upon love for Allah and His Messenger. So, we 
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as an Ummah must take practical steps to defeat this divided mentality 
and erase these map lines physically that indoctrinate the Ummah into 
believing in this false separation (Azan, Issue 5: 13). 
The central theme that runs through the text points to an important aspect of AQ’s 
thinking, i.e. the political division of the world is superfluous. AQ suggests to the 
character to imagine the political division of the world based on one’s faith. The ideas 
of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harab are the concrete political categories for the 
constructed character. Dar-al-Islam, in the organisations’ understanding, is a piece of 
land without any intra-national boundaries.  
AQ’s claim to world domination, therefore, shall start by dominating the people and 
countries that identify themselves as Muslims. They assert, “[w]e as an Ummah must 
take practical steps to defeat this divided mentality and erase these map lines physically 
that indoctrinate the Ummah into believing in this false separation” (Azan, Issue 5: 13). 
Such divisions are superfluous and “[t]here is no reality in these divides” (Azan, Issue 
5: 13). One of the main aims of ideological violence is to obliterate these manmade 
borders. “Ameer-ul-Mumineen Mulla Muhammad Umar, Shaykh Usama bin Laden, 
Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri and countless other Scholars and Mujahideen from all 
parts of the world have sacrificed their lives for the sake of destroying these manmade 
borders (Azan, issue 3:5). These manmade borders “divided the hearts and bodies of an 
Ummah united by faith. Indeed, the reality is that this Ummah is ONE - united by faith 
in the One True God Allah, His Messenger and His final Book, The Glorious Quran” 
(Azan, issue 3:5). 
Fundamentally, all the three Islamist organisations construct a character in the 
discursive practices that is supposed to imagine Muslim identity in terms of a global 
race, that is, the Ummah. I discuss the “global race” aspect of the Ummah in the 
succeeding paragraphs; here, I explain the character’s political understanding of the 
concept. A very strong presumption exists in the discursive character’s understanding 
of the political identity of people who identify themselves as Muslims; all the three 
organisations contribute equally to this presumption. The very concept fuels the zeal to 
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obliterate all political divisions within the Muslim people so that all Muslims belong 
to an international brotherhood known as Ummah. National boundaries, to the 
character, appear a digression from the ideal past when there was only one identity: 
the Muslim identity.  
It is however interesting to note that, despite considering all Muslims part of the 
Ummah, the terrorist initiated ideological action does not differentiate between local 
and foreign populations. This is a peculiar aspect of Arendtian ideological mindset (see 
Chapter 1). In such a mindset, the violent ideological action treats local as well as 
foreign populations alike. They plan and execute their actions in a manner as there are 
no national or international boundaries. The following textual construct published in 
IS Magazine Dabiq points to the IS thinking as to how they disregard international 
boundaries in the planning and execution of their actions.  
Brussels, the heart of Europe, has been struck. The blood of its vitality 
spilled on the ground, trampled under the feet of the mujāhidīn. Flames 
ignited years ago in Iraq have now scorched the battleground of Bel-
gium, soon to spread to the rest of crusader Europe and the West. Paris 
was a warning. Brussels was a reminder. What is yet to come will be 
more devastating and more bitter by the permission of Allah, and Allah 
prevails (Dabiq, Issue 14:4). 
The ideological action, as constructed in the above text, shows complete disregard to 
any implications of the political reality of international borders. In its operation, such 
ideological action treats all opposing forces and populations, i.e. ‘them’ as a 
homogeneous whole, as it imagines ‘us’ a homogeneous whole governed by a single 
Divine Law. Likewise, ‘they’ are also governed by a single law, the law of falsehood. 
The law, whose spirit is based on falsehood, guides all the actions of the ‘other’. The 
law of falsehood, IS suggests to the character, also transcends the national and 
international boundaries; therefore, a claim for transnational dominance on the part of 
the character is not illogical.  
AQ reserves more space in their magazines to discuss the themes linked to the 
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superfluousness of international boundaries than IS or TT. AQ traditionally delves 
much deeper into the ideological reasoning of the ideas. For AQ, the political categories 
of “country” or “nation-state” are innovations and part of the new world order. 
Therefore, “[i]t is necessary to understand the basis and the founding philosophy upon 
which this entire world order” runs (Azan, Issue 3:23). Such understanding shall help 
“to uproot the evil that its [new world order’s—inserted by the author] founding Kafir 
fathers implanted for deceiving the masses” (Azan, Issue 3:23). The key element of the 
new world order “is the concept of the ‘country’ and the ‘nation-state’ that has spread 
far and wide and engulfed almost the whole planet in our modern-day” (Azan, Issue 
3:23). The system supports the “[m]an-made borders that divide people on the basis of 
land, and man-made constitutional law that is implemented by force over the whole 
population” (Azan, Issue 3:23).  
The TT magazine Shariat understands the superfluousness of international borders 
differently. The organisation appears confused on the issue. It propagates the idea of 
Muslim Ummah but also accepts the existing boundaries. Nevertheless, these 
boundaries should not restrict free movement amongst Muslim countries. The TT 
advocates a loose confederation of all Muslim countries to create a Muslim block. 
Fundamentally, the discursive practices of the three organisations construct a character 
that imagines international as well as intra-national borders as being superfluous. Such 
a character reserves special contempt for the very idea of the nation-state.   
5.4 Contempt for the Nation-State  
For an ideological movement, ideological rule in one country with well-defined 
boundaries is a dilemma as “a development towards nationalism would frustrate its 
exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive” (Arendt, 1958:389). 
Hence, for a character that thinks in ideological terms, a nation-state is a manmade 
anomaly that needs to be eliminated at the earliest possible moment. The Islamist 
organisations do not recognise the popularly understood historical evolution of the 
nation-state; rather, they understand it as an evil inflicted upon the Muslim Ummah by 
outsiders. The organisations encourage the character to challenge the political 
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categories attached to the notions of the nation-state such as “country” or “territorial 
nationalism”.  
AQ takes the lead in ideological and philosophical explanations of the concept 
compared to the other two organisations. For AQ “[t]he basic philosophy of the 
‘country’ is that it is a group of individuals who ally themselves with each other on the 
basis of being born in a particular area or land” (Azan, Issue 3: 25). AQ calls such 
nationalism as territorial nationalism. The territorial nationalism is condemnable 
because, “[t]erritorial nationalism forms the basis for the sketching of map-lines that 
rip the heart out of the concept of alliance and enmity for the sake of faith in Allah” 
(Azan, Issue 3: 25).  Nationalism “is more specifically the ‘attachment’ or allegiance 
of a people of a particular land to their land of birth. Nationalism most often pervades 
[sic] and gathers people from different families and tribes into a nation” (Azan, Issue 
3: 26). By contrast, Islam, in AQ’s understanding, “gives us the concept of ‘Dar’ 
instead of the land. The Islamic conception of land is widely different from the Western 
concept. Islam rightfully recognises the earth as the Property of Allah and fully declares 
Sovereignty on it to Allah Alone who is without a partner” (Azan, issue 3: 26). They 
construct that the ideas of “country” and “nation-state” are not organic to Islam; rather, 
the ‘other’ conspired to infiltrate these ideas into the Muslim Ummah. AQ elaborates 
the construct in the following text in the Azan Magazine. 
Amongst the evils that this secularized system has inflicted upon the 
Muslim Ummah is the concept of “countries” or “nation-states” that 
have been implemented upon the masses as if they represent the only 
form of collectivism for the people of the world! The chassis of the 
new world order – with respect to collectivism - is deeply disturbing: 
an amalgam of “countries” – each run by separate “constitutions” all 
coming together to form a “United Nations” under which the entire 
population of the world is regulated! It is necessary to understand the 
basis and the founding philosophy upon which this entire “world 
order” runs and to uproot the evil that its founding Kafir fathers 
implanted for deceiving the masses. One of the key components of 
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this new world order is the concept of the “country” and the “nation-
state” that has spread far and wide and engulfed almost the whole 
planet in our modern-day. Man-made borders that divide people on 
the basis of land, and man-made constitutional law that is 
implemented by force over the whole population – constitute the key 
aspects of this “country” system (Azan, Issue 3: 23). 
The theme of rejection of the nation-state runs through the text mentioned above. AQ 
is uncomfortable with the idea of a nation that is defined by a piece of land and named 
as a country. Such thinking is understandable as the Islamist organisations view the 
Muslim Ummah as a homogenous whole; indivisible through any political, social or 
geographical demarcations. AQ does not believe in the historical evolution of the 
political categories of statehood but points to some hidden machinations of the 
“Kuffar”, who conspired to bring this political change and fashion the thinking of 
Muslim Ummah. AQ propagates that the thoughts of people are controlled by ‘them’ 
and are made to believe that the categories of nation-state and country “represent the 
only form of collectivism for the people of the world” (Azan, Issue 3: 23).  
As the ideological mindset rejects pluralism, it seems incomprehensible for such 
thinking to imagine plurality in governance models. The political categories of 
“country” and “nation-state” are unnecessary irritants in the path of Islamist 
organisations’ ‘claim to global domination’. Thus, the character thinks that such 
political categories are working against their ideological aims, i.e. converting people 
into humanity and rule by one law.  
In the above text, the constructed character appears critical of man’s interference in 
the divine design. “Man-made borders that divide people on the basis of land, and man-
made constitutional law that is implemented by force over the whole population – 
constitute the key aspects of this ‘country’ system” (Azan, Issue 3: 23). In the 
ideological mindset, man is only an instrument of superhuman law and his/her thinking 
and actions should be limited to the implementation of eternal law. Any attempt, on the 
part of man, to think and innovate is contemptible. A nation-state, thus, being a human 
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innovation, appears anomalous to the ideological mindset. The existing arrangement 
“with respect to collectivism - is deeply disturbing: an amalgam of ‘countries’ – each 
run by separate ‘constitutions’ all coming together to form a “United Nations” under 
which the entire population of the world is regulated!” (Azan, Issue 3: 23). AQ 
constructed discursive character, thinks that the creation of all the above mentioned 
political categories became possible only once ‘they’ destroyed the Muslim Khilafah—
a global empire under a global leader. Such destruction had a well thought out plan. 
AQ explains their understanding of this plan in the following text.   
The ruling brains behind this satanic world order would not have 
been able to rope the Muslims in as part of this new world order 
without the destruction of the Khilafah and the emergence of the 
infamous “country” or “nation-state”. The nation-state, with its anti-
Islamic essentials, allows the Kuffar to place their stooges as leaders 
of the Muslims – who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, 
restrict Islam to the places of worship and do all that they can to make 
their “countries” part of the international world order. The nation 
state’s creation as a replacement for the Khilafah paved the way for 
the Kuffar to collectively take Muslims on the same bench as theirs 
and force their international order based on the secular, capitalistic 
UN charter upon their necks (Azan Issue 4: 22).  
In the text mentioned above, AQ desires that the character should believe in the theme 
that had there been Khilafah in place, Muslim majority areas would not have 
transitioned to nation-states. In this sense, this political development in the Muslim 
Ummah is a regression from a previously held world-dominating position. The political 
centralisation is an essential prerequisite for the claim to global domination. The idea 
of the ‘nation-state’ has “destroyed the unity of Ummah and split it into bits and pieces, 
entirely vulnerable to the plans of the Kuffar” (Azan, Issue 5: 12). This political 
regression to nation-state weakens the ideological appeal and helps the ‘other’ to 
manage political systems of Muslim countries. ‘they’ can “place their stooges as 
leaders of the Muslims – who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, restrict Islam 
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to the places of worship and do all that they can to make their ‘countries’ part of the 
international world order” (Azan Issue 4: 22). At the centre of the character’s mindset 
lies the fear that Muslim Ummah’s division into nation-states runs counter to their 
claim to rule the world through one Divine Law. In an article entitled “destroying the 
country idols—consequences of adopting the nation-state concept: the destruction of 
unity, creation of nationalistic armies” AQ explains how the ‘other’ manipulated the 
political process to bring in the downfall of Khilafah.   
One of the fundamental interests of the West and the Zionists, and 
indeed, one of the necessities of their existence, is that they divide us 
by spreading the principles of the secular nationalist nation-state and 
homeland among us, so that we become crumbs that they can easily 
devour. As a result of this ethnic and territorial nationalism, we broke 
apart after the fall of the Khilafah into more than fifty helpless vassal 
states (Azan, Issue 5: 13). 
AQ constructs the theme in the above text for the character to believe that in the 
glorious past they dominated the world because they were not aware of “the principles 
of the secular nationalist nation-state and homeland” (Azan, Issue 5: 13). Such 
unawareness of the new knowledge and experience helped Muslims to stay united. The 
term Khilafah is presented as an ideological glue that bound together “more than fifty 
helpless [Muslim] vassal states”. Arendtian ideologues articulate simple reasons to 
explain a complex phenomenon. The “West and the Zionists” managed to neutralise 
this ideological glue by introducing the ideas of “ethnic and territorial nationalism”. 
The constructed character is made to believe that they should reject all new political 
ideas, especially the ideas linked to the notions of “country” and “nation-state”. AQ 
believes that “[a]fter the fall of the Khilafah in 1924, this “country” and “nation-state” 
concept of the “Kuffar” was brutally enforced upon the Muslims, and since then, 
generations of Muslims have been born into this “country”- oriented world” (Azan, 
Issue 3:23). Previously, Muslim political understanding was based on “[t]he divinely 
legislated brotherhood of the Muslims on the basis of faith” (Azan, Issue 3:23). 
However, now Muslims are forced to “adopt alliance and enmity for the sake of a new 
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idol called the “nation-state” or the “country” instead of for the Sake of Allah” (Azan, 
Issue 3:23). 
Consequently, “for example, the American occupation of Afghanistan is termed as an 
‘internal matter’ of the Afghans that, say, the people of Pakistan or Uzbekistan have 
nothing to do with” (Azan, Issue 3:23).  In the character’s understanding, the idea of 
“nation-state” or “country” weakens the ideological claim to global domination. AQ, 
therefore, frames the idea of the nation-state as a conspiracy against Muslims.   
The Islamist organisations not only reject the political categories of “country” and 
“nation-states”, they also single out one of the most coercive institutions of the nation-
state, i.e. nationalistic armies. The discursive practice of the Islamist organisations 
constructs a character who plans ideological domination of the world. The ideological 
domination for the character means domination of every aspect of life, i.e. conceptual 
as well as physical. As the political categories of “country” and “nation-state” are 
considered a hurdle in conceptual domination, the nationalistic armies are imagined as 
a hurdle to physical domination. AQ frames the theme of nationalistic armies as an 
obstacle to the realisation of the ideological claim of global domination. The following 
text in the Azan Magazine elaborates this line of thought.   
In the countries that obtained freedom from the imperialistic powers, 
the biggest hurdle faced by the Islamic movements that sought to 
establish the Islamic system and the Shariah Law, has been the 
(Nationalistic) Army. Whenever these Islamic movements neared 
victory through protests, demands and the democratic way, the 
military snatched the Rule and declared these (Islamic) groups as 
illegal; or the military used its influence and power to dissolve 
legislative assemblies and deny the standpoint of the parties that had 
reached the assemblies through democratic elections and their public 
support. It is worth pondering upon for those people who are trying 
to revive Islam that how come the Army played such a role against 
the Islamic parties in all of the Muslim countries that gained 
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independence from the imperialistic powers? (Azan, Issue 5:15).  
The above text reveals an important theme of AQ’s thinking. It exposes the 
organisation’s perceptions of political and military power. Noticeably, AQ is willing 
to coexist, rather, and use the existing political institutions to seize power but outrightly 
rejects any coexistence or use of existing Muslim military institutions to advance their 
claim to global domination. AQ suggests to the character that as wider Muslim 
populations are receptive to their ideology, they can succeed to gain power through the 
existing political institutions. This hope gives AQ the confidence to engage with 
otherwise “Taghut political systems”.  It seems to be an “ends justifying means” 
compromise on the part of the organisation. The compromise is linked to the hope of 
success. The successful capture of power in a state shall act as a springboard and help 
in claiming the global domination of the world. The past ideologues, e.g. Hitler, ceased 
power through a “democratic process”. Arendt also notes the phenomenon of 
widespread support of the masses for successful ideologies. She asserts that ideologies 
stealthily work and influence large populations before these are visible to the outside 
world (Arendt, 1958: 457). By the time, the ideological movements surface and become 
visible at the national or international stage, large portions of local populations already 
subscribe to the ideological claims of these movements. Ideological movements 
provide a platform to already prevalent ideological ideas.  
In the text, the character constructed by AQ is supposed to be willing to use existing 
political systems like “protests, demands and the democratic way[s]” (Azan, Issue 5:15) 
to advance their ideological claims, but outrightly reject engagement with the 
institutions of Muslim nationalistic militaries. They understand the centrality of 
violence as a commonality between a military and a terrorist organisation; both 
jealously guard and claim their monopoly over this vital instrument of enforcement. 
Violence and its instruments, being central to the ideological mindset because of their 
role in fashioning the factual reality, need complete monopolisation by ideologues. 
Fundamentally, the Islamist organisations’ understanding of violence is akin to the 
statement: who so ever controls violence controls politics.  
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In the textual expressions, the organisations think that the existing political institutions 
of the Muslim countries can be used to advance their ideological claim to world 
domination, but the Muslim nationalistic militaries pose a great challenge to their 
claims13. In the following text, AQ repeats the theme of nationalistic Muslim militaries 
being a hurdle to their claim to global domination.    
At this time, the militaries of the entire world – whether in the West or 
in the Muslim countries are organized according to these Kufr 
ideologies of Clausewitz. Hence, it is not possible for these nationalistic 
militaries to play any role in establishing the Khilafah and waging Jihad 
in the Path of Allah. These armies have their own formulated beliefs, 
ideologies and their own thought and philosophy.  Their way of thought, 
organization, goals and aims are all separate from those of this Ummah, 
and run contrary to Islam. Hence, it is utterly impossible for these 
armies to be converted to “Islamic armies” via some minor changes. 
These are not “our armies”. They are “armies of the West”. Let alone 
waging Jihad, they are the main obstacle in establishing Khilafath and 
waging Jihad! May Allah rid us off them! Ameen! (Azan, Issue 5: 15) 
AQ, in the text mentioned above, explains some of the reasons as to why these 
militaries are an obstacle to their claim to global domination. The chief reason, in AQ’s 
understanding, lies in the ideological training of the institution. The Muslim militaries 
are trained on the “Kufr ideologies of Clausewitz” (Azan, Issue 5: 15). They explain,  
According to Clausewitz, ‘war’ is a state’s political tool or a 
 
13 This analysis intends to point out a future direction of research. It may be an 
interesting study to investigate as to what are those specific ideas in the Muslim 
nationalistic militaries which are not useful for the ideological movements, especially, 
as the Muslim militaries and ideological movements share the same ideological 
slogans? Alternatively, if the soldiers in the nationalistic Muslim militaries share the 
ideas of wider Muslim societies, then, why the Islamist organisations do not consider 
the standing nationalistic Muslim militaries useful for their ideological purposes? This 
thesis can be a starting point for further research to contrast the ideas of the Islamist 




continuation of the state’s policy. It is the result of this very 
ideology that despite bearing all kinds of power and ability, all 
the armies of the Muslim Ummah do not fight Jihad in the way 
of Allah; rather, they fight under the command of the democratic 
Government and to safeguard the interests of the state. Thus, 
even if the Shariah ordains Jihad, and the state’s policy is against 
it, then these armies do not wage war. And if the Shariah forbids 
fighting and the state’s policy dictates war, these armies forego 
all Shariah commands and jump into these wars” (Azan, Issue 5: 
15).  
The discursive practice constructs a character that believes in ideological violence. The 
people executing ideological violence jealously guards against all constraints except 
the ideology. AQ invokes Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, a Prussian military 
theorist and general who emphasised the political and "moral" aspects of war, to 
highlight this important aspect of ideological violence. In Clausewitz’s writings, 
violence is understood as temporary and subservient to policy; it does not have 
independent value. By comparison, the ideological violence, i.e. Jihad, is permanent 
and an element of the ideology. It has its principles and is waged in its own right. 
Chapter 6 deals with ‘Violence and the Call for Action’ as a separate element of the 
character’s mindset. The very point is that there is a fundamental difference in the 
understanding of the nature and role of violence that separates Muslim militaries from 
Islamist organisations. In Muslim militaries’ “way of thought, organisation, goals and 
aims are all separate from those of this Ummah and run contrary to Islam” (Azan, Issue 
5: 15). They conclude, “[t]hese are not ‘our armies’… They are ‘armies of the West’ 
because “[l]et alone waging Jihad, they are the main obstacle in establishing Khilafah 
and waging Jihad” (Azan, Issue 5: 15).  
The TT takes a different position on the status of Muslim militaries. They find the 
existing institution useful but with certain modifications. The institution should 
suppress its nationalistic outlook, and all Muslim militaries should be merged into one 
grand Muslim military organisation. They propose the following idea in the Urdu 
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magazine Shariat.  
 
[Translation by the author] The combined military strength of fifty-
seven Islamic countries totals up to six million. If they are equipped 
well with the ground and air armament, they can ensure the 
impregnable defence of all Islamic countries. Nuclear-armed 
Pakistan should share the nuclear formula with Islamic countries. We 
should manufacture long-range missiles and tanks (Shariat, Issue 2: 
41).   
TT appreciates the value in the existing military institutions but wants to combine all 
the Muslim nationalistic militaries under one command, which should ensure the best 
skills are shared within the block. TT constructed character appears less forceful in 
obliterating the existing international borders between the Muslim countries but 
supports the idea of having a superstructure that should combine all Muslim countries 
on an ideological basis, thereby making the existing boundaries meaningless. The 
central idea across all the three Islamist organisations focuses on a global ideological 
state under a global leader.  
5.5 A Global State led by A Global Leader 
The organisations construct a character in their discursive practice who thinks that to 
realise the claim to global domination, they need to have a global state ruled by a global 
leader. They name such a leader as Khalifa. “Khalifa” is the title drawn from Islamic 
history. In the ideological state “Khalifa” shall be the head of state who shall exercise 
absolute political as well as religious authority.  A global ideological state, in AQ’s 
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understanding, is a natural order, “since this earth belongs to Allah, only Allah’s system 
will be implemented upon it – so that even the “Kuffar” can live according to the way 
of the Fitrah[nature](translated by the author)… so that the earth can be saved from 
Fasaad[turmoil](translated by the author)” (Azan, Issue 3: 43). AQ constructed 
character in the discursive practices believes that Divine Law is the only law that 
allows people to live according to the laws of nature. They think the main reason for 
the human conflict is linked to the diversity of political and social systems. A single 
law under a single leader governing all the subjects shall eliminate conflict. The three 
Islamist organisations have also appointed such a global leader. AQ nominated Ayman 
al-Zawahiri (after the death of Usama bin Laden) while IS famously declared 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Khalifah. TT appointed Mullah Umar as the leader of the 
believers (Amirul Momineen). I note that AQ and IS construct similar themes on the 
topic of “the global state led by the global leader” while TT gives some allowance to 
existing political divisions amongst the Muslim countries. Nevertheless, all three 
Islamist organisations connect to the theme of a global statehood under a global leader. 
TT imagines such a state to comprise of a loose federation of all Muslim countries. 
Muslims should leave the existing international institutions and form their own 
“Islamic General Assembly” with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. The following 
textual construct explains their vision of the global state.   
 
 
[Translation by the author] [Islamic countries] should abandon the 
United Nations and constitute an “Islamic General Assembly” which 
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can maintain peace and reconciliation amongst the Islamic world. 
Equal rights and freedom should form the basis of cordial 
relationships (amongst Muslim countries). [The Islamic General 
Assembly] should sincerely work for the resolution of human, social 
and cultural issues, and human rights and liberty. It should have its 
central office in Saudi Arabia (Shariat, Issue 2: 42).  
The constructed character, whom I call ideologue, thinks that the whole globe should 
have one system of governance supported by Allah’s Law, which is also the law of 
nature. The AQ textual construct articulates that “Kuffar” are unaware of the fact that 
Allah’s Law is the law of nature. Therefore, global implementation of Allah’s Law 
shall be beneficial to ‘them’ as well, as they shall be able to live as per the laws of 
nature. All existing systems of governance are unnatural as these systems are not 
following Allah’s Laws. These unnatural systems of governance are the main cause of 
turmoil in the world. The turmoil persists because “the rebels of Allah can never rule 
over the believers in Allah. They cannot have authority over them. The enemies of 
Allah cannot have more honour than the friends of Allah” (Azan, Issue 3: 42). AQ 
desires that the character should believe that “[t]oday, we are fighting a battle that will 
reap the fruits of the global Khilafah's return, Insha’ Allah. Our fight today requires our 
utmost effort in all types of expertise since we are fighting to establish a government 
for humanity” (Inspire, Issue 19:19). They think that Khilafah is the “government for 
humanity” and all other forms of rule are the rules of ignorance. IS shares the thoughts 
with AQ in the following textual expression.  
There is nothing after the rule of Allah, the Wise, the All-Knowing, 
other than the oppressive rule of the darkness of Jahiliyyah, and no 
matter what humans name their laws and systems they remain the rule 
of Jahiliyyah, which the whims of the Kuffar manipulate. Its people 
enjoy no stability in its decrees, nor do they achieve any religious or 
worldly success. But who is the one who knows that the rule of Allah is 
the best of rule? Indeed, it is the believer who has certainty (Rumiyah, 
Issue 13: 8).  
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The above-referred text emphasises the theme that all systems of governance except 
the rule of Allah are unsuccessful and unstable. However, anyone who is not in the 
system of faith cannot understand the true nature of this failure and instability—you 
need to be inside the system to understand the true nature of this phenomenon, i.e. a 
believer. Contrarily, the universal law of Allah is the only option that can guarantee a 
stable political system for humanity. This global rule of Divine Law operates through 
a global leader, i.e. the Khalifah. AQ articulates the philosophy of the global rule 
through a global leader in the following textual construct published in the Azan 
Magazine.  
When the Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) and Kingship of Allah passes from 
the existential circle and enters into the legislative realm, and when man, 
the noblest creation of the universe, by virtue of his status as the 
vicegerent of Allah, implements the Shariah revealed by Allah on earth, 
then this is called “Islamic Khilafah”. Khilafah is the practical 
manifestation on earth of Allah’s Kingship of the heavens. Just as the 
Kingship of the heavens belongs to Allah in the same manner, the 
Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) of the earth also befits Him alone and 
establishing this very Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) is called Khilafah 
(Azan, Issue 6: 31).  
The theme of a global rule by a global leader, in simple words, is a rule (Khilafah) in 
the name of Allah. All laws in Khilafah must flow from Allah’s Law. IS is in league 
with AQ in suggesting to the character that Khilafah means, “directing people to the 
path of Allah and realising His word in this life. So, it is a noble trust, and it is a weighty 
trust. And it is part of Allah’s command that people must shoulder themselves, and it 
requires a special kind of person to have patience while being tested” (Rumiyah, Issue 
8: 23, 24). This “special kind of person” who shoulders this responsibility and heads 
the global state is known as Khalifa.  
The IS further explains that the institution of Khilafah has recently been revived after 
a long break. They celebrate this revival and think that “from the greatest of blessings 
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granted to the Muslim Ummah in general and to the mujāhidīn, in particular, is the 
revival of the Khilāfah, the Muslim body which had been absent for several centuries 
since the collapse of the ‘Abbāsī Khilāfah” (Dabiq, Issue 12:29). The revival of the 
blessed Khilafah is for humanity and “[n]o one realizes this blessing more than one 
who has experienced the crusader lands of the West, then Shām [Syria (Translation by 
the author)] tormented by the Baathist and Nusayrī tawāghīt, followed by Shām 
plundered by the apostates of the Free Syrian Army and its nationalist allies” (Dabiq, 
Issue 12:29).  
The AQ affiliated writers, as usual, delve much deeper into the reasoning of the 
discursive construct than the other two organisations. AQ articulates the following 
seven fundamentals of a legitimate Khilafah.    
One:  Supreme Authority in a Khilafah rests with Allah Alone. 
And it is for the implementation of Allah’s Government on 
earth that the truthful Prophet or a successor of his (called 
the Ameer or Khalifah [Caliph]) has been made Allah’s 
Deputy or Governor. So, in the system of Khilafah, 
Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) of Allah Alone is acknowledged. 
And since it has been acceded to through the Prophet of 
Allah, therefore the obedience of the Prophet and his 
successor has been made Wajib (incumbent).  
Two:  In Islamic Khilafah, the pivot of the system and the highest 
Meezan is the Shariah law, according to which nations of the 
world are exalted and subdued. 
Three: The axis of the system is the Majlis-e-shoora (a body for 
mutual consultation). 
Four:  The purpose of Khilafah is the establishment of Deen 
[religion] 
Five:  Establishing brotherhood among Muslims and act as mercy 
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for all humanity.  
Six: Every person in Islamic Khilafah takes the Bayah (Pledge 
of Allegiance) to the Khalifah or his representative, i.e. 
Ameer.  
Seven: Absolute obedience to the Ameer or Khalifah in all Ma’roof 
(good) matters (Azan, Issue 6:32).  
Thematically, the above mentioned seven fundamentals present a global state under a 
global leader, called Khalifah. The Khalifah shall establish Allah’s Law authoritatively. 
Such a state shall demand the unilateral and unequivocal submission of the subjects to 
the authority of Khalifah. AQ insists that “only a Government which consists of these 
seven fundamentals of Divine Rule, and which is founded on these seven pillars, can 
truly be accepted as an Islamic Khilafah or an Islamic Government” (Azan, Issue 6:32). 
If somewhere “a personal, tribal or party rule is established in the name of an Islamic 
Khilafah, then it will absolutely never be termed a Khilafah (…) Rather, it will be the 
antithesis of the Khilafah” (Azan, Issue 6:32).  
As the first fundamental of Khilafah highlights, the character is supposed to accept 
Khilafah as the only legitimate authority. It shall be incumbent on Khilafah to make 
all-out efforts including violence (Jihad), to extend Allah’s Law to the whole world.  
The Khilafah shall wage “Jihad against those who oppose Islam after being called to it 
until they accept it or enter into the dhimmah (The covenant granted to the “Kuffar” in 
an Islamic State)” (Azan, Issue 6:33). 
Elsewhere in the Azan Magazine, AQ enumerates the important tasks of the institution 
of Khilafah. The foremost task of the institution is to monopolise and strictly control 
the interpretations of the eternal law. The constructed character abhors diversity and 
plurality of opinions. Therefore, Khalifah must ensure that only the ideological mindset 
exists in the world dominated by them. He (the Islamist organisations believe that only 
masculine gender can be a Khalifah) should ensure the continuity of “the religion upon 
the established principles and upon the issues that the Salaf [the renowned and pious 
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scholars of the past14] of the Ummah agreed upon” (Azan, Issue 6:33). The institution 
shall control the thinking of the subjects and safeguard against any innovative 
interpretations of the laws. It is necessary because the ideology has already “established 
principles”. These principles were agreed upon by the medieval scholars. Therefore, 
all new experience must be understood and interpreted in the light of those principles. 
All affairs in the global state shall be organised according to ideology. Khalifah, in the 
capacity of a global head of a global state, should remain vigilant and “should a man 
of Bid’ah emerge or a misconceived person deviates, he must clarify the evidence and 
show them the truth. Also, he must impose on them the punishment they deserve (…) 
and safeguard the Ummah from deviance” (Azan, Issue 6:33). Khalifah shall strictly 
implement “the Islamic penal code, so as to protect things, which Allah has forbidden 
from being violated and to safeguard the right of His servants from being lost and 
abused” (Azan, Issue 6:33).  
The ideology shall guide all rights and obligations of the state. Dispensation of justice 
is the central occupation of the Arendtian articulated ideologue; it is true for the 
Khalifah as well. Ideologues think that deliverance of justice to humanity is central to 
ideology; they implement the system of justice directly to humanity disregarding the 
petty legality of formal laws (Arendt. 1958: 457). Khalifah, therefore, shall engage 
himself in “the implementation of rules on those who are in dispute and putting a stop 
to their disagreement, so that equity may be established; and so that the oppressor may 
not transgress, and the weak may not feel helpless” (Azan, Issue 6:33). 
Likewise, all financial affairs of the global state shall be decided according to the 
ideology. The state shall collect “Al-Fai (The booty taken from the “Kuffar”) and 
charities according to the textual and ijtihadi [logically deduced from the past examples 
(explanation by the author)] obligations of the shari’ah” (Azan, Issue 6:33). 
The Khalifah must endeavour at all times to keep the ideology central to the affairs of 
the global state. He must ensure ideological training of “the trustworthy people” and 
appoint “sincere advisers to take charge of the tasks and wealth that he confers on them, 
 
14 Inserted by the author.  
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so that the tasks may be organized by efficiency and the wealth protected by the 
trustworthy people” (Azan, Issue 6:33). AQ constructs a character who believes in a 
continuous movement in the affairs of the ideological state. Nothing is fixed and static 
except the ideology and by extension, the supreme leader himself, who has final 
authority over interpretations of the ideology. Khalifah should be “[d]irecting and 
investigating things himself so as to establish the leadership of the Ummah and the 
protection of the religion (…) For, indeed, the trustworthy man may cheat and the 
honest may deceive” (Azan, Issue 6:33).  
IS is equally totalitarian in its thinking about global domination through a global state. 
They think that ideology is supposed to dominate the globe so that all opposition to 
Allah’s Law is eliminated. The global state needs to acquire such powers which can 
avenge injustices committed against Muslims anywhere on earth. All enemies of the 
ideological state shall be eliminated ruthlessly.  
The death of a single Muslim, no matter his role in society, is more 
grave to the believer than the massacre of every kāfir on earth. And 
while the Sharī’ah calls for the invasion of all kāfir lands, certainly 
the aggressors are dealt with before those nations not actively waging 
war against the Khilāfah. This is an obvious reality. Any disbeliever 
standing in the way of the IS will be killed, without pity or remorse, 
until Muslims suffer no harm and governance is entirely for Allah 
(Dabiq, Issue 14:4). 
In their conquest for global domination, the ideological state shall prioritise its fight; 
while all enemies of the ideology must be fought against, the state shall prioritise the 
programme of elimination; certain categories of the enemy must be eliminated first. 
The active opponents must be dealt with before the non-active opponents. IS constructs 
a character who believes that Khilafah shall continue fighting all nations of the world 
and eliminate all real or imaginary enemies “until Muslims suffer no harm and 
governance is entirely for Allah” (Dabiq, Issue 14:4). The Khilafah should choose 
friends and foes based on ideology. Allah’s Law “calls for the invasion of all Kafir 
189 
 
lands” and all “Kuffar” can be killed to save one single Muslim. In their understanding, 
every single Muslim living anywhere is the responsibility of the Muslim Ummah. 
Muslim Ummah, in the Islamist organisations’ discursive practices, closely resembles 
the ideological idea of a global race.  
5.6 Muslim Ummah as a Global Community  
The Islamist organisations imagine Muslim Ummah as a global and superior 
community, supported and acknowledged by eternal law, that has a legitimate claim to 
dominate the world. The organisations suggest to the character that Muslim people 
belong to the original global community created by divinity. AQ argues that “[a]ll of 
humanity was Muslim (worshippers of One God) through the Prophet Adam and those 
who differed from this natural state of collectivism were Kuffar” (Azan, Issue 6:32). 
Therefore, Muslim self-identity, in AQ’s understanding, is the identity of the original 
uncorrupted community that is still following the precepts of the divine and eternal law 
of nature. The divinity, however, being aware of the deviant nature of humans, planned 
to keep them on the right path. The arrangements consisted of new prophets and new 
scriptures. “Humanity were one community, and Allah sent Prophets with glad tidings 
and warnings, and with them, He sent the Scripture in truth to judge between people in 
matters wherein they differed [2:213]” (Azan, Issue 6:32). The character understands 
the scriptural articulations as the truth.  
In the AQ’s construct, initially, all of humanity were the followers of truth, but then 
the deviants differed and separated themselves from the truth; therefore, “[t]he real 
dividers of humanity are those who deny Allah’s true religion” (Azan, Issue 6:32). 
Thus, humanity was divided into two categories; the followers of truth and the 
followers of falsehood. “And this is the natural order, and Kufr is Baatil (falsehood) in 
that it has no reality” (Azan, Issue 6:32). Peace, in the character’s thinking, is linked 
to the acceptance of the truth as “Allah’s true religion guarantees peace on earth. No 
matter how much widespread the “Kuffar” maybe, the truth is the truth” (Azan, Issue 
6:32). The global nation of truth, with the ideology at its heart, is destined to dominate 
the world provided it remains loyal to the teachings of the truth, namely the religion of 
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Islam. AQ explains in the Inspire magazine.   
In reality, the Islamic Ummah is the greatest of human power if it truly 
establishes the religion of Islam and that is exactly what history proved 
throughout the past centuries. This nation is able to battle and resist what 
are known as superior countries (Inspire, issue 7:4). 
The AQ constructed character is supposed to promote the theme that the success of the 
nation of Islam is contingent upon the condition that “if it truly establishes the religion 
of Islam”. As explained elsewhere, the religion of Islam is central to the ideological 
mindset of Islamist organisations. They view the religious identity as the national 
identity of the nation of Islam.  
This nation of Islam transcends all political, geographical and ethnic boundaries. AQ 
blames the West for constructing a non-Islamic way of thinking as follows.  
Sykes and Picot created borders for us. They said to us, Jordan ends here 
at ar-Ramtha, and Syria begins after Ar-Ramtha and Jordan begins after 
Harat Ammar. And Kuwait? Here it is! The city of Kuwait, the “state” 
of Kuwait… And the state of Qatar is a single city. And so is the state 
of Bahrain. And Lebanon? Here it is… the size of a coin. That’s the 
state of Lebanon. And here is Syria. Listen, this is your land and your 
birthplace, and love of one’s homeland is a part of faith. And so on… 
And so, we have begun to think in an “Islamic way” which is in truth 
not an Islamic way but rather, a territorial way of thinking daubed with 
Islam (Azan, Issue 5: 13). 
AQ constructs an understanding in the above text that existing political divisions 
amongst Muslims countries are the result of a well-planned exercise by the ‘other’. 
Such divisions made Muslims think their identity in terms of geography and ethnicity. 
The ideological mindset is independent of geographical and ethnic identities. The 
ideological claim to global domination originates from the imagined fact that eternal 
law is universal in its nature. The Islamist organisations construct a character who 
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believes that being the true followers of the eternal law means that they have a 
legitimate claim to dominate the world. An AQ published rhyme in the Azan Magazine 
summarises their claim to global domination.   
India is ours and China is ours  
And the earth is ours and all is ours   
Islam has become our religion  
And the entire world is our homeland.  
The constitution of Allah is our religion.  
And we have made our hearts its home (Azan, Issue 5: 13) 
The idea of a global nation ignores any boundaries. The only qualification to be part of 
this global nation, i.e. Muslim Ummah, is to belong to Muslim identity. TT notes the 
immense potential of Muslim Ummah in the following construction. 
 
[Translation by the author] Out of eight billion people populated in 
seven continents, one and a half billion are Muslims. Proudly, Islam 
is the greatest of all seven major religions. Sixty out of two hundred 
countries are Muslims, yet, we are under scrutiny. Now, instead of 
suffering passively in silence and despair, we should articulate as to 
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how we can steer Muslim Ummah through this period of trial and 
turbulence (Shariat, Issue 2: 41).   
The Islamist organisations construct a character that shall view Muslim Ummah as a 
global community following the ideology. Every member of this global community is 
supposed to be the true carrier of the Divine Law. A true carrier of the Divine Law has 
a legitimate claim to dominate the world so that every person of the world is forced to 
follow the Divine Law. The true domination of the world shall be realised only once 
every man is fashioned to stop thinking and follow the Divine Law. Therefore, the 
fundamental purpose of the previously discussed subthemes in this chapter namely, 
answering ideological questions, the rejections of international boundaries and nation-
state or articulating a global state or a global community, is to dominate the world so 
that the project to fashion man into an ideological man can begin. The construction 
aims at converting humans into humanity; a human who is devoid of all diversity and 
spontaneity. The human diversity and spontaneity are one of the biggest threats to a 
fictitious ideological world. The ideological mindset, therefore, reserves special 
contempt for human diversity and spontaneity.  
5.7 Contempt for Human Diversity and Spontaneity 
The Islamist organisations construct a character, which is supposed to think that 
Allah’s Law must dominate Allah’s land and convert all men into humanity and follow 
the Divine Law comprehensively. They think that humanity is divided into certain 
contemptable categories, which are not sanctioned by the Divine Law. Humans must 
be disciplined to follow a strict code of life devoid of diversity and spontaneity. As the 
Divine Law is for all humans, global domination is essential to fashion each man 
according to the dictates of the ideology. Man must surrender himself/herself 
comprehensively to the ideology. Spontaneity and diversity, which springs from “free 
choice” must be curbed in every form. An IS member writing in Dabiq Magazine 
understand the notion of “free choice” as follows.  
From amongst the polluted ideologies that have afflicted people the 
entire world over throughout the course of the tyranny carried out by 
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the forces of kufr, is the notion that the people can choose whether to 
follow the truth or to embark upon falsehood. This ideology teaches that 
no one has the right, regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed 
or set of morals on anyone else even if that creed or set of morals is the 
truth revealed by Allah. They went to the extent of attributing this 
“methodology of free choice” to the religion of Allah ta’ālā, and to the 
call of the prophets, peace be upon them. (Dabiq, Issue 2: 5). 
The IS writers, in the text mentioned above, appear very sure about the truthfulness of 
their knowledge claims. The construction does not problematize “truth”. They think 
that the revealed law is the absolute truth, and all ideas that do not relate to the revealed 
law are part of the falsehood. The ideological mindset consists of two clear categories 
of truth and falsehood. The idea of “free choice”, therefore, is alien to this mindset. 
How can there be an idea of a free choice when truth and falsehood are so clear and 
distinguishable? IS, therefore, wonders at the naivety of people who are unable to 
understand this simple fact, and apply “this ‘methodology of free choice’ to the religion 
of Allah ta’ālā, and to the call of the prophets, peace be upon them”? (Dabiq, Issue 2: 
5). The subtle theme, in the above text, proposes that lack of free choice is the original 
human condition and the option to free choice is a deviation from the original condition 
forced through tyranny. People should revert to the original human condition and 
accept the right of the IS to enforce divinely revealed laws.  
In the ideological construct, man does not have a choice against an eternal supernatural 
law that operates as per divine rules. For the ideologue, the human condition and the 
operation of Divine Law are inseparable; human condition follows eternal law, and the 
eternal law mimics the human condition. The Divine Law does not desire that men 
exercise their free choice. Therefore, any diversity or spontaneity flowing out of the 
exercise of free choice must be curbed. All men should be disciplined to follow the 
ideological code of conduct. The ideological mindset shows great contempt to the 
notion of “free choice” in all its forms and manifestations. IS is not ready to tolerate 
even a limited and qualified option of “free choice”. In the following textual construct, 
the organisation condemns a group, who otherwise agree with the ideology of IS, for 
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allowing a narrower option of “free choice.  
Then, when a group within the Ummah woke up and rejected this 
twisted methodology of giving people the choice between absolute truth 
and complete falsehood, the members of this group were stained by this 
polluted ideology, except for those whom Allah had mercy upon. This 
group believed that the people had a choice between right and wrong, 
but within the confines of the “truth”! In other words, they sufficed with 
removing blatant kufr from the field of choice and with letting different 
types of bid’ah and nifāq remain as valid options – bid’ah and nifāq 
whose true nature many Muslims can’t distinguish. They even believed 
some of the bid’ah and nifāq in question to be directly from the Sunnah, 
and anything apart from that to be extremism and excessiveness in the 
religion (Dabiq, Issue 2:5). 
In the above text, a group within Muslim communities think that an actor may be 
allowed to exercise limited free choice as and when they submit to the truth and reject 
falsehood. IS addresses directly to the group of people within Muslim populations who 
believes “that the people had a choice between right and wrong, but within the confines 
of the ‘truth’” (Dabiq, Issue 2:5). This group thinks that the restrictions on human free 
choice should be limited to the initial acceptance of the truth. Once the fundamental 
premise of the ideology, i.e. the absolute supremacy of the terrorist defined Divine Law 
has been accepted, thinks the group, people may be allowed to exercise some choice. 
IS, however, is sufficiently alert to such innovations and quickly condemns this 
approach. All such attempts, in their perception, are “bid’ah and nifāq whose true 
nature many Muslims can’t distinguish” (Dabiq, Issue 2: 5). Bid’ah is “innovation” 
(Azan, Issue 6: 29) and Nifāq is “hypocrisy” (Dabiq, Issue 3: 26).  
Fundamentally, all thinking that advocates any flexibility must be rejected. IS threatens 
the divergent groups mentioned above with continuous violence.  
If, however, you continue upon this condition that you are in, and do not 
repent from the shirk that you are upon and adhere to the religion of 
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Allah with which He sent His Messenger and abandon shirk and bid’ah, 
we will continue to fight you until you return to Allah’s religion, and 
traverse its straight path as Allah has commanded us to do (Dabiq, Issue 
10: 60).  
The central theme of the paragraph mentioned above emphasises that man must be 
coerced to shun all the notions of choice, spontaneity, plurality and diversity, and 
follow one and the only interpretation of truth. IS suggests to the character in the 
discursive practice that early people of Islam not only understood Divine Laws 
comprehensively, but their actions also fit in all situations. The present-day Muslims 
should only mimic the thoughts and actions of the early people of Islam. Man is neither 
likely to face any novel situation in the future nor need to think innovatively. Any such 
practice is likely to lead man to falsehood. They argue, “[t]hese new proponents of 
choice had forgotten that many of the Ummah who held onto the name Islam had left 
through their deeds much of Islam’s attributes” (Dabiq, Issue 2:5). The idea of “free 
choice” never occurred to their minds. “Therefore, giving the people choice was no 
longer a possibility in this new state of affairs. Rather, the guiding principle became 
that every time choice is allowed it will result in misguidance, either in the present or 
in the future” (Dabiq, Issue 2:5).  
The Islamist organisations are uneasy with any mention of human diversity and 
plurality. IS targets Muslim Brotherhood for mentioning human diversity and plurality 
as part of the human condition. IS states, “[p]luralism is also a call necessitating the 
abandonment of a clear-cut shar’ī ruling, the obligation to wage Jihad against apostate 
parties. After denying several clear-cut obligations, this party dares to call itself the 
‘Muslim’ Brotherhood’” (Dabiq, Issue 14: 36). This party, “blatantly call to the 
implementation and preservation of various principles upon which the modern, secular 
state is founded. How can this party thereafter be described as having anything to do 
with Islam?” (Dabiq, Issue 14:36). 
The discursive character is required to dominate the world to fashion all men into 
humanity by obliterating any thinking that subscribes to human diversity, spontaneity 
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and plurality. The essence of pluralism is “legalization of opposing political parties 
within a democratic framework allowing all parties to publicly express themselves 
regardless of their beliefs. All parties have the opportunity thereby to partake in the 
rule of the land” (Dabiq, Issue 14: 35). The Islamist organisations desire that the 
character should understand that all claims to rule should be linked to faith. Such 
understanding is necessary so that the character stays safe from pluralistic thinking. 
Because pluralism excludes any mention of faith and agrees that “[i]f the majority of 
voters support a party – whether it promotes liberal secularism or Marxist atheism – it 
becomes the ‘legal’ authority of the land” (Dabiq, Issue 14: 35). Such thinking is 
problematic because “[t]he Ummah has ijmā’ in that its leaders must be Muslims, as 
Allah said, {O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those 
in authority from amongst you}” [An- Nisā’: 59] (Dabiq, Issue 14: 35). As such, the 
constructed character is not supposed to have any obligation to a rule that does not 
follow the terrorists’ ideology. Human action and thinking must be judged and 
controlled through ideology. Such control is possible only when and if, the discursively 
constructed “ideologue” dominates the world.  
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I analysed the texts in the magazines of three Islamist organisations (AQ, 
IS and TT) to ascertain whether the mindset of the  discursively constructed character 
exhibits the second element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, that is, ‘The Claim 
to Global Domination’, if so, what are the salient ideas linked to this claim? (for 
theoretical understanding, see Chapter 1 and 2). I started the analysis by isolating the 
texts from the magazines that thematically carried a claim to global domination. I then 
read all the isolated material in conjunction with the Arendtian theoretical framework 
(see Chapter 2.4). Through this exercise, I generated six subthemes. I cited the 
exemplary texts that carry the second element of the ideological mindset, ‘The Claim 
to Global Domination’.  
I note that the Islamist organisations do suggest to the constructed character to lay a 
‘Claim to Global Domination’ in the texts of the magazines. The textual constructs 
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envisioned the claim to global domination mainly through six subthemes. The texts in 
the magazines of all the three Islamist organisations constructed a character that 
explicitly claimed to dominate the world. However, there were certain subtle 
differences in the practices of the organisations as they constructed the character. The 
AQ affiliated constructions were generally more abstract and theoretical compared to 
the other two organisations. It appeared that AQ forms the theoretical reasoning of the 
ideas. IS was in-between of theoretical abstractions and practical operationalisation of 
the ideas. TT, however, constructed minimum theoretical reasonings and believed in 
the practical implementation of the ideas. TT, in this sense, appeared as the foot soldiers 
implementing the ideology. Nevertheless, all three organisations believed in the claim 
to dominate the world. A common theme informed by the second element of Arendtian 
ideological mindset runs across the texts of the three organisations.  
I quoted examples from the texts where the organisations engage with ideological 
questions such as the nature of the relationship between human beings and the 
superhuman source. The ideological mindset thinks that, historically, the Divine Law 
has always favoured the ideologues and shall continue to do so in the future as well. 
The constructed character is supposed to believe that they embody the true essence of 
the Divine Law; hence they qualify to dominate the world and interpret the factual 
reality. The pace of the operation of Divine Law is controlled by the superhuman 
source. History, to them, is nothing but the operation of the divine will. The global 
domination by the ideologues means a realignment of the future with the past. The 
international boundaries are superfluous and manmade and should be decimated. I 
quote examples to show that this mindset shows contempt for the idea of nation-states. 
The Islamist organisations believe in a global state led by a global leader. They present 
the Muslim Ummah as a global community and show contempt for human diversity 
and spontaneity. Such an ideological reformation of the global shall need continuous 
violence and action. The ideological mindset is always in perpetual motion and ready 
to execute violence to achieve the ideological aims for the sake of superhuman sourced 
law. In the next chapter, I shall analyse the texts to conceptualise ideological ‘Violence 
and the Call for Action’.      
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Chapter 6: Violence and the Call for Action 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyse the written texts of three Islamist organisations, namely Al-
Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT) to ascertain whether the 
third element of the ideological mindset, namely ‘Violence and the Call for Action’ is 
present in the discursively constructed character’s mindset, if so, what is the extent of 
this presence? As explained earlier, I analyse my empirical material in part II of the 
research to reconceptualise Islamic radicalisation and recategorise its central character 
as Islamic ideologue. The Islamic ideologue of this research is an abstract character 
constructed by three terrorist organisations in their discursive practices in online 
magazines.   
In this chapter, I read the magazines published by three Islamist organisations to isolate 
the exemplary texts that carry the themes of ‘Violence and the Call for Action’. I then 
re-read the separated texts alongside the Arendtian theorisation of ideological mindset 
(see Chapter 2). This exercise unpacks the discursive construction clustered around the 
theme(s) of violence and action and generates certain theory-guided subthemes which 
represent the extent of the presence of the elements in the discursively constructed 
character’s mindset. The language of the ensuing analysis, as in all the chapters, is 
guided by the Arendtian articulations on the theme mentioned above.  
As three Islamist organisations contribute to the discursive practices, the research, 
therefore, takes note of the overlapping and divergent themes in the texts produced by 
the organisations. Such a distinction across the three organisations helps in mapping 
the conceptual differences (if any) and similarities in the discursive construction of the 
character.   
The ideological mindset essentially calls for violence and action. Fundamentally, 
passivity is not an option for the Arendtian character that thinks ideologically. Seized 
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with ideology, such a character becomes restless calling for action, which preferably 
should be violent. The spectrum of ideological action ranges between passive hatred to 
the merciless extermination of the ‘other’. The constructed character prefers violence 
over other forms of action. An emphatic call for violence and action is the central theme 
of the Islamist organisations’ textual constructions in the magazines. The renowned 
terrorist leader Usama Bin Laden urges, “[w]hichever way Allah guided you to this 
path, you must know that the knowledge that Allah gave you requires acting upon. 
Knowledge is not a thing that is sought after in and of itself. Are you not afraid of 
having this knowledge whilst you don’t act upon it?” (Azan, Issue 4; 25). To the 
organisations, theoretical knowledge sans violent action is meaningless.   
In the texts, violent action is not only a means to an end—the end being the ideology—
but forms an integral part of the ideology itself. In this sense, the terrorist violence is 
ideological violence and has certain distinguishing features. It draws justification from 
the past as well from the future. The ideological violence, which the discursive 
construction calls Jihad, is endless and shall continue forever as “the prophet ( هللا صلى  
وسلم عليه ) said, there will still be a part of my Ummah who will fight until the last day” 
(Inspire, Issue14: 59). Consequent to such thinking, the categories of the ‘other’ will 
have to be invented, as and when the exiting categories are eliminated through violence. 
Another distinguishing feature of ideological violence is its perversity of total 
domination. The ideological mindset is not satisfied with the external subjugation of 
the victim but also demands complete internal surrender as well.   
The themes, in the discursive practices constructed by the Islamist organisations, 
suggest that inaction or passivity is not an option for a Muslim — a Muslim must 
always be in action. The direction and nature of the action, however, is strictly guided 
by the ideology. The organisations use two medieval, theology driven terms to decide 
the nature of the action. The terms are part of the popular Muslim political history. 
These terms denote the ideological division of the world. It is important to understand 
the meaning of these two terms as these are fundamentally tied to the discursive 
constructions’ articulations of the theme(s) of violence and action. The term Dar-al-
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Islam, as presented by the terrorists, means the areas ruled by (the people the Islamist 
organisations consider) Muslims,15 whereas Dar-al-harb are the areas ruled by ‘others’.    
 6.2 The Centrality of Violence in Dar-al-harb 
Theoretically, Dar-al-Islam shall be ruled through (the terrorist interpreted) Divine 
Law, i.e. Sharia Law. Dar-al-harb, however, is a lawless space, where the character is 
supposed to be a law on to themselves. The character is not supposed to obey any laws 
in Dar-al-harb and is free to use any means of violence. Although the organisations 
claim that there are laws to govern Dar-al-harab, but those laws can be interpreted 
differently to suit the situation. Formal law, for an Arendtian ideologue, is a needless 
formality. The ideologues can do away with the petty legality of the formal laws 
(Arendt 1958: 450). The ideological mindset may invent and use any method to align 
the actions of humans to ideology. IS in the Dabiq magazine admonishes fellow 
Muslims to opt to one of the only two choices available to them.  
How can Muslims living in the West who claim to have surrendered 
themselves to Allah, completely accepting His rule alone, stand idly 
as these imāms of kufr continue to spread their poison from atop their 
pulpits?(……)One must either take the journey to Dar-al-Islam, 
joining the ranks of the mujāhidīn therein, or wage jihād by himself 
with the resources available to him (knives, guns, explosives, etc.) to 
kill the crusaders and other disbelievers and apostates, including the 
imāms of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are valid 
– rather, obligatory – targets according to the Sharī’ah, except for 
those who openly repent from kufr before they are apprehended 
(Dabiq, Issue14;17).   
The text promotes the theme of violence and action in Dar-al-harb. “The land [of Dar-
al-harb] is permissible [for a Muslim to violate blood and wealth therein] because it is 
a land of shirk. Al-Jassas al-Hanafi said, ‘Anything that is in Dar-al-harb is not a valid 
 
15 Dar-al-Islam literally means the house of peace. As explained elsewhere, peace is 
only possible on the terms of Islamic ideologues, who want the rule of Sharia law.  
201 
 
possession, because it is a land of ibahah and the wealth of its inhabitants is 
permissible’” (Rumiyah, Issue11: 30). The nature of action desired out of an actor is 
fundamentally tied to their physical location: do they reside in Dar-al-Islam or Dar-al-
harab?  
The Islamist organisations, in the above-quoted text, feel that inaction of the “Muslims 
living in the West”, i.e. Dar-al-harb, is a contradiction. The AQ published texts in Azan 
Magazine resonate with IS imagined constructs and suggest that a “Muslim cannot 
reside in Dar-al-harb anyway and there are detailed legislations pertaining to this as 
laid out by the scholars. There remains only one way out for them if they wish to save 
their faith. Either they wage Jihad in their countries, or they do Hijrah and migrate to 
one of the Muslim lands, and subsequently to the Jihadi battlefields” (Azan, Issue 2:31). 
As ideology (Sharia) declares the people in Dar-al-harb as ‘others’, it is legitimate for 
the character to disregard every law of Dar-al-harb and kill them through violent 
action. A decree in the IS published Rumiyah Magazine encourages the character not 
to “hesitate to take the wealth of the harbi “Kuffar”, either by force or through theft 
and fraud, and ponder the statement of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah concerning the Muslims 
who enter Dar-al-harb (Rumiyah, Issue 11: 39). Taymiyya advises an the Islamic 
ideologue that “if he kidnaps them or their children, or subdues them in any way, then 
the lives and wealth of the harbi Kuffar are permissible for the Muslims so, if they seize 
them in a shar’i manner, they own them”’ (Rumiyah, Issue 11: 39).  
In the ideological mindset, ideology informs as well as controls all action. Personal 
experience and reasoning bear no weight while deciding the direction of ideological 
action. In a text in the IS published Dabiq Magazine, Khalifah Abubakar al Baghdadi 
forewarns a potential character to desist from any thought that may suggest a deviation 
from the ideology-guided action. The khalifah in an address entitled “March Forth 
Whether Light or Heavy” says:     
O Muslims! Whoever thinks that it is within his capacity to re-
conciliate with the Jews, Christians, and other kuffār, and for them to 
conciliate with him, such that he coexists with them and they coexist 
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with him while he is upon his religion and upon tawhīd, then he has 
belied the explicit statement of his Lord (‘azza wa jall), who says, … 
{And they will continue to fight you until they turn you back from 
your religion if they are able} [Al-Baqarah: 217] … So, this is the 
condition of the kuffār in dealing with the Muslims until the 
establishment of the Hour” (Dabiq, Issue 9: 52).  
The ideological mindset is non-reconciliatory and occupied with a perpetual and 
continuous active struggle against ‘others’. Such a struggle would continue until the 
end of the world. A continuous violent action, therefore, is an integral part of the 
ideology. The Khalifa further clarifies this aspect of the ideology in the same address.   
He [the Prophet] fought both the Arabs and non-Arabs in all their 
various colours. He himself left to fight and took part in dozens of 
battles. He never for a day grew tired of war … His companions after 
him and their followers carried on similarly. They did not soften nor 
abandon war, until they possessed the Earth, conquered the East and 
the West, the nations submitted to them, and the lands yielded to 
them, by the edge of the sword. And similarly, this will remain the 
condition of those who follow them until the Day of Recompense. 
(Dabiq, Issue 9: 53). 
The text mentioned above highlights and historicizes the themes of perversity and 
perpetual continuity of the violent action. It draws its legitimacy from the past. This 
continued reference to the past by the Islamist organisations is a distinguishing feature 
of ideological violence.   
I note that the Islamist organisations in their discursive practices employ a linguistic 
technique to draw the required legitimacy from the past, particularly, for the themes of 
violence and action. They select certain popularly used metaphors from Islamic history, 
which inherently link the violent action to the personified ‘other’ in the popular Muslim 
theological imagination. My reading of the texts suggests that these metaphors are 
central in linking the discursively constructed character’s mindset to the themes of 
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violence and action. These metaphors not only legitimise and contextualise the 
ideological violence and action but also—like the past ideologues, i.e. the Nazi and 
Communist ideologues—transform the metaphors into weapons of violence.   
6.3 Metaphors as Anchorage of Pointing, Dehumanising and Violently 
Eliminating 
The Communists and racists, in the past, used comparatively inconspicuous premises 
like “dying classes” or races which are “unfit to live” before urging their elimination 
through violence. The Nazi and Communist ideologues did not invent these terms but 
isolated them from existing political ideas of the time for particular interpretations 
(Arendt 1958: 458). Likewise, the Islamist organisations use certain terms and 
metaphors in their textual constructs to refer to the ‘other’ as the object(s) of their 
action. These terms and metaphors are part of Islamic historical literature. 
Predominantly, political ideas linked to these metaphors refer to pointing, 
dehumanisation and violently eliminating the ‘other’. The Islamist organisations use 
and interpret these metaphors to guide and legitimise their violence and action. Through 
these interpretations, they identify and dehumanise the ‘other’ before suggesting a 
logical action for their elimination. The violent action is inherent in the popular 
conceptualisation of these metaphors.   
In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall explore the themes constructed through the 
frequently used metaphors of violence and action by three Islamist organisations 
through their discursive practice for an intended character. The analysed empirical 
material uses four metaphors, namely “Dajjal”, “Kuffar”, “Taghut” and Crusaders. I, 
however, analyse the metaphors under three headings as the fourth metaphor, i.e.  
Crusaders, is alternatively used to refer to the first three. In the succeeding paragraphs, 
I discuss the theme(s) of violence and action associated with these metaphors as 





6.3.1 The Metaphor of Dajjal 
The discursive practices employ the metaphor of “Dajjal” to dehumanise the ‘other’ 
and to suggest a logical violent action against such a demon. The very characteristics 
(as will be explained in succeeding paragraphs) of this character, i.e. “Dajjal” instils 
fear in the minds of the recipient, and fear instinctively “springs man into action”. 
Fundamentally, the metaphor of “Dajjal” draws its legitimacy from some prophecies 
of the Prophet, who used the metaphor to sketch certain abstract ideas, which were 
probably too abstract to be understood by the people of the age. The very title of the IS 
published magazine Dabiq has a direct link with the prophecy of “Dajjal”. The 
organisation claims that they draw the name “Dabiq – [from] a town near Aleppo. The 
Muslims would have encamped here to fight Dajjal” (Dabiq, Issue 5: 31). IS portrays 
that their constructed character is the prophesied character that will fight Dajjal.   
AQ, in line with IS, sensitises the readers about the gravity of the problem associated 
with the metaphor. They write, “the Messenger of Allah said, ‘between the creation of 
Adam and the arrival of the Hour, there is no Fitnah [problem] greater than the Dajjal.’ 
[Ahmad]”’ (Azan issue, 4: 60). AQ relates to the metaphor as follow.   
The real name of Dajjal is not known, because the Ahadith [sayings of 
the Prophet] does not mention it. He is famous for his title. For us, he is 
famous as the Dajjal and this title has become his symbol and mark. 
Dajjal means to cover, to wrap. He is called Dajjal because he has 
covered the truth with falsehood, or because he has hidden his disbelief 
from the people because of his lies, exaggerations and mixing of truth 
with falsehood. Another view is that he is called Dajjal because he will 
“cover” the earth with his armies. What is intended by this is to 
recognize that he is the greater Dajjal who possesses his enormous trials 
with which he will adorn his Kufr and enchant the people, thereby 
putting doubts in the hearts of the people of Allah (Azan, Issue; 5:31).  
The theme of falsehood (of Dajjal) in the above text resonates with the theme of the 
“dying classes” and “decadent people” of race and communist ideologies. The 
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“decadent people”, who need to be eliminated so that the laws of nature or history move 
unhindered. The inherent theme of violence and the call for action against the 
dehumanised ‘other’ is the theme the Islamist organisations are interested in instilling 
in their character’s mindset. The character is supposed to think “Dajjal” as equivalent 
to the past ideologues’ category of “decadent people”. In the following textual 
construct, AQ traces the linguistic roots of the metaphor and reveals its dehumanisation 
effect. 
In the Arabic language, Dajjal is also referred to as the deceiver, the 
fraudster and the adorner. “Dajl” is used to refer to coating gold over 
a fake thing. He is named as Dajjal because lies and deception are the 
prominent characteristics of his personality. His apparent [sic] will 
be different from his inner. All of his claims, plans, activities and 
programs would revolve around one centre: deceit and fraud. All his 
actions would be under the shade of deceit and falsehood. None of 
his actions or statements would be free from this satanic habit (Azan, 
Issue 5: 23). 
AQ, in the above mentioned passage, conveys the theme that all reality flowing out of 
“Dajjal” is false and untrustworthy. Such premises help the ideological mindset to 
dehumanise the ‘false people’ and may lead, through a chain of logicality, to their 
elimination. The meaning and description attached to the metaphor of “Dajjal” call for 
action and violence for the sake of ideologically imagined consistency. As per the 
ideological understanding of the operation of Divine Law, the true believer is supposed 
to align their actions with the movement of the Divine Law. The constructed 
character's logicality, like the reasoning of the past ideologues, e.g. the Nazis, may 
unfold as follows: At this critical juncture of history, we (the ideologues) have 
identified the ‘false people’ or ‘others’ of the ideology, so, if you do not act against 
such people, you are either not a true believer or a coward. In both cases, you are not 
with ‘us’ but with ‘them’. The common usage and linguistic roots of the metaphor 
evoke a reaction and call for violent action to eliminate the ‘false people’, a hindrance 
affecting the movement of history and Allah’s Law.  
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The metaphor gets its value from the fact that in all its manifestations, it serves to 
personify the object(s) of the ideological action. The discursive construction in the 
magazines presents the metaphor of “Dajjal” in two senses.  
A minority of writers in the magazines consider “Dajjal” to be a literal human being, 
who shall appear in later days and would lead the forces of falsehood. However, the 
majority of the texts refer to “Dajjal” as representing the Western civilisation with its 
supposed machinations/conspiracies. Nevertheless, both types of writers agree that the 
term “Dajjal” is reserved for the people who rely on falsehood, deceit, and who are the 
worst of the creatures and need to be eliminated. In an article entitled “Dajjal” in the 
Azan Magazine, AQ applies the metaphor to the West.  
Another meaning of “Dajl” is the bandage that is taped on top of the 
damaged skin to hide its ugliness. Keep this definition in mind and 
look at the adorned vocabulary which the western media (which will 
(probably) serve as the mouthpiece of Dajjal from his first 
international press conference till the end of his limited period of 
authority) invents and with which it hides its bloodthirstiness, cruelty 
and its murderous charades, for example, human rights, socialism, 
democracy, economic well-being, social equality, family planning, 
arts, constitution, law etc. All these words are mere slogans. Behind 
them is a mere mirage. (Azan, Issue 4: 60-61).  
 
In the above textual construction, AQ constructs the theme of rejecting every notion 
that is considered Western as it is inconsistent with the ideology. ‘Rejection of Factual 
Reality’ is another element of Arendtian ideological mindset, which I discuss in 
Chapter 7. The metaphorical characteristics of “Dajjal” such as deceit, falsehood and 
cover-up are equated with the Western civilisation. Another text in an article in the AQ 
published Azan Magazine entitled “Dajjal and the World Today” highlights these 
characteristics of the metaphor.   
The characteristics of the Dajjali civilization are as follows: 
•     Complete, utter rebellion against truth and the forces of truth 
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•     The presentation of truth as falsehood, and falsehood as truth 
•   Great power, (given by Allah to test humanity) which is used 
sweepingly against all opposition. When we see the world around us, 
we come to realize that these characteristics are abundantly found in 
the “new world order” that is implemented upon the masses 
throughout the world. The world we live in is quite a uni-polar world 
with America at the axis, and with Europe and the majority of the 
states of the world, content to be under its flag. They may have their 
differences of opinion here and there, but all of them are united in 
their enmity against ‘terrorism’ and the absolute rejection of Islam as 
the absolute truth and political power (Azan, issue 6:19). 
AQ in the above text expands the central theme of the falsehood of the Dajjali 
civilisation. The Arendtian ideological mindset divides the world simplistically into 
two parts. One part comprises of truth, which is the ideology, while a second part 
comprises of a people who completely and utterly rebel against the truth. I note that the 
Islamist organisations display a strong sense of self-righteousness and firmness in the 
discursive practices, which is typical of the Arendtian ideological mindset.  
AQ constructs that the Western civilisation is utterly confused, and it is difficult to 
separate truth from falsehood. In their understanding, the only legitimate instrument of 
arbitration between truth and falsehood, i.e. power, is in wrong hands and is acting to 
perpetuate the falsehood. The text implicitly guides the character’s mindset to the 
centrality of power in the struggle between the truth and falsehood. An action is 
logically needed to wrest back the power from the false people or “Dajjal” and hand it 
over to the truthful people, e.g. the Islamist organisations. The ideological mindset 
converts inconspicuous phrases and metaphors as the weapons of ideological violence 
and action. The constructions suggest that the necessary action required on the part of 
truthful people is either insufficient or altogether missing from the current situation. 
AQ articulates such a construct in the following text in Azan Magazine.   
The world that we find ourselves in at the moment is a world devoid 
of the Law of Allah - the Divine Shariah revealed upon the heart of 
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Prophet Muhammad. Even the so-called Muslim countries of the 
world have suspended the rule of the Quran, and the Muslim of today 
finds himself utterly handicapped with the loss of Islam as a socio-
economic-political authority. The resulting situation is a terribly 
calamitous one and those who realize it feels the weight of its reality 
once they try to find a place on earth in which they can worship Allah 
Alone, and submit to his religion in its entirety. Majority of such 
people are found beneath the shade of drones, “Hellfire” missiles, 
with the most basic of weaponry in their hands, yearning to defend 
the light of faith within their hearts from an enemy that transcends 
nations and borders (Azan, Issue 6: 19). 
The AQ textual construct highlights the theme of inaction, and the resultant 
consequences flowing out of this inaction. They suggest that the difficult and miserable 
condition the Muslims are in today is due to the inaction of Muslim countries. The text 
aims at evoking the reactionary and retaliatory action from the character. The 
organisation points to the presence of the element of fear in Muslim societies as proof 
of manifestation of the miserable conditions everywhere. The character is guided to 
think that they have been left handicapped by the loss of “socio-economic-political 
authority”. In simple words, AQ propagates the idea that as Muslim countries have 
become inactive due to their “suspension” of the “rule of the Quran”, they have lost all 
power. This inaction and subsequent loss of power have made it very difficult for the 
character to practice their religion. AQ simulates the message to the character that the 
practice of religion is linked to power; it is the character’s inaction that has resulted 
into the loss of power and hence, their inability to practice religion. The organisations 
present themselves as the active ones who are being fought against by “an enemy that 
transcends nations and borders”. The metaphor of “Dajjal” appears a suitable term for 
the Islamist organisations to convey the understanding of this universal enemy, who 
possess all the known and familiar characteristics of “Dajjal”. The metaphor is 
understood with regards to the hidden motives. An article in the AQ published Azan 
Magazine highlights this aspect of the metaphor in further details.   
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The major difference between the last Crusade wars and this one is 
that the last Crusades were fought openly under the banner of 
Christianity, openly against the religion of Islam. This time around, 
the situation is different. The Crusaders have hidden their true 
motives behind their Dajjali face and are continuously saying that 
their war is not against Islam or Muslims (when it in fact is!). Rather, 
it is against a specific group of individuals who are “misguided”, 
“extremists” (Azan, Issue 6: 20). 
For AQ, the current struggle is different and more dangerous than past conflicts. It is 
more dangerous because this Dajjali system does not persuade “the Muslims to verbally 
give up Islam, contrarily, it assiduously seeks to convince Muslims that they can retain 
their faith and fit into the capitalistic, secular, democratic world order (when in fact this 
is impossible). It does not tell them directly to apostatise. Rather, it creates an 
environment for the Muslim of today in which he is required to give up several 
fundamentals of his religion (at times, not even knowing that he is giving them up)” 
(Azan, Issue 6: 22). Fundamentally, AQ, like all ideological organisations, study 
history only through the lens of ideology. It is only the ideology that interprets history 
for an Arendtian ideologue. For the organisation, there is a reason to cloud the term 
“Crusader” with the metaphor of “Dajjal” in the above text. The reason lies in the 
possibility of locating a fixed point of analysis for a past event. The Arendtian 
ideologue abhors static points of reference. For them, nothing is permanent and fixed; 
rather, events and points of references are fluid and moving. While AQ likes to use the 
term “Crusader” as a motivator for the action, they do not want the constructed 
character’s mind to be distracted by any settled analysis of the past. Therefore, for 
them “this time around, the situation is different”, and hence the present actions should 
not be analysed through the past settled principles. All the dehumanising elements of 
the ‘other’, however, are important and must be highlighted through the metaphor of 
“Dajjal”.  
The character is made to think that the actions of “Dajjal” are so mischievous, dubious 
and false that there is no instrument except ideology that can truly interpret those 
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actions. In the above text, the metaphor of “Dajjal” once used skilfully in conjunction 
with the term “Crusader” retains all the dehumanisation effects of the term while not 
allowing the term to be used as a fixed point for a settled analysis. The article further 
analyses a text from a RAND Study entitled “In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad” 
to highlight the aspect mentioned above of the metaphor of “Dajjal”. It reads: 
A recent RAND Study unashamedly stated in its introduction: 
“While it is true that all Jihadis consider themselves Muslim 
fundamentalists, few Muslims, or even fundamentalists, are Jihadis. 
Fanaticism and violence are not unique to Islam, or even to religion. 
As obvious as this point may be, it is important to stress it. This book 
focuses on what Jihadis say and on their narrow view of Islam. As 
crucial as it is to understand their beliefs, they in no way represent 
the whole of Islam.” 
This Dajjali deception is extremely widespread. The aim of isolating 
religion from the conflict and making the Crusade seem like a 
worldwide military and ideological spree to establish “peace” in the 
world which is only opposed by a select few “misguided extremists” 
speaks volumes of the nature of today’s conflict – deception… 
spectacular deception (…) which is the essence of the Dajjali Fitnah; 
and the truth has become strange (Azan, Issue 6: 20).  
AQ sensitises the character’s thinking to reject any suggestion that existing conflict is 
a limited fight, “which is opposed by a select few ‘misguided extremists’” (Azan, Issue 
6: 20). This is a unique position in a sense that at one level the organisation considers 
the wider Muslim community as misguided and supportive of the cause of the Dajjali 
fitnah, while at another level they think that any effort to differentiate between the 
extremists and mainstream Muslims is a “deception… spectacular deception (…) 
which is the essence of the Dajjali Fitnah”. Such a position is helpful to the ideological 
mindset so that the call for violence and action is addressed to as wide an audience as 
possible. The following text argues using a familiar ideological premise with a call to 
choose a side for action.   
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The Muslim Ummah, as a whole, is under attack by the Crusaders. 
Its Book and Prophet have been insulted... its sons and daughters 
have been killed… and yet the vast majority of the Ummah is 
ignorant and immobile to the great wave of events happening around 
the world. They are busy with the mundane life of this world, 
oblivious to the blinding reality that lies ahead. However, for as long 
as Dajjal’s emergence isn’t confirmed, there is yet time for those who 
truly seek to act and choose a side. (Azan, Issue 6: 20).  
AQ constructs the theme that they are willing to accept those who shall reconcile with 
their past and exhibit a resolve for ideological action and side with AQ. They think that 
“ as long as Dajjal’s emergence is not confirmed, there is some time for those who truly 
seek to act and choose a side” (Azan, Issue 6: 20). In this reconciliation, a commitment 
to the ideological violence and action is necessary as “the vast majority of the Ummah 
is ignorant and immobile to the great wave of events happening around the world” 
(Azan, Issue 6: 20). The Islamist organisations exploit the inherent call for violence and 
action in the metaphor while appropriating the flexibility of its application to their 
advantage. They are flexible on the true nature of the metaphor as long as the focus 
remains on the dehumanisation effect of it. The dehumanisation of the ‘other’ help in 
deciding the nature of the retaliatory action. To be flexible on the nature of the 
metaphor (which is against the grain of an ideologue), therefore, is advantageous to 
them to keep the mindset of the character tied to the dehumanisation effect of the 
metaphor. The following text is an example of the compromising tone of such a 
message.  
However, this much is true that from what is apparent of the modern 
civilization of the West, it is preparing the ground for the emergence 
of the “Dajjal, the (false) Messiah”. This is because in the modern 
Renaissance of Europe, the work that is being conducted using the 
power and authority that Europe has - it is the same work that “Dajjal, 
The (false) Messiah” will carry out using his power and authority 
(Azan, Issue 6: 21).  
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The theme in the above text typically portrays the Western civilisation as the ‘other’. 
AQ makes every effort through select language, while interpreting the symbols of 
“Dajjal”, to keep the focus on the dehumanised aspect of the modern civilisation.  As 
the metaphor is abstract in many respects, the organisation can sense a reasonable 
challenge to its interpretations. The idea of an alternate interpretation that has the 
potential to initiate a different action (which may not lead to violence) is against the 
very core of the ideological mindset. The organisation, therefore, uses the 
compromising language as mentioned above to bridge over such a pitfall. Such 
language is necessary to retain the focus on the ideological action and use the inherent 
subtle appeal of the metaphor for violent action. The following text is another pointer 
to the organisation’s yearning for a consensus to label the ‘other’ as “Dajjal”.  
However, it should at least be accepted that the beginning of the 
emergence of the Fitnah that the (false) Messiah will inflict upon the 
world has occurred in one colour or another – this much should be 
accepted. In other words, it can be said that regardless of whether 
Dajjal has emerged or not, the Dajjali fire has indeed erupted (Azan, 
Issue 6: 21).  
The central theme with regards to the use of the metaphor of “Dajjal” in the AQ 
published magazines is to equate and apply the metaphor to the West. Such a use lends 
unquestioned legitimacy to ideological action and violence. AQ believes that “it is not 
hidden from the eyes of many that the characteristics of the ‘New World Order’ that 
the Mujahideen are fighting against are strikingly similar to the Fitnah of “Dajjal”. 
Many among the people of knowledge have stated so” (Azan, Issue 6: 21). One of the 
fundamental themes in the metaphors used by the Islamist organisations is to present 
the existing situation in a manner that it seems novel and unparalleled. In their 
understanding, it is so novel—like all Arendtian totalitarian thinking—that existing 
terms and categories of analysis fail to interpret the reality. The metaphors, converted 
into weapons of violence, present the ideologically categorised “decadent people” or 
‘false people’ in a manner that a violent action appears the only solution to deal with 
such a menace. After all, in a situation where every action of the ‘other’ is a deception, 
where nothing can be relied upon, what constitutes a suitable action to resolve such a 
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conundrum? Logically, if there is no starting or engaging point in the riddle of the 
‘other’, negotiation or engagement does not appear to be an option. Such a riddle directs 
one’s attention to an action that can comprehensively resolve it, albeit through removal 
or elimination. It is precisely this uncertainty where, suggests Arendt, the logicality of 
the ideological mindset takes over and guides the action to a logical conclusion of 
violence.   
As the ideology has pronounced the Dajjali people as ‘false people’, logically they must 
be eliminated to clear the path for Allah’s Law to take its course. The character must 
take action against the Dajjali people. It is this inherent interpretation of the metaphor 
that, once used by the ideological organisations, turns it into the weapon of violence. 
The metaphorical nature of this weapon of violence makes it very useful for ideological 
purposes. As the ideological violence and action, would always need new categories of 
‘them’, the metaphorical nature of the phrase is useful to that end. The metaphor has 
the necessary flexibility to accommodate new categories of ‘them’. The following text 
published by AQ illustrates the idea of expansion of the metaphor; a Muslim country, 
namely Iran, has been included in this category of ‘them’.  
We should remember that Iran is the centre of the one-eyed Dajjal. 
It is the place from which Dajjal will emerge. See the authentic 
Ahadith. All this Iran- American tooth-cracking is a drama that the 
Americans and Iranians have continued as a display…Iran will never 
be attacked… If ever you see a conflict in Iran, then know that this is 
not an attack. Rather, it is merely a shift of authority from the 
secondary minions of Dajjal to the primary ones. An example of this 
was when the authority passed hands at the time of Khomeini… From 
the hands of the Shah of Iran to Khomeini…This was portrayed as 
the “Iranian Islamic Revolution”. It would not be far off to swear that 
Khomeini was a Dajjal from among the Dajjals of which the Prophet 




IS attributes the same meaning to the metaphor of “Dajjal” as AQ. However, IS applies 
the metaphor less to the Western civilisation and more to Jews and the deviant 
Muslims, especially Rafidah. IS, however, is less abstract in their application of the 
metaphor than AQ. I note that IS, unlike AQ, refrains from mentioning the word 
“civilisation” while referring to the metaphor of “Dajjal”, rather, they prefer to call the 
Western forces “crusaders”. IS applies the metaphor to highlight more concrete and 
specific categories. They frequently refer to “the Dajjal and his followers, [as] the 
cursed Jews, who have a history of betraying and even killing the Prophets of Allah” 
(Dabiq, Issue 5: 4). In line with AQ, IS also frames the metaphor as representing the 
forces of evil, which need to be fought against; both the organisations refer to the same 
source, i.e. the sayings of the Prophet as the origin of the metaphor. IS refers to the 
“narrations [that] typically speak of the final battles that the Muslims will engage in 
with the Christians and Jews, including the confrontation in which the Muslims are led 
by ‘Īsā (‘alayhis-salam) against the Dajjāl’” (Dabiq, Issue 5:4). They think the Rafidah 
deserve the title of “Dajjal”, more than the crusaders.  
The fact the apostate Rāfidah are more cohesive, organized, fervent, and 
aggressive than the other allies of the crusaders – the apostate tawāghīt 
and sahwāt – has gained them the favor of the crusaders, and 
accordingly, the crusaders rely upon them and the Rāfidah’s Kurdish 
allies more so than others in the war against the Khilāfah. The Rāfidah 
overall are more barbaric and united than the crusaders themselves, but 
the muwahhidīn of the Khilāfah have sharpened many knives and 
prepared many car bombs to slaughter the flocks of Rāfidī sheep until 
the last Rāfidī under the banner of ad-Dajjāl dies (Dabiq, Issue 11:52). 
TT, however, when compared with the other two Islamist organisations, relies less on 
this metaphor in the construction of the mindset of the discursive character. Such a 
lack of reliance is consistent with their previously explained thinking, which is less 
abstract and has a more nationalistic leaning in their approach than the other two 
organisations. Nevertheless, their conceptualisation of the metaphor is consistent with 
the other two organisations. In an article entitled سرکس دجالی  [the Dajjali Circus] 
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(Shariat, Issue 23: 29), they refer to deception as the distinguishing feature of the 
Dajjali Circus performed by Americans.  
Dajjal is not the only metaphor that the Islamist organisations employ to guide the 
mindset of the discursive character for violence and action, there are others that the 
organisations frequently refer to in the magazines to incite the character to violent 
action. In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall analyse two other metaphors, namely 
“Kuffar” and “Taught” that are frequently employed in the discursive practices of the 
organisations.  
6.3.2 The Metaphor of Kuffar 
“Kuffar” is the plural form of Kafir. In the Islamist organisations’ discursive practices, 
it is used to identify the ‘other’. The term is used metaphorically in mainstream Islam 
to refer to the non-Muslims. Kafir means the one who refuses to believe. The metaphor 
is very flexible and can accommodate all shades of the ‘other’. It is universally used by 
Islamist organisations to dehumanise the ‘other’ before suggesting a violent action for 
its elimination. IS suggests that “the blood of a Kafir is cheap, filthy, and permissible 
to shed” (Rumiyah, Issue 1: 35). AQ categorises all those who do not subscribe to their 
understanding of religion as “Kuffar”. “Atheism and empiricism” is one of the 
distinguishing features of “Kuffar” as, “they [Kuffar] say: ‘There is nothing but our life 
of this world, we die, and we live, and nothing destroys us except Ad-Dahr (the 
time)[45:24]”’ (Azan, Issue 4: 10). Such deniers have “‘no knowledge’– no basis or 
evidence for their claim” (Azan, Issue 4: 10). AQ suggests a very broad criteria to 
declare someone Kafir, that is, “[e]veryone who leaves an obligation among the 
obligations, commanded by Allah the Almighty in His Book or asserted by the Prophet 
  .(in sunnah, in a rejecting way and denial, he is surely a Kafir” (Inspire, 14; 29 (ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص)
TT agrees with the two other Islamist organisations in identifying the ‘other’ as 
“Kuffar” and then subtly suggesting a violent action against them. All the three 
organisations firmly instil the centrality of violence in the mindset of the discursively 
constructed character in all action against “Kuffar”. The following textual construction 




[Translation by the author] Muslim Ummah is under attack from the 
Kuffar and their supporters. The forces of Kuffar and Taghut have 
pierced their bloody nails into the resources of Islamic countries. To 
get rid of this situation, Muslims must urgently fall back to their duty 
of Jihad (Shariat 39: 18).  
As mentioned elsewhere, AQ takes the lead in historicizing the meaning and 
application of the abstract concepts compared to the other two Islamist organisations. 
AQ refers to certain historical developments as the mischievous activities of “Kuffar”. 
In their understanding, “Kuffar” not only control the existing conditions of Muslims 
but also have engineered the historical evolution of the Islamic thought to their 
(Kuffar’s) advantage. AQ articulates that    
after the fall of the Khilafah in 1924, the Kuffar brought all of their 
new-age false concepts, ideas and philosophies to the Muslim lands 
and implemented these upon them by force. Then, through media, 
education and economic sanctions, the Kuffar Taught these 
philosophies to entire populations of Muslims, rendering them as 
slaves in both body and mind. Generations of Muslims were born into 
this “new world order”. Kuffar-created map lines became etched 
deeply into their hearts and minds, and the concept of an Ummah 
based on faith was utterly destroyed (Azan, Issue 4: 18). 
In the text mentioned above, AQ uses the metaphor of “Kuffar” to simplistically link 
the changes in the Muslim societies to the machinations of the ‘other’; it is being used 
to delegitimise anything different from the ideological interpretation of history. Here, 
the “Kuffar” are shown to have coordinated to destroy “the concept of an Ummah based 
on faith” (Azan, Issue 4: 18). The metaphor of “Kuffar” is a proxy for the ‘other’. The 
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ideological mindset makes every effort to dehumanise the ‘other’. In the above text, 
the character is being guided to focus on the mischievous effect of the actions of 
“Kuffar”. The metaphor “Kuffar” delegitimises and dehumanises the actions of ‘other’. 
The logical response, therefore, would be a retaliatory action. The dehumanisation of 
the ‘other’, fundamentally, frees the responsive action from any moral constraint. That 
is one of the reasons that the organisations pay so much attention to the dehumanisation 
of the ‘other’. The organisations go a step further to enhance the inherent 
dehumanisation effect of the metaphor; they add adjectives to the metaphor. AQ 
constructs the dehumanisation of “Kuffar” in the following text.   
It is known that these filthy Kuffar merely sat in rooms and drew lines 
on maps to divide entire populations of Muslims into “countries”. 
According to the Kafir Winston Churchill, the land of Jordan came 
about due to a mere single stroke of his pen in the Cairo Conference of 
1921! The stroke came out slightly curved because he emitted a hiccup 
(possibly) due to the whisky he had been drinking that Sunday 
afternoon. What a sad state of affairs! Borders of Muslim lands were 
decided by the drunken minds of snobby Kuffar (Azan, Issue 4: 20).  
The text not only carries the theme of wicked actions of the ‘other’ but also adds 
adjectives to it like “filthy Kuffar” and “drunken minds of snobby Kuffar”. Therefore, 
for the organisation, it is not only the actions of the “Kuffar” that are condemnable, but 
the “Kuffar” in their personal capacity are filthy, drunken and snobby. The Divine Law 
has already reserved a gruesome punishment for such dehumanised people. “The 
torment of the Kafir, the apostate and the hypocrite, starts immediately after death; the 
ripping out of the soul, the desperate crying unheard by men, the humiliation of the 
angels’ insults, the spread of fire under him, the regret of seeing his place in Paradise 
if he had become a Muslim” (Azan, Issue 5: 5). Compared with the punishment of the 
Divine Law, the violent action against “Kuffar” appears to be more lenient. 
Additionally, the violent action appears to conform to the Divine Law that has already 
decreed a much more severer punishment for ‘them’. In all their action, the 
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organisations pretend that they advance the cause of the superhuman law. They are 
interested in the movement of the Divine Law, which moves to debase “Kuffar” for 
their transgressions. As “Kuffar” are a hindrance to the movement of Divine Law and 
also do not deserve to be treated like human beings (due to their actions) violent action 
against them is actually helping the Divine Law to take its natural course. The “Kuffar” 
need to be separated and eliminated. The metaphor of “Kuffar” is flexible and can 
accommodate deviant Muslims, who have been decreed as such. The following IS 
construct in Dabiq Magazine articulates possible concrete actions against such deviant 
Muslims who fall under the category of “Kuffar”.   
Their women can be taken as slaves and their property can be seized. 
They are apostate heretics whose repentance cannot be accepted. Rather 
they are to be killed wherever they are found and cursed as they were 
described. It is not permissible to use them as guards, gatekeepers, or 
custodians. It is obligatory to kill their scholars and religious figures so 
that they do not misguide others. It is prohibited to sleep at their homes, 
accompany them, walk with them, or follow their funeral processions if 
their deaths are known. It is prohibited for the Muslims’ authorities to 
abandon the order of Allah by not executing the hudūd upon them” 
[Majmū’ al-Fatāwā] (Dabiq, Issue10: 9). 
IS supports the theme of aggressive action against the excluded “apostate heretics”. 
The ideological action should start from the social boycott and culminate at total 
elimination and dismemberment of the ‘other’. Every possible humiliation is permitted 
against the creatures who fall under the category of “Kuffar”. The only way out for a 
Kafir to save himself/herself from violent action is to submit to the ideology.  The IS 
character is supposed to think that “Kafir’s blood is not spared until he becomes a 
Muslim” or gets “a covenant given by the believers [Muslims]” (Rumiyah, Issue, 1: 
35). In their understanding “shedding the blood of a non-dhimmi Kafir is not sinful but 
is rather rewarded with Jannah. Allah’s Messenger said, ‘A Kafir and his killer will 
never be gathered together in the Fire’” (Rumiyah, Issue 1:35).  
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IS, however, suggests a different action for women and children. This discretion, in the 
nature of the action, is not based on any sentiment of sympathy—as an ideologue 
rejects such sentiments for the ‘other’—but on the usefulness of the action. The 
organisation explains that imprisonment is more useful “so that they [children and 
women] can become slaves, which is more beneficial than killing them, and killing 
them does not harm the enemy; so making them slaves is more optimal than killing 
them” (Rumiyah, Issue 1:35). Fundamentally, the ideological action against “Kuffar” 
includes dehumanisation and elimination. Another metaphor that is frequently used 
towards the same end is “Taghut”.   
6.3.3 The Metaphor of Taghut  
“Taghut” is another metaphor that inherently calls for action and violence and is 
frequently employed by three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices. The 
textual constructs use this metaphor in parallel with the metaphors of “Dajjal” and 
“Kuffar”. The relevance of such metaphors when used as the weapons of ideological 
violence lies in their intensity of the focus on the violent retaliatory action; these create 
sharp and distinct categories of ‘them’. The use of popularly imagined metaphors helps 
the Islamist organisations to make the discursive character to understand and 
categorise complex situations as ‘them’ simplistically. An implied call in such 
categorisations guides the character to an ideological action. AQ explains that “every 
law and every command other than the Law and Command of Allah is included in the 
definition of Taghut and as Muslims, we are required to reject every aspect of the 
Taghut and to believe in Allah Alone” (Azan, Issue 1: 63). “Tawagheet is the plural of 
Taghut which can refer to a ruler who rules by other than what Allah has revealed” 
(Azan, Issue 6: 39). AQ delves deeper into the definition of the metaphor in the 
following text. 
Tāghut literally means a tyrant, i.e. someone who exceeds limits and 
exaggerates in kufr. And whoever exceeds his limit in disobedience 
is a tyrant. Tāghut technically means - Ibnul Qayyim says, "Tāghut 
is everything/everyone who exceeded his limits either worshipped, 
220 
 
followed or obeyed - so, the deity of any people is the one whom they 
refer to in judgment besides Allāh and His prophet, or worship other 
than Allāh, or follow him without taking any consideration of Allāh, 
or obey him in a matter that is a disobedience to Allāh" (Inspire, Issue 
13: 38). 
Through the metaphor of “Taghut”, AQ delegitimises all systems of governance except 
the one approved by the ideology. As mentioned earlier, the organisations exploit the 
inherent flexibility in the metaphorical nature of the expression and expand its 
application to new categories of ‘them’. Therefore, the metaphor is equally applicable 
to deviant Muslims as well as non-Muslims. While AQ articulates the metaphor in the 
more abstract term, IS applies it to its immediate opponents; the concrete 
operationalisation of ideology in the real world guides the ideological organisations to 
fashion the articulations of the metaphors. For example, IS thinks that “the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party in Turkey – including their Syrian branch, the PYD (Kur- dish 
Democratic Union Party) [is] led by the tāghūt Abdullah Ocalan” (Dabiq, issue 10: 30). 
Likewise, Turkey’s past leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Dabiq, Issue 10: 32) and 
present leader Tayyab Erdogan (Dabiq, Issue 10: 32) are also “Taghut”. In other words, 
the Islamist organisations construct a character that believes that all political leaders 
who support any system of governance other than the ideological one are “Taghut”.    
AQ decrees “the falsity of the belief of such people who even wish to go for judgment 
in their disputes to the Taghut and the laws of the Taghut” (Azan, Issue 1: 63). Such a 
complete control over not only the action of a character but also the very source of that 
action, i.e. the thought, is typical of the Arendtian ideological mindset. The 
metaphorical use of the word “Taghut” incites the action of absolute rejection, 
resistance and active opposition to everything that falls short of the ideological 
approval. For the character, the metaphor is a label that indicates all areas against 
which ideological action is required.  
In line with AQ’s tradition, the organisation provides conceptual clarity on the meaning 
of the metaphor. The AQ published Inspire Magazine names six salient manifestations 
221 
 
of the metaphor. The Magazine quotes and interprets verses from the Quran to support 
its categorisation. The six manifestations of “Taghut” are “Shaytan; desire; witchcraft; 
a ruler who changes the laws of Allah; parliaments; and the United Nations” (Inspire, 
Issue 13: 38).  
Parliaments are Taghut “because parliaments are legislative: they carry out legislation 
and lawmaking together with Allāh” (Inspire, Issue 13: 38). The United Nations 
deserves this metaphor “because the conventions and agreements of the United Nations 
are compulsive to kufar and vowing on it. Among the compulsory kufr of the United 
Nations, is its obligation on its members to go for judgment to the International Court 
of Justice, i.e. referring judgment to the Tāghut. This alone is enough to make this 
organization - The United Nations – Tāghut” (Inspire, Issue 13: 38). AQ sees the hand 
of “[t]he Jews and Christians, who created this secularism (out of which stems 
nationalism and democracy), invented the term “nationalism” and then used it to divide 
the Muslim Ummah into pieces. They destroyed the collectivism of the Muslims and 
planted upon them their agent ‘Tawagheet’” (Azan, issue 1: 69). 
The metaphor “Taghut” thus covers all modes of thought, systems and organisations 
that take a different view of affairs than the terrorist explained ideology. It 
simplistically categorises everything outside the ideology as “Taghut” and hence 
renders it a legitimate target for the ideological action. AQ suggests that the action 
against “Taghut” can take the following forms.      
Disbelieving in Tāghut: Is done by heart, tongue and limbs: 
I.    by heart: This is by believing in the nullification of its 
worshipping and believing in enmity and hatred towards them. 
II.  by speech: This is by declaring that they are kufr and disavowing 
them by tongue and renouncing them, their religion and followers 
and declaring them kufr.  
III. by limbs: This is by dissociating from them, avoiding them and 
waging Jihād on them, and also waging Jihād on their followers and 
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soldiers. Sheikh Suleiman ibn Samhaan said: ‘Allāh says: and We 
certainly sent among every Ummah a Messenger (proclaiming): 
‘Worship Allāh (Alone) and avoid tāghut. [16: 36] Allāh says that all 
the Messengers were sent with the message of avoiding tāghut. 
Whoever does not avoid tāghut, contradicts with all Messengers. 
Allāh says:   But those who have avoided tāghut, lest they worship it, 
and turned back to Allāh – for them are good tidings.   [39: 17] In 
this verse, there is evidence for the obligation of avoiding tāghut in 
many ways. The word 'avoid' as used here means hating him, enmity 
by heart, cursing and denouncing him by tongue, removing him by 
killing him. Whoever claims to be a Muslim but does not do that, he 
is not sincere’ (Inspire, Issue 13: 38-39).  
The textual construct by AQ engages with the theme of violence and action inherent in 
the metaphor of “Taghut”. The organisation guides the mindset of the character to their 
understanding of the ideological violence and action, that is, “[t]hose who believe, fight 
in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause of tāghūt. So, fight 
against the allies of Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak [4: 76] (Inspire, 
Issue 4: 22). 
“Taghut”, therefore, is an object of ideological violence and action. Thus, living with 
“Taghut” is a contradiction for the ideological mindset. The ideological mindset is 
prompted to take action to resolve any contradiction. In the Arendtian articulations, the  
ideological mindset is very consistent in its logicality and reasoning; it calls for 
violence and action for the sake of ideological consistency. Therefore, “[w]hoever 
claims to be a Muslim but does not do that [i.e. take action against “Taghut”], he is not 
sincere” (Inspire, Issue 13: 39). The terrorists are prepared to take any action—
sometimes even irrational action—to stay consistent ideologically. In the pages of IS 
published Rumiyah Magazine, a member “declared baraah [disavowal] from his Taghut 
father, once even asking the Amir [leader] to allow him to go and assassinate his own 
father, saying: ‘I know one person who should be targeted, my Taghut father. If you 
give me permission, I will finish him’” (Rumiyah, Issue 2: 10).  
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Essentially, the preferred nature of an action for the Islamist organisations—like all 
ideological organisation—is violent. The Islamist organisations use the metaphors for 
“pointing”, dehumanising and eliminating the ‘other’. The identified and dehumanised 
‘other’ needs elimination. The Islamist organisations’ discursive practices extensively 
use the term Jihad to guide the whole process of elimination of the ‘other’ through 
violence.  In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall analyse the nature of this violent and 
ideological action.   
6.4 The Nature of Violent and Ideological Action - Jihad 
I note that encouraging the followers to engage in extreme violence, or Jihad, is the 
central theme of the Islamist organisations’ discursive practices. Principally, in the 
ideological mindset, the preferred mode of action for change is violence. The lesser 
actions, which at an early stage might appear as nonviolent like disavowal and 
disapproval of “Taghut”, should be considered as the stepping-stones that should lead 
the constructed character to the ideologically sanctioned extreme violence, i.e. Jihad. 
All three Islamist organisations use the term Jihad as an umbrella term to refer to their 
violent action. Additionally, the three organisations conceptualise and use the term 
Jihad in identical ways in the texts; their understanding of the term is independent of 
their working conditions, e.g. political, geographical, and so on. For example, TT, 
which has the maximum nationalistic content in its texts, is unequivocal in emphasising 
the obligatory nature of the violent action in the Shariat magazine.  
 
[Translation by the author] The Prophet said: you engage in Jihad 




The Islamist ideology inspired violent action has certain distinguishing features. 
Firstly, ideological violence is endless. It is not a means to an end but an end in itself. 
In this sense, it would continue until the time a utopian ideological world, far in the 
future, is in place. And secondly, Islamist violence draws its justifications from the past 
as well as from the future. The Islamist organisations on the one hand frequently refer 
to the past violent action and historical holy texts to justify its continuity and on the 
other, also justifies it through their claim to a utopian ideological world that shall 
materialise in the distant future.   
Generally, the term Jihad is a widely known term. It has multiple interpretations, 
depending upon who is explaining the term. There are interpretations in certain Muslim 
circles which interpret the term predominantly meaning as a struggle for self-
reformation. This section of the research, however, is focused on understanding the 
nature of violent action as constructed by three Islamists organisations in their 
discursive practices. As violence is an essential element of the Arendtian ideological 
mindset, my aim in this section is to present and analyse those exemplary texts from 
the magazines that thematically carry the salient characteristics of the ideological 
violence, i.e. Jihad.  
6.5 Jihad is Only Violent 
In the magazines, the Islamist organisations defend the violent nature of Jihad. In their 
understanding, Jihad or violent action is the essence of Islam. Therefore, IS rhetorically 
question, “how can the zanādiqah (heretics) or even those who blindly follow them – 
Bush, Obama, and Kerry – obstinately claim that ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ meaning 
pacifism?” (Dabiq, Issue 7: 22). The organisation argues that “[o]ne of the biggest 
shubuhāt [doubts] propagated by the heretics is the linguistic root for the word Islam” 
(Dabiq, Issue 7: 22). It is erroneous to claim that “it comes from the word salām 
(peace), when in actuality it comes from words meaning submission and sincerity, 
sharing the same consonant root” (Dabiq, Issue 7: 22). A textual construct in the IS 
published Dabiq Magazine reads: 
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Islam is the religion of the sword not pacifism. He (sallallāhu ‘alayhi 
wa sallam) also described the sword as being the key to Jannah 
[Reported by Ibn Abī Shaybah on the authority of Abū Mūsā]. He 
also declared that his worldly provision was placed for him in the 
shade of his spear and that the best livelihood for the Muslim in the 
future is what he takes with his sword from the kāfir enemy (Dabiq, 
Issue 7; 22). 
The sword for IS, when metaphorically used, means violent action. The violent action 
is justified from the past as “Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was sent 
with four swords” (Dabiq, Issue 7:20). In their understanding, violence was central in 
the dealings of the Prophet with his opponents. He used “a sword for the mushrikīn 
[who worship other than the God—translation by the author]” (Dabiq, Issue 7:20). The 
Prophet used the second “sword for Ahlul-Kitāb [people of the book— translation by 
the author]” (Dabiq, Issue 7:21). While the third sword disposed of the “munāfiqīn” 
[the dual-faced— translation by the author] and the fourth sword symbolises the 
violent action against the “bughāt” [rebellious aggressors—translation by the author] 
(Dabiq, Issue 7: 21). Supporting the same understanding, TT further clarifies certain 
misconceptions surrounding the term Jihad in one of their textual constructs in the Urdu 




[Translation by the Author] Some people want to persuade the public 
away from the sacred killing through their self-expanded meaning of 
the term Jihad. The Prophet said that there shall be a time when it 
shall be propagated that this is not the era of Jihad; in fact, that shall 
be the best of the times for Jihad (Shariat, Issue 63: 23). 
TT is equally uncomfortable with any suggestion of nonviolent nature of the action. 
They reject every proposal to present Jihad as a nonviolent struggle. The text in the 






[Translation by the author][Some people] Deliberately do not 
accept the word “killing” in the phrase “killing for the sake of God” 
and try to explain away this “killing” in a specific sense by using 
the word Jihad. They explain that the word Jihad has its roots in the 
word “johad”, meaning an effort. They then expand this meaning 
and say that one can make an effort in any task, such as an effort to 
earn lawfully or serving one’s parents is also Jihad. By equating 
Jihad with the effort, they conspire and appear to keep people away 
from the mainstream understanding of the “philosophy of Jihad” 
(Shariat, Issue 63: 23). 
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The abovementioned understanding of the term Jihad is common among the three 
Islamist organisations. IS equally supports the theme mentioned above in the following 
text.  
O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the 
religion of war. Your Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was 
dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation. He was ordered 
with war until Allah is worshipped alone. He (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa 
sallam) said to the mushrikīn of his people, ‘I came to you with 
slaughter’ [Reported by Imām Ahmad from ‘Abdullāh Ibn ‘Amr]. He 
fought both the Arabs and non-Arabs in all their various colours. He 
himself left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for a 
day grew tired of war … His companions after him and their followers 
carried on similarly. They did not soften nor abandon war, until they 
possessed the Earth, conquered the East and the West, the nations 
submitted to them, and the lands yielded to them, by the edge of the 
sword. And similarly, this will remain the condition of those who follow 
them until the Day of Recompense (Dabiq, Issue 9: 53). 
The text in the paragraph mentioned above constructs two themes for assimilation of 
the character. One, it suggests that violence was instrumental in all the Muslim 
successes in the past. The Prophet changed reality through violence. The companions 
of the Prophet continued with the violence, which shall continue endlessly. Two, it 
suggests that violence is divinely ordained by God; therefore, it is sacred and good. 
The “Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy 
to the creation” (Dabiq, Issue 9: 53). The theme of violence, being good and merciful 
is peculiar to the ideological mindset. Such understanding resonates with the past 
ideologue(s), e.g. Hitler, who thought that the act of elimination of the disabled and 
incurable people is not only mercy to them but shall also help in the movement of the 
law of nature (Arendt, 1958: 433). AQ also repeats the unique theme of violence as 
mercy in their following textual construct in the Azan Magazine.  
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We have come to take you out from the worship of men to the worship 
of the Lord of men; and from the narrowness of this life to the vastness 
of that life and the Hereafter; and from the tyranny of all other religions 
to the justice of Islam” (Azan, Issue1: 10).  
AQ in the text mentioned above constructs the theme that violence is good for the re-
fabrication of humanity and society. Violence can refashion society in a manner that it 
can free itself from tyranny and have justice. In their understanding, such a state cannot 
be reached until and unless each member of the ‘other’ is either re-fabricated or 
eliminated. IS believes that “kufr alongside muharabah (belligerence) is present in 
every Kafir, so it is permitted to enslave him just as it is permitted to kill him” 
(Rumiyah, Issue 11: 29). It also reserves special abuse for those who abandon 
ideological violence as they “are akin to the fornicators, the sodomites, and the 
drunkards” (Dabiq, Issue 11:13). IS repeats the themes of merciful and reformative 
violent action in an article entitled “Why we hate you and why we fight you” in the 
following text.   
What’s equally if not more important to understand is that we fight 
you, not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true 
freedom in this life and salvation in the Hereafter, freedom from 
being enslaved to your whims and desires as well as those of your 
clergy and legislatures, and salvation by worshiping your Creator 
alone and following His messenger. We fight you in order to bring 
you out from the darkness of disbelief and into the light of Islam, and 
to liberate you from the constraints of living for the sake of the 
worldly life alone so that you may enjoy both the blessings of the 
worldly life and the bliss of the Hereafter (Dabiq, Issue 15: 33).  
The organisations construct a character who is supposed to think that ideological 
violence is good and necessary to refabricate people and their thought. Such violence 
is sacred and guarantees Islamic renaissance. Each person of the ‘other’ needs to be 
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refabricated and reformed. The character has been tasked by the superhuman source 
for this refabrication. Such ideas shall need continuous effort, hence, infinite violence.    
6.6 Infinite Violence 
The ideological violence, i.e. Jihad, is endless and would never cease. Islamist 
organisations consider it an essential part of their ideology (religion). Therefore, it is 
supposed to continue until the time the ideology wins over the world completely. AQ 
is explicit about the endlessness of Jihad in the following text.    
Jihad will continue in its various forms and fighting will continue 
until the Day of Judgment and will not be harmed or deterred by those 
who betray it (Inspire, 2, 40). 
The theme of infinite violence is obvious in the text mentioned above. Jihad is not tied 
to any specific outcome, but being part of the ideology, it is mandatory and shall 
continue forever. However, some textual expressions of the Islamist organisations 
mention a highly subjective utopian world in the distant future where violent action 
may cease. For example, IS claims that “the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, 
and swung until ‘Īsā (Jesus – ‘alayhis-salām) kills the Dajjāl (the Antichrist) and 
abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its 
justice will prevail on the entire Earth” (Dabiq, issue 7: 24). Another text links the 
utopian vision to a narration of a companion of the Prophet in the following language.  
The sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its 
plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring. 
There will be no rivalries, no envy, no hatred, to the point that a man 
will pass by a lion yet it won’t harm him, and step on a snake yet it 
won’t harm him” [Reported by ad-Diyā’ and ad-Daylamī on the 




IS, however, suggest that until such a utopian world comes into being the “parties of 
kāfirīn will continue to be struck down by the unsheathed sword of Islam – except for 
those who enter into īmān [Islam-by the author] or amān – for there will always be a 
party of Muslims fighting parties of kāfirīn until there is no more fitnah and the religion 
is completely for Allah alone” (Dabiq, Issue 7: 24). Paradoxically, for the sake of 
continuity of violent action, new categories of ‘them’ will have to be created, when, 
and if existing categories are exhausted through elimination. I shall discuss the 
objective nature of ‘them’ in the following chapter while discussing another element 
of the ideological mindset namely, ‘The Objective Enemy’. Fundamentally, Jihad in 
the Islamist organisations’ imagination is central to the ideology and an act of worship. 
AQ articulates the argument as follows.    
Indeed, Jihad is a lifelong devotion, like prayers and fasting, and 
religion isn't a matter of taste, for us to leave part of it and perform 
another part.…… No! Jihad is still obligatory on you as long as you 
are capable, and the fields of competition continue to be in need of 
your expertise and efforts (Inspire, Issue 4: 18). 
The above text refutes any suggestion that the ideological violence is only a means to 
an end. Although it is also used for a purpose; uniquely, this violent action (Jihad) is 
an end in itself as well. This is the distinguishing feature of ideological violence. 
Continuous and infinite violence for the sake of ideology is an essential element of the 
Arendtian ideological mindset. IS also floats the idea that the violence is a better deal 
in a bargain for the hereafter. The character is asked to believe that the ones “who fight 
in the cause of Allah [actually] sell the life of this world for the Hereafter” (Rumiyah, 
11: 30). The following self-explanatory text from TT published Urdu Magazine Shariat 




[Translation by the author] Irrespective of the fact that innumerable 
Muslims or their representative leaders may be killed, injured, orphaned 
or imprisoned, this shall not constitute a defeat to the Islamic forces. As 
it not the people that are the cause of this war, but the ideology. It is due 
to this understanding that the Prophet said that war should continue with 
falsehood till the end of times. Therefore, the war shall continue until 
there is a difference of opinion, and Allah’s religion is not fully 
implemented on the earth.  
In the last fourteen centuries, Muslims are sacrificing their lives. 
Although, the sacrificed have left this world, leaving fellow Muslims 
helpless, yet their martyrdom and absence shall not harm the movement. 
The reason lies in the fact that our actions, messages, wars and steps are 
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based on religion and ideology; it has nothing to do with individuals 
(Shariat, Issue 24: 37).   
The violent action against the ‘other’ shall continue indefinitely until their complete 
annihilation or subjugation. IS articulates the endless nature of the violent action in the 
following text.   
Just as your disbelief is the primary reason we hate you, your dis-
belief is the primary reason we fight you, as we have been 
commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit to the authority 
of Islam, either by becoming Muslims, or by paying jizyah – for those 
afforded this option – and living in humiliation under the rule of the 
Muslims (Dabiq, issue 15: 32). 
The text carries the theme of an ideological action that is focused on ‘their’ (the 
enemy’s) mindset. IS warns ‘them’ that, “even if you were to stop fighting us, your 
best-case scenario in a state of war would be that we would suspend our attacks against 
you – if we deemed it necessary – in order to focus on the closer and more immediate 
threats, before eventually resuming our campaigns against you” (Dabiq, Issue 15: 32). 
Any temporary suspension of the violent action, therefore, is part of a strategy and the 
action shall resume shortly for an endless continuity. The continuity has been decreed 
by the ideology. IS pronounces that they have been ordered by the superhuman source, 
i.e. God to “fight them until there is no fitnah [paganism] and [until] the religion, all of 
it, is for Allah” (Dabiq, Issue 15: 32). The organisation’s resolve to continue with the 
infinite violence can be understood from the following text published in Dabiq 
Magazine.  
The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, 
torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue 
to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease 
to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you were to pay jizyah 
[protection tax] and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, 
we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop fighting 
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you then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter into a 
covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you (Dabiq, Issue15: 
33).   
The above mentioned textual construct highlights an important and implied theme of 
ideological violence. The ideological violence aims at something beyond the physical 
surrender of the ‘other’; it aims at complete subjugation of the thought as well. All 
action flowing out of hate shall continue even if “you live under the authority of Islam 
in humiliation” (Dabiq, Issue 15: 33). AQ is in sync with IS in this endless hate flowing 
out of their allegiance to the ideology. AQ propagates that those who “claim that loving 
Allāh does not require jealousy nor anger for the Sake of Allāh…. contradicts the 
method of the Qurān and Sunnah” (Inspire, Issue 12: 33). IS concurs with such thinking 
and emphasises that “[a] Muslim’s loyalty is determined, not by his skin colour, his 
tribal affiliation, or his last name, but by his faith. He loves those whom Allah loves 
and hates those whom Allah hates” (Dabiq, 11; 19). The character is supposed to 
pursue their opponents through the actions of hate (which is another form of violence) 
until ‘they’ surrender their inner self completely as well, i.e. stop thinking and become 
ideologues. 
The theme of perpetual and continuous violence is the central theme the organisations 
construct for the discursive character. Perpetual activism and feverish activity are 
central to the character’s mindset. They must continue to act in all circumstances. 
When they are unable to act violently, they must pursue the ‘other’ through the act of 
hate. Arendt emphasises, “[p]ersuasion is not the opposite of rule by violence, it is only 
another form of it(…)that is, an attempt to use violence by words only” (Arendt, 1990: 
80).  
The ideological mindset constructs clear, sharp and distinguishable identities of the 
‘other’ for an equally distinguishable ideological action. Inconsistency and confusion 
are not the domains of such thinking. The ideological mindset perceives inconsistency 
as an anomaly waiting for an action to resolve the anomaly. The Islamist organisations 
believe that the “other’s” physical surrender has created an inconsistency; ‘they’ have 
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yet not surrendered their thinking to the ideology. That means, ‘they’ have managed to 
live under an ideological rule but without completely surrendering to the ideology. In 
the ideological language living with inconsistencies is hypocrisy. “The essence of 
hypocrisy – both major and minor – is a discrepancy between what the inner self 
encloses and what the outer self discloses, and that minor hypocrisy can beget major 
hypocrisy” (Dabiq, Issue 3: 25). For the ideological mindset, the action is necessary to 
unmask the hypocrisy.   
6.7 Violent Action as a Provocation to Unmask Hypocrisy 
In line with the Arendtian ideological mindset, the Islamist organisations employ 
violence as a tool to unmask the hypocrisy of the world (Western) powers. In the 
Arendtian articulations, the ideologues perform an act to provoke a power to use 
violence. The aim is to expose the hypocrisy of power. The ideological thought feeds 
on contradictions and hypocrisies of the real world. Sometimes ideologues perform 
violent action as a strategy to provoke the ‘other’ to react with disproportionate 
violence. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers can be categorised as one such 
action. AQ relates to the 9/11 attacks as a provocative action.    
Before 9/11, the Jihad was limited to some specific lands. Today, 
because of their own spending, it has spread throughout the world 
and the basic belief and ideology of all the Jihadi groups is the same 
- Allah’s Law on Allah’s Land (Azan, Issue 1: 59). 
AQ endorses the theme that the 9/11 violent action helped in promoting the terrorist 
ideology. Through this action, they managed to spread the call for action and violence 
throughout the world. AQ argues that “changing the status quo is not an easy task. 
Rocking the boat affects everyone. The Prophets experienced the consequences of 
challenging the status quo that was instituted and defended by the powerful. They 
suffered, and their followers suffered” (Azan, Issue 9: 34). The Islamists understand 
that they will have to pay the price to provoke the status quo. They assert, “today the 
status quo is fiercely defended by the powerful and not everyone has the courage to go 
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against it. If you defy it, you suffer. You pay a price” (Azan, Issue 9:34). AQ, however, 
is determined to rock the boat to unmask the hypocrisy of the rulers. They articulate:  
The drone chain has been exposed and the hypocrisy of the rulers has 
been laid bare. They have been lying to the Ummah from the start. 
They do not care for the causes of the Ummah. And the Muslims in 
fact, know this. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, are rocking the 
boat.  And they have Allah on their side (Azan, Issue 1: 18-19).  
The organisation constructs a character in the text mentioned above, which thinks that 
the initiation of violent action against the Muslim rulers is a way to expose their 
hypocrisy. Such action forces the rulers to state their position on certain issues. This is 
an indication that Islamist organisations are confident that Muslim masses shall support 
their ideology consistent stance. They take pride in taking a provocative action to 
expose the operations of the drones. The Muslim rulers, while claiming to be close to 
the Muslim causes, are unable to disrupt the drone operations from their lands. AQ 
finds it justified to rock the boat after they have identified this inconsistency in the 
Muslim rulers’ position. Rocking the boat is expected to unmask the hypocrisy of the 
Muslim rulers. The Islamist organisations’ constructed character is supposed to take 
every action, including against their self-interest, so that the ideological claims appear 
consistent. The Islamist organisations list possible actions against the ‘other’ as part of 
the action of disavowal.  
6.8 The Action of Disavowal  
Violence, for the Islamist organisations, is a preferred action, however, in situations 
where such an action is not possible, the character is supposed to practice the action of 
disavowal against the ‘other’. The ideology should guide all the actions of disavowal. 
Disavowal encompasses all the actions that are taken as part of the ideological action. 




The Quran does not want a unity in which evil retains its nature and 
gets mixed up with goodness. It does not want a unity in which 
darkness and light mix together to form a third mixture. No! If such 
was the case then there would be no Quran, no Quranic Ummah, no 
call towards Islam, no Ummah of Islam... This is because the mixing 
up of truth and falsehood yields darkness in which the reality of all 
things is lost and this only begets falsehood (Azan, Issue 2: 44).  
The theme of the textual construction suggests separating the ‘false people’ from the 
‘true people'. The character is being encouraged to separate themselves from the ‘false 
people’ at all levels, e.g. political, social and so on. The following text published by 
AQ in the Azan Magazine narrates seven levels of disavowal.  
1.    Cutting relations of the heart with them 
2.  Verbally proclaiming hatred and disavowal 
3.    Refraining from imitating them in all aspects 
4.  Completely cutting off any social relation(s) with them 
5.  Refraining from mixing with them 
6.    Opposing their desires 
7.    Fighting Jihad against them (Azan, Issue 2: 45 ). 
The Islamist organisations include all tangible and intangible actions in the category of 
disavowal of the ‘other’. The list mentioned above helps in pointing, dehumanising and 
then violently eliminating the ‘other’. The character is encouraged to develop a 
mindset that sees reality through the ideology. AQ propagates that “the Quran ordered 
that the hatred and disavowal of the disbelievers should not be kept in the heart only. 
Rather, it needs to be openly proclaimed” (Azan, Issue 2, 46). It urges “the Muslims to 
separate themselves from the non-Muslims by their actions” (Azan, Issue 2: 46). The 
organisation, being totalitarian, constructs the action of disavowal as a method to 
control the thinking of the subjects. An article in the AQ published Azan Magazine 
entitled “Disavowal” exposes the totalitarian nature of their mindset.    
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The Shariah of Allah did not deem separation and distinction between 
the Muslims and disbelievers as sufficient. To make this distinction 
even clearer, the Shariah ordered the Muslims to refrain from 
conducting any mu’amlaat (social and political relations) with the 
disbelievers. Hence, if Islamic authority is enforced, the flag of Islam 
is raised and the Shariah courts are established, then according to the 
way of the righteously guided Caliphate and the Islamic Government, 
the Muslims are not to seek help from the disbelievers; and neither 
are they allowed to give the disbelievers any share in politics; they 
are to refrain as much as possible to involve them in any socio-
economic-political action. This is because this apparent association 
with the disbelievers may lead to that same affection or love for them 
(which is forbidden) (Azan, Issue 2: 47). 
The theme of the discriminatory action against the ‘other’ runs through the text. In the 
ideological mindset, the binary division of the world is just a first step; decisive action 
must follow to prove the ideological claims to be the right claims. The above mentioned 
textual expression gives a glimpse of an ideological world they want the discursive 
character to believe in. The action of disavowal in the textual construct, like the 
previously explained action of violence, draws its legitimacy from the past action, i.e. 
in the governance model of the righteous caliphs. It suggests that a perpetual action is 
mandatory for the character so that the ideological mindset can be implemented in its 
entirety. Non-believers must be excluded from all “socio-economic-political action”. 
AQ builds the argument on the understanding that “[t]his is because this apparent 
association with the disbelievers may lead to that same affection or love for them 
(which is forbidden)” (Azan, Issue 2: 47). The organisation communicates to the 
character that “[y]our word is different from theirs. Your matter is different. You and 
they are completely separate” (Azan, Issue 2: 46). This separation must be cemented 
by further proactive action. The article further suggests:  
After removing all the relations of the heart and body, the Shariah 
took another step forward and proclaimed that the relation of the 
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lovers of Allah (meaning Muslims) with the enemies of Allah is one 
of enmity and hatred (Azan, Issue 2: 48). 
Like the theme of perpetual violence, AQ also constructs the theme of perpetual enmity 
and hatred. The character is required to sever all the relationships from the ‘other’. The 
character should follow enmity and hatred of the ‘other’ as the guiding principles of 
action. IS articulates reasons for such an action in the following text.   
We hate you because your secular, liberal societies permit the very 
things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He 
has permitted, a matter that doesn’t concern you because your 
Christian disbelief and paganism separate between religion and state, 
thereby granting supreme authority to your whims and desires via the 
legislators you vote into power. In doing so, you desire to rob Allah 
of His right to be obeyed and you wish to usurp that right for 
yourselves. “Legislation is not but for Allah” (Dabiq, Issue 15: 32).  
As the ideological action and violence are aimed at refabricating the world as per the 
Islamist imagined glorious past, all innovation, therefore, must be rejected. Innovation 
is linked to thinking. The ideological mindset is not comfortable with the human faculty 
of thinking. The Islamist organisations construct such a character who thinks that 
Divine Law should be applied directly to humans without taking into account the 
human condition. All flexibility that humanmade laws afford to fellow beings through 
legislation is rejected. Such an activity “rob[s] Allah of His right to be obeyed” (Dabiq, 
Issue 15: 32).  All the influence of the humanmade laws should be fought against and 
disowned. IS displays their resolve for this resistance in the following text.   
Your secular liberalism has led you to tolerate and even support “gay 
rights,” to allow alcohol, drugs, fornication, gambling, and usury to 
become widespread, and to encourage the people to mock those who 
denounce these filthy sins and vices. As such, we wage war against 
you to stop you from spreading your disbelief and debauchery – your 
secularism and nationalism, your perverted liberal values, your 
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Christianity and atheism – and all the depravity and corruption they 
entail. You’ve made it your mission to “liberate” Muslim societies; 
we’ve made it our mission to fight off your influence and protect 
humanity from your misguided concepts and your deviant way of life 
(Dabiq, Issue 15: 32).  
IS purports that it is mandatory for the character to disown and fight against the 
Western civilisation and all the values it stands for. In the Islamist organisations’ 
discursive practices, this struggle is not optional but mandatory.   
6.9 The Mandatory Nature of the Violent Action  
In the Arendtian ideological mindset, violent action is mandatory for every ideologue 
so that all hindrance is removed, and the Divine Law can take its course. The mandatory 
nature of violent action is well settled in the ideological mindset. AQ-affiliated 
terrorists show their surprise that “[e]ven today, many Muslims mistakenly believe that 
they are absolved of the duty of Jihad because that is the job of the Army and the police! 
We seek refuge with Allah [from such thinking]” (Azan, Issue 5: 15). AQ emphasises 
the mandatory nature of the violent action to the extent that it equates it with other 
religiously sanctioned acts of worship. They emphasise that    
Jihad is an obligation upon all, just like the prayer and the fast! Allah 
Says: “Jihad is ordained for you (Muslims) though you dislike it, and 
it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and that you 
like a thing which is bad for you. Allah Knows but you do not know.” 
[2:216] (Azan, Issue 3:19).  
TT also endorses the same theme in their texts in the TT published Urdu Magazine 




[Translation by the author] Jihad is ordained for you, while the 
situation is that you dislike war. It is possible that something you 
dislike might be good for you and something you like might prove 
bad for you. God is all-wise (about your welfare), and you lack in the 
knowledge (about your welfare) (Shariat, Issue 33:29).  
All three Islamist organisations advocate action and violence as a normal way of 
practising the ideology (or religion) in their texts. They think the Divine Law makes it 
mandatory for them to practice violence or Jihad in their routine lived lives. This 
normalisation of violence is the distinguishing feature of ideological violence. IS re-
emphasises that it is “amongst the major sins that many parents order their children 
with the abandonment of the fard ‘ayn jihād [obligatory fighting—by the author]” 
(Dabiq, Issue 10:15). For them, the violent action is like “the prayer and the fast” 
(Dabiq, Issue 10: 16). AQ endorses this mandatory nature of violence and decrees that 
“[t]he scholars of the Ummah have a consensus that under a situation such as ours 
today, it becomes Fardh Ayn [obligatory—by the author] upon every Muslim to wage 
Jihad” (Azan, Issue 3: 7). AQ explains,   
[i]f the enemy attacks a Muslim border or enters any Islamic land, 
then as we mentioned before, Jihad becomes Fard ‘Ayn upon the 
entire population of the country and all around it. In this situation, 
permission is not required. There is no permission for anyone from 
the other; even the child goes out without the permission of his 
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parents, the wife without the permission of her husband, and the 
debtor without the permission of his creditor” (Azan, Issue 4: 28). 
The organisation promotes the theme that in certain circumstances, violent action 
becomes an individual obligation. In such situations, the character is encouraged to 
disregard all traditions, norms and laws of society and engage in the violent action at 
all cost. TT follows IS and AQ in emphasising and taking pride in the violent action. 
TT sensitises the character to remain on guard as the ‘other’ is conspiring to distract 
‘us’ from our real spirit of Jihad. A text in the TT published Urdu Magazine Shariat 
reads,   
 
[Translation by the author] The Jihad is our fundamental religious 
and traditional base. Initially, our forefathers and then we employed 
it as a weapon of strength against the aggressor, but now, 
unfortunately, the enemy labelled it terrorism. Now our syllabus has 
been cleaned off the verses, which persuaded for Jihad. Even such 
efforts are underway, which will obliterate the history from the 
glorious actions of our forefathers. Due to this effort, the future 
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generations will either have a very weak understanding or forget 
Jihad and defence of their motherland (Shariat, Issue 38: 27).   
The theme of a violent action named as Jihad is central to the Islamist organisations’ 
discursive practices. A perpetual violent action is mandatory to advance ideological 
aims. The organisations think that such violence helped the Muslims in the past, and 
the same shall be the case in the future as well. The Jihad for the TT, as mentioned in 
the above text, is not only the part of the ideology but has acquired the status of a deep-
rooted tradition as well.  
6.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I conducted theory-guided thematic analysis of the discursive practices 
of three Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ, IS and TT as expressed in their texts, to 
ascertain whether the third element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, namely 
‘Violence and the Call for Action’ is present in the discursively constructed character’s 
mindset, if so, what is the extent and nature of such presence?  
I noted that the third element of the Arendtian ideological mindset is present in the 
mindset of the discursively constructed character. I argued that Islamist organisations 
think that the world is divided into two parts, Dar-al-harab and Dar-al-Islam. Dar-al-
harab includes all lands ruled by Kuffar, and Dar-al-Islam includes all lands ruled by 
the Islamic ideologues. Violence is central in Dar-al-harab. The character is supposed 
to be the law unto themselves in Dar-al-harab. The Islamist organisations skilfully 
employ certain metaphors as the anchorage of ‘pointing’, dehumanising and violently 
eliminating the ‘other’. I cited texts to analyse the metaphors of “Dajjal”, “Kuffar” and 
“Taghut”. I argued that the metaphors inherently call for violence against the ‘other’. 
In Sections 6.5 and 6.6, I analysed and discussed the textual constructions to note that 
Islamists assert that Jihad is mandatory. Additionally, it is endless and can be waged as 
a permanent feature of the ideological mindset. It is legitimate to use violence to 
unmask Western hypocrisy. A character that is unable to be violent should resort to the 
actions of disavowal. I cited and analysed the examples of the actions of disavowal.  
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The violence and action are not optional for the constructed character but are 
mandatory. The character is supposed to actively seek and take action all the times 
against the ‘other’. The ideology had already defined the categories of the ‘other’. The 
ideological ‘other’ is not subjective but an ‘Objective Enemy’. It is the ideology that 
has identified certain people as enemies. The next chapter shall analyse the 
conceptualisation of the ‘Objective Enemy’ as an essential element of a character’s 



















Chapter 7: The Objective Enemy 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyse the texts published by Islamists in the magazines to detect the 
themes of the fourth element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, namely ‘The 
Objective Enemy’. The aim is to detect and analyse those ideas that the three Islamist 
organisations use to construct the mindset of the abstract, discursively constructed 
character; whom I call the Islamic ideologue. The construction of an ideal type is 
grounded theoretically in the method developed by Sigwart from Arendt, namely 
“characterology”. I employ a thematic analysis technique to work on the texts to detect 
the themes/subthemes employed by Islamists to construct their ideal type of character. 
I read Islamist texts and Arendtian theorisation on the fourth element of the ideological 
mindset in order to generate subthemes that form the paragraph headings. In this 
chapter, I analyse the presence of the chapter theme, i.e. the objective enemy, as the 
fourth element of Arendtian ideological mindset through six sub-themes.  
The Arendtian ideological mindset is set into motion by the acceptance of the first 
premise of ideology, i.e. the superhuman source as the origin of thought. The logicality 
of the ideological mindset prompts the ideologue to act in sync with the superhuman 
sourced eternal law and dominate the world for its re-formation through ideological 
violence. The ideology has already ordained the elimination of certain people who are 
suspected of opposing the operation of eternal laws. These people gain the status of an 
objective enemy, as this status is independent of subjective behaviour of the nominated 
people. In eliminating the objective enemy, the ideologues do not experience any sense 
of guilt or remorse as they are following eternal law that decides which people are to 
play the role of the executioner, and which people should act as the victim. In rest of 
the chapter, I analyse the theme of objective enemy through six subthemes, namely: 
Insulation from personal experience; the centrality of hate in the construction of 
objective enemy; the ideology defined enemy; ideology deciding all relationships —
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”Wala” and “Bara”; eternal conflict; and the objective enemy is independent of 
subjective behaviour.  
7.2 Insulation from Personal Experience  
The ideological mindset does not conceive an enemy based on some personal 
experience. Ideological radicalisation rewrites the memory of a mindset. It obliterates 
all ideas and experiences that are inconsistent with ideology and insulates the mind 
from personal experience. It is akin to a new birth of the mindset with a clear, 
unambiguous and consistent script sourced to a Divine Law. The idea of a new birth of 
the mindset is important, as it can guide the deradicalisation efforts as well. A revival 
of personal experience may hold a key in deradicalising an ideologically radicalised 
character. Arendt rightly concludes in “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1958) by 
emphasising that “the beginning is the promise, the only ‘message’ which the end can 
ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity 
of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom” (Arendt, 1958: 479).  
In the texts, Islamists are aware of the importance of personal experience and its 
connection with the development of a mindset. Personal experience is central to the 
subjective understanding of a condition. The ideological mindset rejects the subjective 
nature of human experience. It pretends to deal objectively with eternal laws, i.e. laws 
of nature, history and God. Islamists are particular in insulating the personal experience 
of the constructed character from the potential enemy. AQ advises the potential 
recruits that the best course of action is to emigrate from the lands of “Kuffar” but “[i]f 
you fail to emigrate, then at least boycott the disbelievers” (Inspire, Issue 1: 17). The 
theme of disavowal is a particular attempt aimed at insulating the character from any 
personal experience arising out of a relationship with an enemy.  AQ narrates seven 
levels of disavowal, which are designed to insulate the character from any personal 
experience with the enemy. These are:  
1. Cutting relations of the heart with them  
2. Verbally proclaiming hatred and disavowal  
3. Refraining from imitating them in all aspects  
4. Completely cutting off any social relation(s) with them  
247 
 
5. Refraining from mixing with them  
6. Opposing their desires  
7. Fighting Jihad against them (Azan, Issue 2: 45) 
The central theme in all the seven actions mentioned above aims at insulating the 
personal experience from the objective enemy. The ideological mindset is very 
particular about ideological consistency. That is why it advises “cutting relations of the 
heart with them” as a first step so that a new mindset is developed. It is akin to having 
a new birth. All actions of disavowal must flow from a new mindset. The discursive 
character is not supposed to have duality in their mindset; their mindset and actions 
must be clear from any ambiguity. Islamists construct disavowal to materialise at three 
levels. At the first level, the character should reconstruct the mindset through ideology 
by following action number 1 and 6. At the second level, the character should take 
passive actions as listed from number 2 to 5. Finally, at the third level, i.e. action 
number 7, the enemy must be eliminated.  
IS agrees with AQ in the actions of disavowal; however, IS takes it to another level and 
insists that “the issue [of disavowal] went so far for some Sahaba [the companions of 
the Prophet] that specific promise would be made to Allah to not even touch a mushrik 
(Rumiyah, Issue 7: 28). Further, “spilling the blood of the mushrikin is the greatest 
form of disavowal” (Rumiyah, Issue 7: 28). The Islamists take the idea of the insulation 
from the personal experience very seriously and refer to Islamic political history, where 
“disavowal of the mushrikin was no longer counted to be merely declaring enmity to 
them and dispraising them. Rather, waging Jihad against them and fighting them until 
they surrender to the command of Allah was added to it (Rumiyah, Issue 7: 27). IS, 
therefore, constructs the characteristics of an ideal type of the Islamic ideologue as 
follows.   
The Dunya and its adornments could not tempt him. Scholastic degrees 
and their deception could not confine him. Neither a spouse, nor wealth, 
nor children could entice him away from his religion. Rather, he cast all 
of that behind him when he understood tawhid and knew that Jihad in 
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Allah’s cause is the best proof of his allegiance to the Muslims and his 
disavowal of the mushrikin, amongst whom he was born, raised as a 
child, and entered into man-hood (Rumiyah, Issue 8: 41).  
All the seven actions mentioned in the previous paragraphs that govern the 
relationships between the Islamic ideologues and the objective enemy do not include 
any material considerations as the basis of the relationship. So, then what is the central 
principle(s) that govern the relationship with the objective enemy? It is hating. I note 
that Islamists construct hate as the central emotion governing all the relationships with 
the objective enemy.   
7.3 The Centrality of Hate in the Construction of the Objective Enemy  
The discursive character is supposed to hate everything related to the enemy. The texts 
in the magazines advise the character not to keep hatred in the heart but display its 
presence through empirical actions as well. Hate should not be confused with the act 
of disliking. The emotion of disliking may suggest some discontinuity with the object 
of disliking. This discontinuity is a space available to the victim where they may 
escape. On the contrary, hate establishes a continuous and strong bond without any 
space between the executioner and the victim. The Arendtian ideological mindset does 
not envisage any space for any human innovation. Divine Law must operate as per the 
will of the superhuman source equally for the executioner and the victim. IS, in the 
following text, admonishes the followers to avoid soft political statements against the 
enemy and display animosity towards ‘them’.    
[F]ight the kuffār wherever they may be found, show animosity towards 
all of them, and do not incline towards them using elusive statements or 
those whose words carry false meanings based upon modern day 
political concepts. The religion of an individual Muslim is not upright – 
even if he worships Allah and abandons shirk – until he shows 
animosity towards the mushrikīn and proclaims his animosity and 
hatred towards them, how could it be permissible for a party with power 
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and influence to become feeble in practising this great rite at least in its 
political messages (Dabiq, Issue 10:20).  
IS constructs the theme in the text mentioned above that hate is a “great rite”, which 
must be practised even when the political situation suggests otherwise. IS is not ready 
to permit the usage of diplomatic language that does not carry the message of hate 
towards the ‘other’. It appears from the texts that the sentiment of hate must continue 
even if the enemy is ready to perform all the empirical actions that are expected out of 
‘them’. The sentiment of hate is so central to the ideological mindset that the 
corresponding sentiment of mercy is completely missing from it. I have not come 
across a text in my reading of the magazines that may incite the sentiment of mercy 
towards the objective enemy. In certain instances where a quoted Quranic text suggests 
an exception to the general rule of hate against the enemy, Islamists interpret it in a 
manner that the element of hate retains its grip over the discourse. For example, IS 
interprets an exception to a rule in the following text.  
Ash-Shafi’i said, “And the Kafir’s blood is not spared until he becomes 
a Muslim” (Al-Umm). Mentioning the exception of killing women and 
children, he also said, “And the reason for the prohibition of shedding 
Muslim blood being different from the prohibition of shedding the Kafir 
child’s and Kafir woman’s blood is that they are not to be killed due to 
specific revelation restricting this killing (while the initial ruling allows 
shedding Kafir blood in general). And our opinion regarding this –and 
Allah knows best – is that the restriction exists so that they can become 
slaves, which is more beneficial than killing them, and killing them does 
not harm the enemy; so making them slaves is more optimal than  killing  
them” (Al-Umm) (Rumiyah, Issue 1: 35).   
IS, in the following text, emphasises the centrality of the sentiment of hate as the 
principal of the relationship with the enemy.    
What’s important to understand here is that although some might argue 
that your foreign policies are the extent of what drives our hatred, this 
particular reason for hating you is secondary, hence the reason we 
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addressed it at the end of the above list. The fact is, even if you were to 
stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping 
our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason 
for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if 
you were to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in 
humiliation, we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop 
fighting you then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter 
into a covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you (Dabiq, Issue 
15: 33).  
The text emphasises the theme that it is the ideology (Islam) that is the fundamental 
reason that the Islamists hate the ‘other’. Subjective behaviour has no role in the 
objective nature of the status of the enemy. AQ in an Urdu text narrates that the nature 
of enmity is ideological and shall not cease until and unless one ideology dominates 
the other.   
 
[Translation by the author] And these Kafir people shall fight you  
 forever, and if they prevail upon you, they will turn you away from 
 your religion (Hitteen, Issue 1: 24).  
IS further explains that “[w]e hate you, first and foremost, because you are 
disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah – whether you realize it or not (…)It is 
for this reason that we were commanded to openly declare our hatred for you and our 
enmity towards you” (Dabiq, Issue 15: 31). The Islamists’ constructed sentiment of 
hate is not a spontaneous emotion that springs from an adverse human experience; it 
is well planned and objective. IS further elaborates,  
The gist of the matter is that there is indeed a rhyme to our terrorism, 
warfare, ruthlessness, and brutality. As much as some liberal journalist 
would like you to believe that we do what we do because we’re simply 
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monsters with no logic behind our course of action, the fact is that we 
continue to wage – and escalate – a calculated war that the West thought 
it had ended several years ago (…) So you can continue to believe that 
those “despicable terrorists” hate you because of your lattes and your 
Timberlands, and continue spending ridiculous amounts of money to try 
to prevail in an unwinnable war, or you can accept reality and recognize 
that we will never stop hating you until you embrace Islam (Dabiq, Issue 
15: 33). 
The theme in the above mentioned IS construction resonates with the Arendtian 
ideological mindset that has a pattern of actions, which are dictated by and are 
consistent with ideology. The ideology defined enemy is an objective enemy, and the 
ideologues shall continue to fight against it until and unless it accepts the ideology. IS 
further constructs that “we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they 
submit to the authority of Islam, either by becoming Muslims, or by paying jizyah – 
for those afforded this option – and living in humiliation under the rule of the Muslims” 
(Dabiq, Issue 15: 31). The Islamists not only themselves use hateful metaphors in the 
texts, but they think that enemy is also using the same metaphors against ‘us’.   
[Translation by the author] The fact of using certain metaphors related to 
war and religion by Americans can indicate how ingrained the 
relationship of war and religion is in the American consciousness. All the 
words which are being to describe this war are part of the Crusade 
literature. For example, fighting evil, absolute justice, a war between good 
and evil etc. in these terms, Muslims are being referred to as evil and false 
(Hitteen, Issue 1: 17). 
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The Islamists not only construct hate as the central principle of the relationship with 
the objective enemy, but they also believe that the enemy is also following the same 
principle. For example, AQ, in a text in the Inspire Magazine, explains that the enemy 
hates them because Islamists follow the principle of the ideological relationship with 
‘them’.  
Thus, whoever declares walâ’ and barâ’ah and abandons softening up 
before them, will be hated excessively. And it is not far from mentioning 
that defaming and misrepresenting al Qaeda in the media, which 
belongs to the Jews, Christians and munâfiqîn, is an obvious proof [of 
their hate] for you to observe (Inspire, Issue 8:50).  
AQ constructs the theme in the texts that “[t]he Jews, Christians and Munâfiqîn hate 
and detest them [AQ] the most out of all” the enemy groups” (Inspire, Issue 8:50). In 
another rhetorical construction, AQ elaborates the theme of hate as the principle of the 
relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
O, the legislations’ slaves and the constitutions’ slaves. O, the people of 
the UN and the new world order. O, people of the false religions of 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism etc. O, the people of the new religions 
of Democracy, secularism and nationalism. O, Armies and Police of the 
Pharaoh. We leave you and your religion. We disbelieve in you and in 
your polytheistic constitution and your pagan councils and your UN’s. 
And we have enmity and hate towards you! Unless you believe in 
ALLAH alone! And accept His Law with full submission (Azan, Issue 
3:18).  
Islamists, in their texts, mention an enemy that is constructed by the ideology.     
7.4 The Ideologically Defined Enemy 
The Arendtian ideological mindset has an enemy that is determined and defined by the 
ideology. The character is supposed to locate, pursue, hate and eliminate the 
ideologically defined enemy. IS explains, “[w]e perform jihād so that Allah’s word 
becomes supreme and the religion becomes completely for Allah. Everyone who 
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opposes this goal or stands in the path of this goal is an enemy to us and a target for 
our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his lineage may be. We have a 
religion that Allah revealed to be a scale and a judge” (Dabiq, Issue. 15:20). Islamists 
identify four types of enemies in their texts, which are determined by the ideology. 
Virtually everyone who does not subscribe to the Islamist ideology is an enemy. The 
first types are Jews and Christians. AQ articulates that “[m]any of the people of the 
Scripture wish they could turn you back to disbelief after you have believed, out of 
envy from themselves [even] after the truth has become clear to them [2:109]” (Azan, 
Issue 4: 22). In the following Urdu texts, AQ mentions the first types of enemies.     
[Translation by the author] We know that Jews are the most severe in 
their enmity towards Islam. Allah says, “verily, you shall find Jews and 
idolaters as the worst of the enemies of the believers” (Hitteen, Issue 1: 
20). 
[Translation by the author] Our history of wars with people of the book 
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indicates that most of our wars were waged against Christians. During 
the gulf war, newspapers published research of certain historians. The 
research mentioned that during the last fourteen hundred and ten years, 
Muslims and Romans fought three thousand and six hundred wars. In 
fact, barring a short period, we remained in conflict. Whereas in the last 
fourteen centuries, we fought only twice directly with Jews; the first 
time during the time of the Prophet and second time now after the 
capture of Palestine by Jews. However, against Christians, we are in a 
continuous fight, and the sayings of the Prophet informed us that it 
should continue until the end of time (Hitteen, Issue 1: 21). 
AQ also translates from the Quran to support their construction.  
 [Translation by the author] O believers, do not make friends from Jews 
and Christians, as they are friends to each other (Hitteen, Issue 1:21). 
They translate another verse from the Quran as follows.  
 
[Translation by the author] Fight against those people among the people 
of the book who, who do not believe in Allah and the last day, and do 
not forbid which Allah and the Prophet have forbidden, and do not 
accept the true religion. (Fight against them) until they pay war money 
in all humility  (Hitteen, Issue 1:26).  
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AQ quotes another Hades [sayings of the Prophet] as follows.  
[Translation by the author] I have been appointed before the hour with a 
sword, and my livelihood has been placed under a spear (Hitteen, Issue 1: 
30).  
TT also constructs the same mindset as the other two organisations. Although they are 
less theoretical and more focused on the actual battle against the American led coalition 
forces.  
 
[Translated by the author] Salahuddin Ayyubid once said, “I do not 
know whether Islam spread through sword or morals, but I know it well 
that without a sword Islam cannot be protected” (Shariat, Issue 40:31). 
The second type of objective enemies comprises of mushrikin [idolaters] and 
disbelievers. AQ quotes the Quran to pronounce that “verily, the disbelievers are ever 
unto you open enemies [4:101]” (Azan, Issue 4: 22). AQ, in the following text, lays the 
basis of the relationship, i.e. enmity, between Muslims and mushrikin.  
[I]t is sufficient for a Muslim to know that Allah made duty upon him 
to take the mushrikin as enemies and to not take them as awliya, and He 
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made it obligatory to love the believers and to take them as awliya. He 
made this an essential of iman, just as He negated the iman of whoever 
shows love to those who oppose Allah and His Messenger, eve fathers, 
sons, brothers, or tribesmen (Rumiyah, Issue 2: 5).  
TT articulates the objective nature of the battle between the forces of Satan and truth 
in Afghanistan.  
 
[Translated by the author] It is the fact that the forces of Satan had 
always been fighting against the people of truth. Today more than forty 
countries are fighting against the Islamic government, which is a great 
challenge for Mujahideen in this battle of truth and falsehood (Shariat, 
Issue 57: 17).  
IS further articulates the second type of the objective enemy in the following text. 
Thus, anyone who is neither a Muslim nor a dhimmi Kafir, while still a 
tyrant against himself, deserving both hatred and humiliation, is a 
hostile tyrant deserving aggression. This is because shirk itself is dhulm 
(tyranny). And although the people of dhimmah are mushrikin from the 
People of the Book, their shirk is subjugated and humiliated under the 
Shari’ah of Allah enforced upon them. So, the duty to fight the tyrants 
– the mushrikin – is clear and established. But Allah did not only 
command the “fighting” of disbelievers, as if to say He only wants us 
to conduct frontline operations against them. Rather, He has also 
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ordered that they may be killed on or off the battlefield (Rumiyah, Issue 
1: 34-35).  
The third type of enemy is the modern institutions and the ideas attached to such 
institutions. AQ states that it “is apparent from the goals and operations of their 
international ‘New World Order’ in which the United Nations plays the supreme role” 
(Azan, Issue 4: 22). The ideology has also identified ‘their’ aims and objectives against 
‘us’. “They want to fulfil the plans of their real master - Satan, and to turn the Muslims 
away from the blessed path of Paradise. Allah says that they ‘wish that if they could 
turn you away as disbelievers’” (Azan, Issue 4: 22). TT elaborates in detail the 




[Translation by the author] Under two conditions, a Muslim can fight a 
 Muslim. Firstly, if a Muslim joins a non-Muslim military and says that 
it is my duty to fight, and I do not consider it consider it a sin to kill the 
 opponent, Muslim or Kafir alike. Alternatively, he pronounces that I am 
 paid by them so I obey their orders and can kill a Muslim if I am asked 
 to do so. In this situation, such a person is a Kafir and out of the pale of 
 Islam due to his action; he is not entitled to the concessions which are 
 otherwise specific to Muslims. Secondly, the person who fights well 
 organised as you [Islamists] fight for the success [of the enemy] against 
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 the Taliban or an Islamic government. This is the worst type of disbelief, 
 and no other type is severer than this one (Shariat, Issue 63:36). 
The fourth type of objective enemies are the Muslims who do not follow the 
interpretations of Islamists, which I call the ideological understanding of Islam. IS 
constructs this type of enemy as follows.  
“Murtadd Brotherhood” group and its parties, factions, and sister 
organizations, which have denied tawhid, the Shari’ah, “Wala” and 
“Bara”, and Jihad, and have resisted adhering to these tenets, mocked 
them, waged war against them, and supported the Crusaders and the 
tawaghit in waging war against them. Rather, it is obligatory on the 
Muslim to manifest his disbelief in all of these apostates as much as he 
is able to, with his pen and tongue, and his sword and spear (Rumiyah, 
Issue 1:6). 
AQ, in their Urdu Magazine Hitteen, constructs the fourth type of enemy as follows.  
 
[Translation by the author] Therefore, it is important for Mujahedeen 
that they keep their objectives clear, so that Jihad should not remain 
confined to repelling the aggressive enemy from the Muslim lands, 
rather, this Jihad should be waged against all the ideas that have entered 
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into Muslims such as non-Islamic beliefs; historical or modern 
polytheist ideas; different etiquette spread from common human 
relations to the relations of power; polytheistic democratic system; 
Western Jewish capitalism; manmade ignorant international laws; 
superfluous borders enacted on the nation of  nationalism; and for 
complete destruction of UN, Security Council, IMF and World Bank. 
Jihad should replace all the above with Sharia Law, liberty to pronounce 
the government of God, the dominance of Islam and 
 establishment of Khilafah on the pattern of prophethood (Hitteen, Issue 
 4:35). 
The above mentioned categorisations of the enemies help in conceptualising the idea 
of the objective enemy constructed by Islamists. In their treatment of the enemy, 
Islamists do not categorise the enemy in such categories and treat all the types equally. 
The treatment includes, pointing, dehumanising and then eliminating. Equal treatment 
is premised on the concept that all the enemies have been defined by the ideology 
objectively. Therefore, as the Islamists do not have any control over the nomination of 
the enemy, they do not enjoy any flexibility in its treatment. An eternal enemy needs 
an eternal conflict.  
7.5 Eternal Conflict  
The enemy in the Arendtian theorisation of ideology is eternal and objective. Therefore, 
Islamists domination of the enemy shall lead to two implication; either the enemy shall 
be refabricated according to the ideology, or it shall be eliminated. Arendt emphasises 
that, if the laws of some superhuman force (History or Nature) have pronounced 
“inferior races” or “dying classes” to be the objective enemies, “[g]uilt and innocence 
become senseless notions; “guilty” is he who stands in the way of the natural or 
historical process which has passed judgement over “inferior races”, over individuals 
“unfit to live”, over “dying classes and decadent peoples” (Arendt, 1958: 465). As the 
enemy constructed by Islamist is eternal, the nature of the conflict is eternal as well. 
AQ declares that “[i]nflicting terror on the enemies of Allāh moves you closer to Him” 
(Inspire, Issue 12:32). Therefore, if the character desires to be closer to Allah, they 
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shall have to inflict terror on the “enemies of Allah”. In the Islamists’ perception, 
seeking nearness to Allah is a hope that shall never end. Hence, the character is 
supposed to nominate new categories of ‘them’, if, and when the exiting categories of 
the enemy are eliminated. Such a conceptualisation needs an eternal conflict. AQ 
constructs the theme of a conflict between the eternal enemies in the following Urdu 
text.   
 
[Translation by the author] That is the reason that historically, Islam 
has divided humanity into two groups. One group comprise of Muslims; 
these are the people who obeyed the prophets of the time till the time 
the last of the prophets, i.e. Muhammad appeared. Now only the people 
who follow the Prophet Muhammad are called Muslims. The second 
group consists of non-believers, who appeared in different types every 
time such as idolaters  and worshipers of falsehood (Hitteen, Issue 
4:89). 
The basis of eternal conflict with the eternal enemy is faith (ideology). AQ, in the 
following text, identifies ‘our’ faith and ‘their’ sin as the main reason for the eternal 
conflict.   
When will they accept you? Either you abandon your faith, or they 
abandon their sin, and this won’t happen. If they abandon their sin, this 
means they become Muslims, and the conflict cools down. And if you 
abandon your Islam, you have committed shirk.  So, the conflict 
continues. So, their sin and our faith is the reason (…)This is because 
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Allah has set down a rule that does not change, and this rule says: “And 
the Jews and Christians will never be pleased with you until you follow 
their way [2:120] (Azan Issue 1: 71).  
The Islamists, in the text mentioned above, construct the theme of an eternal enemy 
with eternal conflict. The conflict cannot be managed through any means because 
ideological laws originate from a superhuman source and never change. IS articulates 
that even “[a] halt of war between the Muslims and the kuffār can never be permanent, 
as a war against the kuffār is the default obligation upon the Muslims only to be 
temporarily halted by the truce for a greater shar’ī interest” ( Dabiq, Issue 8:67). IS 
constructs the theme of an eternal conflict in the following text. 
Know well that our fight will continue until you are defeated and submit 
to the rule of your Creator, or until we achieve martyrdom. Allah has 
made our mission to wage war against disbelief until it ceases to exist, 
as he has ordered us to kill all pagans wherever they are found. He said, 
“Then kill the pagans wherever you find them” (At-Tawbah 5) (Dabiq, 
Issue 15: 63). 
The Islamists promote the theme in the texts that the idea of an eternal conflict is not 
constructed by them only, but the enemy also constructs the same idea in its discourse. 
AQ quotes texts considered as the statements of the Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi and the US President George W Bush, where they construct eternal conflict. 




[Translation by the author] George Bush’s Attorney General Ashcroft 
compared the idea of God in Islam and Christianity and tried to prove 
the superiority of the Christian idea of God. Prior to him, the Italian 
Prime  Minister Berlusconi had said, “the Christian civilisation is 
superior to the Islamic civilisation, and the way it defeated Communism 
it shall defeat Muslim civilisation as well.” At another occasion, Bush, 
while addressing a gathering of Canadian soldiers proved that he 
believes in every word of the statement by repeating the statement. He 
said, “come and join us in this war of crusades” (Hitteen, Issue 1: 14). 
Islamists perceive that the enemy fights to gain control of their Islamist ideology. They 
construct every battle that they fight, as the battle of religion. In the following text, AQ 




[Translation by the author] Islam always designate a battle as the battle 
of religion, fought under the conditions of Sharia Law. Equally, if our 
enemy is also fighting on the basis of his religion, then it a religious 
battle from the point of view of both the parties, therefore, all battles 
which were fought against Jews, Christians and idolaters fall in this 
category. The objective of the current conflict is to weaken the 
Ummah’s glorious foundational ideas of faith, so that capitalist 
democracy, liberalism and secularism are applied to Ummah. Islam, like 
Christianity, should also become insignificant and subservient to the 
capitalist civilisation (Hitteen, Issue1: 15). 
TT, in the following text published in the Shariat Magazine, dispel an impression that 




[Translation by the author] These people believe that Taliban (TT) can 
make their enemy understand that it is God’s hand in Taliban’s planning 
and success and that no intelligence agency is supporting them. These 
people can make the enemy believe that it is not the strategy planted by 
Pakistan, Iran, Arabia, Russia or any other country, but it is the war 
between faith and Kuffar (Shariat, Issue 63: 33).  
The eternity of the conflict with the eternal enemy is permanent. The persecution of 
declared enemy shall continue even after its elimination from this world, albeit through 
divine laws. The eternal enemy shall be treated rather more harshly in the eternal life 
of hereafter than in this world. AQ consoles the ideal types by assuring them that “let 
not your eyes turn towards those whom the present life deceived and who dawdle away 
in their disbelief not knowing that an eternal fire awaits them the moment they drop 
from this world” (Azan, Issue 4: 39). The ideas of enmity (or loyalty) are central to the 
ideological mindset. This mindset thinks in the binary sense, i.e. you are either with 
‘us’ or with ‘them’. AQ, in the following text, askes the ideal types to demonstrate their 
loyalty through actions.  
In the time of the Messenger of Allah, loyalty to Allah and His 
Messenger and the believers was by being a soldier of Muhammad's and 
failing that test was in having loyalty towards the Quraish or the Jews. 
Today loyalty of Allah and His Messenger and the believers is 
manifested in defending Islam and the Muslims and failure in that test 
is having ones loyalty towards America and its allies and the agents of 
America – the rulers of the Muslim world (Inspire, Issue 2: 61-62).  
In the pursuit of eternal conflict with the eternal enemy, no rule should pose any 
hindrance in the elimination of the enemy. Islamists, however, acknowledge that 
Islamic history does mention certain exceptional circumstances such as contractual 
obligations, when the life of the enemy may be spared, although on very humiliating 
terms. Sensing that contractual obligations may hinder their objective treatment to the 
objective enemy, and may be considered as an opening to sympathetic behaviour, 
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Islamists encourage abrogation of contracts. IS, in the following text, legitimises 
abrogation of any contracts made with the enemy.    
The hadith indicates the clear permissibility of spilling their blood and 
taking their wealth until they accept Islam. This hadith also shows the 
relationship between fighting and taking wealth, as all Kuffar who are 
not under the contract of dhimmah are enemies from whom ghanimah 
is taken. Allah said, “Indeed the disbelievers are a clear enemy to you” 
(An-Nisa 101). He also said, “So consume from what you have taken of 
ghanimah, as it is halal and good” (Al-Anfal 69). As for those who claim 
to be bound by contracts which they have made with the Kuffar, then 
they should know that, besides the Kuffar of every nation today 
breaking any possible covenant with the Muslims by waging war with 
them, imprisoning them, and otherwise transgressing against them, 
Allah has nullified every contract made with the mushrikin, saying, 
“Allah and His Messenger convey their disavowal to those of the 
mushrikin with whom you made covenants” (At-Tawbah 1). He then 
mentioned the order to kill all those who claim partners for Allah, 
saying, “So when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikin 
wherever you find them. Take them, surround them, and sit at every out- 
post, lying in wait for them” (At-Tawbah 5) (Rumiyah, Issue 8: 13). 
For Islamists, all the relationships are established through the interpretation of the 
ideology. Personal interest or any other human motive should not be allowed to decide 
the nature of the relationship with friend and foe. “Wala” and “Bara” is the term used 
by Islamists to define the ideological relationship with all. 
7.6 Ideology Deciding all Relationships — “Wala” and “Bara” 
“Wala” and “Bara” is a concept that reveals the nature of ideological relationships. The 
term is premised on the principle that all human relationships are decided by ideology. 
It is a concept borrowed from Islam’s political history. AQ explains: “Al-Walā' is 
loyalty towards the believers and barā' is a disavowal of the disbelievers. Allah says 
that every Muslim will be tested for his loyalty” (Inspire, Issue 2: 61-62). The 
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organisation notes that the “192416 was disastrous for the Muslim Ummah and a core 
degeneration in key Islamic concepts followed. The creeds of “Wala” and “Bara” 
(Alliance and enmity for the sake of Islam) and Jihad were abandoned, and the Muslims 
suffered from decline thence on” (Azan, Issue 2:37). IS places the concept of “Wala” 
and “Bara” at the centre in their construction of the ideological mindset. At one point 
the organisation feared that “[t]he sincere mujāhidīn knew all along that it was neither 
the drones of the crusaders nor their modern high- tech weaponry that could harm them, 
but it was the gradual and discreet decline of walā’ and barā’ within the hearts that 
could deal the greatest injury to the cause of jihād” (Dabiq, Issue 12:39). IS follows 
AQ in the conceptualisation of the concept and constructs that “a Muslim’s loyalty is 
determined, not by his skin colour, his tribal affiliation, or his last name, but by his 
faith. He loves those whom Allah loves and hates those whom Allah hates. He forges 
alliances for the cause of Allah and breaks relations for the cause of Allah” (Dabiq, 
Issue 11:19).  In the following text, IS explains the concept and establishes its link with 
the principle of hate.  
“Islamic” preachers and writers often do so with humanistic undertones 
that seek to portray Islam as a religion of peace that teaches Muslims to 
coexist with all. Deluded by the open-ended concept of “tolerance,” 
they cite numerous āyāt and ahādīth that – rightfully so – serve to 
demonstrate that racial hatred has no place in Islam, but they do so for 
the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts to “Islamize” more 
“liberal” concepts that the kuffār apply across the board for achieving 
evil, such as political pluralism, freedom of religion, and acceptance of 
sodomites. In doing so, these “du’āt” seek to encourage the kāfir 
societies they live in to be more accepting of them, rather than meeting 
the enmity of the mushrikīn with hatred and disavowal. They forego the 
concept of walā’ and barā’ (loyalty and disavowal for the cause of 
Allah), not bothering to educate their readers of the Muslim’s obligation 
to reject kufr, separate himself from the kuffār, abandon their lands, 
 
16 The year 1924 is the year of the demise of Khalafah in Turkey.  
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harbour enmity and hatred towards them, and wage war against them 
until they submit to the truth (Dabiq, Issue 11:19). 
The central theme in the IS published text mentioned above promotes the theme that 
“Wala” and “Bara” should decide all relationships with the enemy. AQ constructs a 
similar theme in their Urdu magazine Hitteen in the following text.  
 
[Translation by the author] The basis of relationships for Muslims is the 
declaration of belief in God and not on one's country. While the idol of 
country orders that love or hate, friendship or enmity and internal or 
external affairs policy should be based on the interests of this idol. Islam 
has no place for nationalism. All Muslims are one Ummah. A country 
is only to allocate an identity, like a name or a tribe (Hitteen, Issue 
8:169). 
The relationships based on the idea of “Wala” and “Bara” do not take into account 
personal experience but rather the ideological pronouncements. The ideal types are 
supposed to negate all feelings experienced through personal relationships and generate 
sentiments of hate and friendship as dictated by the ideology. IS, in the following text, 
takes pride in observing such a relationship.   
If one were to have any doubt that this firm bond [of “Wala” and “Bara”] 
is upheld by the soldiers and leaders of the Islamic State, they could 
simply look to 1400 Rāfidah massacred by their fellow Iraqis and Arabs 
(…), or the countless spies dispatched to the Islamic State by the various 
nations of the world only to be executed by their fellow countrymen. 
Here in the Islamic State, all affiliations are null and void when they 
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conflict with one’s allegiance to Islam and the Muslims. So, the Syrian 
mujāhid doesn’t hesitate to trample on the Syrian flag, and the American 
mujāhid doesn’t think twice about setting fire to the “star-spangled 
banner.” The muhājirīn and ansār have recognized that their strength is 
in their unity upon tawhīd, not in any racial affiliations (Dabiq, Issue 
11:20).  
IS, in the above text, constructs a unique idea of a race that transcends all the previous 
ideas of race. This race is united in enmity and hate towards the objective enemy. One 
way to realise this race is to hate the enemy for the sake of ideology. The Islamist 
organisations encourage the ideal type character to commit heinous crimes against 
their own people so that the ideology triumphs. AQ also constructs a similar message 
and asserts that (an ideological understanding of) Islam “is the kinship between us and 
the people (…)The American Muslim is our beloved brother, and the kāfir Arab is our 
despised enemy even if he and we were to have shared the same womb” (Dabiq, Issue 
11:20). In the Urdu language magazine, Hitteen, AQ condemns all relationships (not 
based on “Wala” and “Bara”) as divisive and evil.  
 
[Translation by the author] Initially we were badly butchered through 
nationalism; then we were divided based on geography; then tribal 
claims divided us; this way these pejorative loyalties sucked every drop 
of blood from our bodies (Hitteen, Issue 1:52).  
IS admonishes their fellow Muslims for violating the ideological principle of loyalty 
and enmity. They highlight that certain Muslim societies do not adhere to this principle 
and complain that “[t]he Arab Iraqi Christian is their brother who has all rights whereas 
the Indian or Turkish Muslim has no rights” (Dabiq, Issue 8: 8). AQ takes it to further 
extreme and delegitimises all established rights of the native people, and decrees that 
“Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah’s. The 
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state is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims” (Dabiq, 
Issue 11:20). The term ‘wala’ is not used only for loyalty to Islamists but is also used 
for anyone who feels any sympathy towards the enemy. Anyone harbouring sympathy 
towards the objective enemy is considered practising ‘wala’ towards ‘them’ and, 
therefore, considered one of ‘them’. IS, in the following text, forewarns Muslims to 
avoid such gestures.     
Wala and bara are two of the principles of Islam according to ijma’ 
(consensus), and they are from the testimony of “La ilaha illallah.” A 
Muslim is not called a Muslim until he disavows kufr and its people, 
even if they are his closest relatives (…) So know that having wala for 
the Kuffar is not only through aiding them and supporting them against 
the Muslims. Rather, simply harbouring love and affection for them and 
approving of them are examples of wala (Rumiyah, Issue 6:22). 
IS imagines that the West is working against the concept of “Wala” and “Bara” through 
a well-planned system of education that dissuades the younger Muslim generation from 
“a fundamental cornerstone of Islam”. They argue: 
Children attending the schools of the kuffār are first introduced to the 
kufrī concept of nationalism, whereby they are required to stand for the 
national anthem, and in places such as America, pledge allegiance to 
some national symbol such as the flag, or recite nationalistic slogans, or 
pledge allegiance to a tāghūt king or president, as is the case with the 
lands ruled by murtadd nationalist tawāghīt. The point is to indoctrinate 
them into the system as early as possible by beating into their heads that 
their loyalty, first and foremost, is to the nation or to their race, not to 
the people of Islam, not to their religion, not even to Allah! This runs 
contrary to walā’ and barā’, a fundamental cornerstone of Islam (Dabiq, 
Issue 12: 34).  
IS appears to be very sensitive to the theme of “Wala” and “Bara” and notes that “[a]fter 
initiating the destruction of their walā’ and barā’, the schools of kufr then introduce 
children to their open-ended concept of ‘tolerance’ beginning at a young age. They 
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teach them to tolerate and respect other religions” (Dabiq, Issue 12:34). Rejection and 
hatred of everything that is associated with the objective enemy are built into the idea 
of “Wala” and “Bara”. IS states that taking part in the “Kuffar” festivals such as 
“Christmas, Halloween, and Easter (…)dress up, paint their faces, sing songs, attend 
parties, exchange gifts, and take part in school plays held for these various occasions” 
(Dabiq, Issue: 12 34) are all against the idea of “Wala” and “Bara”. AQ agrees with 
the IS constructed mindset on “Wala” and “Bara”. They criticise the Western efforts of 
weakening “Wala” and “Bara” through the education system. “Instead of the core creed 
of “Wala” and “Bara” (i.e. a Muslim is an ally to his Muslim and an enemy to the 
Kafir), the new education system preached the lie of the philosophers: ‘All human 
beings are equal regardless of religion; friendship and enmity on the basis of religion 
is a thing of the past’”(Azan, Issue 2:40). AQ links their understanding of the term to 
the Quran. They translate from the Quran as saying, “[w]hat is the matter with you? 
How judge you? Or have you a Book through which you learn? That you shall have all 
that you choose? [68:5-38]” (Azan, Issue 2:40). AQ suggests a different education 
system for Muslim children with its focus on the objective enemy, namely Western 
civilisation.  
The reality is that there needs to be a completely new education 
system… a system that recognizes the core creed of Tawheed 
(monotheism), ‘wala and bara’ (Alliance and enmity upon belief in 
Allah, his Prophet and his religion), Ihsan/Tazkiya (Spirituality) and 
Jihad– the four absent avenues in the world of today that work against 
the new world order and actualize the dynamic reality of Islam. The 
system must be free from any and all association to Western civilization. 
Rather, it should consider it as a firm enemy (Azan, Issue 2: 41). 
The theme of “Wala” and “Bara” is central to the ideological mindset constructed by 
the three Islamist organisations. IS complains that a sister Islamist organisation, namely 
TT should not have resisted IS expansion in Afghanistan as they (IS) pronounced that 
they are following “Wala” and “Bara”. IS argues that Taliban “waged war against the 
Khilāfah that ruled by the Sharī’ah and that practised walā and barā while their Taliban 
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‘emirate’ forcefully resisted the clear-cut and definite obligations of walā and barā” 
(Dabiq, Issue 11:4). It shows the acceptance of the centrality of the concept of “Wala” 
and “Bara” by Islamists, as mere pronouncement is considered enough to win an 
argument in a political debate. TT, in the following text, tries to convince the local 
Muslim population that in no way they are harming their interests (which is wala), 
rather, they are fighting against the objective enemy.   
 
[Translation by the author] God forbid the war is not against Afghans. 
Taliban takes the position that Crusaders have taken over our country. 
And according to the Islamic instructions when a Kaffir country attacks 
a Muslim country Jihad becomes obligatory for inhabitants of the 
country. Taliban, under the same logic, giving blood in a Jihad against 
the American aggression. Their Jihad is not against Afghanistan or 
Afghans in any manner (Shariat, Issue 63: 36). 
7.7 The Objective Enemy is Independent of Subjective Behaviour. In the 
ideological mindset, subjective behaviour displayed by the enemy on account of fear 
or any other motive has nothing to do with their ideology determined status of being an 
enemy.  It is the superhuman sourced law, which has declared certain people as 
objective enemies. AQ, in the following Urdu text, claim that they do not accept or 
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reject anything at their own; rather, the superhuman sourced law dictates everything 
for them. They say,  
 
[Translation by the author] We neither forbid nor permit something for 
someone. We only ask that accept whatever God permits or forbids. 
(Hitteen, Issue 8:153). 
Islamists think that historically Muslims had been acting upon the advice mentioned 
above in the text. Therefore, most Muslim campaigns against non-Muslims were 
unprovoked and launched to fulfil the objectives of the Divine Law. In the following 
text, AQ reiterates its stand that the chief purpose of the past Muslim campaigns was 
divinely ordained.  
The wars with the Persian and Roman Empires were unprovoked and 
were for the prime purpose of spreading the truth to humanity. The 
Muslim messenger to the Persian leader said: “Allah has sent us to 
deliver the servants of Allah out of servitude of one another into the 
service of Allah, and out of the narrowness of this world into the 
vastness of both this world and the afterlife and out of the oppression of 
religions into the justice of Islam.” There is no conciliatory tone in this 
statement and no inclination on the part of its deliverer to live in 
“harmony” with followers of different religions. It was clear to the 
virtuous Muslims then, who had proper understanding of what their 
duties towards Allah were and who had pride in Islam, that all religions 
were false, and that all systems of government were oppressive, and that 
only Islam can salvage humanity in both this world and in the Hereafter 
(Inspire, Issue 2: 37).  
The central theme in the text quoted above propagates that if you fall within the 
category of an enemy, you shall be eliminated or humiliated sooner or later as per the 
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dictates of the ideology. The ideology defined status of an enemy is enough of a crime 
to allow its elimination. However, in the political history of Islam wherever 
“[e]xceptions were made for the Jews and the Christians (…) They were made to know 
that [they] are considered to be misguided and are destined to Hellfire. The early 
Muslims let the Jews and the Christians know this in the clearest and most 
unambiguous manner. They did this out of the concern and care for them” (Inspire, 
Issue 2: 38).  
AQ cites examples where the enemy has no other crime but the crime of being in the 
category of the objective enemy.  
Regarding their statement: “It is not legitimate to declare war because 
of differences in religion, or in search of spoils of war.” This statement 
is false. The pagans of Arabia were fought because they were pagans, 
the Persians were fought because they were Zoroastrians and the 
Romans were fought because they were Christian.  
The great Muslim Sultan Mahmud Sabaktakeen fought against the 
Hindus because they were Hindus and he personally led his army in a 
risky campaign deep into the land of India with the sole objective of 
destroying the most revered idol in all of India. He was fighting because 
of this “difference of religion” our esteemed scholars are discounting. 
Allah says: {And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the 
religion, all of it, is for Allah} [al- Anfāl: 39]. The Messenger of Allah 
said: “I was instructed to fight humanity until they testify that there is 
no one worthy of worship except Allah” (Inspire, Issue 2: 38). 




[Translation by the author] It is a factual truth that it was the killings 
and a display of sword that the polytheists, who were a hindrance to the 
spread of Islam for the twenty-one years, as despite listening to the 
Quranic verses and sayings of the Prophet in Mecca, they refused to 
accept [the message]. But when they watched Muhammad entering in 
Mecca with the ten thousand companions, they dispelled their disbelief 
and entered in Islam in droves (Hitteen, Issue 4:28). 
 
[Translation by the author] [Continue with the killings until] “all false 
religions are subjugated; either all their followers are killed, or they 
leave their religion in fear” (Hitteen, Issue 4:32).  
TT follows the other two organisations ( AQ and IS ) in the construction of the theme 
that it was sword drawn against the objective enemy, which turned the tide against the 




[Translation by the author] Except one odd battle all the battles that 
were fought by the Prophet or his companions after him, were offensive. 
The need for a defensive Jihad was never felt; this was the case until 
Muslims became weak, which encouraged the enemies to attack. Watch 
out; it is the Qadiani version of Jihad, which is being presented under 
cover of Ghamdian thought. These sorcerers are serving Dajjal by 
eliminating the love of Jihad from peoples’ hearts. Keep clear of such 
fraudsters. It is only the faith that keeps one connected to God, if one 
were to lose it, what else is left with oneself ? (Shariat, Issue 63:23). 
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AQ, in the texts mentioned above, constructs two themes. Firstly, the theme that the 
main reason for the past wars waged by Muslim rulers was religious (ideological). The 
enemy had not committed any crime except that they were declared as ‘others’ by the 
prevalent Islamist ideology. Secondly, the theme that countries can be invaded just for 
the sake of the spoils of war. The nomination of the enemy by the ideology in itself is 
sufficient for such invasion. A defined and dehumanised enemy is at the mercy of 
Islamists for any treatment. AQ further continues with the themes.       
Fighting fisabilillāh can also be for the objective of spoils of war. Most 
of the dispatches that the Messenger of Allah sent from Madinah were 
in search of spoils of war. Badr itself was an expedition headed by 
Muhammad himself in pursuit of a caravan of goods belonging to the 
Quraish. In fact, the classical scholar Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali states that 
the purest and best form of sustenance for the believer is that of 
ghanīmah (spoils of war) because it was the source of living Allah has 
chosen for His most beloved of creation, Muhammad. The Messenger 
of Allah said: “My sustenance was made to be under my spear” 
Throughout our early history, the greatest source of income for the 
Muslim treasury was through the revenue generated from fighting 
fisabīlillāh. Spoils of war, jizyah (a tax taken from the Jews and 
Christians), and kharaj (a land toll taken from conquered land) 
represented the most important sources of income Islamic treasury 
(Inspire, Issue 2: 38).  
The discursive character constructed by the organisations is supposed to be ever ready 
to plunder, humiliate or eliminate the objective enemy. So, if you are declared an enemy 
by the ideology, you do not have much choice. If your life is spared, you must agree 
for a much humiliated and politically inactive life, or else you convert to the Islamist 
ideology. The ideological mindset actively seeks the objective enemy, as elimination of 
this enemy is essential for the advancement of the cause of the ideology. In their 
endeavour to advance the movement of superhuman sourced law, ideologues should 
remove all contradictions in the way of ideological rule and achieve consistency in all 
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their claims. The ideological mindset either rejects or reinterprets all fact associated 
with perceived factual reality for the sake of ideological consistency. The next chapter 
shall deal with the fifth and the last element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, 
namely ‘Rejection of Factual Reality’.  
7.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I analysed the texts published by Islamists in their magazines to detect 
the themes associated with the fourth element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, 
namely the objective enemy. The aim was to ascertain whether this element is part of 
the character’s mindset that is discursively constructed by the three Islamist 
organisations in their magazines. I started by separating the symptomatic and 
exemplary texts from the magazines that carried the theme of an enemy. I then reread 
these texts along with the Arendtian theorisation of the theme of the objective enemy. 
By applying the Arendtian criteria of ideology, I generated six subthemes, which 
formed the paragraph headings in this chapter. I then quoted texts and analysed these 
according to the thematic instances of the subthemes.  
I noted that the Islamists construct a character in their magazines that believes in an 
objective enemy, which is defined by the ideology. Islamists claim that they have no 
role in its determination as it is the enemy defined by the Divine Law. The ideal type 
character is supposed to point, dehumanise and eliminate this enemy so that Divine 
Law takes its own course. The ideological action against the enemy may commence 
with different levels of disavowal. Disavowal of the enemy should not only be 
pronounced but demonstrated through empirical actions.  
My analysis of the texts reveals that, for the ideological mindset, the fundamental 
principle of relationship with the objective enemy is hate. The sentiment of hate should 
be central to all the relationships with the objective enemy. The objective enemy should 
not be allowed to escape hate. The alternative of hate is either the elimination or 
assimilation into the Islamists’ imagined ideological world. The texts affiliated with 
AQ and IS complement each other in the construction of the objective enemy. I do not 
note any difference between these two organisations in all the subthemes associated 
with the objective enemy. TT, however, is less forceful in the construction of the 
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objective enemy. It may be due to the reason that TT has a well-defined enemy in the 
shape of US-led coalition forces; therefore, they may need less ideological abstraction. 
Nevertheless, TT does construct an objective enemy, but the language that constructs it 
is more nationalistic in its themes. Yet, TT constructed mindset is similar in its 
fundamental themes. Given the circumstances, it can switch seamlessly to an AQ or IS 
constructed mindset. It is the same ideological mindset operating in different 
circumstances.          
The discursive constructions by all the three Islamist organisations convey the theme 
that they are in an eternal conflict. In this fight against the eternal enemy, the Islamic 
idea of “Wala” and “Bara” should guide all the relationships. “Wala” and “Bara” are 
the relationships dictated by the superhuman sourced law. The ideological law 
objectively lays down an ideological criterion of relationships amongst humans. The 
relationships of “Wala” and “Bara” are independent of all personal experience. As the 
real human experience is divorced from the conceptualisation of the objective enemy, 
it is not allowed to interpret factual reality as well. The ideological mindset rejects the 
experience gained through the five senses if it is inconsistent with the ideology. The 
next chapter deals with the fifth element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, namely 












Chapter 8: Rejection of Factual Reality 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This is the last of the analysis chapters in which I approach my empirical material to 
ascertain whether the fifth element of the Arendtian ideological mindset, ‘Rejection of 
Factual Reality’ is present in the mindset of the discursively constructed character.  
Factual reality means the reality of facts as understood by the five senses in humans. I 
follow the same method as in previous chapters to separate and then analyse the 
symptomatic and exemplary texts from the magazines. I read the separated exemplary 
texts along with the Arendtian theorisations on the fifth element of ideological mindset. 
I generate four subthemes that are associated with the chapter theme, i.e. rejection of 
factual reality. The subthemes form the paragraph headings.  
The factual reality, in the Islamists’ constructions, is predestined. Nothing is happening 
at its own but originates in and guided by the first cause, i.e. God.  At its core, the idea 
suggests a mindset that believes all the present or the future events, including one’s life 
span, are minutely written and preserved with God. Conceptually, therefore, the reality 
is a mere formal display of already decided facts. Man is a mere actor without any 
control over the events.  This actor has been tasked by the Divine Law to act in 
accordance with the ideology. Life does not have meaning in its own right but is just 
an expression of Divine Law. The Divine Law has its own principles of movement.  
Arendt theorises that ideology transforms the mindset of an ideal type of an ideologue 
in a manner that the character conceives factual reality through a super sense. The 
ideological mindset subjects a knowledge claim realised through the five senses to an 
additional ideological check. The facts that conform to the fictitious ideological world 
are accepted, and rest are either rejected or reinterpreted. Rejection, reinterpretation or 
acceptance of facts becomes an exercise in imagination guided by ideology. The 
character type while interpreting the facts looks for the ideological consistency in their 
observations, even at the cost of the factual reality of the observations.    
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Rejection of factual reality by the ideal type, however, takes many forms. It is quite a 
complex exercise to tease out all the categories of this element of the ideological 
mindset from the texts in the magazines. I speculate that this element might be more 
observable in the visual expressions, namely photos and movies produced by Islamists. 
Nevertheless, I cite, quote and analyse the texts, as per my adopted method, i.e., to 
detect and conceptualise the thematic expressions of the element from the written texts.  
The texts in the magazines construct a character that is supposed to believe that human 
life is temporary, superficial and created for the express purposes of a higher law. 
Human life has a fixed end date, which corresponds to a divine script. Factual reality 
is merely an expression of Divine Law. Therefore, in our interpretations, facts must 
conform to the Divine Law. Any contrary observation means there is a fault in our 
interpretations of the facts. Sometimes the factual reality has deeper and hidden 
meaning, which may be concealed by the conspiring minds. The ideologue, however, 
is equipped with the instrument of ideology to decipher the true nature of hidden facts. 
It is, therefore, legitimate for the ideological mindset to twist facts so that it can realise 
an imagined consistency. The Arendtian ideological mindset shows its true potential 
once ideological movements assume power; as in power, they manage to operationalise 
their mindset maximally and try to transform the factual reality to match their 
ideological claims.   
8.2 Rejection of Human Life 
Human life, for an ideological mindset, is superficial. It is bereft of any meaning in its 
own right but is created for the sake of the historical movement of Divine Law. Its 
purpose and meaning can only be understood in the context of eternal law. Human life 
is merely a part of a gigantic process moved by eternal laws. The ideological mindset 
is “historical, concerned with becoming and perishing” (Arendt, 1958: 469). The 
discursive constructions by Islamists in the magazines express such themes through 
their texts. The human life on earth, for them, is superfluous and temporary. AQ 
announces that “this life of the world is only amusement and play! Verily, the home of 
the Hereafter, that is the life indeed, if they but knew [29:64]” (Azan, Issue 2: 13). 
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Another text in the AQ published Azan magazine further elaborates the theme 
mentioned above as follows.    
Realize that the purpose of our life is not eating, sleeping, engaging in 
luxury or apparent progress. Rather, we have come into this world for a 
specific purpose, for a limited time, so that it is clear who does good and 
who indulges in evil. The real and eternal life is that of the Hereafter, 
and it is the best life (Azan, Issue 6:37).  
The above mentioned AQ construction assigns a specific purpose to the temporary life. 
But this purpose does not originate in human thinking; rather, it originates in a 
superhuman sourced Divine Law. The Divine Law is moving according to a gigantic 
historical process; human life is just a part of this movement. The Divine Law is in 
constant operation to judge human life according to a preordained scale. The scale has 
patterns of good behaviour and evil behaviour. As this life is temporary, it should not 
be wasted in fulfilling human needs like “eating, sleeping, engaging in luxury or 
apparent progress” (Azan, Issue 6:37). In contrast to this temporary life, this mindset 
imagines an eternal and real-life that shall start after death. The theme of temporariness 
and superfluousness of this life is repeated in the same magazines. Such a theme frees 
men “from wasting their efforts in going after the limited goods of this deceptive life; 
rather, it broadens their horizons by explaining to them that this life is merely a stepping 
stone for the coming eternal afterlife when every one shall be held accountable before 
Allah” (Azan, Issue 1:10). AQ constructs the themes of temporariness and 
superfluousness of this life with a purpose, namely, the rejection of the existing human 
life. Such a rejection decouples a character from the materialistic pursuits they are 
engaged in the world. This mindset thinks that it is a wastage of effort to engage in 
worldly affairs.  
The Islamists, in their texts, construct an ideological mindset where existing human life 
is considered temporary, worthless and deceptive. Human life in this world as such is 
not real and is created for a different divine purpose. The character is encouraged to 
consider this life as part of a gigantic movement of the historic superhuman sourced 
law. If the character moves in sync with the Divine Law, they shall win eternal life in 
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the bargain. AQ uses two distinct terms to express the themes related to the 
temporariness of ‘this’ life and the eternity of ‘that’ life. The term “Dunya” stands for 
the worldly life, and “Akhira” stands for eternal life (Azan, Issue 2:77). The texts 
suggest that the human life of “Dunya” should be rejected while the life of “Akhira” 
should be desired. AQ further elaborates on the themes of “Dunya” and ‘Akhria’ in the 
following text. 
How long will you live in ākhira? Infinity. Now if we want to make a 
ratio of dunyā to ākhira, what do you do to make a ratio? You divide 
dunyā on ākhira. So 114 divided by infinity, what's the answer? Math 
tells us that it's zero. Nothing. There isn't even a ratio! But Rasūlullāh 
was more generous than that. He said, "if this world was worth the wing 
of a mosquito…" but then you can notice that Rasūlullāh said one wing 
so the mosquito can't even fly! He didn't even say two wings. So dunyā 
is nothing. Worthless (Inspire, Issue 2: 64). 
The term “Dunya” and “Akhira” and the themes attached to it are similarly used in the 
texts across all the three organisations.  IS advises the character that “[t]hey should not 
incline nor adhere to the Earth” (Dabiq, Issue 11: 63). A text in the IS published Inspire 
Magazine contrasts the two terms as follows.  
Jannah [Akhira] is different from dunyā in four areas:  
1. This world is temporary and akhira is permanent. Allah says about 
dunyā: [mata `al ghuroor]. And Allah says about Jannah: {the 
afterlife is better and everlasting}. 
2. There's a difference in quantity. 
3. There's a difference in quality. 
4. Everything in dunyā is contaminated and everything in ākhira is 
pure (Inspire, Issue 2: 63). 
The theme of rejection of a temporary worldly life for an eternal one is deeply 
embedded in the mindset constructed by Islamists. In the IS construction the ideal 
character types were “not held back by the Dunyā from fulfilling their obligation to 
Allah and proved that they were ready to sacrifice what was dearest to them for the 
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sake of responding to Allah” (Dabiq, Issue 13: 3-4). AQ stretches the theme further to 
reject the political organisation of people such as democracy. They construct that 
democracy has “[t]he polytheistic principle of separating “Dunya” from Deen 
(religion)” (Azan, Issue 4:23). It is a pre-emptive move to reject any other interpretation 
of human life. The ideological mindset conceives only one (true) interpretation of the 
factual reality, i.e. the interpretation of ideology. Therefore, AQ thinks that their 
conception of Islam (ideology) “shall rule in government, politics, economics, 
societies, legislations and judiciaries. Islam is not limited to a few rituals of worship to 
be done inside some specific buildings. Hence, this false principle that separates Islam 
from human life is utter disbelief” (Azan, Issue 1:64). AQ rejects all knowledge claims 
that are not interpreted through their ideology. The Islamists construct a character that 
is supposed to treat their existence in this world as temporary and unreal.  
The theme of un-realness of “Dunya” and realness of “Akhira” is a very powerful idea. 
The idea has the potential to disengage the character from all real human emotions and 
experiences. Fear, for example, as an incentive to an evasive action is eliminated from 
this mindset. 
[Translation by the author] A Muslim is not supposed to be called a 
Muslim if he/she is afraid of anything other than God. All praise be to 
God, I am a Muslim and am not afraid of anything except the Creator 
(Hitteen, Issue 8: 30).  
The idea of un-realness of “Dunya” mitigates the emotion of fear in the ideal type 
character. How can an unreal event generate fear in a character? IS exhibits their 
understanding of fear further by narrating a story of a female in their magazine Dabiq.   
Yes, she was afraid of him for herself because she knew he was a 
criminal! She knew that he was upon falsehood, but fear prevented her 
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from saving herself in the dunyā and the Hereafter! What kind of fear is 
this that might make you lose your Hereafter? What kind of fear is this 
that makes you remain with a man that has enmity towards the allies of 
ar-Rahmān[Allah17]. And what kind of fear is this that keeps you remain 
under the same roof with a man who is not lawful for you, and whom 
you are not lawful for? Rather, you even give birth to his children! You 
give birth to the children of an apostate man who is a stranger for you! 
By Allah, it is obligatory for a woman to feel that the destruction of the 
entire world is easier on her than to remain in the guardianship of a man 
who is an enemy of Allah, His Messenger, and the believers (Dabiq, 
Issue 10: 45-46). 
The central theme in the text quoted above suggests that the reality (or unreality) of all 
human relationships should be assessed through ideology. IS wonders as to how fear 
can prevent a believing wife to separate from an apostate husband. The character 
should discount fear as a motive for an action or inaction. As all reality other than 
defined by the ideology is unreal, the emotions generated out of such un-reality should 
also be considered unreal.   
Apart from fear, the idea of rejection of ‘this’ unreal human life constructs another very 
strong emotion, the emotion of sacrifice. This emotion of sacrifice has a flavour of a 
bargain as well, i.e. exchanging a temporary and unreal thing with a real one. I note 
that a belief system of worthlessness and un-realness of the worldly life is linked to the 
ideal types’ readiness to sacrifice their lives. The Islamists glorify and exemplify this 
emotion of sacrifice, and also appeal to man’s rational self; a rational bargain which is 
very beneficial. IS declares that "[t]here is no person who dies and is pleased to return 
to this Dunya - whereby he has (in Jannah what is better than) Dunya and what it 
comprises - except the martyr for the favours of martyrdom he sees. He is pleased to 
return to Dunya so that he is killed again" (Inspire, Issue 13:5). Such understanding of 
un-realness of “Dunya” and realness of “Akhira” and the resultant emotions generated 
by this belief system construct the mindset of the ideal types. All three Islamist 
 
17 Translation by author 
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organisations construct such characters repeatedly in their textual expressions to 
inspire followers. AQ published Magazine Azan narrates a typical transformational 
story of an ideal type in a text. The narration is a real story of a suicide attack launched 
at the Boston Marathon on 16 Apr 2013 and was widely reported in the media. It is a 
story of two brothers who were spending a normal life. The story has three parts; in 
part one, the characters engage with the ideology and realise the un-realness of the 
factual reality of the worldly life. In part two, they interpret the factual reality through 
this newly acquired ideological mindset. In part three, the characters act in a manner 
which is consistent with the mindset. The story reads: 
Tamerlan and his brother realized that the goal of this life was not 
earning money, living in a comfortable house or organizing a large 
business. In the midst of complete darkness, they saw the light and 
realized the purpose of life for which they had been created.  
They came to realize that they had been created to worship Allah Alone, 
to serve His Cause and that this life was merely a transitory passing 
stage, a test to see which of the humans proved best indeed. They 
realized that they were to return to Allah one day Who would question 
them about what they did in this life (Azan Issue, 2:16). 
All the three organisations use similar examples as mentioned above to promote the 
theme of “Dunya” as dark and worthless as compared to “Akhira” which is full of light 
and a worthy place to live in. This theme is the first conclusion that Islamist feed into 
the mind of the character as soon as the character accepts the first premise of the 
ideology, namely, the idea of a superhuman source. This sudden change of mindset can 
be due to multiple reasons. Islamic radicalisation literature discusses different reasons 
for this change of mindset. Arendt, however, says that loneliness provides a fertile 
ground for ideological radicalisation; in loneliness, a character thinks everything to the 
worst (Arendt, 1958: 477). Islamists employ logical reasoning as a tool to link all the 
elements of the ideological mindset. In the text mentioned above the characters of the 
story, i.e. the two brothers, prepare to reject the previously held ideas about “Dunya” 
and adopt the ideological understanding of the term. They acknowledge that previously 
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they were unable to understand the true reality of “Dunya” and, hence, unable to 
understand the true purpose of this life. Through the new lens, namely the ideological 
mindset, they think they can interpret factual reality in its true perspective. The story 
continues: 
Then, realized the severe attack on the essence of Islam that the colonial 
powers of the day had engaged in. Through their new age polytheistic 
religions of secularism, democracy, nationalism, they had misguided 
entire generations of human beings. They realized, as their brothers in 
faith previously did, that the real test living in the system of today was 
to hold on to their faith. They became like those who declared defiantly 
before them that they shall only worship and obey the Law of The One 
True God.   
They saw that success in Islam was not as the West defined it but that 
true success constituted meeting Allah, The Exalted with a heart filled 
with firm faith, and a life lived in service to Him (Azan Issue, 2:17). 
The text quoted above is a typical construction common to all three organisations. The 
character is supposed to be ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of the newly 
acquired mindset. The ideal type is supposed to reject the reality of human life in 
“Dunya” and accept the reality of “Akhira”. AQ suggests to the character that “for 
Muslims, facts are what the Quran and Sunnah tell us – and our intellects only come 
after” (Azan, Issue 1: 16). The character is supposed to believe in the parallel reality.  
8.3 Parallel Factual Reality  
The Islamist organisations construct the theme of a parallel reality, which is visible 
only through the lens of ideology. AQ constructs such a theme in the following text.   
Indeed, there is more than one way of seeing the events unravelling 
around the world. There is the secular, misguided way – that disregards 
the truth of life, ignores man’s relationship with his Creator - Allah, 
overlooks the purpose of life that man was created for and restricts itself 
to empirical ignominy. And then there is the other lens – the lens of the 
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final Message of God revealed for the salvation of the entire humanity 
– the lens of Allah’s Book and His Messenger’s Sunnah – the lens of 
the one true way of life, i.e. Islam. Both the lenses produce very 
different thoughts, perspectives and world views. However, the crucial 
fact is that the latter is upon the truth while the former is upon falsehood 
(Azan, Issue 2: 13). 
In the above AQ published text, the Islamists demonstrate that they are aware of the 
two lenses through which the factual reality is conceptualised. They call the other lens 
as “empirical ignominy”. The idea of a parallel reality, therefore, is not an illusion of 
the mind but a well thought out idea by Islamists. The idea of parallel reality is linked 
to the idea of un-realness of “Dunya” and realness of “Akhira”. The construction of the 
idea of parallel reality is necessary for ideological consistency. Because, in many cases, 
the factual reality in this world is inconsistent with observed facts, the idea of parallel 
reality provides much needed ideological lens to interpret the factual reality in a manner 
that it appears consistent with the ideological claims. AQ contrasts the ensuing political 
implications as the factual reality is interpreted through the two lenses.  
The hands behind the media and those who put up such a one-sided 
picture of world events surely possess a hidden agenda. So, it is 
“terrorism” when the oppressed take revenge, “barbaric crime” when 
the invaded ones produce a backlash and “heinous, cowardly acts” when 
the opponents strike back – and it is “Enduring Freedom” or the likes 
when the Americans invade and destroy entire populations of human 
beings.  
The above world lens would have us believe that it is somehow 
America’s stamped right to invade other peoples’ lands, play mockery 
with their religion and kill masses of their populations. And if the 
oppressed stand up and act in defence then they are guilty of acts of 
“terror”. This lens would have us see that no matter how many people 
America murders in the name of a supposed “war”, the enemy is not 
supposed to even say a word in reply. If they say a word, it is called 
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“spreading terror” and if they strike back, it is called “terrorism” (Azan. 
Issue 2: 14).  
The above text elaborates the political reality as constructed by Islamists. They think 
that the non-ideological view of the events is mischievous and conspiratorial. The 
following text explains how reality appears when seen through the ideological lens. 
And this is what the other lens shows. It shows a world in which there 
is no justice – a world where a Rule of Law according to the final 
Scripture revealed to humanity – the Quran – is absent. It shows a world 
where a few corrupt families have taken reins of entire communities of 
human beings and have subjected them to ruthless man-made policies. 
It shows a world where a few corrupt people have destroyed entire 
civilizations of humanity in the name of a godless, corrupt idea (Azan, 
Issue 2: 14).  




[Translated by the author] Is it not that the enemy stealthily injects the 
poison of secularism in the syllabuses of Muslim countries? Is it not that 
the Crusade NGOs sponsor women to visit our homes to sterilise our 
women? Is it not that the West has handed over mobile phones and the 
internet to our every child and adult to spread sexuality? Is it not that 
the Crusade nations are supporting such movements in Islamic nations 
that struggle for implementation of Kufari laws? Is it not that due to the 
conspiracies of their state and privately managed secrete agencies, 
thousands of youth have to be included in the list of “missing persons”? 
Is it not that these nations support Crusader Russia to crush Islamists? 
Is it not that all these non-believer generations, on one side declare 
Palestinian Mujahideen as terrorists and on the other support Jewish 
state by delivering piles of weapons to them? Is it not that it is these 
sons of Crusades, who by declaring the blood of millions of Kashmiris 
as a waste, pat the lowly Hindus?  (Hitteen, Issue 1:4). 
 
 [Translation by the author] The question is whether the rest of one 
billion and three hundred million Muslims are not in the state of war?  
Whereas the fact is that the Crusaders have engulfed the entire Muslim 
Ummah in a social, cultural, educational and military invasion? Why is 
it so that only one man [Usama bin Laden—inserted by the author] 
along with a few thousand companions are stopping arrows of the 
enemy on their chests? (Hitteen, Issue 1:5).  
The parallel reality is not an illusion, but Islamists imagine it comprising of ‘true’ and 
concrete facts. It can only be realised through the ideological lens mentioned in the 
above-quoted texts. AQ concludes the story of the previously mentioned two brothers 
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by emphasising that “it is through this lens that Tamerlan Tsarnaev (May Allah be 
Merciful to him) and his brother Dzhokhar (May Allah Protect him) saw the world. 
They realized that they were living in a complete system that was designed to work 
against the one true faith – Islam” (Azan, Issue 2: 14). The death in parallel reality has 
a different meaning. “[D]eath in the culture of the mujahid [means]: a transition from 
one deficient life to another perfect one, which, although he hasn’t experienced it, he 
knows by heart, through Allah’s description” (Inspire, Issue 2: 66). Another AQ 
affiliated text explains how Islamists interpret reality through their adopted lens.  
 
[Translation by the author] Should a Muslim whose first Kaaba is 
captured by Jews, whose land of the religious centres of Mecca and 
Medina is captured by millions of Crusader militaries, who can see ruins 
of Lebanon, Fallujah's desecrated Mosques, Palestinian and Iraqi 
children's’ severed dead bodies; and a Muslim who is in knowledge of 
the rapes of Muslim women in the jails of Kashmir and Abu-Ghraib; a 
Muslim who is aware of the blasphemy committed against their beloved 
Prophet, whose holy book  was deliberately burnt and swept into 
sewerage; so if he does not imagine himself in a state of war now when 
shall he feel so? (Hitteen, Issue 1: 5).  
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The interpretations mentioned above of the factual reality seen through the Islamists’ 
lens appear as the inconsistencies of the Divine Law ordained scheme of things to the 
ideological mindset. The ideal type must act and refabricate the Divine Law consistent 
reality. Divine Law is oblivious of humanmade laws; therefore, the character is 
supposed to reject all facts that are inconsistent with ideology. A Divine Law compliant 
factual reality should appear as follows.   
The earth belongs to Allah and the Kuffar have no right to place even a 
single line on any map to dare demarcate boundaries for anyone. The 
borders that they have sketched are false. They do not have any reality. 
The reality for the Muslims is first and foremost what the Divine Law 
has ordained, and the Law of Allah does not sanction these divides. 
Therefore, these map lines and fake borders are worthy of trampling 
beneath the feet (Azan, Issue 3:29).  
The ideology consistent factual reality imagined by AQ has many benefits for humans. 
Islamists claim that experience tells them that ideological rule generates human 
prosperity. In the following text, AQ claims that if the affairs are run as per their 
ideology, the existing conditions of factual reality shall change to very favourable.    
The details of the first (general) benefit is that experience tells us that 
the justice of the Government, the trustworthiness of the people in 
charge of affairs, generosity of the wealthy, and goodness and sincerity 
of the common  folk  collectively  result  in  the  descent of blessings 
from the sky. The rains fall at their proper times, the growth becomes 
aplenty, the fields yield good crops, trade flourishes, trading goods are 
transported easily, calamities are annulled, economy gets developed, 
people of trade and skill are produced in great numbers, the religion of 
truth gains in strength, pious rulers emerge and their kingdoms stretch 
to the adjacent lands, the militaries of the righteous rule strengthen 
(Azan, Issue 4:71).  
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The idea of parallel reality informs the actions of the ideologues. In this reality, for the 
sake of ideological consistency, the words and ideas are understood differently than the 
common understanding of these terms.  
8.4 Conceptual Manipulation of Common Ideas 
The ideological mindset conceptualises the meaning of certain commonly used terms 
differently. This manupulation is not because of an intellectual stimulus, but these 
concepts anchor their mindset to the parallel reality. As usual, AQ takes more of the 
lead in explaining and theorising the novel conceptualisations of the words and ideas 
than the other two organisations. In the following paragraphs, I detect the themes 
attached to the term ‘peace’ by AQ. The organisation warns that “common terms and 
concepts are misused today. Words are changed from their places by the enemies of 
Islam(…) we see that those satanic hands behind this New World Order – the “Kuffar” 
of the East and the West and their agents from the so-called ‘Islamic’ countries use the 
term ‘peace’ in a completely wrong sense” (Azan, Issue 5: 24). AQ articulates that 
whenever the enemy uses the term ‘peace’ the enemy means,    
[t]o tolerate everything against Shariah, to keep silent on blasphemy – 
the insult of the Holy Prophet, to ignore the illegal (haraam) interaction 
of men and women, the presence and “legal’’ status of obscenity, 
nudity, fornication/adultery, homosexuality, etc. It is due to this misuse 
of the term peace and considering it akin to “secularism” that the 
enemies of Islam and Muslims - the Kuffar and their allies, declare their 
own selves as peaceful, peace-loving, etc. and their enemies, the 
Mujahideen of Islam as terrorists, fundamentalists, extremists, etc.! 
Submission to man-made Kufr law is considered “living as peaceful 
citizens” whereas submission to Allah (which necessitates rebellion to 
all man-made constitutions) is termed as “treason” and is punishable by 
death (Azan, Issue 5: 24-25).  
The Islamists in the text quoted above promote the theme that, if one views the term 
‘peace’ in the parallel reality, it radically changes its meaning. Peace, in that reality, 
means a rebellion against all man-made constitutions and human rights. A state of 
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anarchy is named as ‘peace’ in the parallel reality. “In short, leaving Amr Bil Ma’aroof 
Wa Nahi Unil Munkir (Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) a fundamental 
obligation of this Ummah is peace to them while, on the other hand, performing this 
act of worship is terrorism” (Azan, Issue 5: 24). AQ admonishes the people who “say 
that ‘Islam is a religion of love and peace!’ They say a correct thing but what they 
imply from it is a falsehood. If they know real peace, at an individual level as well as 
at the collective level, they will rebel” (Azan, Issue 5: 24). The ‘peace’ “can only come 
through the implementation of Shariah and Shariah can only come through the 
Prophetic method, Jihad” (Azan, Issue 5: 24-25). The only purpose of man’s creation 
is worship. “Living under any other system, he cannot peacefully strive to achieve the 
purpose of his creation” (Azan, Issue 5: 24). In the Islamists’ conception, ‘peace’ cannot 
be achieved through peaceful means. “Kuffar, as long as they do not accept the Truth, 
Islam, can never have peace of heart and mind at the individual level” (Azan, Issue 5: 
24). AQ articulates,  
[s]o, our Dawah of the implementation of the Law of Allah (Shariah) 
on the land of Allah is that of real peace while those who call for any 
other system and claim to be ‘peacekeepers’ or ‘Blue Helmets’ are in 
clear error and their Dawah is full of dajl (deception) and ambiguity. 
These desire-worshippers are misguided themselves and are misguiding 
others to a deceptive, unclear ‘peace’ and then Eternal Hellfire with 
them. They are a good example to learn what happens when humanity 
puts Allah and the Divine guidance from Him (The Holy Quran) behind 
their backs and attempts to define and discuss peace (or any other term 
for that matter) (Azan, Issue 5:25).  
There does not appear to be any ambiguity in the mindset of the ideal type character 
constructed by AQ as far as the understanding of the term peace is concerned. Peace 
for them essentially means following the superhuman sourced Divine Law. They warn,  
[t]ake note! We absolutely reject any concept of peace without the 
implementation of Shariah. We call for the peace which Shariah has 
brought forth for us; which gives man the protection of life, property, 
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Deen, intellect, respect, and lineage;  not that peace which has been 
taken from the Charter  of  the  (Kufr)  United  Nations,  which  is even 
unclear about the answers to the very basic questions of human life! 
(Azan, Issue 5: 25). 
AQ asserts that “[t]hose who believe that if people do not rebel against their man-made 
systems (like democracy etc.) and, willingly or unwillingly, accept living under them, 
then peace will come, are wrong (…) one day or the other, to achieve real peace (…) 
they  will rebel” (Azan, Issue 5: 25). The Islamist organisations not only conceptualise 
the meaning of the certain commonly used term differently but also twist facts to 
achieve the imagined ideological consistency.    
8.5 Facts Twisted for the Sake of Imagined Consistency   
The ideological mindset neither believes in the reality of their experience nor their eyes 
and ears, but only in their imagination. Such imagination is lured by anything which is 
consistent with ideology. They are not convinced by the facts—whether true or 
invented—but the consistency of the system. AQ twists the facts to show that the 
deviant Islamic rulers—the enemies of the ideology—lived such a wasteful life that 
they qualified themselves for the elimination. AQ narrates that “the Saudi prince Faisal 
bin Fahd managed to lose 10 trillion dollars on one gambling table. His heart stopped 
working as a result of this he henceforth died” (Azan, Issue 1:53). They further twist 
the facts to frame the West—an enemy declared by the ideology—as performing the 
acts of an ideological enemy. They estimate that “the price for 1 barrel of petrol with 
its extracted material should be at least $260 per barrel. However, the reality is that in 
our whole history, the price for one barrel of petrol has never exceeded $45 per barrel!  
Most of the time, the price per barrel fluctuates to sometimes even to $10!” (Azan, Issue 
1:53). In another construction in the Urdu Magazine Hitteen, AQ states,  
[Translation by the author] For the West the Crusader, even a Muslim 
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who orders a Lemon Soda instead of a Pepsi in a restaurant, is a terrorist 
(Hitteen, Issue 1:13).  
Due to the Islamist construction of ideology-consistent reality, they need to twist the 
factual to the limits. It is not only the facts associated with the enemy that area twisted 
but an ideology compliant condition of the Muslim Ummah is also constructed. This 
construction, to a non-ideological mindset, may appear a figment of imagination but 
for the ideological mindset, it is the factual reality. They plan and act according to this 
reality.  In the following text, AQ constructs an ideology consistent factual reality.   
All Muslims have a share in the wealth of the Ummah. Every one of us 
knows that the political teachings of our religion advocate that the whole 
Muslim Ummah is one Ummah. The responsibility for the protection of 
its interests is one. The whole Ummah is like one body. The honour, 
assets  and capital of this Ummah are supposed to be the ownership of 
all Muslims. The wealth and capital of the Muslim Ummah is not the 
property of a specific group of individuals. Rather, these belong to all 
Muslims (Azan, Issue 1:53).  
AQ further argues that that “[t]hese lines have only been drawn by the Kuffar to 
separate the Muslims and are not more than a few 100 or 150 years old (Azan, Issue 3: 
28). IS imagines that “the Jews and Christians fight the Muslims for their religion and 
that the more one is fought by them for his religion, the closer he is to the path of the 
Prophet” (Dabiq, Issue 4:43). Islamists stretch their imagination to poetic levels and 
construct certain abstraction. These abstractions are very carefully constructed to 
maintain the consistency of the argument. The ideological mindset, for the ideological 
realisation of reality, learns to draw abstract logical deductions from the first premise 
of the ideology. In the following text, AQ equates war with wind and then draws 
abstract logical deductions from this first premise.   
This war is like wind. It pushes clouds, resulting into rain, filling valleys 
and mountain passes. Lands become wet, grass begin to sprout. Water 
ways may add onto one another causing floods, or can form a torrent 
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washing the tyrants and their najis from the face of the earth (Inspire, 
Issue 11:15).        
IS also realises the factual reality in a similar construct.  A text in the IS published 
magazine Rumiyah constructs this reality as follows.  
On the margins of European jahiliyyah, which conceals its disgusting 
reality beneath a glittering veil of lies and claims, such as happiness, 
security and equality, amongst other false slogans, a wide spectrum of 
jahiliyyah practices emerged which feed off the rotten milk of jahiliyyah 
Europe – rotten milk with which it poisons its children and raises them 
to become deformed versions of the mushrik and atheist monsters of 
Europe. But whosoever Allah wills guidance, the entire earth couldn’t 
prevent that from him (Rumiyah 11:44). 
This ideological journey in imagination twists the meaning of certain ideas and 
instructions in a manner that those become consistent with the ideology. For example, 
in the following text, AQ attributes ideology consistent meaning to an otherwise simple 
instruction in the Quran.      
Allāh says: (O you who believe! Respond to the call of Allāh and His 
Messenger when they call you to what will give you life) [al- Anfāl: 24]. 
Imām al-Qurtubī states that this verse is referring to jihād. It is jihād that 
gives this nation life. We survive through jihād and perish without it. 
Our history is a testimony to that (Inspire, Issue 1: 2).  
This mindset also twists facts to the extent that those can be categorised as 
phenomenally untrue claims. For example, AQ narrates that “Palestine was lost when 
the Khilafah fell” (Azan, Issue 5: 12). Historically, Khilafah fell after World War 1 and 







This is the last of the analysis chapters, in which I analysed the fifth element of the 
Arendtian ideological mindset, the rejection of factual reality. Following the previous 
practice, I detected, separated and analysed the exemplary and symptomatic texts from 
the magazines published by three Islamist organisations. The purpose was to ascertain 
whether the discursively constructed ideal type in the empirical material exhibits all 
the five Arendtian elements of the ideological mindset, and if so, what is the nature and 
extent of the ideas that contribute towards its construction? 
I noted that the fifth element of the ideological mindset is part of the discursively 
constructed character’s mindset. My analysis of the texts carrying the themes of the 
fifth element, however, reveals a slight variation in the construction of this element 
across the three organisations. The organisations manipulate the facts to stay consistent 
with the fictitious ideological world. They do not outrightly reject the facts as Arendt 
articulated in her theorisation. Instead, the ideal type is supposed to believe in a parallel 
reality.  
While AQ and IS used similar language as well as themes/subthemes in the 
construction of this element, there was a difference in TT linked constructions. I found 
comparatively less exemplary and symptomatic texts in the TT published magazines 
than the other two organisations. I attribute this difference to TT’s normal practice that 
they engage less with the abstract and theoretical ideas, as noted in the previous 
chapters.  
Nevertheless, all three organisations engage with the fifth Arendtian element of an 
ideological mindset. They construct an ideal type that is not supposed to value human 
existence in this world and rejects the real and concrete experiences of life. This life, 
for such a mindset, is temporary and superficial. The only purpose of this life is to help 
in the movement of the superhuman sourced Divine Law. They believe in a parallel 
reality that conforms to the Divine Law. The Islamists are aware that factual reality can 
be imagined through two lenses. One of the lenses is for ‘us’, and the other is for ‘them’. 
Each lens interprets the same facts differently. The ideological mindset constructs a 
radically different meaning to certain commonly-used concepts. ‘Peace’, for example, 
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is one such concept that is conceptualised differently than the common understanding 
of the term. The ideological mindset engages in such efforts to stay consistent with the 
ideologically imagined but otherwise absent facts of life.  The organisations twist the 





















Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis has developed a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of Islamic 
radicalisation and its central character, the Islamic ideologue. It did this by revealing 
a link between the Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset and the abstract 
character constructed by three Islamist organisations, Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State 
(IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT), in their online magazines. It applied an Arendtian 
theoretical framework to conceptualise the mindset of Islamic ideologue as an abstract 
character. Specifically, I demonstrated that the study is novel in two aspects, firstly the 
theoretical framework, and, secondly its application. 
I argued that the Arendtian theoretical framework is novel as her criteria of ideology 
(surprisingly) have not been applied by those frameworks that link ideology with 
Islamic radicalisation. This omission resulted in missing an important link with similar 
mindsets of the past, namely the thinking pattern of Communist and Nazi ideologues. 
Arendt, in her analysis of the mindset of Nazi and Communist ideologues, theorised 
five abstract elements of the ideological mindset. In Part One of the thesis, I established 
my theoretical framework and gleaned five essential elements of the Arendtian 
ideological mindset, namely: the superhuman source as origin of thought; the claim to 
global domination; violence and the call for action; the objective enemy and rejection 
of factual reality. I noted that the Arendtian theoretical framework is a right fit to 
conceptualise the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation and to construct a standard 
profile of its elusive central character that perpetuates violence. Islamic radicalisation 
research was missing the standard profile of the radical person. This was the case 
despite the fact that the research had a consensus that radicalisation is a “process”. Yet, 
beyond that consensus, other research lacked focus as to “what” the radicalisation 
process produces. I reconceptualised Islamic radicalisation as a “process” of 
acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset and argued that the 
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“process” produces an abstract character comprising the Arendtian ideological 
mindset.  
The thesis is novel in the application of the framework as well. I adopted the 
“characterological” method of inquiry to conceptualise the ideas/themes which were 
used by three Islamist organisations in their discursive construction of the character. I 
found the method, developed by Sigwart from Arendt, useful in conceptualising an 
abstract ideal type character from the discursive practices informed by ideology. The 
“characterological” approach to understand the mindset of an abstract character suited 
the research design of the thesis. I managed to navigate almost all the themes contained 
in the empirical material. Nevertheless, I understand that there is a possibility that a 
researcher with a different theoretical framework may read the texts differently. I, 
however, assert that the Arendtian theoretical framework was fully compatible with the 
method of the study and the available empirical material. I noted that a powerful 
theoretical framework such as Arendt’s needs an equally powerful method and a large 
enough sample to get meaningful findings. The Arendtian theoretical framework 
applied through a combination of “characterological” method and thematic analysis 
technique managed to detect sufficient ideas/themes from the magazines, which can 
act as a standard profile of the constructed character, i.e.  Islamic ideologue/Islamic 
radical.  
The empirical material consisting of six online magazines in two languages, covering 
a span of seven years, added to the novelty of the research. I claim this as the first study 
of Islamic radicalisation research that has researched a substantial volume of online 
magazines (in two languages) published by three Islamist organisations. In Part Two 
of the thesis, I analysed the texts and showed that the abstract character constructed by 
the three organisations through the texts in their online magazines is an ideologue as 
the discursive practices use all the five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset in 
its construction.  
I started by reading Arendt’s work on ideology, especially “The Origins of 
Totalitarianism” (1958) and gleaned five essential elements of a mindset, which 
Arendt calls ideological thinking. The five elements of the ideological mindset, which 
302 
 
are central to this thesis, are the outcome of my reading of Arendt’s work on ideology 
and totalitarianism. I read her work with the predetermined idea to focus on the 
elements of an ideological mindset. Another reader with a different positionality may 
read her work differently. Nevertheless, I found these elements very helpful in 
understanding the thinking of the central character of the Islamic radicalisation. The 
Arendtian lens can detect those elements of the character’s thinking, which otherwise 
may remain obscure in the texts.  
I, however, acknowledge that the decision to apply the Arendtian criteria of ideology 
to conceptualise Islamic radicalisation and its central character was normative. I 
considered the phenomenon as disruptive and totalitarian, which is based on a perverted 
understanding; I call the ideological understanding of Islamic texts. The Aredntain 
conception of ideology assumes the disruptive and totalitarian nature of the 
phenomenon. The application of the five Arendtian elements of the ideological mindset 
to the Islamist texts underscored the organisations’ efforts to construct a mindset that 
is totalitarian and violently disruptive.   
Nevertheless, the decision to apply the Arendtian perspective was based on certain 
plausible reasons. Firstly, my personal experiences of growing up in Muslim societies 
as a Muslim helped me to make this decision. My experiences were further 
supplemented by my official engagements with the violent Islamic radicals. My official 
responsibilities included preparation of training syllabi for military officers fighting 
violent Islamic radicals in border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, 
that work was a type of fieldwork without a plausible theoretical conceptualisation of 
the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation. As I read Arendt’s work on the ideological 
mindset, my practical experience helped me to make a calculated assessment of the 
suitability of the framework for the conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Arendt’s 
articulations on ideology had certain distinctions which were not available in other 
conceptualisations of ideology.  
Firstly, Arendt employed a unique method of inquiry, namely “characterology” to 
conceptualise the characters influenced by ideology. The ideologue was one such 
character, which she realised mainly from the textual constructs of the Nazi and 
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Communist movements. Arendt reconstructed the mindset of the Nazi and Communist 
ideologues and theorised five essential elements of this mindset. Such 
operationalisation of the notion of ideology in a constructed character is missing in 
other articulations of ideology. Secondly, Arendt’s Jewish community was the target 
of Nazi ideology. This was a unique position available to Arendt to understand the 
operationalisation of an abstract concept, namely ideology in a society with the 
concrete consequences. This positionality was not available to others.  Being part of a 
victim group helps you to understand the thinking and methods of the executioner more 
clearly than being an outsider or part of a larger oppressor group.  
I consulted the existing literature to understand the conceptualisations of Islamic 
radicalisation and its central character. I found that literature broadly uses five 
frameworks to conceptualise Islamic radicalisation, namely: radicalisation as a 
“process”; to what the radicalisation “process” leads; de-radicalisation; radicalisation 
measuring scales; and theories of radicalisation. The literature on Islamic 
radicalisation had wide disagreements as to the identity of the radical. Mostly the 
research focused on the origins of the phenomenon, however, agreed that radicalisation 
is a “process”, but with a marginal focus on the outcome of the “process”. Some 
researchers constructed scales to measure the radicalisation. The radicalisation 
measuring scales did focus on the elements of the mindset of radicals but suffered from 
certain vital issues such as the absence of a theoretical framework, issues of 
methodology, the sample size and generalisations (see the literature review in Chapter 
1). 
This thesis started with the assumption that the Islamic radical is an abstract political 
person comprised of a typical mindset. This mindset is ideological in nature as it 
exhibits all the five essential Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. The three 
Islamist organisations were selected because of their outreach and impact, and the fact 
that all three have been declared as terrorist/Islamist organisations by the UN.  AQ and 
IS had Middle Eastern origins while TT is based in Afghanistan. The first two are active 
globally while TT mostly confines itself to Afghanistan and bordering areas. The 
selection was a good representative sample of the dominant narratives of the Islamist 
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organisations. In the subsequent paragraphs, I present the findings of the thesis. Firstly, 
I chart the standard profile of the ideal type of character constructed by the Islamist 
organisations in their magazines. I label my chart “The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic 
Radicals” (MILIR). I also explain how to use the MILIR, and its likely applications, 
e.g. de-radicalisation. Secondly, I present salient observations of the textual 
constructions. Thirdly, I offer suggestions for further research.  
9.2 The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals (MILIR)  
MILIR is a tool that can help categorising a mindset as ideological. Multiple factors 
can “pull” or “push” the character, as the theories of radicalisation testify (see the 
literature review under the heading “Theories of Radicalisation”), to a condition of 
thinking, which I call the ideological mindset. I detected the ideas mentioned in the 
map by applying a method developed by Sigwart based on Arendt, namely 
“characterology”. The “characterological” method of inquiry assumes that the 
participants of the discursive practices construct an ideal type and abstract character in 
their written, spoken or visual expressions. I conducted the thematic analysis of 
exemplary texts published in the magazines, namely Azan, Inspire, Dabiq, Rumiyah 
(all English), Shariat and Hitteen (both Urdu) by three Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ, 
IS and TT.  
In its present shape, the tool does not differentiate between the themes which might 
also be part of an Islamic religious mindset. This study was not designed for such a 
differentiation. It will be important for future research to prepare and compare the two 
mindsets, the Islamic ideological mindset and the Islamic religious mindset. This 
research presented the ideas that were detectable through the Arendtian theoretical 
framework from the empirical material and did not differentiate amongst the detected 
ideas/themes. The overlap is possible with other types of mindsets. This thesis confined 
itself to detecting the mindset that the Islamist organisations are constructing in their 
discursive practices. In the following chart, i.e. MILIR, I summarise all the ideas/ theme 
that I detected from the magazines and which are used by three Islamist organisations 
in their construction of the discursive character.  I claim that the standard profile of an 
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ideal type Islamic ideologue/radical comprises these ideas/themes. An explanation of 
































The linked Ideas/Themes 
















Source as the 
Origin of 
Thought 
The world is controlled by a Divine 
Law 
117-123 High High High 
Sovereignty belongs to Allah 124-133 High High High 
Divine Law is independent of 
“consensus iuris” (wider consent) 
133-140 High High High 
No separation of religion from politics 140-145 High High High 
Contempt for all types of human 
freedoms and human rights 
145-151 High High High 
Islamic radical is the real freedom 
fighter/real freedom lies in following 
the Divine Law, i.e. Sharia Law 
151-157 High High High 
Divine law is superior and at variance 
with human-made laws 
120-140 High High High 
The claim to 
Global 
Domination 
Answering ideological questions of 
historical importance 
162-169 High High Low 
Superfluousness of international 
boundaries 
169-172 High High Medium 
Interested in revival of historical 
Islamic traditions  
167 - 189 High High  High 
Contempt for the Nation-state 172-181 High High Low 
A global state led by a global leader 181-189 High High Low 
Muslim Ummah as a global 
community 
189-192 High High High 
Contempt for human diversity and 
spontaneity  
192-196 High High Low 
Violence and 
the Call for 
Action  
 
The world is divided into two 
categories, i.e. Dar-al-Islam and Dar-
al-harab 
199-203 High High Medium 
“Othering” through the language of 
metaphors: Dajjal and crusader 
203-215 High High Medium 
Perpetual action or violence 181-242 High High High 
Metaphor Kuffar 215-219 High High High 
Metaphor Taghut 219-223 High High Low 
Jihad is only violent 224-230 High High High 
Jihad shall continue forever 230-235 High High High 
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Violence as a provocation to unmask 
hypocrisy 
235-236 High Medium Low 
The action of disavowal when violence 
not possible 
236-240 High High Medium 
Jihad is obligatory 240-243 High High High 





Insulation from personal experience 246-248 High High Medium 
Hating and cutting social relations 
with disbelievers is mandatory 
248-252 High High High 
The ideologically defined enemy 252-260 High  High High 
Eternal conflict 260-266 High High High 
Ideology decides all relationships-
“Wala” and “Bara” 
266-272 High High Medium 
Enmity is independent of subjective 
behaviour 
272-278 High High Medium 
Jews and Christians can never be 
friends 
252-272 High High High 
All actions are permitted against the 
‘other’ 













Rejection of Human life/The world is 
superfluous 
281-287 High High High 
Parallel factual reality 287-293 High High Low 
Conceptual manipulation of common 
ideas 
293-295 High High Low 
Legitimate to ignore or twist facts  295-298 High High Low 
Eternal law decides who shall be an 





High High Medium 
 
 
Key to assess the emphasis of ideas /themes in an organisation’s textual 
construction   
High: The idea is central to the constructed character’s mindset. It has been very 
strongly articulated in the texts. The organisation has a clear idea of its 
operationalisation and its implications. The exemplary texts that construct the idea are 
frequent and unambiguously articulate the idea.  
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Medium: The constructed character is supposed to be aware and own the idea. The 
frequency of the material related to the idea is less than high. The organisation is 
confused about the execution of the idea in the real world.  
Low: The construction does mention the idea but in a very vague manner. The idea 
appears to have been adopted as part of some tradition. The organisation had a very 
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9.3 How to Use MILIR  
As mentioned earlier, MILIR is a conceptual tool and does not give a score of the 
ideological radicalisation. The presence of all five Arendtian elements is essential in a 
mindset to categorise it as an ideological mindset. All five elements support the 
ideological chain of logicality. MILIR, in its present shape, does not prioritise the 
themes/ideas with regards to the radicalisation and assigns equal weight to all the 38 
mentioned ideas/themes. The thematic analysis of the texts could not capture the 
prioritisation of the detected themes. At places, where the organisations appeared to be 
prioritising a theme/idea, it was for tactical reasons, and the organisations advised 
reverting to the original and rigid position as soon as possible.  
In any application of the tool, the number of detected themes/ideas may vary among 
the assessed Islamic radicals. It is possible that a character’s response may not tally up 
to the mentioned 38 themes/ideas. Such variation is normal. It may be attributed to two 
variations: the variation of exposure of the characters to the ideological information 
and the variation in articulation of that information. It is reiterated that MILIR is the 
chart of the mindset of an ideal type of an Islamic ideologue/radical desired by the 
Islamist organisations; the real representative character of the ideal type in the Muslim 
societies may exhibit variation in the number of detected themes/ideas due to the above 
mentioned factors. The five Arendtian elements, mentioned in the first column, are the 
essential elements of a mindset to be categorised as ideological.  The 38 theme/ideas, 
mentioned in the second column, are the expressions constructed by the Islamist 
organisations in their magazines to articulate the main Arendtian elements. A character 
may use different language to articulate a theme/idea linked to the main Arendtian 
element. However, a contradiction to the themes/ideas, mentioned in the second 
column (the 38 themes), is important. A contradiction shall attract a qualitative 
judgement to assess as to what extent the presence of the main Arendtian element has 
been weaken by the contradiction. More questions may be asked to assess the nature 
of the articulation. In case, in the final qualitative judgement, the contradiction is 
assessed to have neutralised the other affirmative themes linked to an Arendtian 
element, the main Arendtian element may be deemed to be absent in the mindset. As 
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per the argument of this study, the presence of all the five Arendtian elements, 
mentioned in the first column, are essential to categorise a mindset as ideological. All 
the five Arendtian elements are interlinked and together weave that toxic web of ideas, 
which radicalise the ideal type character for violence.  
The conceptual understanding of the Arendtian theoretical framework is necessary 
before an application of the tool. The tool is not independent of its theoretical 
articulations. At first glance, some ideas/themes appear religious in their language, yet 
it is the particular conceptualisation of these ideas/themes, as explained in the thesis, 
that makes them ideological. A column in the chart refers to page numbers in the thesis 
for a consultation.        
9.4 Usages of MILIR 
In any usage, MILIR cannot be separated from its theoretical foundations and the 
empirical chapters that constructed it. Therefore, it must be used as an extension of the 
thesis. MILIR is useful for the following purposes.  
9.4.1 Act as the Standard Profile of the Islamic Radical 
MILIR can fill the gap in Islamic radicalisation research by presenting the standard 
profile of the central character of the phenomenon. The standard profile of the Islamic 
radical is a conceptual construction which focuses on the mindset.  It is in line with the 
study’s central argument that the Islamic radical is an abstract political person 
comprising the Arendtian ideological mindset. The map presents the ideas/themes, 
which the Islamist organisations use to construct the discursive character.  This is the 
profile of an ideal type of an Islamic ideologue/radical, which the organisations 
discursively construct as part of their self-reflection and to attract recruits from amongst 
Muslim communities. In other words, the Islamic radicals, as well as potential recruits, 
aspire to act following this mindset. The assertion that the potential recruits try to 
follow the mindset constructed by Islamist organisations in the texts of their magazines 
is also supported by a recent terrorist incident at the London Bridge on 29 November 
2019. A Guardian newspaper report states that at one point “[t]hey were part of a group 
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that had copies of the al-Qaida English-language extremist magazine, Inspire,” in their 
possession (The Guardian, 30/11/19).   
Do the organisations suggest any overt display of the ideological mindset which sets 
them apart from common Muslims? My readings of the texts suggest that the 
organisations do not construct any unique symbols which help in distinguishing the 
ideal types from common Muslims. The textual constructions, however, advocate 
rejection of everything symbolically attached with the West. Such rejection may extend 
to Western dress codes, mannerisms and modern education systems. In its outlook, the 
constructed character should resemble an orthodox Muslim religious person. The 
character is supposed to practice Islam in its literal sense, which is influenced by the 
interpretations of Imam Ibn Tamiya.  In its routine life, the emerged character is 
supposed to be resigned from the worldly pursuits and remain focused on eternal life 
after death.  
Is there a link between the religion Islam and the standard profile of the constructed 
ideal type? My reading of the texts suggests that the character constructed by the 
organisations is supposed to be an observant Muslim in letter and spirit of the religion. 
The discursive practices legitimise all their actions from Islam. The Islamist 
organisations in their arguments are convinced that they are fighting for the revival and 
glory of Islam. They do not separate religion from politics, hence are unable to 
distinguish between political and non-political interpretations of religion. There is only 
one interpretation of factual reality; the interpretation ordained by the superhuman 
sourced Divine Law.   
9.4.2 MILIR can Inform De-radicalisation Policy  
A confused conceptualisation of the “process” of Islamic radicalisation shall lead to a 
confused counter-radicalisation policy designed to reverse the “process”. This thesis 
constructs a clear conceptualisation of the “process” of de-radicalisation derived from 
the (re)conceptualisation of the phenomenon. I conceptualise the phenomenon of 
Islamic radicalisation as follows. 
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Islamic radicalisation is a “process” of the acquisition of the Arendtian 
elements of ideological mindset. De-radicalisation is a “process” of distancing from 
the elements of the ideological mindset.   
MILIR presents those ideas/themes which the Islamist organisations use to 
operationalise the five Arendtian elements to construct the ideological mindset. MILIR, 
in conjunction with this thesis, can inform a de-radicalisation policy in the following 
areas.  
Firstly, MILIR can act as an initial assessment tool to categorise a mindset as 
ideologically affected or otherwise in the context of Islamic radicalisation. This use is 
important for two reasons: one, it can differentiate between Islamist (terrorist) linked 
ideological violence and some other phenomenon. Such categorisation can help the 
deradicalisers to be sure to proceed against a particular category of the committed 
violence. A Muslim identity may not be a priori proxy for Islamist violence. Two, the 
map has the potential to categorise non-Islamist violence such as violence committed 
by characters affiliated with other ideological movements involving racial/racist, far-
right or far-left thinking. For this assessment, the fundamental five Arendtian elements 
mentioned in the first column of the chart shall apply. Although MILIR is designed 
specifically to represent the standard profile of an Islamic ideologue, the Arendtian 
theorisations of the five elements of an ideological mindset apply to the mindsets 
influenced by other ideologies. Future research can develop a standard profile of other 
types of ideologues from the five Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset.  
Secondly, MILIR can help in the preparation of a de-radicalisation programme 
syllabus. The chart contains the ideas/themes that the Islamist organisations desire for 
the potential recruits. It is a piece of useful information for de-radicalisation 
programmes. The deradicalisers can research and include counter ideas in the courses, 
which can unsettle the arrangement of the ideas in the ideological mindset. In the 
ideological mindset, all ideas are logically deduced from the first premise of an 
ideology. A break at any level of this fatal chain of logicality can make an ideological 
mindset less certain. Uncertainty and ambiguity are the conditions the ideological 
mindset abhors; hence, it may act as the starting point of a de-radicalisation effort.  
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Thirdly, MILIR can help to mitigate a very important observation voiced by a UK 
Government counter-radicalisation strategy paper in the following words.      
Some of the government’s chosen collaborators in ‘addressing 
grievances’ of angry young Muslims are themselves at the forefront of 
stoking those grievances against British foreign policy; western social 
values; and alleged state-sanctioned ‘Islamophobia’. PVE [Preventing 
Violent Extremism—Explanation by the author] is thus underwriting 
the very Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, intolerant and anti-
western world view (Vidino, 2010). 
A governmental research team can develop a questionnaire based on the themes 
mentioned in the tool to pre-assess the levels of ideological radicalisation of the 
collaborators before their selection.  
The tool can also be used to assess the mindset of an (Islamic radical) convict before 
their conditional release from prison. This aspect has become very important in the 
wake of a recent terror attack at the London Bridge. The attacker, Usman Khan, was a 
convicted Islamic radical and was released prematurely from the prison on a license 
(The Guardian, 30/11/19). Further, “Khan was originally classed as never to be 
released unless deemed no longer a threat, but this condition was later lifted” (The 
Guardian, 30/11/19). The newspaper rightly identified that “[t]here is a flaw in the 
policy. You should have [a] substantial ideological evaluation of these individuals 
before they are released to licence” (The Guardian, 30/11/19). MILIR, precisely, is the 
ideological assessment tool that can help the decision-makers deciding whether to 
release an individual to license or otherwise.   
Fourthly, MILIR can act as a reference mindset of an ideal type of Islamic ideologue 
for Muslim societies. They can self-reflect on the ideas/themes used by Islamist 
organisations for recruitment. I think Muslim societies may not be well aware of the 
consequences of certain political and ideological interpretations of religious beliefs. 
There is, therefore, a need for debate within Muslim societies to recognise that certain 
interpretations of religious texts play an important role in the complex web of ideas 
that construct the ideological mindset. Such debate may counter radicalisation attempts 
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by certain members of the community. This suggestion, although very important, may 
generate controversy or maybe outrightly rejected by some sections of Muslim 
communities. My reading of the texts in the magazines coupled with my life long keen 
interest to understand the Islamic texts suggest that there are at least (if not more) two 
versions of the religion Islam; a cooperative Islam and a non-cooperative (and 
ideological) Islam. Both versions have enough material at their disposal to exclusively 
construct their own belief system and a typical mindset. It is also the responsibility of 
the people claiming following the cooperative Islam to distance themselves from the 
non-cooperative and ideological Islam.  This thesis can help them to conceptualise the 
mindset of non-cooperative Islam. MILIR can also help non-Muslim communities to 
understand the radical mindset as the Prime Minister, Imran Khan, of Pakistan desired 
in a recent speech at the UN. He said, “the use of ‘radical Islam’ by Western leaders 
has created an association between a whole religion and terrorism and put people in the 
position of suspecting all Muslims. How is a person in New York, in a European 
country, or in the Midwest of the US going to distinguish between who is a moderate 
Muslim and who is a radical Muslim?” (UN Speeches, October 2019). This thesis can 
help to understand the mindset of an Islamic radical. Based on this research, I can claim 
that Islamic radicals link all the justifications of their radical behaviour to Islam.     
9.5 Salient Observations about the Textual Constructions Across the 
Organisations 
The three Islamist organisations have their separate organisational structures and 
operate in different parts of the world. They publish their separate magazines to 
propagate their message. In chronological order of the establishment of the 
organisations, AQ is the oldest followed by TT and IS. I noted that some writers shifted 
from AQ to IS. At the fundamental level, however, despite their difference in the areas 
of operations and languages, all the three organisations use similar themes to construct 
the mindset of an intended ideal type character. Although I assert that all three 
organisations discursively construct the same character that comprises the Arendtian 
ideological mindset, I do note that, in places, the organisations retain a subtle 
distinction in their textual constructions. This distinction pertains to their level and 
316 
 
language of emphasis as they construct the themes. I include this aspect in the MILIR, 
where I record three levels of this emphasis through a code: high, medium and low. 
These recordings in the chart point to certain important organisational distinctions.      
Such distinctions help in drawing the overall profile of an organisation. A consistent 
‘high’ grade in the recordings signify the closeness of an organisation to the Islamist 
exemplary mindset. For example, AQ received ‘high’ grade in all the recorded ideas. 
It means the characters associated with AQ are hardcore terrorists and need special 
handling than the other two organisations. AQ affiliated radicals form the nucleus of 
the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation. It appears from the analysis of the empirical 
literature that AQ leads the path in transforming the theological argument into the 
ideological argument. The organisation frequently employs argumentative rationality 
to justify its claims. The claims extensively relate to historical Islamic theological as 
well as political literature as a rationale to justify AQ actions. The worldview of AQ 
affiliated characters is transformed completely into the mindset of an exemplary 
ideologue, as was the case with the past hardcore ideologues such as Hitler and Stalin. 
At the fundamental level of conception of abstract ideas, which govern the conduct of 
ideologues, the characters following these different ideologies are indistinguishable. 
Ideologies transform the thinking of their adherents in a manner that they all exhibit a 
thinking framework that comprises all the five Arendtian elements of ideological 
thinking.  
In any deradicalisation effort, AQ affiliated characters shall need special handling. It is 
because of their command over the argument; they pose a special risk for reverse 
radicalisation. The risk becomes acute in a scenario where the deradicalisers share the 
faith with the suspect. The ordinarily trained deradicalisers, who may try to detect the 
tendency for breach of existing positive laws, may not be able to map the full spectrum 
of dangerous ideas in the mind of an Islamist radical. Certain apparently naïve and 
ordinary claims do not breach positive laws. Yet once aligned with the web of 
ideological ideas, discussed in this thesis, the true contribution of ordinary claims 
towards ideological violence can be realised. It is, therefore, important that specially 
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trained deradicalisers who understand the significance of ideological thinking should 
be employed to engage with hardcore ideologues such as those affiliated with AQ.   
AQ is populated with convinced members and is not likely to have mercenaries in its 
ranks. The affiliation is based on strong ideological commitment and less likely to be 
based on material gains. Replacement of top leadership is comparatively less disruptive 
in AQ than the other two organisations. Such replacement, however, is likely to be 
more disruptive to an organisation which is on the other end of the spectrum namely, 
TT. TT, as it scores more ‘lows’ than the other two organisations, is likely to be less 
ideological in its mindset. There is a high chance that non-ideological or mercenary 
members are present in the ranks of TT. IS, although being more close to AQ 
ideologically, is more complex in its approach as it is likely to possess the 
characteristics of both the organisations, that is, more territorial such as TT as well as 
ideological such as AQ. A defeat of IS in one region is possible due to its territorial 
element but the organisation may re-emerge in other regions due to its strong 
ideological appeal.     
This spectrum of profiling also helps in understanding the likely relationship between 
the organisations. Although, heavy cross-fertilisation of ideas between the 
organisations have been noted, yet there is less likelihood that ‘high’ profile 
organisation, i.e. AQ shall exchange members with ‘low’ profile organisation, i.e. TT. 
This is due to a wider difference in ideological emphasis among the two organisations. 
For example, TT scored ‘low’ or ‘medium’ in many of the ideas listed in MILAR as 
compared to AQ and IS. This indicates the distance from the ideological rationality 
employed by the organisation in its construction. A mindset with high ideological 
rationality is less likely to shift to an organisation with low ideological convictions. 
Such inter-organisational transfer is more likely between AQ and IS.   
The level of ideological commitment, expressed in MILAR, helps us to understand 
that, the more an organisation is ideologically committed with these ideas, the less they 
are likely to engage in actions arising out of some political expediency of the time. 
These ideological ideas form part of the fundamental intellectual fabric of the Islamists. 
Therefore, they sincerely believe in the truthfulness of their claims and do not 
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knowingly digress from their convictions. The analysis, however, revealed that TT is 
at the far end of the ideological commitment spectrum among the three organisations, 
hence, some of TT actions may be understood through the notion of political 
expediency. It means that, due to comparatively weak ideological commitment, TT is 
more likely to respond to a political incentive than the other two organisations. In the 
following paragraphs, I discuss some specific observations about the textual 
constructions of the organisations.    
9.5.1 Al-Qaida (AQ) 
AQ, in the textual constructions, appeared to be the mother organisation that fertilised 
the other two organisations in their reasoning of the adopted ideas. AQ articulates 
maximum reasoning for the constructed themes. I easily found all the themes associated 
with the Arendtian ideological mindset in the magazines published by AQ. There was 
a perfect fit in the Arendtian articulations and AQ associated constructions. I can claim 
that AQ influenced characters are supposed to be the most consistent, elaborate and 
philosophical in their ideological reasoning compared to the other two organisations. 
They are supposed to be a true embodiment of the Islamic ideology. In this sense, such 
characters need special handling in their de-radicalisation. The customarily trained 
deradicalisers may be unsuitable for the de-radicalisation of AQ affiliated radicals, 
especially if they believe in the same religion; rather, there is a high risk of a reverse 
radicalisation, i.e. the Islamic radicals radicalising the Muslims employed to de-
radicalise them. I, therefore, suggest this category of Islamic radicals should not be kept 
in the prisons with such prisoners who share their religion.   
The texts in the AQ affiliated magazines, namely Azan, Inspire (both English) and 
Hitteen (Urdu) avoid being specific and construct most of their reasoning in abstract 
terms. The organisation’s Urdu texts in Hitteen Magazine are rich in ideological 
reasoning of their adopted ideas. Such reasoning proved very useful for this inquiry in 





9.5.2 Islamic State (IS) 
IS is second, after AQ, in the abstract construction of ideas and themes in their 
magazines, namely Dabiq and Rumiyah (both English). IS is less abstract in its textual 
constructions than AQ and prefers to quote concrete incidents and situations than 
abstract reasoning. They name their immediate enemy explicitly, yet they use all the 
metaphors and abstract terms which describe the objective nature of the ideological 
enemy. I note that as the ideological organisations start controlling an area, a mismatch 
of fictitious ideological world and ground realities becomes apparent. In such a 
situation the organisational textual rhetorical focus more on immediate conventional 
issues (of power and politics) and reserve less space for theoretical articulations. The 
theoretical reasoning becomes implicit in the actions. The organisations, however, 
continue to employ ideological language mostly borrowed from Islamic political 
history in the description of their claims. The IS-affiliated texts engage well with all 
the five elements of the Arendtian ideological mindset.       
9.5.3 Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT) 
This thesis examined the texts published in the official magazine of TT entitled Shariat. 
The texts in the Shariat magazine articulated significantly less reasoning for the 
adopted ideas/themes. TT, as an organisation appearing more as a resistance movement 
fighting to regain control of lost territory. The themes associated with the Arendtian 
elements of the ideological mindset, in some instances, were more defused in the texts 
compared to the other two organisations. I think the reason lies in the nature of the 
publication. The Shariat magazine aims at conveying the Taliban side of the story of 
the fighting in Afghanistan. The fighting has a very strong flavour of a national 
resistance movement. The magazine mostly narrates stories of battles fought between 
TT and coalition forces led by America. The themes in the texts surface once the 
organisation responds to some criticism of its actions. In contrast to the other two 
organisations that use multiple metaphors routinely to describe the objective enemy, 
TT mostly relies on one metaphor, namely “Kuffar”, for such descriptions.  
Despite the different nature of the TT publication compared to the magazines published 
by the other two organisations, I managed to detect exemplary texts that carried the 
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ideas/themes associated with the elements of Arendtian ideological mindset. I, 
however, noted a lack of texts in Shariat that engage explicitly with the fifth element 
of the ideological mindset, namely ‘Rejection of Factual Reality’. I attribute this 
deficiency of texts to the nature of the publication. Shariat Magazine allocated more 
space to narrate the stories of Taliban resistance to the international coalition forces.  
In a different publication that involves reasoning, TT is likely to articulate sufficient 
themes associated with the Arendtian fifth element. I base this argument on my reading 
of texts published in AQ affiliated magazine Hitteen. AQ publishes Hitteen in Urdu to 
cater to the same audience as that of TT published Shariat. Hitteen is full of reasoning 
and constructed the themes associated with the fifth element explicitly; therefore, I 
quoted mostly from Hitteen to compensate for the lack of texts in Shariat for the fifth 
element.  
An analysis of TT affiliated texts resulted in the conceptualisation of a similar mindset 
as of the other two organisations but operating more subtly and in a nationalistic 
context. TT has already proved during their rule over Afghanistan that, in power, they 
shall try to operationalise their fictitious ideological mindset. It was this commonality 
in the mindset between the organisations that TT refused to cooperate with the world 
against AQ after the 9/11 attacks and paid a huge cost for the retention of that mindset.     
9.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
This thesis mainly informs theoretical and academic research. I consider it an initial 
step in the (re)conceptualisation of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation and its 
central character. The thesis, in line with its adopted structure, remained loyal to the 
Arendtian theoretical framework and did not consult wider political, Islamic literature 
in its analysis. I found the Arendtian perspective, which she constructed from her 
analysis of the past totalitarian movements and their characters, suitable to 
(re)conceptualise Islamic radicalisation and its central character. Therefore, this thesis 
is the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation from the 
Arendtian perspective; another perspective may conceptualise the phenomenon 
differently. Based on my reading of the Islamist texts, I can claim that the Arendtian 
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criteria of the ideological mindset are equally applicable to the central character of 
Islamic radicalisation.  
I noted that the first four elements of the Arendtian ideological mindset (the 
superhuman source as the origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence 
and the call for action; and the objective enemy) were amply articulated in the texts, 
and I did not face any difficulty in finding and quoting the exemplary texts from the 
magazines to support my argument. I, however, noted that the Islamist textual 
constructions slightly digress from the central argument of Arendt in the fifth element, 
i.e., rejection of factual reality. The digression is not contradictory in nature but 
articulated in a different language. The Arendtian articulation of the fifth element 
emphasises the themes of phenomenal untruthfulness and ignoring such facts that are 
not useful for ideological purposes. My readings of the texts, however, could not detect 
the themes of phenomenal untruthfulness in the Islamist constructions; the Islamists, 
rather prefer to manipulate facts than to be outrightly untruthful. The organisations 
manipulate the facts and terms such as “peace” to convey an understanding which is 
ideologically consistent. They, however, do reject “worldly life” as understood by an 
atheist or non-religious mindset and believe in the idea of a ‘parallel reality’. The idea 
of ‘parallel reality’ is consistent with the Arendtian idea of “fictitious ideological 
world”.            
The findings of this research need validation from a further study that should interview 
the known (and preferably convicted) Islamic radicals through a questionnaire based 
on ideas/themes mentioned in MILIR. Such a study can assess a correlation of 
ideas/themes between the discursively constructed abstract character and the real 
representative character, based in Muslim societies. Interview-Based further research 
using the theoretical framework of this study can validate or amend the findings of this 
research.  
During the academic discussions and presentations, I encountered some inquiries that 
dealt with the “why” questions, i.e., the reasons of Islamic radicalisation. This was 
especially the case in my presentation to the UK Home Office at London, where I 
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delivered a presentation to researchers and policymakers of the Home Office. 
Therefore, I mention the areas this research is not about.  
This research does not investigate the reasons of Islamic radicalisation; rather it is 
limited to present the standard profile consisting of themes/ideas of an ideal type 
abstract character, which is constructed by the Islamist organisations through the texts 
in their online magazines. I argued that in the absence of a standard profile of the central 
character of the phenomenon, it is difficult to understand the conditions that give rise 
to the phenomenon. The ideas/themes presented by this study as the standard profile, 
however, can help in tracing back the (social, political, cultural or religious) conditions 
that aid in the acquisition of these ideas. The thesis does not focus on the ideas which 
are shared with an Islamic religious character. It separates and presents the 
ideas/themes, which are detectable through the Arendtian framework from the Islamist 
magazines and categorises the representative mindset of these ideas as an Islamic 
ideologue, and a distinct analytical category from a religious character.  
Based on this research, I identify mainly four areas for further research. First, future 
research can confirm or modify the ideas/themes mapped in MILIR employing a 
different methodology such as interviews of the known Islamic radicals (as explained 
in the above paragraph). Second, separate research can focus on finding out the reasons 
or conditions that contribute to the acquisition of the ideas/themes exhibited by the 
ideological mindset. The analysis conducted through the Aredntian theoretical lens 
gives a novel perspective to view the mindset of the Islamic radicals afresh. The 
analysis of this study is in detail and quotes Islamist texts verbatim, which is useful for 
further studies in the field. It is a contribution and might surprise some to note that 
some of the ideas of the ideological mindset are mainstream and never considered as 
disruptive or contributory to violence.   
Third, further research can focus on identifying the distinctions between two 
characters, which are conflated and contributing to the complexity of the phenomenon 
of Islamic radicalisation, namely the Islamic religious character and the Islamic 
radical character or ideologue. Such research, building an argument from this thesis, 
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shall help to isolate the central character more precisely, and hence, shall enhance the 
understanding of the phenomenon.   
Fourth, based on the ideas/themes mentioned in MILIR, another study can prepare de-
radicalisation course syllabi. This thesis contributes to useful knowledge that guides to 
a specific understanding of certain ideas which are disruptive in nature. A focused 
effort can prepare a syllabus that targets the specific understanding of these ideas. The 
discussions mentioned in the pages of this thesis is useful for training of the 
deradicalisers. This thesis along with the summary chart, should inform the UK De-
radicalisation as well as PREVENT Policy.   
Some may observe that during the course of this research, the phenomenon of Islamic 
radicalisation has already peaked citing the defeat of IS. This might be true in terms of 
military operations as on the 29th of October 2019, the head of IS, Khalifah Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, has been killed in a US military operation. However, the phenomenon of 
Islamic radicalisation is far from over as the conditions which gave rise to the 
phenomenon are neither comprehensively conceptualised nor addressed. The central, 
indistinguishable and banal character of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation 
lives seamlessly in Muslim societies, and nothing has radically changed to disrupt the 
conditions which facilitated the acquisition of the elements of the Arendtian ideological 













The Original 20-Item Religious Fundamentalism Scale 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed.  
2. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.  
3. Of all the people on this earth, one group has a special relationship with God because 
it believes the most in his revealed truths and tries the hardest to follow his laws.  
4. The long-established traditions in religion show the best way to honour and serve 
God, and should never be compromised.  
5. Religion must admit all its past failings, and adapt to modern life if it is to benefit 
humanity.  
6. When you get right down to it, there are only two kinds of people in the world: the 
Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.  
7. Different religions and philosophies have different versions of the truth, and may be 
equally right in their own way.  
8. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God.  
9. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion. 
10. No one religion is especially close to God, nor does God favor any particular group 
of believers.  
11. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.  
12. No single book of religious writings contains all the important truths about life.  
13. It is silly to think people can be divided into “the Good” and “the Evil.” Everyone 
does some good, and some bad things.  
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14. God’s true followers must remember that he requires them to constantly fight Satan 
and Satan’s allies on this earth.  
15. Parents should encourage their children to study all religions without bias, then 
make up their own minds about what to believe.  
16. There is a religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth.  
17. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no 
such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.  
18. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong.  
19. There is no body of teachings, or set of scriptures, which is completely without 
error. 

















The Revised 12-Item Religious Fundamentalism Scale 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety 
of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and 
disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement 
by blackening a bubble in SECTION 1 of the bubble sheet, according to the following 
scale:  
Blacken the bubble labelled  
–4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
 –3 if you strongly disagree with the statement.  
–2 if you moderately disagree with the statement  
–1 if you slightly disagree with the statement.  
Blacken the bubble labeled  
+1 if you slightly agree with the statement.  
+2 if you moderately agree with the statement.  
+3 if you strongly agree with the statement.  
+4 if you very strongly agree with the statement.  
If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about an item, blacken the “0" bubble. You 
may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. 
For example, you might very strongly disagree (“–4") with one idea in a statement, but 
slightly agree (“+1") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please 
combine your reactions, and write down how you feel on balance (a “–3" in this case).  
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed.  
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2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths 
about life.  
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God.  
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion. 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t 
go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given 
humanity. 
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.  
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered 
completely, literally true from beginning to end. 
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally 
true religion.  
9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no 
such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us. 
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right. 
11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or 
compromised with others’ beliefs.  
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no 
perfectly true, right religion. 
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